US Grievances with Saudi Arabia: Disentangling the Legitimate and the Spurious

[Original publication on this website, 30 July 2007. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]


The news that the United States government wishes to sell arms worth $20 billion to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states over the coming decade comes on the heels of the administration's leaked and overtly voiced complaints that Saudi Arabia has not doing enough to support the Maliki government in Iraq and other US goals in the Middle East. An attention-grabbing article in the New York Times on 26 July 2007 cited allegations of administration sources that Saudi Arabia was supporting Sunni Arab groups in Iraq against the government, as well as not failing to do enough to prevent individual Saudi fighters from entering Iraq.










These charges seemed provoked, at least in part, by King `Abdullah's reference to the US occupation of Iraq as "illegitimate"; and by Riyadh's role in brokering a short-lived peace between Fatah and Hamas. The New York Times story, in turn, followed one on 29 April 2007 that portrayed former Saudi ambassador to the US Prince Bandar b. Sultan in an unfavorable light. On 29 July, the US ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad contended in a television interview that "Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries are not doing all they can to help us in Iraq. At times, some of them are not only not helping, but they are doing things that is undermining the effort to make progress."

Following announcement of the arms sale, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert commented that Israel realizes that the US must support moderate Arab states and the sale would support Israeli interests in strengthening a common front against Iran - even though a right-wing Israeli politician voiced concerns that a change of régime in Saudi Arabia might put the weapons in hostile hands. This seemed to portend a more positive Israeli attitude towards Saudi-American relations. Admittedly, Olmert's attitude may have been tempered by the simultaneous announcement of a 25% increase in US military aid for Israel.

Not surprisingly, the usual coterie of anti-Saudi congressmen objected to the proposed sale. Their objections were based on the presence of 15 Saudis among the 19 hijackers on 11 September 2001, implying that the Saudi government played a role in the attack, and that Riyadh evinces a "tacit approval of terrorism" as well as demands that Saudi Arabia show "responsibility" for US foreign policy interests and should not reconcile Palestinian factions.

Certainly there are reasons for the United States to be disappointed with Saudi Arabia. Some of these are domestic and essentially of a moral nature - such as the treatment of women, the excessive behavior of many members of the royal family, and the situation of expatriate workers in the country. Others reflect differing priorities of national interests. By and large, the US has little reason to complain about Saudi oil policy. The rapid acceleration of oil prices - and US gasoline prices - in recent years had nothing to do with Saudi Arabia and its production levels; instead, the US was responsible in part because of rising consumption, natural catastrophes, and refinery problems.

The contention that Saudi Arabia supports terrorism is simply indefensible. This should be clearly evident after the kingdom found itself seriously threatened by the terrorist campaign of al-Qa`idah in the Arabian Peninsula against targets in 2003 and following years. If Saudi Arabia were not as conscientious in shutting down support for Islamist extremists as it should have been before 2003, it certainly has little reason to support them - or remain indifferent - now. Similarly, the idea that the kingdom is deliberately lax in preventing to Saudi extremists making their way to Iraq is surely irrational. Each Saudi who survives the trip is a potential future terrorist inside the kingdom and each Saudi who blows himself up in Iraq excites the imagination of an extremist hardcore in Saudi Arabia.

The assumption that Saudi Arabia should blindly follow the American lead on Iraq, beginning with the vagaries of the sanctions policy of the Saddam Husayn era, accelerating with the 2003 invasion, and continuing with the disintegration of Iraqi society into civil war, is - to put it mildly - naive.

Saudi Arabia has staked its present and future to an alliance with the United States for the past seven decades. That alliance - based on such factors as the dependable supply of oil to global destinations, an American security umbrella for the kingdom and allies, the American role in Saudi Arabia's development, trade, and education - is simply too crucial to jettison. Nevertheless, the appearance of occasional divergences in views between Riyadh and Washington are to be expected. Foremost among these are Arab politics and the Israel-Palestine dilemma.

To condemn Saudi Arabia for supporting terrorism because it has dealt with Hamas on a diplomatic level says more about Washington myopia than it does about Saudi reliability. To expect the kingdom to blindly support an Iraqi political construction whose capability and legitimacy erodes day by day involves a failure to understand Saudi national interests and its understandable concern that the disintegration of Iraq under the present régime may have serious knock-on effects for the kingdom. And to expect the Saudis to bankroll the American-produced mess in Iraq while Washington dictates (or, rather, dithers) policy is disingenuous. Yes, surely Riyadh can do more and approach the situation in Iraq more constructively. But, equally, so can Washington.

Expensive arms deals may provide some small measure of expanded security. They may also play a limited role in enhancing GCC defenses against potential Iranian hostility, at least in terms of deterrence. They will undoubtedly help American manufacturers financially and add to the personal coffers of certain influential Saudis. Most importantly, however, they will help cement the sometimes wobbly but fundamentally unshakeable alliance between Washington and Riyadh. Criticism between allies not only is common but should be expected and embraced. It is, however, a two-way street.

2006 Bahraini Elections Presage Little Fundamental Change

[Original publication on this website, 12 December 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Bahrain’s elections for the Majlis al-Nawwab (Council of Representatives) concluded with a second round on 2 December 2006. In short order, these were followed by appointments to a new Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), the upper house in the bicameral parliament, and the formation of a new cabinet.

The elections were notable for the participation for the first time of al-Wifaq (the National Islamic Accord Society) and Wa‘d (the National Democratic Action Society), and several other opposition parties that had also boycotted the first elections in 2002. Al-Wifaq, generally regarded as the most potent Islamist Shi‘ah party in Bahrain although it also has Sunni members, captured 17 of the council’s 40 seats. The society (political parties are technically banned in Bahrain) won in nearly every constituency in which it competed. This was not a surprise, although the overwhelming margins of victory were impressive. The society’s head, Shaykh ‘Ali Salman, won his seat with a commanding some 84% of the vote. Wa‘d, on the other hand, fared poorly. The grouping of mainly Sunni liberals, with many of its leaders drawn from leftist former exiles, failed to win a single seat, even in constituencies where tactical alliances were established with Wa‘d’s al-Wifaq ally. As expected, female candidates also fared poorly. The only woman member of the house, Latifah al-Qa‘ud, ran unopposed in her constituency (which included the uninhabited Hawar Islands). Her victory was widely regarded as a government concession. The closest actual race involving a female candidate saw Dr. Munira Fakhro losing to Sunni Islamist Dr. Salah ‘Ali, the head of the Muslim brotherhood bloc in the outgoing parliament. She appeared to be trailing slightly in a close race that would have been decided in the second round when a burst of more than 1000 votes recorded at “general voting centers” gave outright victory to Dr. Salah. As a result, Dr. Munira announced that she would challenge the results in court.

The establishment of the “general voting centers” was one of a number of opposition complaints about the election. Ten such centers were announced for al-Manamah so that voters would not have to travel to their home districts to vote. The opposition, however, claimed that the centers’ real purpose was to ensure pro-government electoral results, as in the above case. Tampering with the electoral process was alleged from the beginning but received dramatic attention when Dr. Salah al-Bandar, a British citizen of Sudanese origins who had been employed in the Central Informatics Organization (CIO), circulated a lengthy report that provided details on the government’s strategy to manipulate the elections and on the corruption of leading officials, including Shaykh Ahmad b. ‘Atiyatallah, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, the head of the CIO, and the official in charge of the elections. Dr. Salah was quickly fired and deported while the media was warned against publicizing the matter and several web blogs were shut down after they discussed the matter. Although the government subsequently declared that the Ministry of Justice would oversee the elections, Shaykh Ahmad seemed to continue in that role. The government did not permit outside observers to observe the election.

The opposition long had complained about the gerrymandering of districts that assured a Sunni majority in the parliament. The 2006 elections saw Sunni winners outnumbered Shi‘i winners, 23 to 17, despite a Shi‘ah majority of some 60%-70% of Bahrain’s total citizenry. (It should be noted, however, that the divide between government and opposition in Bahrain does not fall strictly along sectarian lines. The long history of opposition to the government in Bahrain has included many Sunni elements and leaders as well as Shi‘ah and at least a few Shi‘ah have been allied with the Al Khalifah.) A second major issue involved naturalization, with the opposition charging that thousands of Arabs from neighboring countries (including non-resident Saudis who were permitted to vote at a polling center on the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway) and Baluch had been naturalized in order to provide additional pro-government votes. One positive outcome of the elections would appear to be that the new council would be composed of a generally higher quality of members than the previous one.

The prospect of a newly ensconced and activist al-Wifaq bloc in the lower house raising embarrassing and anti-government matters will be tempered by continued government control of parliament, if not the Majlis al-Nawwab as well. Within days of the completion of the second round of elections, the King appointed a new Majlis al-Shura that closely resembled the previous one, i.e. a pro-government body that would counter-act any possibly controversial bill passed by the lower house. (In addition to the two houses having an equal membership, the speaker of the unelected upper house has a vote in case of any tie.) The council’s members include 20 Sunnis, 18 Shi‘ah, one Christian, and one Jew, as well as 10 women among them.

Assured that the elections had resulted in little practical change in the status quo, the cabinet resigned and a new cabinet was appointed on 11 December. It was little changed from the previous one and headed again by Shaykh Khalifah b. Salman, the king’s uncle and Prime Minister since 1971. Dominated by Sunnis and especially members of the ruling Al Khalifah, it appeared to contain two concessions to sectarian differences. A Shi‘i, Jawad Salim al-‘Urayyid, was appointed as one of three deputy prime ministers (the other two are from the Al Khalifah) and an erstwhile al-Wifaq member, Dr. Nazar b. Sadiq al-Baharinah, was named Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Most portfolios remained unchanged.

Contretemps Over the UAE and American Ports

[Original publication on this website, 21 February 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

It is difficult to understand the underlying motivations of politicians opposed to the US government’s acceptance of DP World’s purchase of Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) and therefore taking over P&O’s existing contractual arrangements to run various American ports. When P&O was British-owned, there was no controversy to its management of these ports. The outcry has arisen solely because the new P&O owner is “Arab” and a government-owned enterprise of the government of Dubai, a constituent member of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Five objections to DP World’s assumption of these port management contracts have been aired. However, an objective examination of these complaints shows that none constitute sustainable reasons to object to this change in company ownership. The objections are that:

1. The UAE provided a base of operations for al-Qa‘idah members and agents. This implies that an al-Qa ‘idah base existed in the UAE similar to ones in Sudan and Afghanistan. A further insinuation is that the UAE government not only knew of al-Qa‘idah activity in its territory but colluded with the organization. Certainly al-Qa‘idah members used the country for transit. But so have millions of other travellers. The UAE, and Dubai in particular, have made access to the UAE progressively easier for many nationalities, including those of neighboring countries. American visitors, for example, receive a pro forma visa on arrival at Dubai airport. Freedom of movement is a touted American goal; why should the UAE be different? There is no evidence that al-Qa‘idah ever operated openly or on a permanent basis within the UAE. Permitting it to do so would run completely counter to the orientation and record of the UAE government. The UAE can be faulted for not recognizing the danger that Islamist extremists posed and for not tracking the movements of al-Qa‘idah operatives more carefully. But then the 9/11 hijackers not only travelled to and within the US, they lived in the country, studied in American schools and universities, and obtained flight training in American institutions – all without the US government being aware of their purpose. And the UAE government has reminded the US that it not only has provided its support and the use of its facilities for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq but captured a key figure implicated in the bombing of the USS cole hiding in the UAE in 2002 and handed him over to the US.

2. The UAE provided a financial base for the movement of al-Qa‘idah funds. Yes, al-Qa‘idah wired funds through Dubai, just as thousands of other individuals and groups have. If there is a sin here, it is a sin of omission, not commission. Dubai has prided itself on avoiding red tape and government bureaucracy. This has driven its emergence as a major entrepôt and commercial center. There are hundreds of thousands of expatriate workers in the UAE. Western middle-class expatriates think nothing of wiring funds to home accounts. But for low-paid workers from the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, the fees that both originating and receiving banks charge even on small amounts of money are prohibitive. Thus, they use the hawwalah system, whereby they hand over their money to an agent in the UAE. That agent writes or telephones his corresponding agent in the expatriate’s home country who then turns the money over to the expatriate’s designated recipient, all for a very small fee. Certainly, the simplicity and absence of record-keeping in this system can be and was abused. After 9/11, the UAE responded fully to American requests and put in place tighter controls over the financial sector and measures to prevent money-laundering. Is the UAE the only country to discover that its institutions had been used for illegal transfers of money by extremists? What about the American example of a few years ago when the IRA regularly collected funds in the US for the purchase of weaponry to be used in Northern Ireland?

3. Two of the 9/11 hijackers were from the UAE. Again, factually correct. But how can two people – or even several dozen – be considered representative of a population of over three million. American citizens have been imprisoned for participating in al-Qa‘idah. British citizens carried out the terrorist attacks on London transport in July 2005 and a British citizen attempted to blow up a US-bound aircraft with a shoebomb. Are they representative of their countries? Few UAE citizens engage in illegal activity of any kind, even fewer can be regarded as Islamist extremists, and the UAE government, rather than being sympathetic to al-Qa‘idah, is pointedly pro-Western. Any visitor to Dubai would know in an instant that extremism is not practiced or tolerated there. If anything, Dubai can only be described as open, multicultural, laissez-faire, congenial, and perhaps even hedonistic.

4. The UAE permitted its territory to be used for the transmission of nuclear technology and materials from Pakistan to Iran and other states. Once again, at best a sin of omission rather than commission. The Pakistani nuclear scientist who provided the technology and materials did so secretly without the approval – and apparently the knowledge – of his own government, let alone the knowledge of any other governments apart from the recipients. Why use the UAE? For the same reason that innumerable commercial enterprises utilize the UAE’s many efficient facilities – transportation hub, transshipment center, free-trade zones, developed financial sector.

5. Prior to 9/11, the UAE government recognized the Taliban. Yes, the UAE recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. But deciding whether or not to recognize groups that control major territory in a strife-torn country is not a perfect science. Nor does diplomatic recognition necessarily imply approval of ideologies and/or behavior. If this were so, the United States would have had no formal contact at all with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites throughout the Cold War. Why did the UAE recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan? Apart from the fact that it seemed to control much of the country and carried out at least some functions of government, the UAE probably followed Saudi Arabia’s lead – believing that having diplomatic relations would allow at least the possibility of wielding some influence with the Taliban and thereby possibly moderating some Taliban practices and policies. The canard that recognition of the Taliban somehow indicates that the UAE holds similar values and policies is instantly dismissable by anyone who has any knowledge of the UAE.

If there is a problem with security in American ports, it has not arisen because P&O has suddenly become “Arab”-owned. If foreign ownership is the problem, where were all the politicians when P&O first contracted to manage the ports? Much talk has been expressed inside and outside the Beltway about anti-Americanism around the world. It is hard to escape the conclusion that driving force of this ruckus is little more than anti-Arabism.

The Pertinence of the Uncertain Process of Succession ... Again

[Original publication on this website, 24 January 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

Five years ago, I published two articles on succession in the Gulf, one in the Washington Quarterly and the other in the Middle East Journal. [Copies of both articles may be downloaded from the Publications page on this website.] In these articles, I noted that despite significant social, economic, and even political change in the GCC states, it is “disturbing that the mechanisms for the transferral of power remain disconcertingly vague and ambiguous.” [MEJ, p. 599]

Since publication of the two articles, three aging rulers out of the six GCC monarchs have died. But problems of age and/or health still bedevil the future in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and possibly Abu Dhabi. Even Oman’s Sultan Qabus at age 65 is getting on in years and has no clear successor. The problem of succession in the Gulf has not been solved: the question of who is to follow incumbent rulers remains urgent while no further progress has been recorded in dealing longer-term problems of expanding political participation and transitioning ruling families to a more suitable role for modern states.

The death of King Fahd in Saudi Arabia has put full authority and power in the hands of ‘Abdullah. But his succession and his rapid confirmation of half-brother Sultan as heir apparent simply postpones the pressing issue of succession. In the Washington Quarterly article, I described the succession issue in Saudi Arabia as having four factors. The first, succession to King Fahd, was settled with his death and the accession of King ‘Abdullah. The second, succession to King ‘Abdullah, was seemingly settled in part by the appointment of ‘Abdullah’s half-brother Sultan as heir apparent, although Sultan’s age and health may indicate that the problem will arise again in the near future. There seems to be little likelihood that the fourth factor, the disappearance of the Al Sa‘ud as kings of Saudi Arabia, will be a factor in the foreseeable future, barring sudden and unexpected developments.

But the third and remaining factor, i.e. the issue of generational change, remains problematic and seems just as – if not more – pressing now as it was five years ago. The transition to the next generation could not have been made under either Fahd or ‘Abdullah because none of their sons are deemed suitable. The likely path of succession is thought to run through Nayif and Salman and only turning to the next generation after they have had their turns. Increasing age and a possible weak spell under Nayif, however, may force the issue sooner rather than later. But the mechanics of transition are problematic as well: which grandsons of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz will become the first kings of their generation and how will succession progress from there once the first grandson is crowned?

Now that the Kuwaiti succession issue apparently has been settled with the abdication of Amir Sa‘d al-‘Abdullah, a scant week after his succession, and as the appointment of Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad as the latest amir seems imminent, the question moves back to the serious and uncertain process of choosing the next heir apparent, just as is the case in Dubai following the death of its amir a few weeks ago. The choice of the new Kuwaiti heir apparent is a two-fold problem: first, there is the question of retaining the balancing act between the Al Salim and Al Jabir branches of the Al Sabah ruling family; and, second, Kuwait’s own pressing requirement for a generational transition. The two issues are intricately bound up together.

The Al Salim branch has become unmistakably weaker in recent decades. In part this is due to the long reign of the recently deceased amir, Shaykh Jabir, and the powerful role played by his brother and soon-to-be amir, Shaykh Sabah. The latter’s influence became particularly powerful in the last few years when he emerged as de facto ruler during the illnesses of his brother Jabir and the heir apparent Sa‘d. For the first time ever, the formal position of prime minister was decoupled from that of heir apparent and given to Sabah.

But just as important in the demise of the position of the Al Salim was the disappearance of notable personalities in its line. The strongest member of the branch at the time of Shaykh Jabir’s accession in 1977 was Shaykh Jabir al-‘Ali, but his acerbic and combative personality led to his being passed over as heir apparent by Sa‘d al-‘Abdullah of the same branch. Sa‘d’s apparent incapacitation follows the death of Jabir al-‘Ali some years ago and the next likely candidate from the Al Salim, Salim al-Sabah, son of an amir and long serving deputy prime minister and minister of defense, withdrew from politics in 2001 for health reasons. One of the few logical choices remaining among the Al Salim is Dr. Muhammad al-Sabah, brother of Shaykh Salim and Foreign Minister, but doubts remain whether he is a strong candidate.

By tradition, the appointment of Shaykh Sabah as amir should be accompanied by the appointment of an Al Salim as heir apparent. But this is not enshrined in law and the recent public spat between the branches over the deposition of Shaykh Sa‘d may well point to the Al Jabir attempting to monopolize rule within their branch. But this prospect raises a further question: where would succession fall even within the Al Jabir?

In the Middle East Journal article, I wrote that “For the future of the family, it may well be necessary to select the next Amir – or, more precisely, the next Heir Apparent after Sa‘d – from a new generation. But the present generation took up public positions when in their 20s and 30s and have spent the last 40 to 50 years proving themselves and running the country. The following generation has never had the opportunity to prove themselves even though they are now into their 50s.” [p. 586] There is little change in that assessment.

My earlier observation that more systematic methods of choosing heirs apparent is required in the Gulf should be coupled urgently now – after the Kuwaiti spectacle – of acceptable and face-saving methods of easing aging and infirm rulers into superannuation. The long and sad degeneration in the health of King Fahd, Shaykh Jabir, and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai a few years ago turns the pretense that they continued rule into farce and only harmed the international reputation of their countries. The two problems are inter-connected of course, since in some states the heir apparent is chosen from the same generation as the ruler. This may be an additional argument for settling on the principle of primogeniture, or at least one of the sons of the incumbent ruler.

It is not just a question of transitioning to a chronologically younger generation as the present one dies off. There must be qualitative change as well. As I wrote in 2001, “Their successors – sooner or later – must come from a generation with formative experiences in the ‘retrenchment’ or even ‘post-oil’ periods. They must be ready to install new post-rentier economies and to embrace political participation by educated, sophisticated, and heavily middle-class societies. The essential question is whether this ‘passing of the generational torch’ will come in time to preserve the core of these regimes or whether it will be too late as a consequence of doubtful succession patterns. [Washington Quarterly, p. 174]

A New Ruler in Dubai

[Original publication on this website, 6 January 2006. No republication or further distribution without author's permission. All rights reserved.]

On 4 January 2006, Dubai’s ruler Shaykh Maktum b. Rashid Al Maktum died unexpectedly in Australia. He was immediately succeeded by his younger brother and Heir Apparent, Shaykh Muhammad b. Rashid, who was also automatically confirmed as in his late brother’s federal positions as the Vice-President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates.

Shaykh Maktum’s death is unlikely to lead to any significant changes in Dubai since he had been little more than titular ruler and Shaykh Muhammad had been guiding policy since before the death of their father, Shaykh Rashid b. Sa‘id, in 1990. It is also unlikely to lead to major change on the federal level as the positions of Vice-President and Prime Minister are automatically allocated to the ruler of Dubai. However, it is possible that Muhammad may exercise more of a hands-on role in these positions, given that Maktum had little interest in exercising his authority and given Muhammad’s much more dynamic and aggressive personality.

The first of two key questions to be answered is who will Shaykh Muhammad select as his Heir Apparent. Will he elevate one of his two brothers – older brother Hamdan, Deputy Ruler of Dubai and UAE Minister of Finance and Industry, or younger brother Ahmad – or pass succession to one of his own sons. Maktum succeeded his father as ruler, despite younger Muhammad being far more qualified, because of an unwritten principle of primogeniture. It is logical to suppose that Muhammad will carry on the tradition and anoint his eldest son, particularly since neither Hamdan or Ahmad is much more dynamic than Maktum was.

The second is question is whether he will retain the portfolio of UAE Minister of Defense and will there be any significant changes in the new UAE cabinet he is to form, last shuffled just before the death of UAE President Shaykh Zayid in 2004. Dubai has no automatic right to the portfolio and surrendering it now might mean that it would go to the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi. For this reason, Muhammad may prefer to keep the title.

A logical, though not by any means certain, successor as Minister of Defense might be Abu Dhabi’s Shaykh Muhammad b. Zayid Al Nahyan. An ambitious son of the late Shaykh Zayid, Muhammad b. Zayid was promoted from Deputy to Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces about 1993. Although unable to succeed his father in 2004, he persuaded his half-brother Shaykh Khalifah b. Zayid, the new ruler of Abu Dhabi, to name him Heir Apparent in Abu Dhabi and, a year later, as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Relations between the two Muhammads – Muhammad b. Rashid in Dubai and Muhammad b. Zayid in Abu Dhabi – has improved in recent years and the two may strike an alliance over this position.

An alternative stratagem, even less likely, might be the appointment of Shaykh Sultan b. Zayid Al Nahyan, presently UAE Deputy Prime Minister and long-time Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As a non-starter for succession in Abu Dhabi, despite being Shaykh Zayid’s second oldest son, Sultan could provide a compromise choice.

Fundamentally, though, Shaykh Maktum’s death is not going to change operations in either Dubai or the UAE, even though it might provoke some intense jockeying for position on both the amirate and federal levels.

Oman: Omanis, Ibadis, and Islamism

[First published on the website of the Tharwa Project (www.tharwaproject.com), 28 February 2005.]

A wave of recent arrests has brought Oman briefly into the international spotlight, a rare occurrence for the sultanate. Little information has become available about the arrests. Early reports said that an attempt was going to be made to disrupt the Muscat Festival, an annual cultural and entertainment program. However, the Minister of Information informed the press on 30 January 2005 that the detentions stemmed from an attempt by those involved “to form an organization to endanger the national order.”

Early media reports that over 300 had been arrested seem to have been wildly exaggerated. An activist in Muscat said the total was less than 30 and an unnamed diplomat claimed it was less than a dozen, while a regional newspaper published a list of 15 names. According to this list, those detained included faculty from Sultan Qabus University, the College of Law and Shari‘ah, Nizwa Education College, ministry employees, employees in the mufti’s office, and several imams of mosques. All of the arrested seem to be from northern Oman, specifically the regions of al-Dakhiliyah, al-Sharqiyah, and al-Batinah, and all appear to be Ibadi. (Another six were reported to be arrested later in mid-February.)

Although Oman’s predominant image is that of an Ibadi country – the ruling family is Ibadi, the more traditional form of leadership consisted of an Ibadi imamate, and Oman possesses the only large-scale Ibadi community in the Islamic world – the population is actually mixed. No reliable figures exist regarding the sectarian composition but an informed guess would put it at roughly 50% Sunni, 45% Ibadi, and less than 5% Shi‘ah. While the heartland of Oman is heavily Ibadi, Sunnis are found in large numbers along al-Batinah coast, in al-Dhahirah region adjoining Abu Dhabi, in the eastern town of Sur, and especially in the southern region of Dhufar.

Al-Ibadiyah is a moderate offshoot of al-Khawarij, the first secessionist movement in Islam, but it is very similar today in belief and practice to mainstream Sunnism. Many of the initial followers of the Ibadi subsect in 8th-century Basrah were Omanis and they brought the belief back to Oman, where an independent Ibadi state existed for a thousand years. That state was headed by an elected imam, chosen from the adult male population and acclaimed in his office by the entire society. Although dynasties frequently emerged, the Ibadi political expression is highly egalitarian in principle, a feature that is underlined by the absence of any special role in society played by descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Ibadi imamate disappeared in the 1950s when a highly respected and capable imam was replaced by a weaker figure, heavily dependent on his brother, along with a prominent tribal shaykh and outside support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. By the end of the decade, the sultanate – based in Muscat and headed by the Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty since the 1740s – was in firm control of the interior of Oman and the imamate seemingly was consigned to the dustbin of history.

As a consequence of this development, northern Oman has basked in political tranquillity for nearly half a century and the country as a whole has been free from domestic dissidence since the end of the Dhufar War in the mid-1970s. By and large, Omanis have adopted the outlook of their neighbors up the Gulf: the country has embarked on ambitious socioeconomic development and the citizenry have enjoyed a more prosperous life than their pre-1970 ancestors. Although the population is largely Arab, the Baluch form a significant minority, as do several ethnic strands of Shi‘ah. Inequities exist in the present state but minorities are not prevented from material and social advancement, either legally or in daily practice.

What then might be the conditions or grievances at the root of the present arrests? There are significant parallels with a similar wave of arrests in 1994. At that time, perhaps as many as a thousand individuals were interrogated and some 300-400 arrested on charges of subversion. A State Security Court was hastily convened in November 1994 and it sentenced about 135 individuals to prison terms; a few given death sentences saw their convictions subsequently commuted by the Sultan to life imprisonment. All prisoners were freed as part of the Sultan’s Silver Jubilee amnesty in November 1995. While the Sultan, in his 1994 National Day speech, accused those arrested of being Islamic extremists, little evidence was offered for this assertion and many in Oman continued to entertain doubts.

Speculation that the Omani arrests this year might be linked to al-Qa‘idah-related violence in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is undoubtedly unfounded. Al-Qa‘idah sees Sunnis as its primary audience and those arrested in Oman are Ibadis. Even Oman’s small Shi‘ah community has been remarkably quiescent since the Iranian Revolution, with only a few incidents of pamphleteering and abortive demonstrations. The high proportion of Sunnis in the 1994 arrests can be attributed largely to numerous detainees from Sur and Dhufar – Sunni areas whose inhabitants traditionally have been more outspoken than other Omanis.

This last detail may indeed point to a principal reason behind the 2005 arrests. Oman under Sultan Qabus has seen enormous change, mostly for the better. But the country is troubled by an unequal distribution of income, falling oil production, rapidly expanding population and unemployment, and the entrenchment of a political and commercial elite who have shown little restraint in taking advantage of opportunities to grow rich, often through abuse of the public purse.

The last decade has seen an understated but definite swelling of disgruntlement with the current state of affairs. Omanis have been bombarded with details of radical Islamists, al-Qa‘idah, the fall of Saddam’s Iraq and the American occupation, and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian strife. Not surprisingly, many young Omanis have become disillusioned with their ruler’s and the elite’s orientation. At the same time, and from another angle, Oman’s headlong rush towards modernization undoubtedly has produced a backlash among Omani conservatives.

The demise of the imamate in the 1950s was due to military action by the Sultan’s forces and his British backers, not because of any internal evolution. The last imam, Ghalib b. ‘Ali al-Hinawi, is still living out his days in al-Dammam, Saudi Arabia. There are no sultans in traditional Ibadi thought and the present régime’s legitimacy is based largely on its ability to maintain order, guarantee opportunities, and encourage material prosperity. That some Omanis remained opposed to the “secular” ways of the new state and society should not be surprising. That they should band together “to form an organization to endanger the national order” is. The suspicion that the authorities in Muscat have overreacted once again cannot be entirely laid to rest yet.

Security and Political Challenges in Saudi Arabia

[First published on the website of the Tharwa Project (www.tharwaproject.com), 12 December 2004.]

Much concern has been expressed recently about the stability of the Al Sa‘ud régime, with fears that al-Qa`idah-linked extremism might cause its downfall, much as religious opposition took the leading role in ending the Pahlavi régime in Iran. But it bears repeating today just as much as it was in 1979: Saudi Arabia is not Iran.

To be sure, there is a long history of dissidence and even extremism in Saudi Arabia. The Third Saudi State was created in the early 20th century as a result of a campaign of conquest that involved resistance on occasion. All Sunnis within the Saudi dominion were expected to observe the Wahhabi (or salafi) form of Islam while the Shi‘ah remained apart and objects of discrimination. The efforts of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (ruled 1902-1953) to forge a permanent state out of these conquests was opposed by radical leaders amongst the Ikhwan, the settled bedouin who formed the fanatical armies carrying out the conquests. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was finally forced in the late 1920s to face down the dissident Ikhwan on the battlefield.

Pan-Arab secular nationalism posed a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s unity during the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to very real threats from “progressive” Arab republics, domestic ideological stirrings prompted the emergence of the “Free Liberals” and the flight from the kingdom of their leader, Al Sa‘ud prince Talal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, and some of his brothers. The mid-1960s also witnessed several waves of arrests in the Saudi armed forces. While there was much speculation outside the country of coup attempts, in fact nearly all arrests seem to have been of individuals who became exposed to ideologies outside the country and did little more than speak rashly of their political beliefs.

In recent years, dissidence in Saudi Arabia has centered on Islamist opposition, particularly as the appeal and promise of secular political ideologies has faded. But Islamist opposition has long threatened the state. Confrontation on such grounds dates back to the opposition of the hardliners amongst the Ikhwan. Islamist opposition also appeared in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, as religious and social conservatives defied the régime and resisted changes. Most prominently, a group of neo-Ikhwan composed largely of members of Najdi bedouin tribes that had provided the forces of the earlier Ikhwan, seized the Great Mosque of Makkah in 1979 and were dislodged only by violent force.

Salafi opposition and extremism emerged after the Kuwait War of 1991. This included domestic borderline opposition, ranging from hardline or conservative religious figures as well as “liberals.” Gradually, exile groups began to appear, such as the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in London, a breakaway group known as the Movement for Islamic Rights in Arabia (and more latterly as al-Islah), the Committee for Advice and Reform (a now defunct group contemporaneous with the appearance of CDLR and begun by Usamah bin Ladin), and the Saudi Institute in suburban Washington. Finally and more seriously, a number of so-called “dissident clerics” directly or indirectly aided the emergence of an al-Qa‘idah-linked or -influenced underground.

Apart from the extremists, the last decade has seen the emergence of a variety of “reformers.” Like most Saudis, these activists do not wish to overthrow the régime or to replace it. What they want is for the system to work better and more equitably, i.e. to reform it. Who are these “reformers”? Some are “religious” conservatives who believe that the state and society have become too liberalized. Others are “secular” liberals. About a dozen of these were arrested in the spring of 2004. Three are still being held in jail and have been placed on trial for “criticizing the political establishment” and “causing instability” by collecting signatures for petitions and communicating with foreign media. But the appeal of “secular” liberals is tiny and a concerted effort has been made to bridge the chasm between Islamic reformers and liberals.

The agenda of the reformers has accelerated in the past two years with a series of petitions and dialogues. In part, this development can be viewed as a follow-on to the establishment of the appointed Majlis al-Shura (or Consultative Council) in early 1990s. The movement is notable for including some “dissident” clerics and a measure of unprecedented Sunni-Shi‘i cooperation. As for the movement’s nature, the petition titled “In Defense of the Nation” of September 2003 provides a good example. The document was signed by more than 300 academics, medical doctors, writers, business people, and government employees. Signatories were drawn from both Sunni and Shi‘i communities while 51 signatures came from women. The petition called for an increased constitutional nature of society, eventual elections to Majlis al-Shura, the independence of the judicial branch, respect for human rights, allowing civil society institutions to function, the elimination of corruption, a fair redistribution of wealth, better distribution of social welfare benefits (such as education, health care, housing), and enabling women to practice their social and economic duties. The government’s response so far has been little more than the announcement of partial elections in early 2005 for municipal councils.

The attack on the US Consulate in Jiddah on 6 December 2004 that killed nine, in addition to three attackers, and apparently was carried out by elements inspired by al-Qa‘idah if not linked to that network, understandably renewed fears that the Saudi state might not be able to counter the challenge of Islamist extremism, either in terms of deflecting its ideological support within the conservative Muslim community in Saudi Arabia or more directly as a security problem posed by orchestrated acts of violence. It bears reminding, however, that Saudi Arabia is not in the grip of a civil war and that this latest in a wave of violence carried out in the last few years may indeed be the dying gasps of an enemy that the Saudi government has doggedly pursued.

There is no room for doubt that the kingdom faces a severe security threat, much like the United Kingdom has faced in its many years of terrorist activity by the IRA. The régime’s response must be fourfold. First, it must continue to improve and enhance fundamental security measures and responses in order to meet and eventually eliminate these acts of violence. Second, it must separate the extremists from supporters – real or potential – in the kingdom, the so-called “dissident clerics” and their followers, in part by demonstrating that extremist views are as unacceptable and un-Islamic in Saudi Arabia as they are for Muslims elsewhere. Third, it must be more vigilant in remolding a more tolerant and multifaceted society that implicitly and explicitly rejects such extremist views. Fourth, it must create an atmosphere that does not attract young men in particular to extremism, in part by resolving the admittedly difficult dilemma of providing employment for an exploding population but also by psychologically incorporating its youth fully into a changing society, a youth all-too-often alienated by social marginalization and lack of a sense of belonging or contributing as much as by economic discrimination.

An analysis of security incidents in Saudi Arabia since 1979 shows approximately 144 security-related incidents over this period. (A comprehensive chronology and summary of security incidents in the kingdom can be found elsewhere on this website.) Ninety-two of these were relatively minor incidents, consisting of arrests, arms discoveries, demonstrations, and hijackings. Some 53 were more serious, involving fatalities. There were nine major incidents comprising invasions or bombings of mosques, military installations, housing, or office complexes. The first of these was the seizure of the Great Mosque of Makkah by Neo-Ikhwan in 1979. Only two other major incidents took place between 1979 and 2003: in 1995, a car bomb was set off at a National Guard facility in Riyadh and another exploded in 1996 at US military barracks in al-Khubar. But 2003 brought two attacks and 2004 saw another four. The pattern was mirrored in the acceleration of other types of incidents: 71 of the total 92 minor incidents and 44 of 53 fatal incidents have taken place in the past two years.

This recent explosion in security incidents is due almost entirely to a deadly campaign launched by al-Qa‘idah Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, a loose group of several hundred Saudi extremists. These extremists have killed nearly 100 expatriates in the kingdom since May 2003, as well as a number of Saudis. They have struck through large-scale attacks, such as the assault on a housing compound in Riyadh (May 2003), another assault on a Riyadh housing compound (November 2003), yet another attack on a Riyadh housing compound (April 2004), the car bombing of the General Security Building in Riyadh (April 2004), a multi-pronged attack on civilians in the industrial city of Yanbu‘ on the Red Sea (May 2004), a similar attack on businesses and a residential compound in al-Khubar in the Eastern Province (May 2004), and the assault on the US Consulate in Jiddah (December 2004).

As security tightened around likely targets, extremists began to employ a simpler tactic: five expatriates were either killed outright in drive-by shootings (such as a Frenchman at a bank machine in Jiddah) or kidnapped and subsequently killed (as happened to an American engineer who was beheaded). Just as much violence erupted in gunbattles between Saudi security forces and extremists when raids were conducted on hideouts or suspects attempted to flee from checkpoints.

The recent attack on the Jiddah consulate has been interpreted already as either a failure of security or as a confirmation of instability in Saudi Arabia. It is neither. It should be remembered that the attackers, although managing to penetrate the outer perimeter of the consulate compound, failed to get inside the consulate itself. While security around the consulate obviously needs improvement, the swift raising of a barrier prevented the attackers from driving into the compound and they only managed to shoot their way through the gate on foot.

Does the latest attack mean that the Saudi government’s campaign to eradicate domestic terrorism is a failure? Riyadh has contended that it has broken the back of the movement and eliminated three of four al-Qa‘idah cells. A constant series of raids on safe houses, shoot-outs elsewhere, and captures of caches of arms, ammunition, explosives, and cash, seem to point in this direction. On 6 December 2003, the Ministry of the Interior announced a list of the 26 most wanted suspects. A year later, 14 on the list had been killed, three were captured, and another one surrendered. That left eight at large. Two proclaimed leaders of al-Qa‘idah in the Arabian Peninsula were killed in succession. The Jiddah attack clearly proves that the movement has not been eliminated but the slowing of attacks and increasing confrontations between security forces and small bands of extremists indicates that the organization is finding greater difficulty in operating, is using less experienced operatives in less complex operations, and is losing much of its stocks of weaponry.

It is impossible to know how many active extremists remain in the kingdom. By some estimates, hardcore membership stood at more than a thousand at the beginning of 2003; other estimates put the remaining number at 100 or 200. Attrition has not only thinned the numbers but resulted in the death or capture of many of the most experienced and brightest members. The great danger, however, remains the recruitment of newer members from alienated Saudi youth, spurred at least in part by the anti-American campaign in Iraq. The danger is greatest in the Wahhabi homeland and disaffected and poorer regions of the country. A majority of suspects arrested or killed appear to be from Najd, including many from major tribes, followed by others from the southern provinces, particularly ‘Asir and Jizan. Although hideouts are discovered, arrests are made, and attacks are carried out in al-Hijaz and the Eastern Province, the perpetrators do not tend to be from those regions.

Does the latest attack indicate that the country is becoming increasingly unstable, even perhaps on the brink of civil war? In 1979, the success of the Iranian revolution prompted some outside observers to speculate that the Al Sa‘ud régime would be next to fall, and in short order. A quarter of a century later, the same alarmism all but proclaims the end of the Al Sa‘ud in the near future. This seems at least as unlikely as in 1979. The country is not in turmoil and the numbers of extremists form only a tiny proportion of the Saudi population. What the country faces is a serious security problem, not unlike that posed by the IRA for the British government. Its only threat in a larger political context is if the state proves unable to contain and eliminate the threat. The longer terrorist and dissident acts persist, the greater doubt will be raised about the capability of the government to handle the crisis. But there is little to suggest that the kingdom has reached that point, or that the majority of its population has lost faith in their government.

At the same time, however, there is no doubt that the kingdom faces serious problems. Nearly two decades of budget deficits caused by low oil prices have hampered development and the provision of services; it will take more than two or three years of budget surpluses as a result of the oil price rise of 2004 and 2005 to correct this. The population has exploded in the last several decades. The 1974 census showed a Saudi population of only six million. The 1992 census doubled the Saudi population at a little more than 12 million. The 2004 census put the Saudi population at 16 and a half million. Although a detailed demographic breakdown has yet to be made public, at least half the population undoubtedly is under the age of 16. Millions more have reached school-leaving age and are searching for non-existent jobs. Per capita income dropped by three-quarters between the boom years of the oil price explosion and the beginning of this century. Considerable emphasis has been placed on economic diversification but oil remains the engine of the state and society and will continue to maintain that role for the foreseeable future.

Politically, the country faces at least three major problems. Foremost is the brake on political development posed by the unyielding weight of the Al Sa‘ud family on the country. While it is undeniable that the Al Sa‘ud not only created the state but are the glue that holds it together, it is equally undeniable that the family as an institution has a stultifying and regressive impact on the kingdom. In part, this is due to an inevitable problem in all monarchies of uneven leadership. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was an exceedingly dynamic leader who forged the Third Saudi State in the 20th century. But he designated his unsuitable eldest son Sa‘ud as his successor and it took 11 years for the far more capable second son Faysal to rescue the country and implement the first major reforms. King Khalid was not the best choice to succeed Faysal but fortunately he reigned more than ruled. His more capable half-brother Fahd ran the state on a day-to-day basis until he succeeded as King himself. The tragedy of Fahd’s kingship has been his physical and mental incapacitation in recent years, preventing the heir apparent ‘Abdullah from taking control and carrying out necessary measures in time. The problem of uneven leadership is replicated throughout the government. Members of the huge family occupy hundreds if not thousands of positions, large and small, in the bureaucracy. Some of them show great merit and competence; others hold their jobs simply on the basis of birth.

But the problem of the royal family extends beyond its role in government. The family forms an extensive caste, membership of which is defined purely by blood. By and large, family members are above the law, they receive regular stipends and are not required to pay for air travel on Saudi Arabian Airlines or to pay their utility bills. Many have entered business, either as hidden partners or openly; no one can compete fairly against an Al Sa‘ud business rival. The old division of responsibility wherein the royal family holds political power while the merchant class monopolizes commerce has been eradicated.

A second major problem lies in social attitudes and religious conservatism. The partnership between the Al Sa‘ud and the Wahhabi religious establishment – dating from the 18th-century arrangement between the political leader Muhammad bin Sa‘ud Al Sa‘ud and the religious reformer Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab that created the First Saudi State – has been the bedrock of the country’s politics. It continues to define the state as the center of Islam, not only because the holiest cities in Islam are found within its borders but also because of the state’s claim to be the spiritual home of Islam as well. This partnership threatens to become a ball-and-chain for those members of the royal family, such as ‘Abdullah, who seek to modernize the country. Even King Faysal found himself hobbled: for every step forward, he was forced to take a step backwards to placate the conservatives. As an example, he managed to gain acceptance of the principle of universal girls’ education but at the cost of placing control of girls’ education under the thumb of the reactionary religious establishment.

The consequence is a population at large that is deeply mistrustful of the outside world and swayed by radical interpretations of Islam. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the Middle East where women are not allowed to drive, move about in public by themselves, or carry out any legal transaction without the intervention of a male guardian. It is the only Islamic country that relies upon a system of so-called “religious police” or “morality police” to enforce such matters as the strict segregation of men and women and observance of prayer times. Not surprisingly, the maturation of young Saudis under such a system, reinforced by reactionary lessons in school, has produced a fertile climate for the recruitment of foot soldiers for extremist Islamists.

It also needs to be said that the long-standing alliance with the United States has become a third major problem. For more than half a century, the Al Sa‘ud have placed their eggs in the basket of Saudi-American cooperation. This has been manifested most obviously in the provision of an American security umbrella over the kingdom. In return for Saudi purchases of more than adequate supplies of military arms and supplies at top prices – not to mention cooperation with Washington in such matters as the Contra affair and the Saudi purchase of US treasury bills – the United States guarantees Saudi Arabia’s security from external threats. This arrangement paid off for the Al Sa‘ud in a minor way during the threat from war-torn Yemen in the 1960s, in a potentially more serious way during the Iran-Iraq War, and in a major way after Saddam Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait and the campaign by the American-led alliance to reverse the occupation and protect Gulf oil fields. Saudi dependence on the United States also extended more deeply to the development of the country, beginning with ARAMCO’s activities in the Eastern Province and extending to the provision of US government and private-sector technical assistance in a myriad of endeavors.

But the alliance has become an increasing liability on both sides. The American public and Congress have long demonstrated a hostility to Saudi Arabia, dating back to the oil price revolution of 1973-1974 and beyond. The emergence of Usamah bin Ladin as the world’s most feared terrorist and the presence of 15 Saudis among the 11 September hijackers has only compounded the hostility. Of the more than 600 prisoners that the US government continues to hold in Guantánamo, nearly one-quarter are Saudis.

Naturally, this has increased resentment by Saudis of their treatment in the US. The biggest problem in the relationship from the Saudi view for many years was unquestioning American support of Israel, a support that has become increasingly problematic as the second Palestinian intifadah wears on. The American invasion of Iraq, bolstered only by Britain and a handful of other countries, magnified Saudi indignation. In that perception, the United States has invaded a fellow Arab country and, instead of bringing peace and democracy, it has turned the country into a chaos of violence; it has made Iraq “safe for terrorism.”

The Saudi Arabian government may indeed have broken the back of the extremist campaign. But, as the recent Jiddah incident demonstrated, it has a long way to go to eradicate the remnants and restore order to the country. Even more importantly, the government must face up to the growing challenges in front of it and enact the types of reforms that will bring true social and political progress. The government has surmounted serious challenges in the task and appears to capable of doing so now. But it will not be an easy task and there is no guarantee of success.

Year	Total Incidents	Minor Incidents (arrests, discoveries, demonstrations, hijackings)	Fatal Incidents (involving shooting or bombing, and including security raids)	Major Incidents (coordinated operations against major targets resulting in multiple deaths)
1979	2	1	-	1
1985	2	1	1	-
1988	2	-	2	-
1989	1	1	-	-
1994	1	1	-	-
1995	3	1	1	1
1996	4	3	-	-
2000	6	3	-	-
2001	7	5	2	-
2002	5	5	2	First al-Qa‘idah-related activities begin with arrests
2003	38	28	18	2
2004	78	46	28	4
2005	35	22	13	-
Total	184	117	68	9

The Impact of the United States Election on the Gulf and the Middle East

[First published on the website of the Gulf Research Center's Gulf in the Media, Dubai (www.gulfinthemedia.com), 24 November 2004.]

As many commentators around the world have noted, the outcome of the recent American presidential election affects the entire world nearly as much as it does the United States. And the the Middle East and the Gulf are likely to feel its impact the most.

The two most pressing Middle East issues facing the re-elected Bush administration are the situation in Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian strife. It is by no means certain that a Kerry administration would have made much headway in solving either problem. But it is also unlikely that a second-term Bush administration will have much luck in accomplishing its goals in the region either – particularly since it has its hands full with Iraq and appears intent on continuing to keep its distance from active intervention in Israel and Palestine.

Early indicators of the focus and direction of the administration’s second term are for a continued and probably strengthened conservative approach. The resignation of Colin Powell as Secretary of State removes the last moderate – and moderating – senior government official in the foreign-policy equation. His successor, Condoleezza Rice, undoubtedly will take a more hardline posture on most issues and the State Department’s complexion will change considerably more if, as is rumored, John Bolton is promoted from Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security to Deputy Secretary.

Changes at State are mirrored by the apparent politicization of the Central Intelligence Agency where Porter Goss, a Republican congressman recently appointed by Bush to head the agency, has brought in staffers from his congressional office and the House Intelligence Committee. These moves have forced the resignation of the Deputy Director and senior figures in the Clandestine Service. Fears are being voiced that the housecleaning at the agency will produce a more ideological CIA and one that is careful to serve narrow administration interests, instead of clashing over them as before the election.

With Rice’s move to State, the National Security Council, to be headed by her present deputy Stephen Hadley, probably will have a reduced exposure, and policy in the Department of Defense is unlikely change unless the Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is removed, a move that is beginning to look increasingly unlikely.

Within a few short weeks of Bush’s re-election, the outline of the administration’s second-term policy towards the Middle East already has begun to appear. Only days after the election, the long-intimated and full-scale assault on Fallujah was launched and increasingly strong-arm techniques were employed against other Sunni targets. American strategy seemed to be aimed not only at Islamist “insurgents” but at recalcitrant Sunnis who threatened a boycott of the planned Iraqi elections in January 2005. Washington’s emphasis on these elections, as well as their prompt holding at the planned time, have become a key litmus test for the administration’s perceptions of success in its Iraq policy.

The second aspect of Middle Eastern policy began with British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit to Washington. The death of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat shortly after the election was seen as an unexpected opportunity to get matters rolling on the Middle East peace process front. Bush resisted Blair’s pressure for the appointment of a special American envoy to re-engage Israelis and Palestinians in meaningful negotiations. The White House still seems committed to the absurd notion that the road to Israeli-Palestinian peace lies through Iraq. This suggests that as long as Iraq remains in a quagmire, which seems likely to persist for some time, Bush and company will keep their distance from Israel and Palestine. After Rice actually replaces Powell, American disengagement probably will look even more pronounced.

The most the Bush administration seems ready to countenance is gentle encouragement for almost inevitable moves on both sides. Washington applauded Sharon’s decision to remove Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip and it supports a fair and productive Palestinian election to replace Arafat. Neither development owes anything to American action and neither promises much payoff on its own. It has been months since the most recent buz