
J.E. Peterson

Cut-off date: 31 December 2003
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EXPLANATORY NOTES

This is the second edition of an earlier bibliography on the same subject, published in 1985. This edition includes all of the original entries plus all possible entries from 1985 through the end of 2003. The principal cut-off date is 31 December 2003.

No bibliography can ever be as comprehensive as it is intended to be, and that certainly holds true for this one. Thus some caveats are in order. The entries herein are principally in English, with efforts to include other Western languages as appropriate. No attempt has been made to include publications in non-European languages. To do so would have greatly complicated and expanded the scope of the bibliography and its printed size. For similar reasons of maintaining a manageable size, no attempt has been made to include material from general magazines, weekly and daily news organs, or specialized newsletters.

The multiplicity of wars in the Gulf, or more specifically in the northern Gulf, has created confusion in terminology, particularly but not only in the West. “The Gulf War” was initially applied to the Iran-Iraq War and then, in an astonishing example of memory loss, transferred to the conflict in Kuwait in 1991. With hostilities in Iraq in 2003, the confusion has only grown with commentators unable to decide whether to call the latest conflagration “Gulf War II” or “Gulf War III.” This terminology does not, of course, address the fact that all three wars have taken place solely in the northern Gulf and that terming them all “Gulf Wars” is rather like calling the American intervention in Grenada a “Caribbean War.” To avoid these problems, this bibliography adheres to the following terminology. The conflict between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988 is termed “the Iran-Iraq War.” The war between Iraq and the coalition of forces involved in the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 is termed “the Kuwait War.” The American attack on Iraq in 2003, with British assistance, is termed “the Iraq War.” The phrase “Gulf states” normally refers to the six monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman.

The Kuwait War has created a voluminous literature, not all of which is central to this bibliography. There has been no intention to include annotations for most works dealing solely with military aspects of the wars, those focusing on the impact of the war on domestic politics and society outside the Gulf, and works dealing with environmental damage. Shorter works, accounts of military action at the Service or unit level, and more ephemeral citations typically have been excluded. Works on internal developments in Iraq, including the Shi’ah uprising in the south and Kurdish affairs in the north, have also been excluded except where they can be regarded as having an impact on Iraqi policy or actions towards its Gulf neighbors. Fuller coverage of these topics is contained in Andrew Orgill’s *The 1990-91 Gulf War: Crisis, Conflict, Aftermath – An Annotated Bibliography*. Similarly, a number of similar works dealing with the Iran-Iraq War have not been provided with annotations.

A similar problem occurs with the equally burgeoning literature on al-Qa’idah and terrorism that appeared after the attacks of 11 September 2001. On the same grounds, this bibliography does not claim to be comprehensive on this frequently peripheral subject but includes material only when it is directly relevant to the volume’s headings. The Iraq War in March-April 2003 obviously
occurred too recently to include most serious publications on the war itself. However, it has been possible to include a number entries from the policy debate before the war.

Author’s identifications are given as they appear in the published work. No attempt has been made to update affiliations. In this sense, the bibliography may be useful also in providing limited biographical information through authors’s careers. Page numbers have been provided for all quotations, except for quotations used in entries from the first edition. Citations from the first edition have been identified with a  symbol following the annotation. Stylistic differences have also crept in between the first edition and the new entries for this edition. With a separation of nearly two decades, this is only to be expected. Institutions and abbreviations such as the GCC and CENTCOM have become familiar while new institutions and abbreviations such as WMD and UNIKOM have appeared in the interim. The details and debate over the US establishment of a rapid deployment force, current at the time that the first edition appeared, is of historical interest now and a section detailing with this topic has been retained intact from the first edition.

It may be seen that the definition of “regional security” has been stretched rather far when it comes to publications on individual countries of the Arabian Peninsula. A number of books and articles have been selected for inclusion because they may provide useful perspective on the state of affairs that underpin these countries’ security requirements and environment, even if they are not directly concerned with matters of defense and security.

Despite diligent efforts, it was not always possible to examine each bibliographic citation, which accounts for the absence of an annotation for a minority of entries. In addition, page numbers are absent in a few entries because they were accessed online or because references were incomplete and the items were not accessible for examination. Every attempt has been made to make the bibliography comprehensive up to the cut-off date of 31 December 2003.

J.E. Peterson
March 2004
ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBW</td>
<td>Chemical and biological warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority (US and British administration of Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sultan’s Armed Forces (Oman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANG</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USGPO</td>
<td>United States General Printing Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMTM</td>
<td>United States Military Training Mission (Saudi Arabia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
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OVERALL VIEWS AND GENERAL DISCUSSION


3. Ahrari, M.E., and Omar Khalidi. “The Emerging Shape of Strategic Competition in the Persian Gulf.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 23-29. ♦♦ A review of the recent security environment in the Gulf by a professor at US Air War College and a staff member with the Agha Khan Program for Islamic Affairs at Harvard University and MIT respectively. The authors feel that “The dynamic relations among the Gulf states are likely to play an
important role in determining the scope and nature of strategic competition in that area in the coming decades. Both superpowers are likely to play reactive roles.” (p. 28)


5. ________. *The Persian Gulf Region in the Twenty First Century: Stability and Change*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996. In the first book, an associate professor of political science at Hiram College (Ohio) reviews security-related developments in the Gulf from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The work concentrates heavily on Iran, with chapters focusing on Iran’s military capabilities, its political system, the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy and developments in the Islamic Republic. In the second work, Alalmolaki takes a broader perspective by surveying the history, social composition, economy, and foreign policies of all eight Gulf littoral states.


7. Barnett, Michael. “Regional Security after the Gulf War.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 4 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 597-618. An associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison looks at developments in the regional security of the Middle East (not just the Gulf). He regards regional security as depending on viable cooperative security arrangements based on strategic stability and mutual assurance and on a domestic order that supports (or acquiesces in) such principles and arrangements. His judgment is that “Thus far, the region has made substantial progress toward regional order, some progress toward regional stability, and little headway toward domestic stability and order” and “so long as there is little domestic peace, there is unlikely to be regional peace.” (pp. 617-618)

8. Basheer, Tahseen M. “Structural Challenges to Security in the Gulf.” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 26-37. A former Egyptian representative to the Arab League stresses that stability is the key to a security system for the Gulf. This can be achieved only with solutions to certain problems: a clear definition of Arab state sovereignty, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a transformed relationship between Iran and the Arab states, a deep relationship between the Arab states and African states, and management of the domestic struggle for legal democratization and human rights.

10. Dalton, Richard. *Winning the Peace in the Gulf: A Long-Term View*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993. ●● A British diplomat and visiting fellow at the RIIA examines potential sources of danger in the Gulf and explores alternative methods for keeping peace in the region. He concludes that “Proposals for Gulf security have included a repeat of Desert Shield or a copy of European security structures. But both would be flawed. ... The ambitious proposals for a Middle East Security Conference presuppose a solution of all the region’s outstanding political issues. What is required instead is a more pragmatic approach using the sort of cooperation that will build confidence such that the more dangerous issues can be tackled and solved in the future. Its initial basis can be the coalition, which explicitly and implicitly included all the states of the region in an consensus against the attempt to extinguish the existence of Kuwait.” (p. 34)

11. Davies, Charles E., ed. *Global Interests in the Arab Gulf*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992. ●● A collected volume from papers given at an annual University of Exeter conference on the Gulf. The initial papers deal with Gulf history while the second part discusses oil prospects in a paper by Peter A. Davies (British Petroleum) and Paul J. Stevens (University of Surrey) and Arab labor in the GCC in a paper by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair (Birks and Sinclair Ltd.). K. Subrahmanyam (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi) discusses relations between the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent while Anoushiravan Ehteshami (University of Exeter) broadens the focus to Gulf relations with newly industrializing countries. Willem Van Eekelen (Secretary-General of the Western European Union) covers Western European security interests in the Gulf while Susumi Ishida (International University of Japan) details Japan’s oil strategy. The Soviet Union’s role in the Gulf and wider region is handled by Vitaly Naumkin (Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow) and Alexei Vassiliev (Institute for African Studies, Moscow) while Anthony H. Cordesman (Georgetown University and US Senate adviser) adds a long paper on US power-projection capabilities in the region and Richard W. Murphy (US Council on Foreign Relations) discusses American political policy. Rolf Müller-Syring (Leipzig University) outlines the process of militarization and John Townsend (Business International) observes the far-reaching economic and political changes in the Gulf’s last few decades, concluding that “if any ruling family in the Gulf is seen by the people to be putting dynastic survival ahead of overall national interests and in doing so emphasises its lack of accountability to the people, then that family will assuredly be ousted.” (p. 386)

13. Sours, Martin H. “Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Middle East: Regional Stability Within the New World Order.” Asian Affairs (Washington), Vol. 18, No. 1 (June 1991), pp. 43-51. Two articles drawn from an issue devoted to the search for peace in the Middle East. Dickman, a former US ambassador to the UAE and Kuwait, states that “Very little consideration ... was given to what the United States might hope to accomplish once Iraq left Kuwait. Now that the war has ended, it remains unclear ... how the United States hopes to achieve regional stability in the Middle East.” (p. 5) Sours, a professor at the American Graduate School of International Management, says that US hegemony in a new world order will be restricted by its economic and social weakness, thus increasing the roles played by prominent regional states such as Germany in Europe, Japan in the Pacific Rim, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. “By hosting and participating in the coalition that defeated Iraq, the Saudi regime has shown the ability to operate on the global level.” (p. 50)


15. Doran, Charles F., and Stephen W. Buck, eds. The Gulf, Energy, and Global Security: Political and Economic Issues. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991. The product of a project sponsored by the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., this volume gathers papers presented at a joint conference between the institute and Johns Hopkins University SAIS that attempt to assess the situation in the Gulf at the beginning of the 21st century. The project began and the conference was held before the Kuwait War but, by the publication cut-off, the papers were able to include comments between the Iraqi invasion and the war. Some of the contributions concentrate on individual countries in the region while other authors look at the interests of external powers. John W. Limbert (US Consul-General in Dubai) concludes that Iranian politics lurched unpredictably from one extreme to the other during the 1990s and looked likely to continue to do so. Phebe Marr (National Defense University) notes that “With the need to rebuild, Iraq could not play much of a regional role and, indeed, could become prey to hostile neighbors.” (p. 49) David E. Long (US Coast Guard Academy), writing on Saudi Arabia, foresees that “Once the immediacy of the Kuwait crisis recedes, and assuming the Saudi political system escapes unscathed, ... changes are likely to be most reflected not in major policy shifts but in an incremental decrease in Saudi willingness to accommodate US oil, economic, political, and defense interests.” (pp. 104-105) Joseph Wright Twinam (The Citadel) ends his survey of the other GCC states by observing that “Once the immediacy of the Kuwait crisis recedes, and assuming the Saudi political system escapes unscathed, ... changes are likely to be most reflected not in major policy shifts but in an incremental decrease in Saudi willingness to accommodate US oil, economic, political, and defense interests.” (pp. 104-105) Joseph Wright Twinam (The Citadel) ends his survey of the other GCC states by observing that two regional problems will complicate US relations with the GCC states: how to deal with revolutionary Iran and perceptions of the US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Shahram Chubin (Graduate Institute of International Studies) anticipates the collapse of the Soviet Union by postulating that Soviet policy in the Gulf might become more benign and amenable to greater cooperation with the United States. The essay on the European Community and the Gulf by Philip Robins (Royal Institute for International Affairs) judges that European Community policy towards the Gulf will continue to focus on oil and the possible disruption
of trade despite the continuation of twelve individual European policies. Meanwhile, Ukeru Magosaki (Japanese Foreign Ministry) and Yasumasa Kuroda (University of Hawaii) notes that Japan is developing a policy in the Gulf independent of the United States (mainly to protect its oil interests and access to markets) but they foresee US-Japanese differences remaining narrow and acceptable. In other papers, Edward N. Krapels (Energy Security Analysis) sees a continuing rise in US oil imports from the Gulf, which will mean that “the United States will continue to regard the strategic defense of oil-exporting countries against outside threats as one of its primary military missions.” (p. 24) Michael Collins Dunn (International Estimate) declares that “The end of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis will not end the arms race in the Gulf; in fact, the crisis itself will be a major determinant in procurement decisions.” (p. 82) In the final essay, co-editor Charles F. Doran (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) lays out the formal conclusions of the study, which are that the “managing of external hostilities and vulnerabilities caused by the hostilities” is of higher priority than “focusing upon the matter of domestic political stability of régimes, which will tend to take care of itself....” and that “the US government, in conjunction with cooperating countries inside and outside the Gulf region, embark on a set of two track arms control initiatives involving both arms suppliers and purchasers” because “without arms constraint, the next war will be much more devastating than the last.” (p. 208) (Co-editor Stephen W. Buck is with the US Department of State.)


17. Dunn, Michael Collins. “The New Geopolitics of Southwest Asia.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1997), pp. 142-149. •• The editor of The Estimate opines that “a great many games, both great and small, are being played [in the increasingly linked Central and Southwestern Asia....” (p. 142) He makes the points that links between Central Asia and its southern neighbors are much deeper than previously realized; that links between the Tajik
and Afghan wars began during the Afghan-Soviet period; Islam has always been a rallying point in Central Asia but not in the modern, urban, political Islamist sense; the Tajik civil war is a rivalry of regions and not a conflict between Islam and secularism; the Taliban are a Pushtun traditionalist movement seeking to restore a romanticized version of the tribal village; Pakistan and perhaps the US initially encouraged the Taliban because they seemed able to unite Afghanistan; “pipeline politics” and broader trade opportunities, as well as ethnic allegiances, explain changing regional alignments; and ethnopolitics plays a major but not decisive role in regional conflicts.

18. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, and Gerd Nonneman, with a contribution by Charles Tripp. War and Peace in the Gulf: Domestic Politics and Regional Relations into the 1990s. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991. The authors, from the University of Exeter, examine domestic politics in Iran and Iraq (the latter chapter is contributed by Tripp, of the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies), Iraq’s relations with the other Arab Gulf states, military developments in the Gulf, and the defense investment and military procurement strategies of Iran and Iraq. The final two chapters consist of a collection of relevant documents and a chronology of Gulf events over the period of 1980-1991. The book was written before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait although a February 1991 postscript discusses the consequences of the onset of Kuwait War and suggests that a satisfactory solution to the situation in the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli dispute will impossible without addressing the Middle East arms race and the absence of a viable regional security structure.

19. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, ed. From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994. Papers from a 1993 conference at the University of Exeter’s Centre for Arab Gulf Studies. Among the contributions, Valeria F. Piacentini (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan) discounts Iranian political-imperialistic policy in Central Asia and charges that Saudi Arabia’s support for the re-Islamation of the area is due to its desire to limit Iranian influence there. Mai Yamani (University of Oxford) traces the connection between Saudi Arabia and Central Asia throughout Islamic history and the integration of Central Asian immigrants into Saudi society. The editor, Anoushiravan Ehteshami (University of Durham) examines Iran’s relations with the Central Asian republics and sees the possibility of a shift in the Gulf’s balance of power because of GCC competition. Rosemary Hollis (Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies) discusses Western and primarily American security policy in the region and remarks on the contrast between policy towards Central Asia – tentative and multilateralist – and policy towards the Gulf – pronounced direct involvements and commitments. Vitaly Naumkin (Russian Center for Strategic Research and International Studies) discusses political and security linkages between the Gulf and Central Asia.

in the Gulf between 1971 and 1991. He focuses on the changing environment of regional politics between the 1970s and the 1980s, the impact of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war.


23. Hameed, Mazher A. *Arabia Imperilled: The Security Imperatives of the Arab Gulf States*. Washington, DC: Middle East Assessments Group, 1986. Also published as *Saudi Arabia, the West and the Security of the Gulf* (London: Croom Helm, 1986). The executive director of the Middle East Assessments Group examines Gulf security with an emphasis on the security perceptions, resources, and problems experienced by the Gulf states themselves. A final chapter deals with strategies for protecting US interests in the Gulf. He advises that “U.S. assistance to the GC states must be defined in terms of what these countries need to improve their ability to handle their own security as much as possible, thereby reducing the need for or likelihood of U.S. intervention...” (p. 170) and warns that “one of the most effective ways of protecting U.S. interests in the region lies in ensuring that there is enough movement toward a just and lasting peace between the Arab states and Israel.” (p. 172)


25. Hiro, Dilip. *Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran after the Gulf Wars*. London: Routledge, 2001. A London-based writer and journalist provides an account of developments in Iraq after the Kuwait War, including sanctions, mutual hostility between American presidents and Saddam Husayn, and Operation Desert Fox in 1998. He couples this with a similar examination of Iran, the impact of Rafsanjani’s policies, the emergence of Khatami, and the struggle for control between reformers and reactionaries. An epilogue describes the situation after the election of George W. Bush as US president.

26. Hollis, Rosemary. *Gulf Security: No Consensus*. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993. Whitehall Paper Series, 1993. A research fellow at the RUSI examines the respective views on Gulf security of each of the four actors in the Gulf: Iran, Iraq, the GCC, and the West. Her balance sheet is that “There is no prospect of agreement on Gulf security between all those involved so long as they retain incompatible objectives. ... The result is a stand-off....” (p. 71)
27. ________, ed. *Oil and Regional Developments in the Gulf*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Middle East Programme in association with Division of Research and Studies, Crown Prince Court of Abu Dhabi, 1998. Papers from a 1997 conference in Abu Dhabi. John V. Mitchell (RIIA) begins the book with an overview of developments in the global oil and gas industry while David G. Heard (Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company) looks at the industry in the UAE. Gary G. Sick (Columbia University) examines the failure of Washington’s “dual containment policy” while the editor (RIIA) scrutinizes differences between the US and Europe regarding Gulf policy. Raad Alkadiri (Petroleum Finance Company) assays the problems in the Iraq sanctions policy and Edmund Herzig (RIIA) surveys Iran’s regional relations. Mai Yamani (RIIA) provides a look at generational change in Saudi Arabia. The editor, in her concluding remarks, states that “there is reason to believe that the period of US predominance in the management of Gulf security may have peaked” and “the desire of Gulf Arabs to build up regional alignments and connections in response to specifically regional concerns is clearly present. These sentiments seem likely to portend an end to the relative isolation of Iraq and Iran.” (p. 158)


31. *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1990), section on “Strategic Discussions.” Papers drawn from a September 1989 conference include: Edward Lavalle, “Collective Security and the Superpowers: Trends of Significance for the Persian Gulf States” (pp. 3-20); Helmut Hubel, “The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf in the 1980s and Beyond” (pp. 21-35); Tuomo Melasuo, “The Role of the Persian Gulf in the Importance of the Indian Ocean” (pp. 37-49); A.F. Borovali, “Turkey and the Gulf” (pp. 49-58); Elizabeth Gamlen, “US Strategic Policy Toward the Persian Gulf” (pp. 59-84); Hamid Mowlana, “Geopolitics of Communication in the Persian Gulf” (pp. 85-106); and Muwahid Hussein Shah, “Enwrapped in the Flag: How US Lawyers View the War in the Persian Gulf” (pp. 139-149).

Boundary questions are discussed in: Asghar Jaffari Valdani, “Unstable Borders in the Persian Gulf” (pp. 539-560); Keith McLachlan, “The Iran-Iraq Boundary Question” (pp. 584-603); Richard Schofield, “Disputed Territory, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Iran” (pp. 614-639); and Mohammad Reza Dabiri, “Abu Musa Island: A Binding Understanding or a Misunderstanding” (pp. 576-583). Iranian-Iraqi relations and the future of Iraq are the subject of: Ali Asghar Kazemi, “The Legal Issues Pending in the Present Iran-Iraq Relations” (pp. 604-613), and John Waterbury, “Iraq’s Future: Is Democracy the Only Way Out” (pp. 775-780). The role of oil in security considerations is discussed by: Paul Rogers, “Oil and Security in the Persian Gulf” (pp. 722-737); Narsi Ghorban and Mohammad Sarir, “Oil and Gas: An Outlook for Future Cooperation Among the Persian Gulf States” (pp. 738-754); and Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Politics of World Oil Prices: Lessons from the Past and Prospects for the Future” (pp. 755-774).

33. Johar, Hasan A. “New Dimensions of Future Security in the Gulf.” *Journal and Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 267-294. A member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly reviews such pertinent aspects of Gulf security as domestic politics, relations within the GCC, and regional security. He advises that the Gulf states must face certain realities, including ending “the tribal age based on isolation,” the necessity for a regional approach to development, the need for political reform to stop “outrageous expenditures, abuse of authority, administrative corruption,” and the requirement for enacting a regional security project. (pp. 290-291)

34. Jones, Peter. “Maritime Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf Region.” *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 368-392. The author, Middle East Security and Arms Control Project leader at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, stresses the importance of maritime security in the Gulf and advances some ideas for maritime confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of information on naval procurement policies and exercises, and agreements not to attack civilian targets.

36. Kemp, Geoffrey, and Janice Gross Stein, eds. *Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security*. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. ●● The outcome of three workshops sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and edited by a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor at the University of Toronto respectively. The book begins with several overview essays, including Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies) on ethnic conflict and state building in the Arab world and Ghassan Salamé (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris) on future arrangements for regional security. The views and policies of regional actors on Gulf security are discussed by Shaul Bakhash (George Mason University) on Iran, Shahram Chubin (formerly at the Graduate School of International Studies, Geneva) on Iran as well, Charles Tripp (University of London SOAS) on Iraq, Soli Özel (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) on Turkey, Abdel Monem Said Aly (Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo) and Hassan Saleh (Amiri Diwan, Qatar) on the GCC, David McDowell (independent writer) on the Kurds, and Barham A. Salih (representative of the Kurdish Regional Government in the United States) also on the Kurds. The key issue of WMD and delivery systems is covered by Marvin M. Miller (MIT) and the potential of water leading to regional conflict is examined by Thomas Naff (University of Pennsylvania). Implications of Gulf security arrangements on US policy are handled by William B. Quandt (University of Virginia), Thomas L. McNaugher (RAND Corporation), and Richard K. Hermann (Mershon Center and Ohio State University).

37. Kemp, Geoffrey. “The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize.” *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998/1999), pp. 132-149. ●● The director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center argues that, despite current downward trends in oil prices, dependence on Gulf oil will increase in future and thus the Gulf’s security will remain important to the global economy. With this in mind, “the continued crisis over Iraq and the US stand-off with Iran are vivid reminders of the region’s continued instability. Although the US remains Gulf oil’s protector of last resort, America’s forward military presence is itself a cause of political unrest in the Muslim world.” (p. 149)

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University) dwells on social change, Michael E. Bonine (University of Arizona) analyzes population growth and the labor market, and Mai Yamani (University of London SOAS) covers health, education, and gender.

39. Long, David. “Prospects for Armed Conflict in the Gulf in the 1990s: The Impact of the Gulf War.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1993), pp. 113-125. •• A retired US Foreign Service officer suggests that the most plausible scenario for conflict would be either Iran or Iraq attacking each other or one of the smaller Gulf states. Still, he judges that “the chances of a renewal of major armed conflict in the Gulf in the 1990s are fairly low.” (pp. 123-124) He notes that Washington’s ability to keep a balance in the Gulf depends on its capability in maintaining a military presence in the region. “However, the longer the United States feels compelled to deploy military forces in the region, the more likely it is to wear out its welcome.” (p. 125)

40. McKnight, Sean, Neil Partrick and Francis Toase, eds. Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges for the New Generation. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2000. Whitehall Paper. Published with the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. •• A collection of papers presented at a 1999 conference by academics, diplomats, and British politicians. A section on the GCC contains papers by Andrew Rathmell (Kings College London) on GCC military and political cooperation, Othman al-Rawaf (King Saud University, Riyadh) on a Gulf view, and Richard Schofield (School of Oriental and African Studies, London) on border disputes. Ali Ansari discusses Iran’s internal politics while Christopher Rundle (formerly with the British Foreign Office) focuses on the impact of US and European policy on Iran, and Hadi Semati dissects Iran’s view of Gulf security. Iraq is the subject of papers by Mustafa Alani (RUSI) on Saddam’s support structure, Tim Niblock (University of Exeter) on post-Saddam Iraq, and Nemir Kirdar (Investcorp Ltd.) on the economic aspects of Gulf security. Jamal Suweidi (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi) discusses the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Robert Joseph (National Defense University, Washington) analyzes deterrent strategies regarding WMD, and Peter Jones (Privy Council Office, Ottawa) regards prospects for a regional arms control regime. Fred Halliday (London School of Economics) outlines the dangers of Islamic radicalism, Magnus Ranstorp (University of St. Andrews) presents the threat this poses to the GCC states, and Gerd Nonneman (Lancaster University) responds with régime responses to the threat. Paul Stevens (University of Dundee) looks at the impact of declining oil revenues in the GCC states.

41. McMillan, Joseph, Richard Sokolsky, and Andrew C. Winner. “Toward a New Regional Security Architecture.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 161-175. •• Two research fellows at the US National Defense University and a staff member at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge, MA, respectively, argue that the focus on reconstruction in Iraq has diverted attention from the unfinished business of creating the basis for lasting security in the Gulf. The authors examine the problems remaining in the region for the US and advance the case for a Gulf collective security architecture relying on
the participation of all the littoral states and consisting of “a mutually reinforcing network of linkages among all the Gulf states, including Iraq and Iran.” (p. 167) They see the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a model. The US should not be a formal member but instead provide support and assistance.

42. Mahallati, Mohammad Jafar. “The New Persian Gulf Security Arrangement and the Relevant Factors.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 8, No. 1 (July-August 1991), pp. 22-24. ●● A former Iranian ambassador to the UN notes three approaches to Gulf security: domination by a single hegemonic power (which is completely outdated), a balance of power (which was responsible for the major destabilizing events in the region through the 1980s), and collective security (featuring non-interference by external powers).


45. Pamir, Peri. “The Gulf in a New World Order: Peace-Building Scenarios for the Middle East.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 283-300. ●● The program coordinator at the Conference of Rectors of European Universities argues that the responsibility for picking up the pieces from the Iran-Iraq War rests ultimately with the international community and that “The main challenge for the UN in the postwar period will be to link the issues of security, stability, democracy and developmentin the Middle East and, by so doing, to try to heal the wounds of war and lay the foundations for a lasting peace in the region.” (p. 297) The first step is a solution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

46. Peterson, J.E. Defending Arabia. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. ●● A study of Gulf security concerns over the course of most of the 20th century. British security policy in the Arabian Peninsula pre-dated global dependence on oil and the establishment of civil and military air routes and landing grounds in the peninsula between the two world wars formed a principal focus of British activity. After the Second World War, Britain sought to defend its interests in the region through air operations in the Aden Protectorate, assistance to the Sultan of Oman in the 1950s and again in the 1960s-1970s, protection for Kuwait during the Iraqi threat of 1961, and the withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and from the Gulf in 1971. American replacement of the British security umbrella over the Gulf took time to unfold but gathered steam in the 1980s following the Iranian Revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. At the same time, the Gulf states sought to expand their own military capabilities and joined together in the Gulf Cooperation Council. “The United States and Saudi Arabia – and behind the Saudis, the other five GCC states – will remain mutually dependent far into the next century. Neither can afford to jeopardise the
support and co-operation of the other during this period. Consequently, the necessarily close
coordination of security interests in the Gulf between these states must build on foundations
of mutual trust and sensitivity.” (p. 246) A distillation of these themes was published earlier
(Fall 1984), pp. 465-488.

47. Potter, Lawrence G. “Confidence-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf.” *Iranian Journal of
International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 353-367. ●● The deputy director
of the Gulf/2000 project at Columbia University suggests as confidence-building measures:
declarations of peaceful intent by regional leaders, exchange of basic information, better
communications, improved maritime security, and regular consultation between military
forces. A shorter version of the article was also published as “The Need for Confidence-
Building Measures in the Persian Gulf.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (January-
February 1996), pp. 27-30, and a longer version under the same title in Gary G. Sick and
Lawrence G. Potter, eds., *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy,

Headline Series, No. 315. ●● The deputy director of the Gulf/2000 project and adjunct
professor at Columbia University concisely summarizes developments in the Gulf,
emphasizing the internal transition of the Gulf nations from traditional entities to modern
states, the impact of recent wars in the region, the prospects for regional cooperation, and
prospects for US policy. His conclusion is that “The American age in the Persian Gulf,
historically speaking, has just begun and will probably be of much shorter duration than that
of the British. While it lasts, the United States should work to promote regional
reconciliation and not permit the countries to postpone facing their problems.” (p. 69)

49. __________, and Gary G. Sick, eds. *Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles and the
the editors’ Gulf/2000 conferences begins with a historical study of Gulf security by J.E.
Peterson and is followed by a survey of the Gulf’s ethnic diversity by Mehrdad Izady. The
GCC perspective on Gulf security is analyzed by Ibrahim A. Karawan while the Iranian
perspective is provided by Saideh Lotfian and separately by Bijan Khajehpour-Khouei. The
islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, disputed between the United Arab Emirates and
Iran, are covered from the Iranian perspective by Jalil Roshandel, from the Arab Perspective
by Hassan Al-Alkim, and by Richard Schofield. Papers on the “new generation” are
contributed by Mai Yamani on Saudi Arabia and Hadi Semati on Iran. Abdullah Alshayji
discusses Iranian-GCC relations while Raad Alkadiri covers Iraq and the GCC.

50. Pridham, B.R., ed. *The Arab Gulf and the West*. London: Croom Helm, for the University of
Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1985. ●● A compilation of papers originally presented
at a 1984 Exeter symposium and edited by the deputy director of the Centre for Arab Gulf
Studies at the university. The volume begins with a pair of contributions on the establishment
of the British treaty system in the Gulf: David Roberts (retired British diplomat and Middle East Association) provides a British view and Husain M. Albaharna (Bahraini Minister for Legal Affairs) a Gulf view. Anthony Parsons (retired British diplomat) follows with a British perception of the Gulf. Economics are covered by John Townsend (Business International) on economic interdependence, Yousuf A. Shirawi (Bahraini Minister of Development and Industry) on the transfer of technology, Sinclair Road and Averil Harrison (both of the Committee for Middle East Trade) on Gulf investment in the West, and Giampaolo Calchi Novati (University of Pisa) on the EEC and the GCC. A section on international politics and security contains papers by John Duke Anthony (National Council on US-Arab Relations) on US views of Gulf security, William L. Dowdy (University of Lancaster) on the security implications of the Strait of Hormuz, and Bichara Khader (University of Louvain) on the Gulf, Palestine, and the West. Robert Swann (Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation) examines cultural interchange from the European point of view while Levon H. Melikian (University of Qatar) surveys the Gulf reaction. The final section consists of various viewpoints on the future of Gulf-European-American relations: Abdullah ibn Faisal ibn Turki Al Sa’ud (Royal Commission for the Development of Jubail and Yanbu’) for the Gulf, Michael Sterner (retired US diplomat and International Relations Consultants) for the US, and Olivier Carré (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales) for Europe.


52. Robins, Philip, with a chapter by Jonathan Stern. The Future of the Gulf: Politics and Oil in the 1990s. Aldershot, Hants, England: Dartmouth, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1989. A research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs summarizes political and economic developments in Iran, Iraq, and the GCC states before examining the role of the superpowers in the Gulf and then Stern looks at the importance of the Gulf for oil supplies.

53. Roshandel, Jalil. “Confidence-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf.” Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 627-642. The author explores the idea of establishing a strategy of Non-Offensive Defense within a collective Gulf security system. Such a strategy would embrace friendly relations, peaceful resolution of differences, arms control, disarmament, measures to create confidence and security, and a defense-oriented restructuring of the armed forces.

55. __________, ed. Crises and Quandaries in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Published in the United States as Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002. ●● A collection of articles on current developments in the Gulf. Contributors include Turki al-Hamad on GCC cooperation, Sean Foley on UAE security, Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green on political stability in the GCC states, Shafeeq Ghabra on socioeconomic change in Kuwait, Daryll Champion on Saudi Arabia’s stability, Jon B. Alterman on US-GCC security relations, Amin Tarzi on US policy vis-à-vis Iraq, Amatzia Baram on Iraqi politics and foreign policy, Michael Eisenstadt on Iran’s nuclear policy, Seth Carus on Iran’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, and Abbad Samii on Iranian domestic politics. Most contributions were previously published electronically in the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) apart from three published elsewhere; all can be found in this bibliography in separate entries under the author’s name.

56. __________. “The Persian Gulf After the Cold War: Old Pattern; New Era.” MERIA News, Issue 4 (April 1999), distributed electronically. ●● The deputy director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies in Israel summarizes recent developments in Iran and Iraq and suggests that in the coming decade “the focus on the Gulf will involve several crises and one or more war.” The article was also published in German in Internationale Politik (June 1999).


58. Sick, Gary G., and Lawrence G. Potter, eds. The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. ●● A collection of a dozen papers presented at conferences organized by the Gulf 2000 project in 1994-1995 and edited by the director and deputy director of the project. Gary Sick begins the volume with an elaboration of what he regards as a “crisis in slow motion” that stands to transform the domestic politics and relations of the Gulf states with their neighbors and the outside world. Richard K. Herrmann and R. William Ayres (both of Ohio State University) look at the Gulf after the end of the Cold War and regard the future geopolitics of the Gulf as being determined most on the domestic level. F. Gregory Gause III (University of Vermont) examines the political economy of national security in the GCC states and Paul Stevens (University of Dundee) looks at the impact of oil (and oil prices) on Gulf politics. Karim Pakravan (First National Bank of Chicago) discusses private sector development and privatization mainly in Iran and Saudi Arabia while Richard N. Schofield (University of London SOAS) surveys the resolution of many border disputes. Munira A. Fakhro (University of Bahrain) provides background on and an assessment of the 1990s political unrest in Bahrain. Anthony H. Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies) analyzes Iranian military capabilities and outlines Tehran’s strategic options. Lawrence Potter examines the viability of confidence-building measures in the Gulf. Frank E. Vogel (Harvard Law School) looks at Saudi Arabia and Iran as case studies for Islamic governance. Roy P. Mottahedeh (Harvard University) and Mamoun Fandy (Georgetown University) then discuss Islamic movements in the Gulf and assess whether they should be included in the
political process. Finally, Anwar M. Gargash (independent scholar in the UAE) looks at challenges the Gulf faces in the future, including the problem of regional powers vis-à-vis small states, the dilemma of security, unsolved territorial disputes, and internal change. He emphasizes the need to break the cycle of mistrust in the region and charges that “The larger states in the Gulf must initiate this process...” (p. 338)

59. Sindelar, H. Richard, III, and J.E. Peterson, eds. *Crosscurrents in the Gulf: Arab, Regional and Global Interests*. London: Routledge, for the Middle East Institute, 1988. A collection of papers originally presented as lectures at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Columbia University and former National Security Adviser to President Carter) provides an introduction to US policy in the region and the Carter Doctrine, which he helped to formulate. The following three papers look at the Gulf in international affairs, with papers by Hermann Frederick Eilts (Boston University and a former US ambassador) on the GCC states’ foreign-policy perspectives, John Duke Anthony (National Council on US-Arab Relations) on the GCC, and Roger F. Pajak (Office of the US Secretary of the Treasury) on Soviet policy in the region. The next section consists of contributions by Wayne E. White (US State Department) on the Iran-Iraq War, Joseph C. Story (Gulf Consulting Services) on Gulf oil policies in the 1980s, and Rouhollah K. Ramazani (University of Virginia) on the potential for terrorism. Studies of individual Gulf states as provided by Dale F. Eickelman (New York University) on the next generation in Oman, David E. Long (Georgetown University and US State Department) on Saudi Arabia’s policies toward its neighbors, and J.E. Peterson on the future of federalism in the UAE.

60. Tanaka, Mitsuhiko. “Current Military Considerations in the Gulf.” *JIME Review*, No. 29 (1995), pp. 35-62. A senior research fellow at JIME in Tokyo surveys the security situation in the Gulf and the military build-up of the GCC states and their ties to external protectors. He notes that “the United States and other nations that are deeply involved in the Gulf and Middle East through arms transfers have many problems of their own. ... [But] The United States is working to maintain its overwhelmingly large presence in the Gulf. Meanwhile, countries such as France and Russia are trying to boost their arms export shares, as well as their influence in the region.” (p. 51)


62. Wells, Samuel F., Jr., and Mark A. Bruzonsky, eds. *Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. A great deal of this book deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict but there are a number of essays on the security situation of individual countries, among them Adeed I. Dawisha (George Mason University) on Saudi Arabia, Christine Moss Helms (Smithsonian Institution) on Iraq, and Robert S. Litwak (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) on Iran. In addition, Robert J. Lieber (Georgetown University) looks at relations between the industrialized
countries during the 1970s and 1980s while Dennis Ross (National Security Council) and Shahram Chubin (Graduate Institute of International Studies) discuss Soviet policy-making in the region. The second contribution by Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke University) “reviews the premises and emerging outlines of a US military strategy in Southwest Asia and advances some ideas concerning the integration of US military capabilities into a broader political framework.” (p. 306)

63. Wizarat, Talat A. “Strategies for Conflict Resolution in the Persian Gulf.” *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 1991), pp. 31-39. ⚫️ The chair of the international relations department at the University of Karachi reviews the many disputes in the Gulf and suggests three areas of attention to promote peace and security: tension relaxation and confidence-building measures, a regional security agreement, and a Gulf common market.
OIL SECURITY


65. Abu-Khadra, Rajai M. “Is the Gulf War Endangering World Oil Supplies?” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (January-February 1988), pp. 42-45. A former adviser to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Oil sees that the possible disruption of Gulf oil supplies to the West will be mitigated by over-production by Gulf producers, by unused production capacity outside the Gulf as well as inside it, by the equivalent of one month’s exports of Gulf oil at sea at any one time, and by far larger Western government and company oil stocks than in previous crises. “The real danger to oil supplies is if the tanker war is escalated into attacks on oil installations.” (p. 45)

66. Adelman, M.A. “Oil Fallacies.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 82 (Spring 1991), pp. 3-16. A professor emeritus of economics at MIT stresses the importance of oil in the health of international economy and reviews the circumstances in which oil price explosions occur. He is decidedly anti-OPEC, accuses Saudi Arabia of regularly violating promises regarding oil supplies, and contends that “only American armies kept Iraq out of Saudi Arabia.” (p. 16)


70. Akacem, Mohamed. “A New World Order for Oil.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1992), pp. 23-32. An associate professor of economics at Metro State College believes that “Desert Storm reaffirmed the dominance of the wealthy Gulf states in future oil matters. That dominance will not necessarily translate into the disintegration of OPEC as we know it, but the center of power has already shifted from Vienna to Riyadh.” (p. 23)
71. Alkadiri, Raad, and Fareed Mohamedi. “World Oil Markets and the Invasion of Iraq.” Middle East Report, No. 227 (Summer 2003), pp. 20-27. •• The director of the markets and countries group and the chief economist at the Petroleum Finance Corporation concur that the US invasion of Iraq has the potential to change the dynamics of the global oil market but much depends on the direction and timing of changes, as previous experience with Saudi Arabia and Venezuela demonstrate.

72. Amirahmadi, Hooshang. Oil at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Interplay of Market Forces and Politics. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996. The Emirates Occasional Papers, No. 5. •• The chair of the urban planning and policy development program at Rutgers University advises that the international oil outlook is uncertain for both consumers and producers and gauges that “World oil demand is on a steady rise. In the long run, supply will catch up with demand and oil prices will stabilize at a higher price.” (p. 8) He argues for a more hospitable attitude from the West toward OPEC, as it will benefit the West and its oil companies. A “reciprocal supply-demand security” will give OPEC producers “predictable and unimpeded access to stable markets at fair prices...” (p. 35) while OPEC guarantees “adequate and steady flow of oil at fair prices to its consumers.” (p. 36)


74. _________. “Oil Security at the Dawn of the New Millenium.” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 275-290. •• The author, from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, looks at recent developments on both the supply side and the demand side of the international oil industry and suggests that the United States’ policy towards Iran and Iraq involves contradictory goals: “economic (promoting the interests of American corporations abroad) and strategic (punishing régimes whose policies are perceived as a threat to American national security).” (p. 290)

75. Bina, Cyrus. The Economics of the Oil Crisis: Theories of Oil Crisis, Oil Rent, and Internationalization of Capital in the Oil Industry. New York: St. Martin’s Press; London: Merlin, 1985. •• The book opens with a discussion of the various theories advanced for the 1973-1974 oil crisis, which the author groups into traditional, dependency, and conspiratorial theories, and judges to be subjective and speculative. After a historical review of international oil pricing, Bina examines the role of raw materials, theories of rent and competition, the role of US oil production, and econometric models of oil prices and oil rents. He then develops an alternative theory concluding that “the individual value of crude oil, from the aged U.S. oil fields ... is the basis of the market value of the entire energy industry at the global level.” (p. 118) In his view, “contrary to conventional wisdom,” ... the increase in the oil royalties of the Middle East was not the cause but the consequences of the oil crisis.” (p. vi; emphasis in original)
76. Brown, William R. “The Oil Weapon.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1982), pp. 301-318. ●● The author, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Central Connecticut State University, addresses various arguments that have been raised about the “Arab oil weapon.” While he agrees that the oil embargo in 1973/1974 was ineffective, he takes issue with the assertion that petroleum is a matter of economics and that therefore the Arab oil producers will not risk their oil income to pursue a solution of the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, Brown contends that the oil glut of the early 1980s represented a temporary phenomenon that was not likely to prevail for long. He notes that the Arab producers have begun to take steps toward a more viable oil strategy, including marketing changes in the direction of bilateral state trading arrangements, increasing the proportion of oil shipped in Arab tankers, expanding Arab refining capacity, and exercising greater control over eventual oil destinations. Brown points out that application of oil diplomacy is essentially a last-resort strategy for the Arabs, and for Saudi Arabia in particular. Its success depends on the intricacy and friendliness of the US/Saudi relationship, and the Saudis are not likely to take the high risks of employing the oil weapon unless they become “totally exasperated with Washington’s procrastination as successive administrations attempt to manage rather than resolve the problem which Arabs see as being the result of Israeli obstinacy.” ●

77. Chalabi, Fadhil J. “OPEC: An Obituary.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 109 (Winter 1997-1998), pp. 126-140. ●● The executive director of the Center for Global Energy Studies and a former acting secretary-general of OPEC examines OPEC’s dwindling influence in the international oil markets, especially following the Kuwait War, but concludes that “despite ... dire predictions, the news of OPEC’s demise might be premature” (p. 139) since global energy demand is expected to rise significantly. This, however, the author says, is unlikely to solve OPEC’s myriad problems and he singles out the Gulf states for remaining “adamant in their resistance to privatization, deregulation, and fiscal discipline.” (p. 139)

78. Collins, John M., and Clyde R. Mark. “Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf: Use of U.S. Armed Force to Ensure Supplies.” Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 26 April 1979; updated 8 January 1980. Issue Brief No. IB79046. ●● Basically an updated and condensed version of the authors’ earlier study, *Oil Fields as Military Objectives*. This “issue brief” summarizes vital US interests in the Gulf, assesses the limited amount of military force that could be spared for a Gulf emergency, and factors in the consequences of Soviet intervention. The authors reiterate their earlier conclusions, charging that the US defense establishment lacks much latitude to cope with sizeable contingencies. In the view of those who feel that an American-Soviet confrontation in the Gulf is a distinct possibility, say the authors, two courses of corrective action are available: “accept the possible sacrifice of U.S. and allied interests that prominent spokesmen in Congress and the Executive Branch consider crucial, or strengthen our defense establishment.” Another version of this issue brief, slightly updated with the assistance of Elizabeth Ann Severns, was reprinted in: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Security Interests


80. ________. “Recognizing U.S.-Arab Interdependence: The U.S. Stake in Gulf Oil.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 20 (Spring 1987), pp. 57-61. ●● A short article, adapted from a speech by the president of Conant and Associates, emphasizes the high proportion of world oil reserves in the Gulf and suggests that “By the mid-1990s, it would not be surprising if the Gulf provided not today’s 50 percent of international oil, but 75 percent.” (p. 57) For this reason, the author states American interests towards the Gulf as being uninterrupted access to Gulf energy, a substantial presence in the region to limit Soviet expansion, helping to ensure the security and independence of all Gulf states from external aggression, and helping to insure the independence of Israel from external aggression.


82. Cordesman, Anthony H. “The One True U.S. Strategic Interest in the Middle East: Energy.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 117-127. ●● The Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies reasons that the key to the Middle East’s expanding strategic value lies in two factors: “oil will retain its importance as a critical energy supply” for the foreseeable future (p. 117) and because the Gulf’s oil reserves are vast. The question is whether the region “will act as a stable supplier of oil and gas exports at market-driven prices.” (p. 124)

83. ________. “Middle Eastern Energy After the Iraq War: Current and Projected Trends.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 126-147. ●● In a follow-up to his earlier article, the author notes that the Iraq War has had little impact on the overall importance of Middle Eastern energy or meaningful changes in global and US dependence on the region’s oil and gas exports. After examining global reserves, Cordesman notes that “most estimates indicate that the Middle East will steadily expand its oil production, increase its share of world production, and increase its impact on the global economy through 2030.” (p. 130)

Neff discusses structural changes in the world oil market. Other contributions of interest here include Gary Samore’s survey of politics and energy policies in the Gulf and Geoffrey Kemp’s examination of potential military threats to Western interests in the Gulf and possible responses.


86. Gillespie, Kate, and Clement M. Henry, eds. Oil in the New World Order. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995. The product of a 1992 conference at the University of Texas at Austin, and edited by two professors at that institution, this collection of papers focuses on the international oil industry after the Kuwait War. In addition to examinations of global issues affecting the industry, papers concentrate on developments in the former Soviet Union and managerial perspectives from Britain, Japan, Venezuela and Russia. Case studies of national oil strategies in the Middle East include Lahouari Addi (Université d’Oran, Algeria) on Algeria, Mary Ann Tétreault (Iowa State University) on Kuwait, Hooshang Amirahmadi (Rutgers University) on Iran, Peter Sluglett (University of Utah) on Iraq, and David E. Long (C & O Resources, Washington) on the GCC states.


88. Golub, David B. When Oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy, 1973-1985. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1985. Harvard Middle East Papers, Modern Series, No. 4. A Marshall Scholar at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, argues that oil and politics have been inseparable in Saudi Arabia and discerns that “the overall picture of Saudi oil policy since 1973 is ... one of long periods of price maintenance punctuated by two periods [1973-1974 and 1978-1979] during which Saudi policy caused or exacerbated sharp price increases.” (p. 4) Golub perceives that various forces at the international, regional, and internal levels have influenced Saudi decision-making, which is based on Riyadh’s perceptions of its vulnerability. “[T]he centrality of security-related concerns calls into question the importance of the Saudi desire to maximize oil sector profits. How important can long-term profits be when short-term security-related concerns seem to have determined policy during the two oil crises?” (p. 45)

89. Han, Vo Xuan. Oil, the Persian Gulf States, and the United States. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. An economist at Winthrop University (South Carolina) analyzes the impact of oil on the rentier states of the Gulf and the evolution of their economies as a result. He notes that US-GCC relations in the future will be affected by US dependence on Gulf oil, long-term
economic performance in the Gulf states, the speed of technological development in the region, and the Gulf’s internal political development.


92. Jaffe, Amy Myers, and Robert A. Manning. “The Shocks of a World of Cheap Oil.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 16-29. Jaffe and Armstrong (from the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations respectively) contend that, instead of oil shortages, the world faces a long-term danger of “a prolonged oil surplus and low oil prices over the next two decades.” (p. 16) The consequence of reduced oil income in the Gulf, the authors argue, is likely to be shrinking economies, bleak employment prospects, increased political opposition, and fewer means for governments to buy off critics. This does not bode well for US policy, they conclude. While the US proved its capability to handle external threats to the flow of Gulf oil by the Kuwait War, it does less well in coping with internal threats. In addition, the fall in Gulf oil exports to the US (but growth in exports to Asia) may well mean that “the expensive military role of ‘guardian of the Gulf’ will become increasingly vulnerable to those at home calling for more burden-sharing.” (p. 27)

93. Johnson, Thomas M., and Raymond T. Barrett. “Mining the Strait of Hormuz.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 107, No. 12 (December 1981), pp. 83-85. A short note by two military officers who were members of a State Department/Department of Defense military survey team sent to Oman in 1979. They argue that the strait is “deep enough to deny bottom mining against all but the deepest vessels and to deny blockage by sinkings. It is wide enough to make the mining task difficult, because it calls for the use of moored mines which are somewhat easier ... to find and remove.” But the authors note that mining can pose a psychological threat to shipping.

94. Kanovsky, Eliyahu. “Oil: Who’s Really Over a Barrel?” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 51-64. An economic professor at Bar-Ilan University in Israel rejects the idea of an OPEC revival or a serious shortage of oil supplies being behind recent oil price rises. Instead, he blames it on “errors of judgment, including: a shortage of refineries...; neglect of infrastructure needed for electric power; bungled policies in California's electrical
sector; and harsher winters in Europe which increased demand for fuel oil” (p. 56) and “a shortage of revenues for the producing countries.” (p. 53) This leads him to conclude that Saudi Arabia’s budgetary problems are primarily due to the need to continue defense spending because of corruption.

95. Knauerhase, Ramon. “Saudi Arabian Oil Policies.” *Current History*, Vol. 83, No. 489 (January 1984), pp. 29-32, 36-37. The author, a professor of economics at the University of Connecticut, contends that Saudi oil policymaking is shrouded in deepest secrecy. In theory, the king makes all oil decisions but he is supported by three advisory bodies: the Council of Senior Princes, the Council of Ministers, and the Higher Petroleum Council. Knauerhase suggests that Saudi policymakers have two options: to restrict output and sell at a high price, or expand output and sell more oil at a lower price. In the author’s view, Saudi Arabia has chosen the first option.

96. Lenczowski, George. “The Persian Gulf Crisis and Global Oil.” *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 462 (January 1981), pp. 10-13, 43. A discussion of the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on international oil supplies. Although early attacks on oil installations resulted in a large drop in oil exports for both countries, the existence of spare capacity around the world limited the adverse effects on oil prices and supplies. Lenczowski concludes that the war will not cause global disruptions but it may result in serious temporary shortages for heavily dependent customers. He advises major powers with a stake in the region to work to reduce tensions and suggests that the development of alternative export routes would be prudent.

97. Levy, Walter J. *Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941-1981*. Ed. by Melvin A. Conant. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982. A collection of reprinted articles by a well-known oil consultant, reflecting major stages in international oil developments from the beginning of World War II to the early 1980s. Of particular interest here are Levy’s Foreign Affairs articles on “Oil Power, “ “Oil and the Decline of the West,” and “Oil: An Agenda for the 1980s.” In “Oil Power” (Vol. 49, No. 4 [July 1971]), Levy points out that the emergence of OPEC has signalled a shift in the balance between oil producers and oil importers in the former’s favor. He emphasizes that “Despite their new position of power the attitude of the oil-producing countries still reflects a lingering heritage of emotional resentments against former colonial administrators and concessionary circumstances.” Levy begins “Oil and the Decline of the West” (Vol. 58, No. 5 [Summer 1980]) with the gloomy observation that “The year 1979 was one of grievous setbacks for the future security of the oil supply of the Western world, its economic and financial prospects, its strategic capabilities, and its political stability.” In his view, both the oil-exporting and oil-importing countries had adopted irresponsible policies which resulted in an unstable world oil market. A year later, in “Oil: An Agenda for the 1980s” (Vol. 59, No. 5 [Summer 1981]), Levy’s outlook appears somewhat more positive. Despite the emerging oil glut, Levy suggests that substantial dependence on OPEC oil will continue and attaches considerable importance to the actions of Saudi Arabia. However, he points out that in the foreseeable future, no firm reliance can be safely placed on the future availability of the required volumes of Middle Eastern oil at manageable prices. Levy advises
a balanced accommodation between oil exporters and importers, with close consultation and adoption of military measures to maintain the security of the Gulf.


99. Maechling, Eugenie. “Security Risks to Energy Production and Trade: The Problems of the Middle East.” *Energy Policy*, Vol. 10 (June 1982), pp. 120-130. The author, a research associate at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), examines physical threats to Western supplies of Gulf oil, with emphasis on Saudi Arabia. Maechling notes that the limited capacity of east-west pipelines and Mediterranean ports means that the Strait of Hormuz will remain the primary route for Gulf oil exports in the foreseeable future. She questions the ability of Gulf oil producers and their allies to defend their oil installations, their coastlines, and the strait. In particular, Maechling points out that Saudi Arabia could not withstand an attack from Israel; consequently, it is critical that the US provide Israel with sufficient guarantees of support and incentives not to carry out a pre-emptive strike against Saudi air defenses. Finally, Maechling notes that Gulf oil security is ultimately a political problem, and diplomatic moves to defuse the tensions in the Middle East are the best way to protect oil installations.

100. Maugeri, Leonardo. “Not in Oil’s Name.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July-August 2003), pp. 165-174. A vice-president of ENI takes note of the conspiracy theories linking the Iraq War to control of oil and warns that the linkages between oil and politics is not simple. He notes that “In short, the world is not running out of oil, and there is no oil security problem in today’s world market. The problem instead is that many Western observers speak about oil security when what they have in mind is stable and cheap oil supplies.” (p. 171) He advises policymakers to bear in mind that some volatility in oil prices is inevitable and that sounder Middle East policies are required.

101. Morse, Edward L. “The Coming Oil Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (1990), pp. 36-56. The publisher of *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly* and a former deputy assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy holds that “While the wild card recently placed on the table by Iraq is changing many of the rulers of the game, it is unlikely to affect them very substantially in the long run. The oil system has been moving in directions based much more on the economic logic that has governed its growth than on specific government acts.” (p. 56) He believes that “The transitional period between the oil industry’s deep recession of the past few years and its coming boom is bound to be bumpy [and] We can
expect upward and downward price gyrations over the next couple of years.” (p. 41) Still, he sees an inevitable rise in oil prices over the decade of the 1990s.


103. Telhami, Shibley, and Fiona Hill. “America’s Vital Stakes in Saudi Arabia.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (November-December 2002), pp. 167-173. The authors of the first article (associated with Hess Energy Trading and Firebird Management respectively) address “the contest for energy dominance between the world’s two largest oil exporters, Saudi Arabia and Russia” (p. 16) and describe how the Russian and Central Asian oil industry has been able to take market share away from Saudi Arabia’s stagnant, state-controlled industry. They suggest that Saudi Arabia can block the oil development of their Russian and Central Asian rivals if they are willing to sustain a cut-throat price war, which might require oil prices to sink to $10 a barrel for two years or more. Morse and Richard conclude that “If both Washington and Moscow encouraged what their companies and publics already do – increasing production in both countries while restraining demand in the United States – the stage could be set for a very new petroleum world.” (p. 31) Telhami (a professor at the University of Maryland and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution) and Hill (a fellow at Brookings) take issue with the contention by Morse and Richard that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are losing their significance for the US. They point out that the world’s oil importers “are all part of a single, seamless oil market driven by supply and demand, and global demand for oil has risen steadily over the last several decades. The options available to these oil importers are clearly determined by price – and therefore by those countries that hold the reserves.” (pp. 167-168) More than 60% of the world’s reserves are located in the Gulf, with 25% of the total in Saudi Arabia alone. They contend that Saudi Arabia will remain important to the US not only because American strategy is based on ensuring an uninterrupted flow of oil but also to prevent hostile forces from seizing control of Gulf oil.

Their essay is followed by a short rebuttal by Abdullah H. al-Othman (executive director of Saudi ARAMCO Affairs) who says that Morse and Richard “incorrectly suggest that Saudi Arabia supplies cheap oil to the United States as a quid pro quo for a favorable US policy toward Saudi Arabia [but instead] Saudi Aramco sells Saudi crude oil at prices based on the prices of selected ‘benchmark’ crudes, which fluctuate constantly.” (pp. 174-175) In addition, Cyrus H. Tahmassebi (president of Energy Trends) challenges the Morse and Richard assertion that Saudi Arabia discounts the price of its oil by $1 a barrel to subsidize the American people and points out that the difference in amount reflects the additional transportation costs from Saudi Arabia to the US. He also disputes the idea of altruistic motives behind Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity of 3mbd and charges that “Saudi spare capacity has emerged often not because of a well-conceived advance plan, but as a result of their miscalculations about future demand for oil.” (p. 176) Morse and Richard reiterate their conclusions in a response.
104. Mullins, Thomas D. “The Security of Oil Supplies.” *Survival*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (November-December 1986), pp. 509-523. An independent consultant reviews the effect of the Iran-Iraq War on oil supplies and regards a worst-case scenario as serious but better than in 1973 and 1980 since “consumers and their governments have taken unprecedented steps in encouraging conservation and alternative fuel substitution as well as a restructuring of the oil industry and with it the relationship between the consumers and the producing states.” (p. 523)


106. *Oil and International Security, Proceedings*. New York: International Security Council, 1987. The proceedings of a conference held in Washington, D.C., in May 1987. The conference summary states that “Only exceptional events such as a major nuclear accident in densely populated regions or a complete interruption to Middle East exports were felt likely to cause a rapid move to high prices. No economic pressure was felt to exist for higher prices.” (p. 10)

107. Olayan, Sulaiman S. “Saudi Arabia: The Burden of Moderation.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 32-41. A Saudi businessman calls for greater understanding of the role that Saudi Arabia has played within OPEC. Because of its position as a swing supplier of oil within OPEC (which has become the swing supplier of oil in the world market), the author contends that Saudi Arabia has been guided by long-term principles ensuring world stability. From the Saudi point of view, to avoid pressures to overproduce there must be a price floor high enough to discourage excessive consumption. At the same time, the price must not be so high as to eliminate world demand for oil before Saudi Arabia completes its industrial development. As a result, the Saudis have found themselves at odds with both the West and OPEC.


109. Pakravan, Karim. *Oil Supply Disruptions in the 1980s: An Economic Analysis*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. Hoover International Studies. The author, an analyst for the First National Bank of Chicago, contends that international cooperation, ideally taking place between OPEC, other oil exporters, and oil importers (including both North and South) is essential to reducing the economic costs of a potential disruption. In this regard, he elaborates a number of “countervailing policies” aimed at reducing disruption costs. For the US, he advocates both “anticipatory policies,” such as an import tariff, stockpiling, and domestic oil and gas deregulations, and “emergency measures,” including the unlimited release of oil reserves at market prices, and regulations requiring the switching to alternative fuels. But Pakravan cautions that the long-term solution to Gulf oil security problems can be
found only in the region itself, where he advocates economic integration, beginning with the hydrocarbon industries. ●


111. Quandt, William B. *Saudi Arabia’s Oil Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982. A Staff Paper. ●● Growing out of the author’s research for his book on Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, this study examines the key role played by Saudi Arabia in the world energy market due to its vast excess production capacity. As for Riyadh’s overall oil policy, Quandt rejects the image of a “country aggressively bent on wielding the oil weapon to extract profits and political payoffs from the industrialized West. With few – but important – exceptions, the Saudis have set production levels so as to meet world demands for oil.” He also points to a direct correlation between regional political problems and Saudi oil production. With the US in mind, he suggests that “good Middle East policy will also prove to be good energy security policy.” ●

112. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. *The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz*. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Nordhoff, 1979. *International Straits of the World*, Vol. 3. ●● Provides a physical description of perhaps the world’s most economically important strait. Ramazani also discusses littoral attitudes to rights of transit, scenarios for possible disruption of oil supplies dependent on the strait, along with an examination of conflicts present in contiguous areas. He concludes with three suggestions: the US should seek collective security for the strait and yield security responsibilities to regional states; both superpowers should reduce military supplies to the region; and the US should encourage an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. While the book is dated in a factual sense (it was written before either the Iranian revolution or the Iran-Iraq war), its analysis of the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and potential dangers remains just as pertinent today. See also Ramazani’s “The Strait of Hormuz: The Global Chokepoint,” in Larry W. Bowman and Ian Clark, eds., *The Indian Ocean in Global Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Nedlands: University of Western Australia, 1981), pp. 7-20. ●

113. Richardson, Neil. “Oil and Middle Eastern Politics.” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 34-44. ●● A political scientist at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee reviews developments in the international oil industry during the 1970s and 1980s, with particular emphasis on the role of OPEC. He judges that “The further stability of prices will therefore rest more on diplomatic relations and domestic political calm, and less on market control, than in the last twenty years.” (p. 43)

114. Romm, Joseph J., and Charles B. Curtis. “Mideast Oil Forever?” *Atlantic Monthly* (April 1996), pp. 57-60, 62-67ff. ●● The authors look at the future role of oil in global energy and assess the likelihood of another oil crisis in coming years. They discount the chances of further sources of oil outside the Gulf and increased domestic US supply providing a solution to an expected crisis and argue in favor of a technological approach relying on US leadership
in research and development. In their view, the world is on the verge of a revolution in energy and environmental technologies.


116. Salameh, Mamdouh G. “Is a Third Oil Crisis Inevitable?” Arab Affairs, No. 11 (Summer 1990), pp. 85-95. A World Bank consultant answers his own question by judging that “the world economy is heading towards its third oil crisis in this century probably by 1995....” (p. 85) Furthermore, “as long as the bulk of oil supplies will come from the Arab producers in the Gulf and as long as the Palestinian conflict is not settled, the continuity of oil supplies cannot be relied upon.” (p. 94)


118. Schuler, G. Henry M. “A Petroleum Forecast: The Impact on US-Arab Relations in the Coming Years.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 19 (Winter 1986-87), pp. 83-87. A resident fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies assesses the international role of Middle Eastern oil in the coming years and observes that the region’s importance is bound to increase because of its unused production capacity and undeveloped reserves. His requirements for better US-Arab relations include the recommendation that the GCC states abandon a quest for oil prices that are perceived as predatory.

119. Skeet, Ian. OPEC: 25 Years of Prices and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. A former Shell official provides a detailed history of OPEC, including an examination of its pricing strategies and production levels. He points out that “Consumer governments were particularly ignorant about oil in 1973. Postwar OECD resurgence had been fuelled on oil but it was provided, as if by sleight of hand, by the international oil industry. ... The crisis of 1973 came as a traumatic shock.” (p. 234) He goes on to explain how the international oil environment changed dramatically in the following decade and a half.

120. Sowayegh, Abdulaziz Al-. Arab Petropolitics. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984. Saudi Arabia’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Foreign Information looks at the purpose, utility, and goals of the “oil weapon.” After a recapitulation of the development of the oil industry in the Middle East, the creation of OPEC and its members’ “triumph” in gaining control of their oil resources, the author examines the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the beginnings of a coalescence of oil and politics. The heart of the book consists of a detailed analysis of the emergence of oil as a weapon against US support of Israel and
an assessment of its future viability and success. Al-Sowayegh concludes that “The real challenge facing the Arabs in the 1980s is to use their oil as an opportunity to promote economic prosperity, and to reaffirm their political sovereignty and international influence to effect legitimate Arab demands for a just and lasting solution of the Palestine problem.”

121. Telhami, Shibley. “The Persian Gulf: Understanding the American Oil Strategy.” *Brookings Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 32-35. ●● The Anwar Sadat professor at the University of Maryland warns that buying oil from other regions than the Middle East or Saudi Arabia will not resolve the problem of US reliance on the region’s supplies. But he observes that “for more than half a century a central drive behind the American military strategy in the oil-rich region ... has been to deny the control of such vast resources to powerful enemies who would thereby become even more powerful and thus more threatening.” (p. 34)

122. Tètreault, Mary-Ann. “Independence, Sovereignty, and Vested Glory: Oil and Politics in the Second Gulf War.” *Orient*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 87-103. ●● A professor at Old Dominion University remarks on the central importance of oil to the Kuwait in statements emanating from both Baghdad and Washington but declares that oil was “at best a half-truth and at worse a smoke screen intended to hide other reasons for the second Gulf war.” (p. 87)


124. __________. Committee on International Relations. *Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study*; Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1975. ●● A comprehensive study of the viability of using US military force to occupy Saudi Arabia’s oilfields in case of an OPEC embargo. The authors, John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark of the Congressional Research Service, conclude that the US could easily defeat defending forces while seizing oilfields and facilities but preserving the installations intact would be uncertain even under ideal conditions. It would be nearly impossible to arrive quickly enough to prevent sabotage, and a considerable investment in material and workers imported from the US, not to mention a lengthy period of time, might be required to repair damages. Furthermore, several US divisions, complete with adequate air, land, and sea support, would be needed indefinitely to maintain security over the installations, and strategic reserves would be depleted to the point that little would be left for contingencies elsewhere. Direct Soviet intervention, a distinct possibility, might well make the US mission impossible, particularly in protecting the sea lanes. Success, the
authors argue, would depend on two prerequisites: slight damage to key installations and Soviet abstinence from armed intervention.  


There are six principal conclusions to this report: (1) oil exports from the Gulf and North Africa are not likely to rise substantially in the next 10 years; (2) even if the Iran-Iraq war is settled quickly, a major oil supply disruption within the next decade is likely; (3) oil has become a political instrument in the hands of the major oil producing nations; (4) unless there is a major shift in current policies, the next two decades could witness growing competition among the governments of the consuming nations for scarce crude supplies; (5) the Soviet Union’s growing interest in the Middle East and its increasing control over Western Europe’s energy supplies pose grave dangers for the Western alliance; and (6) the economic slowdown in the developing countries and the huge increase in their foreign debt jeopardize economic development and threaten to undermine the international financial system. In addition, the report points out that an energy policy aimed solely at reducing imports will not adequately insulate the US from energy crises. “As a consequence our foreign and defense policies must be considered as much a part of our overall energy policy as our traditional programs to reduce oil imports.”  


Includes: (1) a year-by-year chronology of US-OPEC relations between 1960 and 1976; (2) a list of firms producing and exploring for oil in Middle Eastern states; (3) selected statements by OPEC officials; (4) selected documents on US international energy policy; (5) a collection of relevant articles; and (6) a bibliography of articles, government documents, and books on the subject.  


This Congressional Research Service (CRS) project estimates the short-term economic effects on the West of a hypothetical disruption of Gulf oil supplies and concludes that the effects would be catastrophic. A complete cessation of all oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in 1980 (before the recession took hold) would have caused the major industrialized countries to suffer a shortfall of 20-25% in their oil requirements. Crude oil prices would have risen from $30 to between $90 and $300, gross national product would have fallen 12-27% and employment would have dropped by 15-30%. A projection for a similar disruption in 1982 shows milder but still grave effects. The study suggests that the oil glut of the past few years has created
a false sense of security and contends that the US and the West are likely to rely increasingly on Gulf oil throughout the 1980s. Western policymakers are advised to emphasize policies designed to diminish the possibility of a major disruption and to improve preparations, including a useable strategic petroleum reserve and close cooperation with allies to prevent an “every man for himself” competition, in case a disruption occurs.

Political Aspects of the War and External Involvement

129. Abdulghani, Jasim M. Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. London: Croom Helm; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. •• A United Arab Emirates diplomat analyzes Iraq’s relations with Iran between the Ba’th Party’s accession to power in 1968 and the 1975 Algiers Agreement that established a boundary line in the Shatt al-‘Arab and secured the Shah of Iran’s promise to end support for Kurdish rebels. He also discusses Saddam Husayn’s abrogation of the Algiers Agreement, which constituted the opening salvo in the Iran-Iraq War. While emphasizing the importance of the Iranian revolution in upsetting Iranian-Iraqi relations, the author also notes that the war “has had cataclysmic consequences for both countries in economic, military and human terms. It has also had wide-ranging ramifications, both regional and global, and its prolongation and potential spill-over effects on neighbouring states have exacerbated tension and threatened stability in a highly strategic area.” (p. 218)

130. Ali, Sheikh R. “Holier Than Thou: The Iran-Iraq War.” Middle East Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1984), pp. 50-57. •• A political scientist at North Carolina Central University reviews the course of the Iran-Iraq War and notes, inter alia, that the war has exposed the prevailing insecurity in the Gulf, that Saddam’s failure to achieve his stated objectives means he grows weaker as the war rages on, that the war has had a profound impact on the Iranian revolution, that it has proved that an aggressor may lose international prestige if he does not achieve a quick victory, that it has stimulated the West to build up its strategic reserves and increased competition in the search for more oil, and it has pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict off center stage.

131. Aliboni, Roberto. “Recent Developments in the Gulf Crisis: The West and the Gulf.” Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 49-60. •• Six months ago, says the author, the Director of Studies at the Italian Instituto Affari Internazionali, the Iran-Iraq conflict was a forgotten war in the media, but then circumstances changed. One reason, he suggests, that it may have been forgotten was due to Western countries’ difficulty in taking sides. The positions of Western European states were remarkably different from the United States’ official neutrality but with a slight pro-Arab tilt and were more opportunistic than politically inspired. Why were 40 Western European warships included among the 80 Western ships in the Gulf at the time of writing? Aliboni thinks it was probably because of European perceptions that Southwest Asian security was changing and thus the European role must also change, with reinforcement from an Atlantic consensus on such policies as protecting international navigation in Gulf.
132. Alnasrawi, Abbas. “Iraq’s Perspectives.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 133-155. •• A professor of economics at the University of Vermont dissects Iraq’s motivations for and its perspectives during the war with Iran, as well as noting the American position that it did not wish to see either side achieve victory.


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135. Mofid, Kamran. “Economic Reconstruction of Iraq: Financing the Peace.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 48-61. •• This pair of articles assesses the war damage and expenditure of both participants and looks at their post-war reconstruction. Amirahmadi, Director of Middle East Studies at Rutgers University, estimates that the direct and indirect war damage to the Iranian economy was about $592 billion while the financial and budgetary damage added another $53-56b. (p. 30) Mofid, a Senior Lecturer in Economics at Coventry Polytechnic, estimates the monetary cost of the war to Iraq at $452b (p. 53) and notes that the total cost to both countries “exceeds the total oil revenue which Iran and Iraq have received throughout this century.” (p. 53) Both authors note the difficulties involved in reconstruction, which are not only financial and domestic but should include a lasting peace between the two combatants (and within the entire Gulf region as well) to prevent another war.


137. Axelgard, Frederick W. “Iraq and the War With Iran.” *Current History*, Vol. 86 (February 1987), pp. 57-60, 82, 90-91. •• A fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies charges that “A decisive victory by Iran would amount to the most disastrous setback to Western interests in the Middle East since the end of World War II. Iran’s extremist and destabilizing influence would be brought directly to bear against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, endangering the political as well as their oil-policy independence.” (p. 57)

138. Azhary, M.S. El, ed. *The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis*. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies and the University of Basra Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1984. •• A collection of ten papers, most first presented at the July 1983 Exeter symposium. The first two are historical: Peter Hunseker (of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs) provides a chronological outline of the Shatt al-‘Arab dispute since the
seventeenth century; and Arab claims to Khuzistan (or ‘Arabistan) over the last several
centuries are discussed by Mustafa al-Najjar (Director of the Basra Centre) and Najdat Fathi
Safwat. Then, David E. Long (a State Department analyst) discusses the impact of the war
on the international oil market, while John Townsend (of Business International, Geneva)
analyzes its economic impact on the belligerents. Basil al-Bustany (professor of economics
at the University of Baghdad) contends that Iraq’s gamble of wholeheartedly pursuing
development efforts while carrying out the war has been successful. Three papers address
the impact of the war on outside parties. G.H. Jansen (a correspondent for The Economist)
contributes a brief survey of the reactions of various Arab governments; the editor, M. S. El
Azhary (from the University of Exeter), adds an assessment of superpower attitudes to the
war (also published in International Affairs); and John Duke Anthony (President of the
National Council on US-Arab Relations) provides a more substantial analysis of regional and
worldwide implications. Finally, H. G. Balfour-Paul (a former British ambassador in
Baghdad, now associated with Exeter) looks at the numerous missed opportunities for
bringing the long war to an end, and expresses the hope that Iran and Iraq, having turned to
war for a settlement of specific disputes between them, will pursue peaceful means to
advance their respective claims to regional hegemony.

139. ________. “The Attitudes of the Superpowers Towards the Gulf War.” International Affairs
(London), Vol. 59, No. 4 (1983), pp. 609-620. The author, Deputy Director of the Centre
for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, traces the involvement of both the US and
the Soviet Union in the Iran-Iraq war, and their relationship with each of the combatants. He
concludes that both superpowers have found themselves sitting on the sidelines, due to a lack
of leverage over either Iran or Iraq.

Peuples Méditerranéens, No. 40 (July-September 1987), pp. 3-16. The former Iranian
president charges that the Iran-Iraq War has become multilateralized in an attempt to reverse
the consequences of the Iranian revolution.

1989), pp. 85-96. A professor at Haifa University analyzes the devastating impact of the
Iran-Iraq War on Iraq and speculates on what might replace the Iraqi régime, should it fall,
what future direction the Ba‘th party might take in foreign affairs, and prospects for
normalization between Iraq and Syria.

No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 606-628.

143. Brenner, Michael J. “The Iraq-Iran War: Speculations About a Nuclear Re-Run.” Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol. 8 (March 1985), pp. 22-37. The author uses the Iran-Iraq War as
a case study “to assess how nuclear arms, in the possession of either party, or both, could
have affected the outbreak of the conflict, its progression and its conclusion.” (p. 24) He
surmises that if Iraq had the bomb, it probably would have had to use it to force Iran to capitulate whereas Iranian nuclear capability probably would have deterred Iraq from attacking and may have encouraged Iran from pressing its campaign to get rid of Saddam Husayn. The result if both parties had nuclear weapons might be lowered inhibitions on their use and systemic instabilities rather than mutual deterrence.


145. Chalala, Elie. “Syria’s Support of Iran in the Gulf War: The Role of Structural Change and The Emergence of a Relatively Strong State.” *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1988), pp. 107-120. •• The author discounts three common explanations for Syria’s support of Iran against Iraq. The ideological theory, based on Iranian opposition to Israel and the US, he says, is simply propaganda. Similarly, the idea of an affinity between Syrian ‘Alawis and Iranian Shi’ah ignores the fact that the ‘Alawis are a small proportion of the population and can not control everything in Syria. The regional rivalry between Syria and Iraq makes more sense but is convincing only if the conditions which transform it into an actual policy can be specified. Chalala explains the policy to support Iran as resulting from (1) Iraq’s decision to go to war, which left Syria with no choice but to side with Iran to check Iraq; (2) the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which led to the emergence of the Shi’ah as the second most powerful Lebanese force and the only one with which Syria could work; (3) the emergence of a strong Syrian state, which allowed it to exploit opportunities with confidence; and (4) the strength of the Syrian-Saudi relationship (although a weaker factor than the others).

146. Chubin, Shahram. *Iran and Its Neighbours: The Impact of the Gulf War*. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1987. Conflict Studies, No. 204. •• The author, at the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), looks at Iran’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Gulf states, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – all in the context of its war with Iraq. He concludes that “Contemporary Iran’s pragmatism in its [non-Gulf] relations ... has brought some rewards but in the primary issue of the day, the prosecution of the war with Iraq, it has been unable to build up trust or sustain confidence with its Arab neighbours. The reasons for this derive both from the dynamics of the war and the nature of contemporary Iranian society.” (p. 31)

147. ________, and Charles Tripp. *Iran and Iraq at War*. London: I.B. Tauris; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. •• The authors, from the Geneva Center for Security Policy and the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies respectively, look beyond the fighting to examine the impact on Iranian and Iraqi politics, economy, and social conditions. The effect on Iraq has been to “widen the gap between the illusion and the reality of the state, creating expectations which cannot be fulfilled and necessitating further recourse to coercive methods.” (p. 245) As for Iran, in its failure to beat Iraq back and demand retribution in 1982, “Unable to muster the military capability to overthrow the enemy or to bring about its
change through internal revolt, Iran was destined to fight a long, arduous and costly war, which in historical perspective appeared arcane and senseless.” (p. 251)

148. Chubin, Shahram. “La guerre irano-irakienne: paradoxes et particularités.” *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 381-394. An analysis of the Iran-Iraq war as a model for Third World conflicts. Chubin points out that this war is being fought over ideological differences and not territory, which differentiates it from other conflicts. It is suggested that there is little chance that the war will end with an outright military victory for either side, but more likely will halt with a compromise in favor of the country possessing the greatest quantities of military and economic reserves. The author concludes that the Iran-Iraq war is full of paradoxes and cannot serve as an adequate model for future Third World conflicts.


151. ________. “The Last Phase of the Iran-Iraq War: From Stalemate to Ceasefire.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 1-14. The author, from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), provides a summary of the causes and the progress of the war and notes that in its latter stages, “Iran’s leadership had begun to despair of a military solution to the conflict, but was still far from devising a diplomatic strategy for Iran’s extraction from the war.” (p. 10) Chubin concludes that “The major casualty of the war has been the credibility of the Islamic republic among its own rank and file. It will no longer be able to call effectively upon its populace for crusades and sacrifices, but will have to act more like a traditional state.” (p. 14)

152. Cottam, Richard. “The Iran-Iraq War.” *Current History*, Vol. 83, No. 489 (January 1984), pp. 9-12, 40-41. An attempt to explain the causes of the Iran-Iraq war, the reasons for its prolongation and the inaction of the superpowers. The author asserts that Iraq attacked for three reasons: to stop an expansionist Iran; because Iran was part of a dangerous regional alliance aimed at countering Iraqi efforts against Zionism and imperialism; and because of Khomeini’s threats to spread Islamic fundamentalism. Despite Iraq’s poor military performance, the real miscalculation was political, since the Khomeini régime did not collapse, contrary to Baghdad’s expectations. Meanwhile, the author contends that both the US and the Soviet Union have been unable to formulate policies to cope with the war, since the dynamics of events in the Middle East remain disruptive and beyond the control and understanding of either superpower.

154. Davies, Charles, ed. *After the War: Iraq, Iran and the Arab Gulf*. Chichester, West Sussex: Carden Publications, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1990. ●● Papers from an annual University of Exeter conference on the Gulf, edited by a research fellow at the centre, deal with four aspects of the Iran-Iraq War’s aftermath. The first section deals with Iraq and the GCC and includes papers by Liesl Graz (The Economist) on the effectiveness of the GCC, Gerd Nonneman (University of Exeter) on Iraqi-GCC relations, Kamel S. Abu Jaber (University of Jordan) on Iraq as a regional power, and Ahmad Shikara (UAE University) on the Kurds of Iraq and the prospects for national integration. The economic impact of the war is discussed by Kamran Mofid (Coventry Polytechnic) focusing on Iran and Rodney Wilson (Durham University) on Kuwait. Sinclair Road (a consultant for the Committee for Middle East Trade) reviews trade and business prospects for the Gulf while Paul Stevens (University of Surrey) looks at oil and the role of OPEC. George Joffe (London University SOAS) examines developments in Iraq since the end of the war, Homa Katouzian (formerly at the University of Kent) looks at religious politics in Iran, and J.E. Peterson dissects changes in Arab Gulf society. A final section concentrates on strategic issues, with papers by Elizabeth Gamlen (doctoral student at the University of Bradford) on the “tanker war” and US responses, Anoushiravan Ehteshami (University of Exeter) on the military balance in the Gulf, Edgar O’Ballance (Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies) on the impact of the Cold War on the Gulf, and Eric Hooglund (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) on US policy toward the Gulf in the 1990s.

155. Dawisha, Adeed. “Iraq and the Arab World: The Gulf War and After.” *World Today*, Vol. 37, No. 5 (May 1981), pp. 188-194. ●● The Assistant Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs emphasizes that the Iran-Iraq war is a risky undertaking for the Iraqis. Domestic pressures may make it difficult to stop short of total victory and the effects of military defeat are potentially disastrous to the regime. In addition, Iraq’s economic policies have been undermined by the war and the slowing of growth rates may cause discontent. While the war has exacerbated inter-Arab divisions, these have not yet acquired a significant military manifestation. In conclusion, Dawisha warns that the present conflict in the Middle East need not be seen as permanent; in the past, leaders have been able to resolve differences and foster cooperation suddenly and without warning.


Arabia’s security situation in light of the Iranian revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq War by a visiting associate professor at Duke University. He notes that “As the Gulf war continues in its sixth year and with no end in sight, the Saudis and the other GCC members are becoming aware that their financial support of Iraq cannot go on indefinitely, and that the continuation of an open-ended conflict might eventually cause it to spread into their own territories.” (p. 51)


159. Fayazmanesh, Sasan. “US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf War.” Jusur, Vol. 7 (1991), pp. 37-49. According to this article, the American goal during the Iran-Iraq war was to destroy both countries as military and economic powers in the region. But tilting against Iran in that conflict left Iraqi power undiminished. Consequently, the US needed an excuse to destroy Iraq, which appeared when Saddam invaded Kuwait. Thus, the author alleges, the ensuing war was intended deliberately to finish the job of ensuring that Saudi Arabia would be the only pillar of US foreign policy in the region.

160. Ghareeb, Edmund. “The Forgotten War.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 5 (Summer 1983), pp. 59-75. A comprehensive survey of the Iran-Iraq war. The author first examines the long history of conflict between the two countries, to which may be added more recent factors of personal enmity between their leaders and ideological differences. An environment of sustained border clashes and Iranian support for subversion within Iraq helped provoke the Iraqi attack in September 1980. The author points out that after several years of hostilities, the war has reached a military stalemate, with Iran’s greater manpower and superior navy balanced by Iraq’s air superiority and better ground-support operations. A war of attrition has been the result. Ghareeb also discusses the impact of the war on the internal situation in both countries, concluding that Saddam Hussein’s position, although secure at the moment, faces potentially serious challenges if a settlement is not reached soon. As for the Iranian régime, the war has served to arouse religious and nationalist feelings. Since the economy has improved and oil exports are on the rise, the regime does not feel threatened and has no reason to negotiate. Finally, Ghareeb emphasizes that although this is a war between two states, there are considerable regional implications.

161. Goldstein, Walter. “The War Between Iraq and Iran: A War That Can’t Be Won or Ended.” Middle East Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1984), pp. 41-49. A critical review of a struggle between “two ... scorpions locked in a bottle” by an energy specialist at the State University of New York at Albany. The author calls for a quick end to the war and suggests that “Now that both Super Powers are tilting toward Iraq, perhaps they will exercise sufficient restraint to keep the war to severely local limits and to preserve the incompetence of the men fighting it.” (p. 48)
162. Grummon, Stephen R. The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled. New York: Praeger, for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982. Washington Papers, No. 92. A State Department analyst on Iran provides the most comprehensive analysis of the war yet published, even though more than two years of fighting have ensued since Grummon wrote this monograph. The author looks at the historical origins of the conflict, the strategy and tactics employed in the war and military operations, and its impact on the domestic policies of both combatants. Other chapters address regional responses to and implications of the war (including the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council), the role of the superpowers, and efforts at negotiation. Grummon expects that “The Iran-Iraq conflict will continue to be a major source of tension and instability in the Persian Gulf region for the indefinite future,” and adds that the Gulf has become another region with “an almost intractable dispute,” like the eastern Mediterranean (with Arab-Israeli and Greek-Turkish conflicts) and South Asia (India-Pakistan). He also notes that the experience of this war “suggests that one aspect of a comprehensive US security policy should focus on the issue of intraregional security.” The monograph is enhanced by the addition of a number of helpful maps.

163. “The Gulf War, Year Five.” Orbis, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall 1984), pp. 437-447. Four authors provide views on different aspects of the Iran-Iraq War. Dennis Ross (Berkeley-Stanford Program on Soviet International Behavior) discusses the twists in Soviet policy toward the war and concludes that “while the current Soviet level of activism should be expected to continue, it is likely to be tempered if things begin to heat up dramatically....” (p. 447) John Duke Anthony (National Council on US-Arab Relations) argues that in light of the Reagan administration’s policies, “the GCC’s efforts to reduce the causes – whether needs or pretexts – of superpower intervention deserve far more support and encouragement.” (p. 450) Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani (Harvard University) looks at the impact of the war on the world oil market and sees Iran and Iraq as recovering much of their strength after the war ends, largely at the expense of Saudi Arabia. Marshall W. Wiley (former US ambassador to Oman) perceives flaws in Washington’s views of the Gulf and advances suggestions to achieve US security goals, among them “The United States would probably be better advised to strengthen non-military, commercial links between Iran in the West in the hope that a reduction in commercial isolation would accelerate the maturation of the Iranian régime.” (p. 464)


165. Heller, Mark A. The Iran-Iraq War. Implications for Third Parties. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jaffée Center for Strategic Studies; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center
The author, a senior research associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, assesses the impact of the war on regional actors (including Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf states, Syria, Jordan, and Israel), as well as on the Soviet Union, the US, and France. He concludes that none of the principal third parties to the war wishes to see a decisive victory by either Iran or Iraq. Furthermore, while some of these parties may hold some influence with Iraq, they have limited ability to induce Iran to moderate its war aims: there is therefore little likelihood that third parties will be able... to secure an end to the fighting in the near future.

The author suggests that while the combatants in the Iran-Iraq war are matched militarily, Iran is likely to be the eventual victor because of its relative political and economic strength combined with the solidarity of its people in support of the government’s war aims. Further, he contends that once the Iraqi obstacle is removed, the way would be open to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Middle East. In order to prevent such a development, Heller suggests that the West support an Iraqi strike on Iran’s oil facilities.

The author, an analyst at the Brookings Institution, contends that Iraq’s political objectives in attacking Iran were to gain recognition of Iraq’s legal rights to the Shatt al-‘Arab, to discredit Khomeini, and to warn Iran against interference in internal Iraqi affairs. Surprisingly, Iraq pursued only limited military objectives in the early stages of the war. Various reasons have been advanced for this anomaly, including military problems, international political restraint, concern over casualties, the handicapping of military planners by Iraq’s civilian leadership, or restraint urged by Saddam Husayn. In addition to underestimating the resolve of the Iranian régime, an Iraqi miscalculation in the early stages seems to have been the absence of a military or diplomatic plan to bring the war to a conclusion while Iraq still had the upper hand.

A professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy speculates on the consequences of a number of dramatic scenarios in the Iran-Iraq War. He concludes that “To let warfare in the Gulf continue until a whirlpool of violence drowns the Gulf régimes and draws the superpowers into a military confrontation is shortsighted. A farsighted policy is to encourage a negotiated settlement to the war and international development of the Indian Ocean economy.” (pp. 48-49)

A contributing editor of the International Defense Review looks at the background of the war and discusses...
regional perceptions of the threats produced by the war and the Iranian revolution. The author contends that questions about the role of the US and suspicions of alliances have so far frustrated Arab attempts at developing a counterpart to the US RDF. Nonetheless, there have been signs recently of cooperation among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in regard to mutual defense.

171. Hunter, Shireen. “Arab-Iranian Relations and Stability in the Persian Gulf.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1984), pp. 67-76. The Deputy Director of Middle East Studies at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies examines the important role that longstanding Arab-Iranian tensions played in determining recent events in the Gulf. To ameliorate these tensions, she suggests that Arabs and Iranians should set aside conflicting territorial claims, adopt a non-aligned posture and avoid becoming superpower proxies. Iran should stay clear of intra-Arab politics and the Arabs should accept a regional role for Iran in the Gulf commensurate with its size and population. As for the West, it should refrain from taking sides on territorial disputes, encourage a rough military balance between Iran and its Arab neighbors, and acquire a better appreciation of regional political linkages and perceptions.


173. Ismael, Tareq Y. Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982. A collection of documents on the background to the Iran-Iraq war, with a 40-page introduction by a political scientist and specialist on the Middle East at the University of Calgary. Ismael’s introduction treats the historical roots of the conflict, the legal dimension, and ideological aspects. The documents are divided into two categories, one consisting of legal and historical documents (ranging from the 1847 Treaty of Erzerum to the 1975 Iran-Iraq treaty), the following ones being a selection of ideological and political documents, culled from recent statements and publications by leaders in both countries. See also Ismael’s “The Iraq-Iran Conflict,” Behind the Headlines, Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 1981), pp. 1-21.

174. Jawdat, Nameer Ali. “Reflections on the Gulf War.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 5 (1983), pp. 86-98. An Iraqi journalist’s view of the Iran-Iraq war. The author feels that the most probable outcome is the collapse of one side and victory for the other by default. If Iraq were to win, it could not hope to rule over a country of 40 million people and so would settle the outstanding points of dispute in its favor and turn to rebuilding its economy. But the author contends that an Iranian victory would be disastrous, as it would lead to the collapse of the other Gulf states in quick succession and play into Israel’s hands. He urges American support for Iraq, since a stalemate cannot continue indefinitely between two countries with such unequal populations. Continued American inaction is likely to be interpreted by Iran as a sign of weakness and fear. The author concludes by asserting that “Iran today is the clear and present danger to the stability of the region and the world. Iraq is not.”
175. Johansen, Robert C., and Michael G. Renner. “Limiting Conflict in the Gulf.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1985), pp. 803-838. ●● The authors, fellows at the World Policy Institute and Princeton University respectively, outline external involvement in the Iran-Iraq War and charge that international indifference to the conflict is rooted in the desire to keep the belligerents bogged down, the profits to be gained from arms sales to the warring parties, and the opportunity the war provides the United States in expanding its military influence in the region. “By basing conflict resolution on an unprincipled trade in arms and military influence, the United States and other nations increase the risk of a wider war and damage future prospects for lasting peace.” (p. 816) The authors recommend multinational initiatives and a reduction in US military commitments in the Gulf, as well as oil sanctions against both combatants.

176. Joyner, Christopher C., ed. *The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. ●● A comprehensive look at the Iran-Iraq War (inaptly titled in retrospect) and edited by a political scientist at George Washington University. The first part dwells on strategic and political dimensions. Edmund Ghareeb examines the roots of the crisis in both countries, Eric Hooglund (University of California, Berkeley) looks at Iran’s objectives in the war, Phebe Marr (National Defense University) gives the view from Iraq, Bernard Reich (George Washington University) analyzes the role of Israel, Joseph A. Kechichian examines the impact on the Gulf Cooperation Council, Thomas L. McNaugher (Brookings Institution) and Maxwell Orme Johnson (Tacoma Shipbuilding) dissect US policy and use of military force in the war, and Mark N. Katz (George Mason University) looks at the Soviet role. The second part is concerned with diplomatic and legal dimensions and contains articles by David D. Caron (University of California, Berkeley) on the reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers, Boleslaw Adam Boczek (Kent State University) on the law of maritime warfare and neutrality, Anthony Clark Arend (Georgetown University) on the part played by the United Nations, Charles G. MacDonald (Florida International University) on legal aspects of cease-fire negotiations, and R.K. Ramazani (University of Virginia) who advances a proposal for peace.


Studies, Geneva), who concludes that the politics submerged during the war have resulted in a “resurfacing of contentious issues long left dormant or unresolved.” (p. 24) Karsh (Tel Aviv University) looks at the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the other Gulf states while David Menashri (Tel Aviv University) concentrates on the role of the revolution in Iran’s development through the war. Charles Tripp (University of London), judges that “the removable of an unmistakable Iranian military threat [is] likely to present Saddam Hussein with considerable challenges in the future” (p. 76). Amatzia Baram (University of Haifa) reviews Iraq’s history of vacillation between the superpowers. ¶¶ A subsequent section deals with the regional impact of the war. Itamar Rabinovitch (Tel Aviv University) looks at the impact on the Arab world, Robin Wright (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) examines the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, Barry Rubin (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) surveys the role played by the noncombatant Gulf states, Henri J. Barkey (Lehigh University) discusses the impact on Turkey, and Joseph Alpher (Tel Aviv University) analyzes the impact on Israel. Farther afield, Thomas L. McNaugher (Brookings Institution) looks at the “tightropes” the US has been forced to walk in the Gulf, Robert S. Litwak (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) surveys the Soviet Union’s role, and John Chipman (International Institute for Strategic Studies) discusses Europe’s role. Eliyahu Kanovsky (Bar-Ilan University) contributes a piece on the economic impact, concluding that while the end of the war may have negative effects on the oil-producing states, the world’s oil-importing countries ... will breathe a sigh of relief.” (p. 251) ¶¶ A final section consists of a military-strategic overview of the war by Chaim Herzog (President of Israel), an analysis of the post-war arms race by Geoffrey Kemp (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and an examination of the role “escalation” played in the broadening of the war, with a call for paying more attention to the possibility of de-escalation in such conflicts, by Philip A.G. Sabin (Kings College London).

180. __________. “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 256-268. ●● A lecturer at King’s College of the University of London provides historical background and reasons that “geopolitics is the most important single factor that has influenced Iranian-Iraqi relations for generations and, in consequence, accounts for the outbreak of the war....” Essentially, “the war began because the weaker state, Iraq, attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbor, Iran, to reshape the regional status quo according to its own image.” (p. 257)

181. Kassicieh, Suleiman K., and Jamal R. Nassar. “Revolution and War in the Persian Gulf: The Effect on MNCs.” California Management Review, Vol. 26 (Fall 1983), pp. 88-99. ●● The authors first assess the effects of the Iranian revolution on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates in terms of political risk. While they contend that the components of Iran’s revolution are largely absent from the Arab states, they feel that modernization may still exacerbate internal tensions. Kassicieh, a management sciences professor at New Mexico State University, and Nasser, a political scientist at Illinois State University, also look at the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on multinational corporations. They contend that sales
and investments have declined significantly while contracts have decreased in absolute terms.

182. Katz, Mark N. “The USSR and the Iran-Iraq War.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January-February 1987), pp. 8-13. ●● A research associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center judges that an end of the war, no matter who wins, “may provide the USSR with some opportunities, but they [sic] also pose serious risks that Moscow might lose influence in both countries.” (p. 13)

183. Kimche, Jon. “The Gulf War: Iran and-Israel?” Midstream, Vol. 30, No. 4 (April 1984), pp. 3-5. ●● The former editor of the New Middle East and Afro-Asian Affairs charges that the danger to Israel from the Iran-Iraq war exceeds that from Lebanon. Kimche feels that peaceful settlement of the war could be disastrous: it could destroy OPEC and cause the worldwide collapse of oil prices. Furthermore, the threat of an Iranian victory is considerable and Israel’s assistance to ward off the spread of Islamic subversion should be considered.

184. King, Ralph. The Iran-Iraq War: the Political Implications. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987. Adelphi Papers, No. 219. ●● A research associate at IISS outlines the political ramifications of the war on the combatants, on their neighbors in the Gulf, and on the Soviet Union, the United States, and France. He concludes that “The Gulf is not the only region in the world where local states face ‘internal problems’ and the open or latent hostility of their neighbours. But it is one of the few where these factors impinge so closely upon the interests of states outside the region (including both super-powers) and can so readily be aggravated by them.” (p. 62)

185. Kishtainy, Khalid. “The Iraq-Iran War: The War of Miscalculations.” Contemporary Review, Vol. 241 (October 1982), pp. 175-180. ●● An Iraqi view of the background to the Iran-Iraq war and the problems inherent in bringing it to an end. Kishtainy suggests that the war probably should be called the “War of Miscalculations,” as exemplified in Iraq’s assumption that Iran would sue for peace when it was invaded, Iraq’s failure to gain the support of the Arabs of Khuzistan, and Iran’s inability to provoke rebellion among the Iraqi Shi’ah. The author maintains that Iran realizes that Iraq desires peace the most and that Tehran’s intransigent demands are fast becoming another miscalculation.

186. McNaugher, Thomas, and William Quandt. Oil and the Outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 1984. Private Report. ●● This study assesses the impact of alternative outcomes to the Iran-Iraq war (as seen from spring 1984) on the international oil market. The authors, both at the Brookings Institution, suggest that if the war ends in stalemate, with a rough balance of power between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, there is likely to be downward pressure on oil prices. Although seen as a less likely outcome, the worst-case scenario presented in this study is that of a decisive Iranian victory in southern Iraq leading to Iranian hegemony in the Gulf, which would make it easier for Iran to exert pressure on its neighbors to keep their production low and thus prices high. A variant
of these outcomes would be a continuation of the war, with Iran in a strong position but without a clear-cut victory. While this would produce a recurring danger of oil disruptions, they are likely to be limited in size and duration.

187. Maull, Hans W., and Otto Pick, eds. *The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions*. London: Pinter; New York: St. Martin’s, 1989. The result of a 1988 symposium held in Bonn and edited by a professor of international relations at the Catholic University of Eichstätt and an emeritus professor of international relations at the University of Surrey. After an introduction by Stephen Low (Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Bologna Center), three papers provide a larger perspective on the Iran-Iraq conflict. Shahram Chubin (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva) discusses the Iranian experience in the war, Giacomo Luciani (independent economic consultant) looks at the role of oil in the war, and John Voll (University of New Hampshire) examines the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on regional dynamics. Examinations of regional actors are given by Philip Robins (Royal Institute of International Affairs) on Iraq, Johannes Reissner (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Munich-Ebenhausen) on Iran, Anthony Cordesman (Georgetown University) on the regional balance, Ursula Braun (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Munich-Ebenhausen) on the GCC, and Malcolm Yapp (University of London SOAS) on the Kurds and the Turks. The impact on non-regional actors is assessed by Gary Sick (Columbia University) on the United States, Helmut Hubel (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn) on the Soviet Union, Hanns W. Maull on alliance cooperation, and Masashi Nishihara (Japanese National Defense Academy) on Japan.

188. Miller, Marshall L. “Will Iran or Iraq Close the Straits of Hormuz?” *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 121, No. 5 (December 1983), pp. 24-26. A Washington lawyer (and former Defense Department official) points out the difficulties in trying to close the Strait of Hormuz and suggests that both countries may be bluffing in their threat to do so. Instead, he deems it more likely that Iran will launch several air-strikes on key Saudi and Kuwaiti oil installations while Iraq, which would achieve more by blocking Iran’s oil exports than through action on the battlefield, may choose Iranian targets in the northern Gulf.

189. Mylroie, Laurie. “The Superpowers and the Iran-Iraq War.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 21 (Summer 1987), pp. 15-26. An assistant professor of government at Harvard University addresses the effect of the war on the positions in the Gulf of the United States and the Soviet Union. The author maintains that “the Iran-Iraq war is in fact eroding American influence in the Gulf and providing an opening for the Soviets; it is Moscow that is benefiting from the continuation of the war.” (p. 15) She declares that the US should abandon its neutrality in the war since “Iran is threatening, and Iraq is protecting, America’s allies....” (p. 25)

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(consultant and former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates) discussing the Gulf Cooperation Council and Gulf security, Philip H. Stoddard (retired State Department deputy assistant secretary) on Egypt’s connection to the war, Harold H. Saunders (former assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asia) on implications of the war for US policy, Michael Lenker (University of Pennsylvania) on Soviet strategy in the war and Gulf, Craig Baxter (Juniata College) on Pakistan and the Gulf, John Devlin (consultant and former CIA analyst) on Iraqi military policy, and Shireen Hunter (Georgetown University CSIS) on Iran’s defense policy.

191. Neumann, Robert G., and Shireen T. Hunter. “Crisis in the Gulf: Reasons for Concern But Not Panic.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 16-21. The authors, both presently affiliated with Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, advance the opinion that, despite the potential for expansion of the Iran-Iraq war in 1984, “the conflict is less likely to escalate further than to be contained.” As reasons, Neumann and Hunter point to military weaknesses and increased war-weariness on both sides.


193. Parasiliti, Andrew T. “Iraq’s Military Containment of Iran.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1989), pp. 128-145. The program officer at the Middle East Institute examines primarily the domestic consequences of Iraq’s war with Iran and looks at the country’s future after the ceasefire. He concludes that “On the domestic front, Iraqi society showed [an unprecedented] degree of unity and cohesion in confronting Iran” and that “The lack of a peace agreement with Iran means that Iraq must still devote its energy to its demographically and geographically superior neighbor.” (p. 145)

194. Parrott, J.B. “The Response of Saudi Arabia to the Iran-Iraq War.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter 1986), pp. 42-56. A doctoral candidate at the University of Virginia contends that “during the first five years of the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia sought to contain its spread while maintaining a balance of power between the two belligerent states.” (p. 42) But this was not always possible in his view. Saudi assistance to Iraq did not provide much leverage with Baghdad and even less through Iran on Syrian opposition to Iraq.

Iran-Iraq War, tracing the origins of the war, Iraq’s decision to attack, Iran’s decision to carry the war back into Iraq, and the al-Faw, Karbala, and Tawaklana ala Allah campaigns. He adds a postscript on the Kuwait War, judging that Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait because he was financially strapped and that the professionalism and high caliber of the Iraqi army allowed it to withstand the prolonged bombing and then restore order in the country. In addition, he believes that there does not seem to have been a genuine revolt in the south of Iraq after the war: “We believe that the Iranians – specifically the Revolutionary Guards – took advantage of the chaos of the Iraqi army’s retreat to infiltrate the south in order to provoke a revolt.” (p. 153)

197. Petrossian, Vahe. “The Gulf War.” World Today, Vol. 36, No. 12 (December 1980), pp. 415-417. ●● A writer for the Middle East Economic Digest contributes a short note on the reasons for the Iran-Iraq war and its progress in the first few months. Like many observers at the time, Petrossian was misled by his belief that a prolonged war was improbable. ●

198. Quandt, William B. “The Gulf War: Policy Options and Regional Implications.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 1-7. ●● In an article originally presented at a June 1984 seminar, Quandt notes that few would have predicted in 1980 that the Iran-Iraq war would continue for as long as it has. Surprisingly, there still seems to be no end in sight, nor has the war had a dramatic effect on oil supplies, nor have the superpowers become deeply involved (although both have begun to express greater support for Iraq since 1983). Quandt points out that there is little the US can do to end the conflict and suggests that “The end of the war will have to grow out of fundamental political changes within the two societies.” ●

199. Rajaee, Farhang, ed. The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992. ●● Amongst the papers published from a 1988 conference on “aggression and defense” sponsored by a number of Iranian universities are those looking at various aspects of the war. Ibrahim Anvari Tehrani (Iranian Foreign Ministry) discusses Iraqi attitudes towards the 1975 border agreement, Keith McLachlan (University of London) looks at Iran-Iraq discord during the 1979-1980 period, S. Taheri Shemirani (Iranian Foreign Ministry) examines the “war of the cities,” Laith Kubba (Iraqi writer) analyzes the war’s impact on Iraq, and Abdolrahman Alem (Tehran University) poses the question of whether war responsibility belongs to governments or individuals. ¶¶ In other papers, Mohiaddin Mesbahi (Florida International University) looks at Soviet involvement in the war, A. Reza Sheikholeslami (University of Oxford) examines the Saudi-American relationship, Elizabeth Gamlen and Paul Rogers (both of the University of Bradford) explain the US decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers, Bahman Baktiari (University of Maine) looks at the role of international law, and Paul Tavernier (Rouen University) offers a parallel analysis of the role of the UN Secretary-General. ¶¶ Djamchid Momtaz (Tehran university) raises the principle of the right of self-defense in the war, Hamid Algar (University of California) looks at the problem of retaliation in terms of fiqh, James A. Bill (College of William and Mary) examines the basis of Iranian power in the war, Richard W. Bulliett (Columbia University) contributes an essay on aggression in historical perspective, and Saeid Marzaee Yengejeh
(Mission of Iran to the UN) argues for a modification of the laws of war in modern international law.

200. ________, ed. *Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997. ●● A collection of papers on the war and the internal debate in Iran, all by Iranian authors. The first part examines the positions of outside actors. Saideh Lotfian (Tehran University) looks at the sides taken by the two combatants’ neighbors, Kazem Sajjadpour (Institute for Political and International Studies) examines the policy of the Soviet Union regarding the conflict, while Ahmad Naghibzadeh (Tehran University) does the same for Western Europe and Reza Ra’iss Tousi (Tehran University) discusses the United States. Bahram Mostaghi and Masoud Taromsari (both of Tehran University) analyze the role of the United Nations Security Council. ¶ Aspects of the war affecting the two combatants, particularly Iran, provides the focus of the second part. Neguin Yavari looks at national, ethnic, and sectarian issues in the war, while Hossein S. Seifzadeh (Tehran University) examines the Iranian revolution and the role of ideology. Iraq’s disclaimer of the 1975 treaty dividing the Shatt al-‘Arab is discussed by Jalil Roshandel (Institute for Political and International Studies) while Mahmood Sariolghalam (Shahid Beheshti University) looks at the cease-fire negotiations. Djamchid Momtaz (Tehran University) follows up with an examination of UN Resolution 598, adopted in 1987 to force the two sides to accept a cease-fire. Houchang Hassan-Yari (University of Quebec) looks at Iranian foreign policy after the war and Daryoush Akhavan-Zanjani (Tehran University) adds a piece on Iraq’s decision to attack Kuwait.

201. Ramazani, R.K. “The Iran-Iraq War: Underlying Conflicts.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 3, No. 5 (1984), pp. 8-11. ●● Noting that the current conflict in the Gulf is “already the longest, the bloodiest, and the costliest war in the contemporary history of the Middle East,” Ramazani delves into various reasons for the war, such as power politics, opposing ideologies, sociopolitical differences, and “displaced aggressions.” He urges the international community to “compel the warring parties – if it continues to fail to persuade them to negotiate a peaceful settlement-by imposing real sanctions.” ●

202. Renfrew, Nita M. “Who Started the War?” *Foreign Policy*, No. 66 (Spring 1987), pp. 98-108. ●● A free-lance journalist formerly with *Le Monde Diplomatique* charges that, although Iraqi troops were the first to cross the border, Iran actually started the Iran-Iraq War. “It broke the peace when, soon after Khomeini’s return, it began active steps to export his revolution to Iraq” and “the ayatollah and his agents proceeded to call upon Iraqis to overthrow their government and to install in its place an Islamic revolution under his jurisprudence.” (p. 98) The author cites Iran’s continued intention to export the Islamic revolution as the reason why it is unwilling to stop the war. “Khomeini provoked the war. Now he wants to win it. The outside world must not let him.” (p. 108)

204. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. “Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War.” *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 597-608. ●● An essay on the far-reaching impact of the war and its unintended consequences by a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. He concludes that “Iran’s leaders sense the permanent threat from Moscow, and this has brought a greater realism in foreign affairs – and, hence, a diminished threat to the Arab régimes of the Gulf. A prudent and low-profile US policy has helped make all this possible.” (p. 608)

205. Rundle, Christopher. “The Iran-Iraq Conflict.” *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol. 17, Pt. 2 (June 1986), pp. 128-133. ●● A British Foreign and Commonwealth Office official provides background on the long-running war and outlines the views of each side on how the conflict might be brought to an end. He notes that the Shatt al-‘Arab (the important waterway partially dividing the two countries, “which geographically lies at the heart of the Iran-Iraq conflict, will be less important after the war, precisely because neither Iran nor Iraq is likely to risk putting too many eggs in that basket.” (p. 133)


207. Sick, Gary. “Trial By Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 230-244. ●● An adjunct professor at Columbia University looks back at the origins of the war, the role of the UN Security Council and the US, reasons for its continuation, and the factors in its eventual termination. He points out that “Both Iraq and Iran are crucial to any long-term US strategy in the Gulf” and that “The United States can take little pride in its policies toward either of these difficult régimes. Washington has been clumsy and inconsistent, and its policies have tended to vacillate between extremes.” (p. 244)

208. Sigler, John H. “The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The Tragedy of Limited Conventional War.” *International Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 424-456. ●● A professor of political science at Carleton University, Ottawa, points out that the Iran-Iraq War is one of the bloodiest wars in modern history but attracts far less international attention than the Arab-Israeli conflict. He follows his brief survey of the progress of the war with the role played by other regional states and the superpowers. He believes that “In strict terms of the United Nations charter, Iraq had little justification for launching this war, but the great powers, none of whom had much sympathy for revolutionary Iran, were reluctant to intervene on behalf of the aggrieved party whose hands were far from clean.” (p. 455)

210. Stauffer, Thomas. “Economic Warfare in the Gulf.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 14 (Fall 1985), pp. 98-116. An adjunct professor at Georgetown University weighs the uses and limitations of economic warfare as presented in the Iran-Iraq War. The combatants’ economic objectives have been to interdict critical imports, destroy oil export facilities, interrupt transit routes (including those of allies), and attack oil refineries. He notes that both countries were particularly vulnerable to economic interdiction but neither side was seriously hampered in its warmaking. The impact on Iran was muted because of the economic dislocations from its revolution and time is on Iraq’s side because of the construction of pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. A short statement on US-Iraqi relations by the Iraqi ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, immediately precedes this article (pp. 95-97).

211. Sterner, Michael. “The Iran-Iraq War.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall 1984), pp. 128-143. A partner in the IRC Group and former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates looks at the impact after three years of war on the combatants, neighbors in the Gulf, and outside powers. He observes that the US has three policy objectives with regard to the war: prevent any disruption of Gulf oil shipments, ensure the security of friendly oil-producing governments, and favor an outcome to the war that does not give the Soviet Union a dominant position in either country.

212. Steinbach, Udo. “The Iranian-Iraqi Conflict and Its Impact Upon the ‘Arc of Crisis.’” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1983), pp. 6-21. The Director of the Deutsches Orient-Institut in Hamburg discusses the implications of the Iran-Iraq war. He points out that this war has blurred the distinction between “traditional” and “progressive” regimes. The political landscape now pits Islamic regimes against non-Islamic ones. Furthermore, the recourse to Islam as a means of correcting social and political injustices strengthens feelings of solidarity between the Arabs of the Gulf and their Palestinian brethren, particularly insofar as Islamic precepts are seen as legitimizing the Palestinians’ cause. Steinbach also notes that while the war has heightened tensions throughout the region, it serves the interests of neither superpower. Above all, he asserts, internal forces dictate changes in the region and Western security policy toward the Gulf should involve greater detachment and composure, with less attempts to “steer” developments. In particular, Steinbach argues that a US policy that sets up Saudi Arabia as the regional power is dubious, since Riyadh’s influence is limited.


214. Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, and Shaheen Ayubi, eds. The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts. New York: Praeger, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983. Four of the papers published in this volume are concerned with the war itself and its impact on the warring
sides: the origins of the conflict (Daniel Pipes, Harvard University), the military and strategic aspects of the war (William O. Staudemaier, US Army War College), the war’s economic implications for the two participants (Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, Harvard University), and the prospects for conflict resolution (Richard W. Bulliet, Columbia University). Other papers address: the minorities question in Iran (Nikki Keddie, UCLA), ideology in recent Iraqi foreign policy (Tareq Y. Ismael, University of Calgary), the impact of Iran’s revolution on instability in the Gulf (Barry Rubin, Georgetown University), the war’s impact on inter-Arab relations (Nazih Ayubi, then at UCLA), and the relationship between Iran, Iraq, and the superpowers (Claudia Wright, a Washington-based journalist). The editors (of Temple University and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, respectively) have added an epilogue on the future prospects of the war.

215. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. War in the Gulf; a Staff Report. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1984. Based on two staff trips to the Gulf in July 1984, this report assesses recent developments in the Iran-Iraq War, the political perspectives of each of the Gulf states, and implications for the US. The authors of the report note that the military balance in the war has shifted in Iraq’s favor during the past year, even though serious Iraqi liabilities still remain. They maintain that “an Iranian assault on Iraq would probably lead to a defeat for Iran unless Iraqi morale collapses.” An Iranian attempt to close the Gulf is viewed as a desperate act of last resort. While the US has the capability to counter such an attempt (at present there are 11,500 American military personnel in the Gulf and Arabian Sea area), doing so “could provide political and military opportunities for the Soviets in Iran.” The report concludes that should the upper Gulf be closed to oil exports, the lost production could be made up quickly elsewhere. However, a total closure of the Gulf could result in a worldwide shortage.

216. Viorst, Milton. “Iraq at War.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Winter 1986-1987), pp. 349-365. A writer on Middle East affairs compares Iran and Iraq to two exhausted boxers after going a dozen rounds. By conventional assessments, he says, Iran should have the upper hand in this war but Iraq has more men under arms and has kept them better equipped because of more outside assistance. The author reports that “Iraqis believe the United States, particularly if it were willing to work with the Soviet Union, could somehow put an end to the war.” (p. 364) He believes that American officials are more amenable to assisting Iraq but only in private.

217. Workman, W. Thom. The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. A revision of a doctoral thesis at Canada’s York University (where the author serves as associate director of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies), this study of the war is divided into two parts. The first looks at “the complex sociopolitical dynamics at work within each country” (p. 23), examining the role of social transformation in creating revolution in Iran and “the repetitive alienation of [Iraq’s] political elite from the wider population” (p. 59) during the monarchy and especially under Ba’thi rule. The consequence was increasing antagonism and a drift to a long, bloody, and indecisive war.
The second part examines how the war consolidated the radical clerics’ hegemony in Iran and permitted the Iraqi “régime with special opportunities to consolidate political control and extend its grip on Iraqi society.” (p. 145) The author concludes that “The Iran-Iraq War, to state it baldly, had two victors: the Ba’th régime in Baghdad and the Theocratic régime in Tehran.” (p. 2)

218. Wright, Claudia. “Implications of the Iran-Iraq War.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Winter 1980-1981), pp. 275-303. ●● An early look at the initial aims, objectives, and motivations of the combatants in the Iran-Iraq war, written by the Washington correspondent of the New Statesman. Wright notes that the US reaction has been restricted to an increase in an over-the-horizon naval presence. No direct involvement is foreseen, but she points out that AWACS aircraft were dispatched to an alarmed Saudi Arabia and declares that this was consistent with an American even-handed policy toward the war. Wright concludes by contending that the war has been a disaster for the region and that it has demonstrated the risks to the superpowers of fostering close alignments within the region. ✴

219. ________. “Religion and Strategy in the Iraq-Iran War.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1985), pp. 839-852. ●● The Washington correspondent of the *New Statesman* and *Témoignage Chrétien* (Paris) advances the thesis that “religion and religious sectarianism were not important factors in Iraq’s decision to go to war – they have become important only after the fact.” (p. 840) Subsequent to the Iraqi attack on Iran, Saddam Husayn sought to portray Iran as an expansionist Islamic state to fellow Arabs and to play up Sunni-Shi’i divisions. After reviewing the strategies of both sides in the war, the author concludes that “If Shiite clerics can be as inept as Sunni secularists, then perhaps the religious label does not mean much at all.” (p. 852)

**Military Aspects of the War**

220. Burgess, William H., III. “Iranian Special Operations in the Iran-Iraq War: Implications for the United States.” *Conflict*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1988), pp. 23-40. ●● The author examines the organization and utilization of Iran’s Special Operations forces and concludes that “Win, lose, or draw, the Iranians will emerge from the war with a large corps of special operations personnel of substantial operational experience. ... The result could be that more and better special operations will be mounted against the enemies of the Islamic Republic.” (p. 35)


critical importance to Western security. More than half of all the world’s proven oil reserves are located in [the Gulf and all of its littoral states] are affected by the war, and an Iranian victory could threaten the stability of the West’s access to oil for decades to come.” (p. 1) He proceeds to analyze the course of the war through the years 1984 to 1987 and assess each side’s strengths and weaknesses. His prognosis holds that there is no clear end in sight and he counsels that “The highest priority challenges for Western policy are to overcome the heritage of American and other covert arms sales to Iran, and to show that the West will now enforce tight controls on arms sales to Iran.” (p. 161) Furthermore, “even if Iraq suffers further reversals, it will be necessary to continue to finance Iraq and vital not to provide arms to Iran.” (p. 162)

223. ________, and A.R. Wagner. Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II; The Iran-Iraq War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. ●● The second in a four-volume set covering recent major conflicts around the world, written by a Georgetown University professor and assistant to US Senator John McCain (Cordesman) and a consultant with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Wagner). The lessons of the Iran-Iraq War as perceived by the authors include the participants’ need for grand strategy, the limited utility of force ratios as a measure of military strength, the importance of military professionalism, the difficulty in conducting combined arms operations, the importance of infantry in modern war and the difficulty of employing air power effectively, the problems of integrating complex weapons and technology transfer, the critical factors of logistics and supply, and the problem for Western forces of power projection in low-intensity conflicts.

224. Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Iraq-Iran War: Attrition Now, Chaos Later.” Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 120, No. 10 (May 1983), pp. 36, 38, 40-41, 43, 116-117. ●● Cordesman points out that Iran seemed on the verge of a major victory in spring 1982 but was unable to carry through. Subsequently, the conflict lapsed into a war of attrition with both sides potentially risking internal collapse. Regardless of which side wins, the author suggests that a number of developments are likely, including massive rearmament, a high technology arms race (possibly ushering in nuclear weapons), an oil war in the Gulf, and growing religious and political conflict in the Arab world. ●

225. ________. “The Iran-Iraq War in 1984: An Escalating Threat to the Gulf and the West.” Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 121 (March 1984), pp. 22-24, 27, 30, 75. ●● The author describes the progress of the Iran-Iraq war over the preceding year, with emphasis on the military weaponry employed by both sides. Cordesman feels that the following year should decide the outcome of the war and he suggests that Iraq is more likely to triumph than Iran, if it can withstand internal strains. As for the US it “needs to speak quietly but clearly, and to carry a medium-sized stick.” ●

226. ________. “The Gulf Crisis and Strategic Interests: A Military Analysis.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 8-15. ●● Adapted from a June 1984 seminar presentation, this article notes that “The situation in the Gulf war has shifted strikingly over the last eight
months, generally in favor of Iraq.” Cordesman sees the war as having reached a military stalemate, equally advantageous to both parties. He believes that the combination of US over-the-horizon military capabilities and Saudi armed forces should be adequate to deal with all but unconventional warfare contingencies. “It is the threat of terrorist attack and the possibility that Iraq might make a major mistake on the battlefield that seems the most serious threat to the Gulf at this time.”


228. Guttry, Andrea de, and Natalino Ronzitti, eds. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Documents and Related Commentaries on Naval Practice. Cambridge: Grotius, 1993. A compilation of documents, edited by two professors from the University of Pisa. The volume covers legal aspects of maritime hostilities during the Iran-Iraq War, including the principle of freedom of navigation, the right of visit and search, convoy, the régime of international straits in time of war, and the legitimacy of mine-laying. Sections are organized by country, with materials including legislation and other administrative orders, parliamentary documentation, and diplomatic documents. Each section is preceded by a commentary by a professor of law. In addition to the two combatants, Iran and Iraq, other countries included are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as material from the United Nations, the European Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Western European Union.

229. Heller, Mark. “The War Strategy of Iran.” Middle East Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 17-24. A research associate at Tel Aviv University reviews the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War and notes that “Iranian capabilities ... were limited by the political agenda of the regime ... not to be aligned with either superpower....” (p.19) Because of Iraq’s military superiority, Iran’s strategy relied more on a war of attrition and exploitation of its economic and social advantages in a prolonged war. “In the final analysis, however, Iran was unable to neutralize Iraqi efforts to change the terms of the conflict or to bring to bear its potential advantage in a protracted war of attrition. ... What remained was an intangible but important spiritual foundation: faith in the existence of Iranian moral superiority and in the ultimately decisive impact of morale.” (p. 23)

230. Iombersteg, Ulrich. “Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War.” Swiss Review of World Affairs. Vol. 37, No. 5 (August 1987), pp. 26-27. A short report by a Swiss member of a UN group of experts sent to Iran and Iraq to investigate charges of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. The team concluded that both sides had probably used chemical weapons against the other and Iombersteg notes that “The use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war will not decisively influence the outcome of that conflict.” (p. 27)

University analyzes the military dimensions of the war through its first six-and-a-half years, including the history of strategic relations between the two countries, developments on the battlefield, and an assessment of combat performance by both sides. He concludes that “The Iran-Iraq war is unlikely to go down in history either for its direct strategic lessons or for its military accomplishments. Instead it may be remembered as a ‘delicate balance of incompetence’ (to use Lawrence Freedman’s words) and as a textbook illustration of the failure to apply most of the classic principles of war, from the adoption of realistic war aims to the conduct of the war itself.” (p. 54)

232. ________. “Military Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War.” *Orbis*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 209-223. ●● A political scientist at Tel Aviv University points out that “The Iran-Iraq War provides devastating proof ... of the precariousness of armed force as a foreign-policy instrument. The ending of the war on the basis of the 1980 status quo ante after eight years of bitter fighting, over a million human casualties, and exorbitant economic dislocations has left the two protagonists virtually empty-handed....” (pp. 222-223) The lessons he cites are that wars are not easily limited, victory requires high morale, but morale cannot replace competence, strategic bombing can work, escalation can be a rational strategy, and timidity is as dangerous as temerity.


234. McNaugher, Thomas L. “The Iran-Iraq War; Slouching Towards Catastrophe?” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 5-16. ●● A research associate at the Brookings Institution notes that “each year since 1983 has evinced roughly the same pattern of Iranian attack, Iraqi air strikes, and general stalemate.” (p. 5) Although “the dull regularity of the Iran-Iraq war may not go on indefinitely; there is potential here for a wider war, possibly even for the ultimate catastrophe – an Iranian victory.” (p. 5) The author proceeds to examine Iran’s growing military competence and diminishing strategic reserve, the US impact, and developments in both combatants' strategies.

235. “The Naval Stakes in the Gulf.” *Navy International*, Vol. 92 (October 1987), pp. 527-533. ●● Three points of view on the subject. Nick Childs traces the naval aspects of the Iran-Iraq War and reviews Western naval commitments to the Gulf. Major-General Edward Fursdon explains the rules of passage through the Strait of Hormuz and Omani territorial waters, and Captain C.W. Koburger, Jr., notes that aircraft and surface gunfire can deal with threats to Gulf shipping from speedboats while air power can deal with missiles but mines present “the most dangerous unanswered threat to those passing on their lawful occasions.” (p. 533)

A journalist and press aide to General Khalid b. Sultan Al Sa’ud (the commander of Arab forces during Operation Desert Storm) returns to Saudi Arabia five years after the war to interview Saudi military and civilian leaders about the events – as well as some Western politicians and analysts. He observes that “I found the men who fought it upbeat about the experience, although most of them are now retired from their military careers.” (p. 22)

237. O’Ballance, Edgar. *The Gulf War*. London: Brassey’s, 1988. ●● A blow-by-blow account of the Iran-Iraq War by a military historian, concentrating almost exclusively on the military aspects. His account ends in April 1987 (although a brief postscript takes the story up to the end of 1987) and thus does not include the end of the war. In asking the question, when will it end, the author concludes that the war’s “continuance depends solely upon Ayatollah Khomeini, who remains in a vengeful mood, insisting that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power; but Saddam Hussein rides a tiger and cannot dismount.” (p. 214)


240. ________. “Iran-Iraq: The War and Prospects for a Lasting Peace.” In Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh, eds., *Iran and the International Community* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 124-142. ●● A view of the Iran-Iraq War by a defense consultant and author. He notes that the end of the war has been followed by a new arms race in the region and opines that “it will take a new generation of leaders in the Gulf states, able to see through the mists of propaganda and prejudice ... to wipe out the root causes of this new ‘Cold War.’” (p. 142)

241. Pope, Sterett. “The Great Gulf War.” *Worldview*, Vol. 27, No. 5 (May 1984), pp. 4-7. ●● A freelance writer compares the Iran-Iraq war with World War I, concluding that the low-technology, labor-intensive character of the war has given it a distinctively Third World quality. He feels that the three factors of petroleum, the attitude of the superpowers, and the course of the Iranian revolution will determine the war’s future.

the logic and pressures of escalation in the Iran-Iraq War as a case study by which to evaluate theoretical assumptions.

243. Segal, David. “The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5 (Summer 1988), pp. 946-963. •• A writer specializing in military affairs gives a blow-by-blow account of the recent months of the war and analyzes the combatants’ strategies and capabilities. He points out that Iranian actions to embroil Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the war have not worked. Iran has been successful in avoiding retaliatory action by the superpowers but “If they are moving toward a consensus on how to deal with the problem, as certain recent developments seem to suggest, then Iraq will survive, and the war may end far sooner than most people now expect.” (p. 962)


245. Staudenmaier, William O. “Military Policy and Strategy in the Gulf War.” Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 25-35. •• An analyst at the US Army War College looks at the strategies pursued by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. He observes that before a nation goes to war it should ensure that the military means of force are consistent with political objectives; this, he contends, Saddam Husayn failed to do and consequently the war may prove to be his Waterloo. Staudenmaier also contends that inept Iraqi strategy constituted the primary reason why Iran was not defeated in the early stages of the war, and notes that although both sides were armed with the most sophisticated weaponry it has been used ineffectively and neither side has demonstrated initiative or aggressiveness in battle. ✿

246. Tucker, Anthony R. “Armoured Warfare in the Gulf.” Armed Forces, Vol. 7 (May 1988), pp. 223-226. •• A look at the role of land forces in the Iran-Iraq War, concluding that “Tactical use of tanks on both sides has at best been unimaginative. Regardless of the unfavourable terrain, neither side seems to be able to organise and conduct large-scale armoured operations effectively.” (p. 226)

The Tanker War and Other Direct US Involvement


252. Gamlen, Elizabeth. “U.S. Strategic Policy Toward the Middle East: Central Command and the Reflagging of Kuwait's Tankers.” In Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., *The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives* (Albany: State University of New York, 1993), pp. 213-249. The holder of a Ph.D. in peace studies from the University of Bradford examines the circumstances that led to the US decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers to protect them from Iranian attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. She argues that “If the United States is to seriously pursue its prime goal of securing oil supplies from the Gulf region it must take advantage of the cessation of hostilities to review both its military and nonmilitary strategies. In particular, it must resolve the dilemmas over its relations with Iran.” (p. 243)

253. “The Gulf War.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 114 (May 1988), pp. 29-57. A set of four articles focusing on the “tanker war” of the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War (by Ronald O'Rourke), the US Navy’s escorting of Kuwaiti tankers (Wesley L. McDonald), press coverage in the US of the war (Jack Cushman), and an interview with the commander of the US ship assigned to the first convoy (Frank C. Seitz, Jr.).

254. Hanks, Robert J. “The Gulf War and U.S. Staying Power.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 15 (Fall 1987), pp. 36-43. A former commander of the US Navy’s Middle East Force highlights the risks to US naval deployment in the Gulf from the combatants, as illustrated by the Iraqi missile strike on the USS Stark and Iranian maritime mining. He notes that “The stakes that have impelled the US military commitment in the Persian Gulf are indeed – and unchallengeably – ‘vital’” but even greater peril lies in the US allowing “those risks to deflect it from strategic purpose” since “a US retreat from its commitment in the Gulf would spell a strategic disaster.” (p. 43)

255. Hawkins, William R. “Strategy and ‘Freedom of Navigation.’” *National Interest*, No. 12 (Summer 1988), pp. 48-56. The research director of the South Foundation agrees that it was in the United States' national interest to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers in 1987, but he argues that the Reagan administration goes too far in sometimes stating its role in the Gulf as being a “global policeman,” rather than confining its posture to defense of its allies and its own interests. Although Iran’s targeting of the tankers had compromised Kuwait’s status as a
neutral, Hawkins notes that its anti-shipping strategy is not “mad” or “criminal” and “it would be counter-productive in the long-run to whip up a crusade against Iran on such grounds. Iran’s strategy is understandable; it is just not in the US interest that it be allowed to succeed. (p. 54)

256. Navias, Martin S., and E.R. Hooton. *Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980-1988*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996. ●● An examination of the Iran-Iraq War as it related to maritime hostilities. The last chapter extends the discussion through the Kuwait War. The authors note that “Traditionally the maritime powers were naval powers with the resources and the will to prevent interference with trade, but since 1945 the trend has been for owners to seek flags of convenience. In seeking cost benefits owners have abandoned protection, swapping steel for gold, for the price of financial freedom is the absence of naval power.” (p. 104) A 10-page appendix lists all the civilian ships attacked during the war.

257. Noyes, James. “Through the Gulf Labyrinth: Naval Escort and U.S. Policy.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 29 (Summer 1989), pp. 1-19. ●● A Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford University) examines the purposes in reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti tankers during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War and concludes that the US “demonstrated successful use of our forces in a murky situation without absolute win-or-lose categories, and absent a precise knowledge of how long we would be there.... (p. 19)


259. Phillips, Tod A. “Exchanging Excuses for Uses of Force – The Tug of War in the Persian Gulf.” *Houston Journal of International Law*, Vol. 10 (Spring 1988), pp. 275-293. ●● An examination of the legal basis behind the American “use of force” in the Gulf as a response to Iranian provocations in attacking oil tankers and mining Gulf waters. The author suggests that it might have been better for the US to have abstained from involvement in the Iran-Iraq War and thereby preserve its neutrality: “Rather than trying to police the Kuwaiti convoys while hiding behind the mask of neutrality, the United States could have backed the United Nations in protecting the convoys under the U.N. flag.” (p. 292)

260. Ramazani, R.K. “The Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf Crisis.” *Current History*, Vol. 87 (February 1988), pp. 64, 86-88. ●● A professor of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia looks at the Kuwaiti decision in 1987 to seek to protect its oil tankers under the American flag from Iranian attacks. He suggests that the proposal of a United Nations Naval Patrol Authority should be followed up.

and the decision for the US to reflag Kuwaiti tankers. The author points out that Iraq’s
decision to escalate into a tanker war was due to its “desperation to see an end to the
protracted war [by] adoption of a strategy based on the exploitation of its superiority in
airpower.” (p. 305) She also concludes that, despite contradictions, “in the longer run, and
in a rather roundabout manner, Baghdad did accomplish its main goal of bringing the Iran-
Iraq War to a standstill.” (p. 308)

1989. An introduction on the Iran-Iraq War and the development of the tanker war in
1987 is followed by detailed tables on allied navies in the Gulf, an extensive chronology of
the Iran-Iraq War, and a list of tankers sunk or damaged during the war.

263. Stork, Joe. “Reagan Re-Flags the Gulf.” *MERIP Reports*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (September-October
1987), pp. 2-5.

cconcern over the impact of the attack on the USS Stark, Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger testifies that “The Stark incident was a tragic accident which shows that
danger is always near.” (p. 9) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J.
Crowe, Jr., adds that “The Stark incident has brought home in a painful way that we must
remain constantly alert and we are now working out with Baghdad some procedures to avoid
a recurrence of an accidental attack. Since the Stark attack we have not as yet seen any
changes in Iranian conduct at sea – in fact they appear be even more cautious than
previously.” (p. 21) In his testimony, Richard W. Murphy (Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) points out that the Soviets would have been happy to
escort Kuwaiti tankers if the US had declined and thereby would have gained additional
facilities in the Gulf. He also notes that the Iranian deployment of Silkworm missiles raises
the threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

265. Committee on Armed Services. Investigations Subcommittee, and Defense Policy
; Report, July 1987. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1987. This report was ordered as a result
of the attack on the USS Stark and the Kuwaiti request for the reflagging of tankers but
considers wider aspects of US policy relating to the Gulf. It concludes that “The
Administration, by agreeing without significant consultation to the Kuwaiti request to reflag
the 11 tankers, placed the Congress in a potentially untenable position” (p. 77), although it
also recognizes that the negative effect of this was exceeded by benefits from the reflagging
itself. Furthermore, the justification for escorting tankers in the Gulf is seen as necessarily
political rather than military. The Administration’s primary objective in acceding to the
Kuwaiti request “was to limit Soviet penetration and presence in the Gulf area.” (p. 78) An
appendix provides details on the commercial shipping attacked by Iran between May 1984 and July 1987.


267. _________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East. Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf; Hearings and Markups, 19 May, 2, 9, 10, 11 and 23 June, 1987. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1987. A series of hearings to consider implications of the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark (17 May 1987), various House resolutions (on requiring a report on US security arrangements in the Gulf, Allied participation in security arrangements, and support for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war), Witnesses include Michael H. Armacost, Richard W. Murphy, and Edward P. Djerejian from the State Department, Caspar W. Weinberger (Secretary of Defense), Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Lt. General R.A. Burpee and Sandra Charles from the Department of Defense, and Congressmen Charles Bennett, Henry Gonzalez, Tom Lantos, and Thomas J. Downey. The committee’s concern seems to center on apprehensions that the attack on the Stark and the decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers could increase the potential for US entanglement in the Iran-Iraq War.

268. _________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf; Hearing, 15 December 1987. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988. The first witness, Richard W. Murphy (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), briefs the subcommittees on recent steps the US administration has taken in the Gulf while the following witness, Edward Gnehm (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) provides more detail on the 21 convoys that the US Navy conducted in the Gulf without incident.


270. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Persian Gulf: Report to the Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, from Senator John Glenn and Senator John Warner on Their Trip to the Persian Gulf May 27-June 4, 1987. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1987. Committee Print No. 100-38. The two senators report on their visit to assess the threats to US and friendly forces in the Gulf and to assess options available to improve security arrangements with friendly Gulf countries. They conclude that efforts should be continued to bring the Iran-Iraq War to a conclusion, that an increase in US military forces is required because of escort commitments connected to the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, and that more support from GCC states and additional burden-sharing by NATO allies is needed. “If we are to succeed,
our commitment must be firm, unequivocal, and enduring. Moreover, it must be well understood and backed by the Congress.” (p. 20)


273. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf*; Hearings, 29 May, 16 June, and 23 and 28 October 1987. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990. **In the first hearing, Richard W. Murphy (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), and Admiral Henry C. Mustin (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations) discuss the attack in the Gulf on the USS Stark (17 May 1987) and the American reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers. The hearing on 16 June heard testimony from Congressman Charles E Bennett (Florida), Michael H. Armacost (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Richard Armitage again, Rear Admiral John W. Kime (Chief of the Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection for the US Coast Guard), Robert E. Hunter (former staff member of the National Security Council), Karl Landgrebe (special assistant to the President of the National Engineers’ Beneficial Association), and Frank Pecquex (legislative director of the Seafarers International Union of North America) on the subject of US involvement in hostilities in the Gulf and the reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers. Caspar W. Weinberger (Secretary of Defense) testified on 23 October about the American attack (of 17 October) on an Iranian oil platform used by the Revolutionary Guard. And on 28 October, former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and former Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson testified on the UN role in the Gulf.**


275. __________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Persian Gulf and the War Powers Resolution*; Report Together With Additional Views To Accompany S. 1343, 10 July 1987. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1987. **Background for bills submitted by Senator Claiborne Pell (Rhode Island) that would require that the use of US armed forces in escort duties in the Gulf complies with the War Powers Resolution (enacted in 1973 as a result of Vietnam to enable Congress to impose limitations on the President’s ability to introduce troops into hostile situations).**
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., provides testimony that stresses that “We have a vital stake in seeing that the region’s supply of oil to the free world remains unimpeded.” (p. 15) But he concedes that it is difficult to construct a simple policy for the region. More details on the situation in the Iran-Iraq War and US involvement in the Gulf are provided by Michael H. Armacost (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), and Rear Admiral Robert Ailes (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations).

A detailed examination of the legality of the tanker reflagging policy under international and domestic standards. The author concludes that “The reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers as a flagging event was a lawful undertaking. The administration was careful to comply with or seek waivers for all documentation requirements. The tenuousness of the link between the tankers and the United States may give rise to skepticism over the degree to which states may abuse the genuine link concept, but such skepticism does not give any state the right to deny the United States nationality of the tankers.” (p. 174)

A professor of international law at the University of Kiel notes that “Both the reflagging of [eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers] and U.S. naval escort operations raise significant issues under international law. Moreover, because the acts of reflagging and escort are closely linked (the U.S. government reflagged the Kuwaiti ships in order to legalize its naval
escort operations), the international law issues raised by each act are similarly linked.” (p. 387)

Background to the Invasion and Developments During the Iraqi Occupation


285. Abideen, Muhammad Ali. *The Historical Pretext for the Occupation of Kuwait*. Qom, Iran: Dar Al-Mostafa, 1995. ●● A translation from the original Arabic of an anti-Saddam Husayn treatise. The author disputes Iraq’s contention that Kuwait was part of the former Ottoman Empire and thus belonged to Iraq as a successor state. Similarly, claims to Kuwait during the Iraqi monarchy and then the republic are dismissed as without foundation and the author attributes the invasion in 1990 to Saddam’s “vainglory and megalomania.” (p. 77)

286. Ali, Omar. *Crisis in the Arabian Gulf: An Independent Iraqi View*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. ●● An impassioned view of the reasons why Iraq invaded Kuwait and its perceived domination first by Britain and then by the United States by an Iraqi resident in the US. The author is supportive of Iraq’s claims to Kuwait but critical of its decision to invade. He believes that a pillar of US regional policy is “that no Arab state or combination of Arab states should rearch parity with Israel in military potential.” (p. 144) The author sees that “The Iraqi invasion and its aftermath have destroyed the fabric of any existing Arab solidarity” (p. 137) and that “Had Kuwait and other Arab members of the Alliance had true democratic institutions, they would not have allowed their governments to cooperate in a conspiracy to destroy the military power of an Arab government.” (p. 139)


289. Shewaihy, Mohammed A. al-. “Historical Claim of Iraq Over Kuwait and the Position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Its Peaceful Solution.” *Korean Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 11 (1990), pp. 55-67. ●● The Iraqi Foreign Minister provides justification for the invasion by combining an outline of Iraq’s historical claims to Kuwait with perceived Kuwaiti antagonism by flooding the market with oil. The Saudi Arabian ambassador to South
Korea responds by refuting Iraq’s historical claims as “sheer lies” and then sets out the kingdom’s position on the crisis, together with its insistence that there can be no solution without total Iraqi withdrawal and full restitution of the Kuwaiti government.

290. Baram, Amatzia, and Barry Rubin, eds. Iraq’s Road to War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. This edited book presents papers originally presented at a 1991 conference at the University of Haifa. The papers are organized around five subjects. Amatzia Baram (University of Haifa) opens the volume with a discussion of the making of Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait, followed by an examination of the weaknesses and strengths of the Iraqi army by Mark A. Heller (Tel Aviv University) and an analysis of the political attitudes of Iraq’s Shi‘ah and Kurds by Ofra Bengio (Tel Aviv University). Then a section of economic roots of the crisis includes papers by Patrick Clawson (Orbis) on Iraq’s economy and international sanctions and by Robert J. Lieber (Georgetown University) on the impact of the war on the international oil market. Chapters on the impact on the Arab world include Joseph Kostiner (Tel Aviv University) on Kuwait, Jacob Goldberg (Tel Aviv University) on Saudi Arabia, Joseph Nevo (University of Haifa) on Jordan, co-editor Barry Rubin (Johns Hopkins University) on the PLO, Ilan Pappe (University of Haifa) on Israel’s Arabs, Michael Eppel (University of Haifa) on Syria, and Yoram Meital (University of Haifa) on Egypt. Farther afield, David Kushner (University of Haifa) discusses the impact on Turkey, Shaul Bakhash (George Mason University) on Iran, and Avner Yaniv (University of Haifa) on Israel. Final chapters include Barry Rubin on US policy towards Iraq before and during the war and Helmut Hubil (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswartige Politik) on French and German policy. The book concludes with a short essay by P.J. Vatikiotis (University of London) placing the Kuwait War in the larger context of 20th-century political trends in the Middle East.

291. Bishku, Michael B. “Iraq’s Claim to Kuwait: A Historical Overview.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 37 (1991), pp. 77-88. A professor at the University of Nebraska at Kearney details the history of Iraqi-Kuwaiti border relations from the origin of the dispute, through the 1961 alarm caused by Iraq’s apparent mobilization to move into Kuwait, until 1990.


294. Arnold, Hans. “The Gulf Crisis and the United Nations.” Aussenpolitik, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1991), pp. 68-77. In the first article, written on the eve of the Kuwait War, the author (associated with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the German Orient Institute) reviews the background to Iraq’s invasion and looks at the development of the coalition to oust the invaders. She observes that Saddam is unlikely to withdraw from Kuwait and remarks that efforts were underway to find a political solution. “In view of the outlined risks of a military operation to enforce UN resolutions this should only be considered as a last
A military conflict could not be limited to the Gulf region.” (p. 67; emphasis in original) Although Arnold, a former German ambassador to the United Nations, believes that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is more of a regional problem than a threat to world peace, he feels that settlement of the crisis is important for the UN, “whether by military means on the part of the major northern powers and bypassing the UN or ... through a negotiated UN solution (perhaps reinforced by the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces). The first solution would substantially weaken the UN, the second would strengthen it somewhat.” (p. 76)

295. Brown, Gordon S. Coalition, Coercion, and Compromise: Diplomacy of the Gulf Crisis, 1990-91. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1997. A former American ambassador and political adviser to General Norman Schwarzkopf during the Kuwait War focuses on the period between the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 and the launching of the air war in January 1991. He concludes that “Diplomacy failed to avert the war because, by October, the major protagonists gave very little room for negotiation.” (p. 84) In fact, he argues, mediation efforts may have convinced Saddam Husayn that the coalition did not have the stomach for war. His refusal to take advantage of negotiating efforts may have been tactical at first but seemed to be driven by “sheer obstinacy in the end.” (p. 84) Brown also observes that it is not surprising that the solidarity of the coalition should have evaporated soon after the cease-fire since it “seems in retrospect to have been more a product of its specific time and circumstances than a reproducible contribution to a new international order.” (p. 91)

296. Bulloch, John, and Harvey Morris. Saddam’s War: The Origins of the Kuwaiti Conflict and the International Response. London: Faber & Faber, 1991. An account of the Kuwait War by two British journalists, with emphasis on explaining the personality of Saddam Husayn and his motivation for invading Kuwait. To the question of whether Kuwait was worth a war, the authors answer that “the crisis was never just about restoring the independence of Kuwait. With his annexation of a sovereign state, Saddam challenged the very basis of international relations within the United Nations, just at a time when that body was emerging from the Cold War era as an effective forum for the resolution of international disputes.” (p. xi) Rejecting the contention that the US or Kuwait was responsible for the crisis, they lay the blame squarely on Saddam for “all the consequences of the aggression.” (p. xiii) They argue that “The invasion was a deliberate stage in Saddam’s war, a war which he waged against his political opponents, against his own people, against Iran and in which, ultimately, he threatened to embroil the rest of the world.” (p. xiii) The book includes a small selection of photographs but omits any bibliography and has only one rudimentary map.

297. Carpenter, Ted Galen, ed. America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1991. Papers from a conference held on the Kuwait crisis before the war began, with emphasis on implications for US foreign policy. Most of the short contributions are by journalists. The first part (with contributions by Christopher Layne, Robert E. Hunter, Ted Carpenter, and Peter Riddell) concentrates on the nature of a
“new world order” and what that means for US political and military leadership in the world, as well as relations with traditional allies in Europe. The second part looks at the impact of the invasion on international oil and features contributions from David R. Henderson, Michael E. Canes, William A. Niskanen, and Richard K. Thomas. In part three, Sheldon L. Richman looks at “Washington’s interventionist record in the Middle East.” Charles William Maynes posits that an American decision to go to war will be based on the factors of oil, order, security, and Israel. Gene R. La Rocque counsels against military action in favor of a diplomatic interlude of one year, Gerald F. Seib emphasizes the “tricky task of keeping the various powers of this dangerous region in balance,” (p. 83) and Leon T. Hadar concludes that the American Cold-War policy in the Middle East will not solve problems of US involvement in the Middle East. The final two papers by Doug Bandow and Rosemary Fiscarelli deal with restoring Congressional war powers and a countervailing view that US security interests must be focused on non-Gulf threats.

298. Collins, John M. “Options in the Middle East.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 116 (October 1990), pp. 119-122. •• A specialist in national defense at the US Congressional Research Service provides lists of eight Iraqi and eight American options of what to do following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. He notes that on both sides, the available options are not mutually exclusive.


300. *Crisis in the Gulf*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1990. •• A pamphlet produced just after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and George Bush’s decision to drive Saddam out. The authors note that “In the rush to resolve the Gulf crisis, nothing is done to reverse the foolish and dangerous policies of oil dependence that brought a U.S. military force into the Arabian desert.” (p. 5) They also call for a public debate on the decision.


302. Dann, Uriel. *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Historical Observations*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1990. •• A short paper written shortly after the invasion and providing background on Kuwait.


306. Eilts, Hermann Frederick. “The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 7-22. ●● A professor at Boston University and former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia examines impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its antecedents in an article published before Operation Desert Storm. He warns that the US should not “keep US ground forces permanently deployed in the Middle East [as it] will weaken the régimes of countries where US troops are allowed to be stationed” and advises that “Any future collective security arrangement in the region, if it is to be indigenously acceptable, must have its origins in the area itself.” (p. 22)

307. Finnie, David. *Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992. ●● A comprehensive examination of the boundary dilemma between Kuwait and Iraq by a lawyer, relying extensively on British documents as well as secondary sources. He reviews the wrangling over Kuwait between Britain and the Ottoman Empire prior to the First World War, as well as negotiations during the Iraqi mandate and independence (until 1958). Subsequent chapters deal with the crisis of 1961, when it appeared that Iraq might invade Kuwait, and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations during the Iran-Iraq War. A final chapter analyzes the reasons for invasion put forward by Iraq in 1990. The author dismisses Iraq’s claim that Kuwait is part of Iraq by citing the 1963 agreement by which Baghdad agreed to abandon its claim and acceptance of Kuwait as a fellow member of the Arab League and the United Nations. As for the dispute over the Rumaylah oilfield, “Kuwait’s alleged transgression of the oil at or near Rumaila can hardly be considered a legitimate *casus belli*, much less an excuse for disregarding an otherwise well-established frontier.” (p. 173) He tends to dismiss the conspiracy theory that Kuwait was deliberately overproducing its OPEC quota in collusion with the United States in order to deprive Iraq of income. He finds greater value in Iraq’s requirement for better access to the Gulf although noting that “Saddam Hussein’s reckless aggression, together with his postwar posturing, understandably reduced international sympathy for Iraq’s geographic plight very nearly to the vanishing point...” (p. 175) and points out that the UN Security Council Resolution 687 after “closed the door” on the border disagreement.


311. Greenwood, Christopher. “Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait: Some Legal Issues.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5 (Spring-Summer 1991), pp. 21-31. ¶ This study by a fellow at Magdalene College, Cambridge, points out that “the invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait were a direct challenge to the principle which forbids the aggressive use of force and denies that an aggressor can still acquire legal title to conquered territory. The response to that invasion, particularly with the commitment of forces from a wide range of States to a massive military action, also demanded some hard thinking about the second principle and the relationship between law enforcement and self-defence.” (p. 21) Another version of this article was published under the same title in *World Today*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (March 1991), pp. 39-43.


we cannot withdraw from the world, yet there is a coalition of far right and far left growing up in this country that prefers to withdraw.” (p. 26) Algerian Ambassador Abderrahmane Bensid introduces the impact of the invasion and war on the Maghrib states. A panel with Jack Wilkinson, Talat Othman, John Christie, and Koro Bessho discusses the economic implications while another panel with Joseph Wright Twinam, David L. Mack, Robert G. Neumann, and Kenzo Oshima lays out the political implications. The final remarks by Clovis Maksoud, formerly the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, are concerned with the beginning of the healing process.

316. “The Gulf Crisis: Political and Economic Implications.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 7, No. 4 (December 1990), entire issue. Different perspectives on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait include Charles Tripp (University of London) on Iraqi politics, an interview with Serge Kirpitchenko (Chief of the Gulf Section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry), R.K. Ramazani (University of Virginia) on US Gulf policy, Joseph Ghogassian (former US ambassador to Qatar) on the mood in the Gulf, James Elles (Member of the European Parliament) on Europe’s role, Tom Kono (New York University) on Japan’s role, Shahram Chubin (M Group, Switzerland) on Iran, Kono on the economics behind the invasion, and Amy Kaslow (Christian Science Monitor) on the regional economic impact.


320. Haselkorn, Avigdor. “Underestimating Sadddam: Why Were the U.S. and Israel Surprised?” Global Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1990), pp. 1-25. •• The author, a defense consultant, charges that the US and Israel suffered from “a multiple, bi-national intelligence – and/or political – failure in Kuwait.” (p. 18) This he blames on poor human intelligence, a failure to assess correctly Iraqi intentions as well as capabilities, erroneous estimates arising from US-Israeli intelligence cooperation, the hampering of reliable intelligence by political considerations, and the irrelevance of the presence of thousand of American civilians in Iraq and Kuwait.


323. “L’invasion du Koweït.” *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 130 (October-November-December 1990), entire issue. ●● An entire issue devoted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Ghassan Salamé, “Les enjeux d’une crise” (pp. 5-13), begins discussion by examining the issues at stake on all sides, including for Iraq, Kuwait, the US, Russia, and Europe. Henry Laurens, “Le contentieux territorial entre l’Irak et le Koweït” (p. 14-24), traces the nature of the conflicting territorial claims, including the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman accord and the 1961 crisis. Elizabeth Picard, “Le régime irakien et la crise: les ressorts d’une politique” (pp. 25-35), focuses on the internal nature and structure of the Iraqi regime which permitted its behavior. Benoît Parisot, “La situation économique et financière de l’Irak à la mi-1990: quelle influence sur la décision d’envahir le Koweït?” (pp. 36-44), concentrates on the economic motivations of Iraq. Jean Leca, “Aux origines de la crise: le discours des acteurs” (pp. 45-68), introduces speeches and interviews which give the viewpoints of Saddam Husayn, Yasir ‘Arafat, Tareq Aziz, and Shaykh Ali Khalifah Al Sabah (the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance). The military and oil aspects are briefly covered by Louis-Jean Duclos on “Les forces militaires en présence” (pp. 69-73), and Khattar Abou-Diab on “Aspects pétroliers de la crise” (pp. 74-78). Broader Arab attitudes are explored by Alain Roussillon on “L’opposition égyptienne et la crise du Golfe” (pp. 79-98), and M. al-Ahnaf on “L’opposition maghrébine face à la crise du Golfe” (pp. 99-114). The issue also includes a chronology of events.


338. Lawson, Fred H. “Rethinking the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait.” *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 1-20. A political scientist at Mills College in California finds the motivation for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait puzzling and reviews the various arguments put forth for it and places them in the context of international-relations theory. He suggests “To the extent that increasing vulnerability led Iraq to resort to coercion
in its dealings with Kuwait during the summer of 1990, overt US military intervention in the Gulf that July precipitated a classic conflict spiral. ... Washington's evident willingness to exercise military muscle in Gulf affairs prompted the Iraqi leadership to conclude that it must take desperate measures to buttress Iraq's strategic position before the United States and its allies succeeded in circumscribing Iraq's ability to influence regional affairs.” (p. 18)

Furthermore, the unresolved aftermath of the Kuwait War and Iraq’s continued vulnerability means that “almost all of the major sources of Iraqi insecurity that precipitated the 1990 invasion of Kuwait remain intact.” (p. 18)


343. Mansuri, Javad. “Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Political and Economic Implications.” *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 9-18. The Iranian ambassador to Pakistan analyzes the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its regional ramifications. He notes that Iran has considered the occupation illegal and has demanded Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal. “The Islamic Republic of Iran during the eight years of its sacred defence against Iraqi aggression, had warned the countries supporting Iraq and supplying arms to it that one day they too will face dangerous consequences of their action.” (p. 15) He adds that Iran opposes the presence of Western and American forces in the region.


346. Morris, Mary E. *Regional Dynamics of the Gulf Crisis*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. P-7700. A short paper by a RAND analyst based on comments delivered at several venues and giving a brief overview of the events leading to the Kuwait War, noting that “The indigenous problems of the Middle East that existed prior to the war
... will still exist when the war is over. They will be the true survivors of the war, and, if anything, they will be worse at the end than at the beginning.” (p. 11)

347. Musallam, Musallam Ali. *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein, His State and International Power Politics*. London: British Academic Press, 1995. Derived from a Ph.D. dissertation at Georgetown University, “this book attempts to disentangle the causes of the 1990 Gulf crisis using insights derived from political theory, and more specifically the theoretical framework set out in Kenneth Waltz’s widely acclaimed *Man, the State and War*... [and argues that the Kuwait War] “resulted from a combination of elements: the leadership of Saddam Hussein, the nature of the Iraqi state, and the interantional system of states and that the crisis was precipitated by a peculiarly unstable combination of these elements.” (p. 5)

348. Mylroie, Laurie. “Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait.” *Orbis*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 123-134. A fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy contends that Saddam invaded because he “seems to have had a grand but simple design, beginning with gaining control of the Persian Gulf’s oil. As suggested by the Kuwait crisis, that dramatic act would make Saddam an Arab hero.” (p. 126)


351. Pelletière, Stephen C. *Iraq and the International Oil System: Why America Went to War in the Gulf*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. A professor of national security affairs at the US Army War College presents the history of the oil industry and the emergence of an international oil company cartel before turning to the emergence of OPEC as a counter to the cartel and the role of Iraqi oil in this context. A final chapter deals with the Iran-contra affair and what the author terms a media campaign that led the US into the Kuwait War, which he sees as resulting from a breakdown of the international oil system. The author sees that Baghdad’s victory in the Iran-Iraq War threatened to make it the head of OPEC, which “would have given it a great say ... over how oil was produced, and that, of course, would have translated into control over pricing. This was a situation repugnant to many, and thus forces inimical to Iraq started a media campaign, the effect of which was to so polarize conditions between the Iraqis and the United States that, at a certain point, war became inevitable.” (p. x)


353. “Pour comprendre la crise du Golfe.” *Le Trimestre du Monde*, No. 12 (1990), special section. There are two parts to this issue’s collection of articles on the Iraqi invasion. First, five
authors look at the diplomatic and strategic aspects of the crisis. Michel Foucher’s “Proche et Moyen-Orient: olivages et divisions d’un ensemble géopolitique très complexe” (pp. 117-121), provides a brief introduction to the problem, including three useful maps. Jean Mathiex, in “Aux racines de la crise du Golfe” (pp. 123-136) recapitulates the historical background to the creation of Iraq and Kuwait and the boundary problem. Bertrand Lang’s article, “Les données politico-stratégique du conflit du Golfe” (pp. 137-147) looks at the factors behind Iraq’s decision to invade and the options available to the US. Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Le Conseil de sécurité face au conflit Irak-Koweit: un directoire en action” (pp. 155-162) carries the theme forward by looking at the UN’s options (relevant resolutions are given in an annex). Siama Parvine, “Le Golfe persique: à la recherche de l’équilibre perdu” (pp. 163-170) addresses the impact on the Gulf. The oil and financial factors are covered by interviews with Nicolas Sarkis, “Les incidences pétrolières de la crise du Golfe” (pp. 171-176) and Jean-Claude Frelon (a pseudonym for a group of French financial experts on the Middle East), “Le Koweit et les incidences financières de la crise du Golfe” (pp. 177-180). The issue also includes an article by Jean-Claude Courdy on “Les incidences de la crise du Golfe sur les relations américano-japonaises” (pp. 89-93).

354. Rahman, H. *Making of the Gulf War: Origins of Kuwait’s Long-standing Territorial Dispute with Iraq*. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996. ●● A senior research officer at Qatar’s Amiri Diwan contends that “To understand the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 it is first necessary to go back to the beginning of the twentieth century when the Ottoman authorities in Basra adopted a robust foreign policy, extending their influence further south... and in so doing raised the question of the status of Kuwait and its territorial limits.” (p. xiii) From this point, he proceeds to outline Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations from the 1930s through the Kuwait War, with particular attention to the thorny questions of a frontier line, border disputes, the status of the borderline port at Umm Qasr, the British-led intervention to defend Kuwait against a presumed Iraqi threat in 1963, and Iraqi claims to the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Rahman concludes that Iraq’s invasion in 1990 was “prompted by [Saddam] Hussein’s personal ambition of becoming the most powerful man in the Arab world... [d]espite the worldwide condemnation and unprecedented international unity in opposing the illegality of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait (since Kuwait had never been part of the Basra administration)....” (p. 321)

355. Rahman, Habibur. “Kuwaiti Ownership of Warba and Bubiyan Islands.” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 292-306. ●● The author reviews the historical claims to sovereignty over these two disputed and strategically important islands lying between Kuwait and Iraq, and concludes that Kuwait’s ownership was established by the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 which independent Iraq subsequently accepted.


359. Saunders, Harold. “Political Settlement and the Gulf Crisis.” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 1-16. ●● A visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and former National Security Council and State Department official explores the option of a political settlement as an alternative to the Kuwait War, arguing that “The practical question is whether and how policymakers can devise ways of confronting lawless and evil acts effectively by using instruments that will not destroy what they are trying to preserve.” (p. 16)


364. Sterner, Michael. “Navigating the Gulf.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 81 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 39-52. ●● A partner in the IRC Group and former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates dissects the United States’ role in the Gulf on the eve of the Kuwait War. While noting that the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait is a positive objective, he adds that such action would leave Iraq’s military capability intact, as well as its claim to Kuwait. Thus, “The objective must be expanded to include the establishment of a stable post-withdrawal military environment that will enable the United States to withdraw the bulk of its military forces and establish a peacekeeping régime.” (p. 44)
365. Stork, Joe, and Ann M. Lesch. “Why War? Background to the Crisis.” MERIP Middle East Report, Vol. 20, No. 6 (November-December 1990), pp. 11-18. The editor of Middle East Report and a professor at Villanova University team up to give the background to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait through brief glances at the history of oil, Iraq, Kuwait, and the Iran-Iraq War. They charge the US with “very selective opposition to aggression” and note “Saddam’s challenge has appropriated its political strength from the Palestinian and broader Arab resentment against the apparent collusion of the US, the West and most of the Arab régimes to maintain a political and economic status quo which, for millions, has become intolerable.” (p. 18)


368. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War; Hearings, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20 December 1990. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991. Principal witnesses in these hearings included James E. Akins (former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia), George W. Ball (former Under Secretary of State), James A. Bill (College of William and Mary), James A. Blackwell, Jr. (Center for Strategic and International Studies), General Duane H. Cassidy (former Commander in Chief of US Transportation Command), Richard Cheney (Secretary of Defense), Eliot A. Cohen (Johns Hopkins University), General William E. Depuy (former Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command), General Charles L. Donnelly, Jr. (former Commander-in-Chief, US Air Force Europe), Admiral Robert F. Dunn (former Assistant Chief of Naval Operations [Air Warfare]), Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy (military analyst), Hermann Eilts (Boston University and former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt), Edward Heath (former British Prime Minister), Martin Indyk (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Judith Kipper (Brookings Institution), Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (former Representative to the UN), Lawrence J. Korb (Brookings), General Frederick J. Kroesen (former Commander-in-Chief, US Army in Europe, Samuel Lewis (US Institute for Peace), Phebe Marr (National Defense University), General Edward G. Meyer (former Army Chief of Staff), Richard Murphy (former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs), Janne E. Nolan (Brookings Institution), Jerrold Post (George Washington University), General Colin L. Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), William B. Quandt (Brookings Institution), Brad Roberts (Washington Quarterly), Joseph J. Sisco (former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Helmut Sonnenfeldt (former State Department official), Leonard S. Spector (Carnegie Endowment), Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. (military analyst), Cyrus Vance (former Secretary of State), and William H. Webster (Director of the Central Intelligence Agency).
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, defines the US response to Iraq’s provocation in terms of (1) “a political test of how the post Cold War world will work”; (2) an opportunity which must be seized to “solidify the ground rules of the new order”; and (3) a necessary consequence of the “dependence of the world on access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf.” (pp. 7-8) He then reiterates President Bush’s objectives as being “first, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait ...; second, the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government. Third, the protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and Kuwait: and fourth, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.” (p. 8) Six weeks later, Secretary Baker updated the committee reporting that US activities had included isolating Iraq through the UN Security Council, achieving cooperation with the Soviet Union on the issue, and building a coalition of 54 nations to contribute militarily or economically to collective action against Iraq.

This session heard from representatives of Amnesty International USA (John G. Healey) and Middle East Watch (Andrew Whitley), two Kuwaitis from Citizens for a Free Kuwait (Dr. Hassan Al-Ebraheem and Dr. Fawziyah A. A. Al-Qattan), as well as several former American hostages in Kuwait.

A lengthy compendium of statements by a number of witnesses on various related topics. The first hearing features statements by Joel Popkin, John Lichtblau, Richard W. Murphy, and Thomas McNaugher on the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. A month later, John H. Kelly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) and Henry S. Rowen (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) reported on the regional and military situations. In October and November, witnesses Richard K. Herrmann, James Place, Sohrab Sobhani, Edward N. Luttwak, Harold H. Saunders, and Patrick Clawson provided views on long-term implications of the Iraqi action. The final hearing centered on US policy in the Gulf with testimony provided by Jerrold M. Post, Laurie Mylroie, and Graham E. Fuller.
Defensive and Regional Security in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States


377. ________. Committee on Armed Services. *Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications*; Hearings, 11 and 13 September, 27, 28, 29, and 30 November, and 3 December 1990. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990. •• Richard Cheney (Secretary of Defense) testifies on the background to the invasion of Kuwait and the need for a military response. General Colin L. Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) then provides details of the build-up of forces in the region. On 13 September, Terrence O’Donnell (General Counsel of the Department of Defense) discusses financial contributions of other countries. On 27 November, Dr. James R. Schlesinger (former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence) reviews the global implications. On 28 November, General David C. Jones (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) endorses President Bush’s actions, Admiral William J. Crowe (also former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) provides observations on the impact on friendly countries in the region while Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (former Secretary of State) discusses the relative merits of sanctions and military action. Additional testimony is provided on 29 and 30 November by James Webb, Edward N. Luttwak, Richard Perle, Christine M. Helms, James A. Placke, Phebe Marr, William E. Odom, Gary Milhollin, William R. Graham, and Leonard S. Spector. Then on 3 December, Cheney and Powell return to brief the committee on UN resolutions and Operation Desert Storm.

378. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf*; Hearings, 6, 12, and 13 December 1990. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991. •• As the countdown to war narrows, the Committee on Foreign Relations held three full days of hearings. The first day heard testimony from national religious leaders, as well as Roger Fisher (Harvard Negotiation Project), Charles Flowerree (former US Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament), Richard N. Perle (former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy), and George Rathjens (MIT). On the second day, three former Assistant Secretaries of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs – Lucius D. Battle, Richard W. Murphy, and Harold H. Saunders – appeared with William Quandt (former National Security Council staff member). The final day heard from academic Middle East experts Fouad Ajami (Johns Hopkins), L. Carl Brown (Princeton), Michael Hudson (Georgetown), Laurie Mylroie
(Harvard), and Amos Perlmutter (American University), as well as Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. (Center for Security Policy), Robert E. Hunter (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Geoffrey Kemp (Carnegie Endowment), Samuel W. Lewis (US Institute of Peace), and Nicholas Veliotes (former Ambassador to Egypt).

379. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf*; Hearing, 8 January 1991. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991. Cyrus R. Vance and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., two former Secretaries of State, provide testimony. The former characterizes the situation as “the most important political military and diplomatic challenge to face us since the end of the cold war” and adds that “What happens in the Persian Gulf can set a course for our engagement in the outside world for years to come.” (p. 2) The latter stresses the importance of finding a military solution.


386. Wright, Robin. “Unexplored Realities of the Persian Gulf Crisis.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 23-29. In an article adapted from an address to the Middle East Institute and published prior to the Kuwait War, a journalist with the *Los Angeles Times* looks at four possible “by-products” of the crisis. She views the future of Iraq rather pessimistically, regards the Saudi talk of domestic changes as perhaps not going far enough, sees the appearance of new divisions within the Arab world that might endanger post-crisis regional stability, and believes that “the Gulf crisis cannot ultimately end until the Arab-Israeli crisis has also been resolved.” (p. 27)
Political Aspects of the Kuwait War (1991) and General Accounts
387. Aarts, Paul. “Democracy, Oil and the Gulf War.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1992), pp. 525-538. •• A professor of international relations at the University of Amsterdam holds that while the successful liberation of Kuwait safeguarded Western access to oil for some years, the longer-term faces some uncertainties arising from the short term stability. “Tightened Western political, economic and military control will, sooner or later, backfire, and give rise to renewed instability – all this occurring precisely at a time when Middle East oil will become even more indispensable than it is now.” (p. 525)

388. ________, and Michael Renner. “Oil and the Gulf War.” *MERIP Middle East Report* Vol. 21, No. 4 (July-August 1991), pp. 25-29. •• The authors, from the University of Amsterdam and the Worldwatch Insitute, state bluntly that “this war was about oil – access, prices, and profits.” (p.25) They perceive that “The arrangements that will follow the US defeat of Iraq will likely produce a kind of joint ‘oil dominion between major consumer countries and a core of oil exporters which will override the interests of the poorer oil importers and exporters like.” (p. 29) Instead of the “Seven Sisters,” the oil industry will be dominated by the “Four Stepsisters” – Saudi ARAMCO, PDV, Exxon, and Shell.


390. Algosaibi, Ghazi A. *The Gulf Crisis: An Attempt to Understand*. London: Kegan Paul International, 1993. First published in Arabic as *Azmat al-Khalij* (1991). •• A former Saudi Arabian minister and his country’s ambassador to the United Kingdom examines Saddam Husayn’s motivations in occupying Kuwait and gives an Arab view of the events leading to Kuwait’s liberation. He notes that “The ‘storms after the storm’ were not limited to Iraq and its allies. The winds of change blew everywhere.” (p. 142) This included Saudi Arabia where petitions for reform were presented to the king.


401. Chubin, Shahram. “The Gulf War: Post-War Gulf Security.” *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (March-April 1991), pp. 140-157. A pair of articles by an ABC News correspondent and a specialist on Middle East politics provide a before and after view of the Kuwait War. Cooley breaks the pre-war diplomacy down into three phases: an American failure to anticipate Saddam Husayn’s move (up to 2 August 1990); an Arab failure in collective security (2 August-29 November 1990); and a predominantly European failure to exert more diplomatic energy in the crisis (30 November 1990-16 January 1991). Chubin discusses the unfolding of the crisis and alternative views of regional security after the crisis’s denouement, noting that “It may be easier to devise military responses to crises than to summon the sustained political will to deal with issues short of crises. The episodic nature of US involvement in the past suggests that this is so.” (p. 155)


404. Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. An exhaustive scholarly account of the Kuwait War, including the invasion, the military build-up, the diplomatic activity, and the actual conduct of the war. The authors, of Kings College London, observe that “Saddam was unfortunate to pick a unique period in international affairs. Had he invaded Kuwait a few years earlier, such wide-ranging collaboration would have been unconceivable....” (p. 438) They also note that Kuwait might not have been invaded if it had
not been for oil and that the successful prosecution of the war returned the United States to “a self-confident and an effective role at the heart of international affairs.” (p. 441)

405. __________. “How Kuwait Was Won.” International Security, Vol. 16 (Fall 1991), pp. 5-41. Reprinted as “How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War” in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and Charles R.H. Tripp, eds., Iraq’s Aggression Against Kuwait: Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 51-64. ●● The authors (both of Kings College, London) detail the American build-up to the Kuwait War and analyze Iraqi and Coalition strategy in preparing for conflict before providing an analysis of the course of the war itself. They also look at Saddam Husayn’s miscalculations and the making of the American strategy in the war. Freedman and Karsh conclude that in order for President George Bush to utilize the advantages of overwhelming air power, he “had to depend on international tolerance of the spectacle of a largely unopposed air bombardment continuing day after day. When he called for a cease-fire, it was because he was aware of a growing unease at the carnage inflicted upon Iraqi troops, and because his basic objectives had now been achieved, even if the future of Saddam himself was left unresolved.” (p. 41)


411. Heidenrich, John G. “The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?” Foreign Policy, No. 90 (1993), pp. 108-125. ●● A former military analyst with the US Defense Intelligence Agency charges that the US government refuses to release an estimate of Iraqi casualties for fear it will provide ammunition to the Pentagon’s critics – too high and it will open the door to charges of barbarism, too low and it might bring accusations of coverup. After evaluating various estimates, the author concludes that the total was well under the unofficially accepted figure of 100,000 and probably under 10,000. He also notes that “Today the bloodiest wars are not necessarily the largest wars [but] the drawn-out conflicts that we once dismissed as ‘brushfire wars’ and now called ‘low-intensity conflicts.’ Witness Somalia and what used to be called Yugoslavia.” (p. 124)
412. Hiro, Dilip. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: the Second Gulf War. London: HarperCollins, 1992. A journalist and author of previous works on revolutionary Iran and the Iran-Iraq War provides a comprehensive analysis of both the political and military aspects of the Kuwait War, as well as the historical background to the conflict and details regarding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the coalition build-up to the war. The book also includes photographs, an extensive chronology, and a good selection of maps. The author judges that “The brutal haste with which [Saddam Husayn] implemented the first phase of his overall plan for the Gulf – the invasion of Kuwait – created a situation which reduced the international position of Iraq itself to halfway between independence and the status it had under British mandate after the First World War. This will remain the supreme irony of the Second Gulf War and the crisis that preceded it.” (p. 453)


414. Ibrahim, Ibrahim, ed. The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1992. The Gulf Crisis grew out of the 1991 annual conference of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, with several papers written subsequently for the book. Unlike many of the edited works on the Kuwait War, this volume places far more emphasis on the impact on the Middle East. Ibrahim Ibrahim and L. Carl Brown set the stage with a historical perspective on state relations in the region and America’s Middle East policy, respectively. The roles of external actors are covered by Michael C. Hudson (United States), Yelena Melkumyan (Soviet Union), Xiaoxing Han (China), and Augustus Richard Norton (the United Nations). As for the impact within the region, Phebe Marr discusses the impact on Iraq, Shamlan Y. Al Essa examines the political consequences for Kuwait, Bernard Reich covers Israel, Michael Simpson examines the Palestinian impact, and Sherif Mardin writes about Turkey. Other contributions are by Jo-Anne Hart on the “Arab state sub-system,” John Duke Anthony on the Gulf Cooperation Council, Michael C. Dunn on lessons for Gulf security, and Hani A. Faris on the post-war Arab political order. Abbas Alnasrawi outlines the role played by oil in the roots of the crisis while the economic aftermath of the war is handled by Ibrahim Oweiss (economic impact), Nemir A. Kirdar (business), and Charles Ebinger and John P. Banks (OPEC). A useful 24-page chronology completes the volume.


416. Khadduri, Majid, and Edmund Ghareeb. War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. This work seeks to provide views of the Kuwait War from all sides. A comprehensive review of the origins and the conduct of the war precedes several chapters discussing Arab and Western responsibility. The authors conclude that the Kuwait war was not inevitable. “Had Western powers been patient in dealing with Arab leaders, or had the Arab leaders acted more quickly before the
wheels of Western intervention rolled, the crisis might have been resolved by peaceful means.” (p. 260)

417. Kodmani-Darwish, Bassma, and May Chartouni-Dubarry. Golfe et Moyen Orient: les conflits. Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 1991. ●● Two analysts at the French institute of international relations summarize the Kuwait War, the background factors, its consequences, and the various roles of regional and external actors. The authors note that the war incontestably wrote a new page in the history of the Middle East but that it solved none of the region’s problems and probably did not enhance its stability, especially as long as Iraq remains a military menace.


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420. Weller, Marc, ed. Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Cambridge International Documents Series, Vol. 3. ●● A set of three volumes of documents on the Kuwait War and its aftermath. The first volume consists of documentary material on the historical background to Kuwait and Iraq, UN Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the imposition of sanctions on Iraq, the protection of individuals and property in Iraq and occupied Kuwait, proposals for peaceful settlement, and the responses of regional and international organizations. The second volume, actually bound in two volumes, includes primary material on the United Nations, past enactments of economic sanctions, UN members' discussion of the application of Article 50 of the UN Charter, and proceedings of the UN sanctions committee. The documents reproduced in the third volume include UN Security Council resolutions and proceedings, and other UN and international documents regarding human rights in occupied Kuwait, the outbreak and conduct of hostilities, the cease-fire, boundary demarcation, the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, the Iraq inspections régime and sanctions, other humanitarian and human rights issues, and further hostilities involving Iraq.


The British ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the war provides personal recollections with emphasis on the importance of Saudi Arabia to Coalition efforts.


431. Sifry, Micah L., and Christopher Cerf. The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. New York: Times Books, 1991. A voluminous (526 pages) collection of reprinted material on the Kuwait War, with emphasis on American official and popular reactions. Most selections are taken from brief articles in the general media or newspaper op-ed pieces, augmented by a few background excerpts from books on the Middle East. The majority of the contributors are American politicians and pundits (representing a wide ideological spectrum) although some academics specializing on the Middle East are also represented. The authors include some speeches and other documentary material of US President George Bush and Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, as well as speeches and testimony in the US Congress. The volume’s obvious usefulness as a reference work or classroom text is weakened by the absence of maps, texts of UN resolutions and other primary documents, chronology, and other vital supplementary material. The bibliography is indifferent.


435. Stein, Janice Gross. “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91.” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 147-179. A professor of political science at the University of Toronto argues that a series of plausible tactical calculations caused Saddam to prefer “to retain Kuwait without war, but [to prefer] war to unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.” (p. 173) He apparently calculated that his regime could survive the military campaign and win a political victory, but he underestimated the impact of air power, in part because it had not figured in the Iran-Iraq War. She notes that “The attempt at deterrence was flawed, inept, and not credible, while the attempt at coercive diplomacy drew on carefully assembled political and military forces to signal unequivocally to Baghdad that the coalition would go to war if Iraqi forces were not withdrawn voluntarily from Kuwait.” (p. 177) Both strategies failed in large part because Saddam was convinced that the US was determined to destroy his régime.


438. Yetiv, Steve A. *The Persian Gulf Crisis*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997. Greenwood Press Guides to Historic Events of the Twentieth Century. A comprehensive history of the Kuwait War intended for a general audience. The author, an assistant professor of political science at Old Dominion University, focuses on the background to US policy in the Gulf, the personalities of Saddam Husayn and George Bush, the part played by arms proliferation, the role of the UN and collective security, and the enduring impact of the war. Appendices include brief biographies, primary documents, and an annotated bibliography.

**Military Aspects of the War**


454. Cigar, Norman. “Chemical Weapons and the Gulf War: The Dog That Did Not Bark.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1992), pp. 145-155. The author, of the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, looks at the reasons why Iraq did not use its chemical weapons capability during the Kuwait War and judges that these included a fear of coalition reaction, an assessment that they would not have much effect because coalition forces were prepared for their use, delivery means were not reliable, and unfavorable weather. However, he makes the point that “more Third World states are likely to be tempted to continue trying to acquire CWs – the simplest weapon of mass destruction – and the means to deliver them, particularly surface-to-surface missiles. Their intent will be to keep up with their neighbors and to protect themselves from ‘CW blackmail’ during political confrontations, as well as for use in combat.” (p. 153)
455. ________. “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for Defeat.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 15, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-29. A professor at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College judges that “Iraq’s own strategy must bear a significant portion of the responsibility for the speed and thoroughness of its defeat. ... Iraq’s key strategic assumptions included an underestimation of US national will, an underestimation of the cohesion of the United Nations coalition, a misinterpretation of the USSR’s role, and a misreading of the military balance and of the likely nature of war in the Gulf.” (p. 1)


six tests advanced by former Secretary of State Caspar W. Weinberger in 1984 for deciding whether to commit US combat forces abroad. He asserts that “US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf crisis should certainly earn the approval of Weinberger and Clausewitz alike.” (p. 38)


472. Francona, Rick. Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall from Grace. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. A personal account of Iraq and the Kuwait War by a US Air Force intelligence officer who was stationed in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War and then served as personal interpreter for General Norman Schwarzkopf during the Kuwait War.


475. Frix, Robert S., and Archie L. Davis, III. “Task Force Freedom and the Restoration of Kuwait.” Military Review, Vol. 72, No.10 (October 1992), pp. 2-10. Two US Army officers describe the formation and work of the Kuwait Task Force, which was “charged with the responsibility for restoring civil order and emergency services” (p. 3) during the Kuwait War. They attribute the mission’s success to the use of army reservists who held civilian qualifications in the same specialties as the Kuwaiti ministries with which they worked.


This report concentrates more on warnings for future US government policy than on the war itself. It does, however, note that the distinctiveness of the Kuwait war limits the ability to draw effective lessons for future wars. In addition, the authors argue that the complex nature of the conflict and its enormous military demands demonstrates a critical need for allies to help in carrying out a similar offensive in the future. Also, danger lies in relying in new technology and weapons systems to the neglect of broader professional military requirements. The report also notes that despite a changed US military emphasis on a regional contingencies strategy, much of the US defense establishment is still focused on and structured for the Soviet threat.

478. “The Gulf War.” *Survival*, Vol 33, No. 3 (May-June 1991), entire issue. Lawrence Freedman (King’s College, London) starts off this collection of articles with an essay on the implications of the Kuwait War for the new world order. The military aspects are covered by R.A. Mason (Foundation for International Security) on the air war, by William J. Taylor, Jr., and James Blackwell (both at the Center for Strategic and International Studies) on the ground war, and by Gene I. Rochlin (University of California at Berkeley) and Chris C. Demchak (University of Arizona) on the technological and organizational aspects. Jonathan T. Howe (commander-in-chief of NATO’s southern region) also discusses the implications for NATO.

479. Hayden, H.T., and G.I. Wilson. “The Tail That Wags the Dog.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 116 (October 1990), pp. 51-53. A pair of US Marine Corps lieutenant colonels emphasize the essential role of logistics in military operations such as Operation Desert Shield, ending with admonition that “Perhaps the tail is indeed beginning to wag the dog – but unless it does, that dog just might not hunt the way it should.” (p. 53)


488. Lambeth, Benjamin S. *Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from Moscow*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992. R-4164-AF. A RAND analyst reviews Soviet pronouncements and reporting during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and subsequent war and evaluates Soviet military analysis of the war and lessons to be learned. He observes that “Some of the most important insights the Russians have drawn from the Gulf experience have been more political than military. These include an admitted need to disentangle from bad allies and a realization that it makes more sense to work with the West than against it.” (p. ix)

489. ________. *Learning from the Persian Gulf War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. P-7850. Based on an earlier talk, the author, a RAND analyst, lists the unique factors of and lessons to be learned from the Kuwait War. He argues that new technology, although very important in the war, “would have been irrelevant in the absence of the human factor that underlay it and drove its application [and that] the impact of technology was almost entirely a function of that technology’s having been intelligently applied.” (pp. 12-13)


495. Mazarr, Michael J., Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell, Jr. *Desert Storm: the Gulf War and What We Learned*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, for the Center or Strategic and International Studies, 1993. A study of the Kuwait War by three analysts at the Center or Strategic and International Studies. The authors discuss the political background to the conflict, as well as the military build-up, the failure of negotiation and deterrence, and the
air and ground campaigns against Iraq. The final chapter offers lessons for the future regarding US defense planning, deterrence strategies, and arm control.


Defence and Regional Security in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States


536. Watson, Bruce W., ed. *Military Lessons of the Gulf War*. London: Greenhill Books; Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993. The editor and co-author (US Defense Intelligence College), along with the other co-authors Bruce George (UK House of Commons), Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr (both of the US Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center), and the “International Analysis Group on the Gulf War,” cover the diplomatic activity prior to the war, the air, ground, and naval aspects of the combat, contributing factors to the coalition’s success (including command and control, intelligence, electronic warfare, and logistics), and several other consequences such as the question of “just war” and the issue of media access to information. The book includes useful appendices on financial and other support provided to the coalition, dates of UN resolutions, a chronology of Iraqi launches of Scud missiles, and air, ground, and naval orders of battle.


**Aftermath of the War, Summaries, and the Impact on the Gulf**

539. “After the Gulf War.” *International Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 183-407. A number of essays analyze the impact of the Kuwait War on the Gulf and elsewhere. Mahmud A. Faksh (University of Southern Maine) looks at the prospects of Islamic fundamentalism and concludes that “the fundamentalists will not soon go away. But neither will they be able to dominate now or in the time to come.” (p. 218) Anwar-ul-Haq Hady (Providence College) looks at various potential security arrangements for the Gulf, including the Damascus Declaration, all the Gulf littoral states, one based on just the Gulf monarchies,
and an American-dominated system, and notes that the last “is not only militarily strong, but it is also likely to be durable because of the mutuality of interests among the participants.” (p.237) Robert Mabro (Oxford University) examines the impact of the war on OPEC and world oil and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon (University of Western Ontario) looks at the UN’s role during and after the war. John Sigler (Carleton University) regards the “pax Americana” and observes that “Where vital interests are concerned, the United States has made clear that it will continue to practice a coercive diplomacy tightly tied to the military in asserting deterrence, compellence, and reassurance.” (p. 300) Alvin Z. Rubinstein (University of Pennsylvania) analyzes Moscow’s role in the Kuwait War and notes that “The co-operation of the two superpowers during the Gulf crisis ... confirmed how far they had moved from rivalry to reconciliation” (p. 301) Mohsen M. Milani (University of South Florida) examines Iran’s post-Cold-War Gulf policy and sees that “The Persian Gulf region will not be stable unless Iran is stable. As the largest, most populous, and oldest nation in the region, Iran cannot be ignored by Washington” and the two countries “urgently need to begin a dialogue.” (p. 354) Fred Lawson (Mills College, California) surveys the progress of political participation in the Gulf states, concluding that “an indigenous Arab nationalist opposition ... is precisely [the] kind of opposition that is apt to find the greatest resonance among potential dissidents in the other Arab states of the Gulf.” (p. 407)


541. Ajami, Fouad. “The Summer of Arab Discontent.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5 (1990), pp. 1-20. A review of the impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on other states in the Arab world by the Majid Khadduri Professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He perceives that “There were deadly if half-baked ideas floating in the Arab world when Saddam overran Kuwait – ruinous concepts of Arab nationalism..., atavistic resentments along that ancient fault-line between Sunni and Shia Islam, wild notions about how to break the impasse between the Arabs and Israelis, resentments toward the West born of the very attraction to it, and then that desire to place the blame on the Gulf states for everything wrong under the sun. The Iraqi dictator plucked these ideas and resentments and turned them into monstrous instruments.” (p. 20)

542. Akins, James E. “The New Arabia.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 36-49. A consultant and former American ambassador to Saudi Arabia looks at the lasting impact of the Kuwait War on the Gulf. “I can agree with confidence – not necessarily satisfaction – that the future Middle East will indeed be different from what we have known, but it will bear no relationship to the idealized picture of generous gulf Arabs using their riches to transform the Arab world.” (p. 36) He notes that “as long as the Gulf states remain secure the United States can reap great rewards” because of their dependence on the US following the Kuwait War. Since the US has not exerted self-discipline to free itself from dependence on oil, it has no choice but to exercise control of the Gulf. “Eventually the
current Arab leaders or their successors will tire of the US presence and ask America to leave. The United States will have to withdraw or face a hostile population. In either case America will once again have to deal with the reality of insecure energy supply and high oil prices.” (p. 49)


548. Bonine, Michael E. “Population and Labor After the Gulf War: Trends for the 1990s.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (January-February 1996), pp. 37-40. ●● A professor of geography at the University of Arizona explains that the Kuwait War did not alter overall basic labor needs but it did introduce significant changes, such as the expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait and Yemenis from Saudi Arabia. The Gulf states will remain highly dependent on foreign labor and Asians will become even more dominant in numbers compared to Arab expatriates.


550. Chahal, Nahla. “O va l'Irak?” *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (1998), pp. 19-33. ●● A professor of sociology at the Lebanese University in Tripoli looks at the situation of “crisis status quo” in which Iraq finds itself after the end of the Kuwait War, and poses – but does not answer – such pertinent questions as is a period of chaos inevitable; is civil war possible and can the country survive it; and what are the repercussions of the Palestinian problem?


553. Danchev, Alex, and Dan Keohane, eds. *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91*. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Published in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford. This collection of articles by mostly British authors on the Kuwait War covers most of the main antagonists and concludes with some reflections on the conduct of the war. Although separate articles are devoted to the role in the conflict of Israel (Avi Shlaim, Oxford University) and the Palestinians (Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Durham University), the only article on the Gulf states deals with Iraq (Amatzia Baram, Haifa University, who notes that Saddam Husayn’s decision to occupy Kuwait City was only one of a series of his miscalculations). Shahram Chubin (Geneva), however, provides an introductory chapter that analyzes the motivations and build-up to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Richard K. Hermann (Ohio State University) places US policy in the context of a domestic debate over the constitution of US interests and the objectives of US policy in the region before concluding that the end of the Cold War had greater impact on the debate than the war. Vladimir Nosenko (Russian Foreign Ministry) discusses the domestic Soviet debate over the crisis and reasons that “the Gulf crisis was a real turning-point in Soviet foreign policy.” (p. 144) Dan Keohane (from Keele University, as is co-editor Alex Danchev) discusses the political and military role of Britain in “Operation Granby” and notes that British involvement did not cause intense domestic divisions, because of popular distaste for Saddam Husayn, the consensus between the main political parties, and Britain’s participation in a United Nations coalition. Jolyon Howorth (University of Bath) observes that most of France’s diplomatic and military participation “was a function of President François Mitterand’s direct control of foreign and defence policy – the famous domaine réservé...” (p. 175) Lawrence Freedman (King’s College London) compares the Kuwait War with the earlier “limited wars” of Korea and Vietnam, concluding that “In the Gulf the basic political objectives – the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait – gave the coalition commanders a very clear criterion for success. It was also attainable employing available capabilities.” (p. 208) He notes the “limitation of means” consisted mainly of international public opinion while the principal “limitation of objectives” included the decision not to try to destroy Saddam Husayn and his régime. Edward Luttwak (Center for Strategic and International Studies) looks at the weaponry used in the air war, Adam Roberts (University of Oxford) details the application of the laws of war to the conflict, and Oliver Ramsbotham (Bradford University) discusses the ways in which various interpretations of the conflict arose.

555. Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang, and Charles R.H. Tripp, eds. *Iraq’s Aggression Against Kuwait: Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. P. Papers from the Second Liechtenstein Colloquium on European and International Affairs discuss the causes and military aspects of the Kuwait War, as well as its impact on various actors around the world. Charles R.H. Tripp (School of Oriental and African Studies, London) outlines the background to the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, Laurie Mylroie (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) discusses the immediate background to the Iraqi invasion, and Gudrun Krämer (University of Bonn) examines the cataclysmic effect of the invasion and war on the Arab world. A section on “power, strategy, and technology” includes the reprint of an article by Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh on the war strategy of Iraq and the Coalition within their political contexts, Erik Yesson (Brown University) evaluates the role of new technology in the campaign, Gustav Däniker (retired Swiss general) reflects on the influence of classical military strategy on the conduct of the war, Christian Catrina (Swiss Federal Military Department) analyzes the impact of the war on conventional arms transfers, and Robert J. Lieber (Georgetown University) discusses the war’s impact on global energy security. The role in the war and its effect on various participants are covered by: Amin Saikal (Australian National University) on the United States and Gulf security, William C. Wohlforth (Princeton University) and Irlina Zviagelskaia (Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow) on the Soviet Union, Helmut Hubel (Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) on Germany, Masaru Tamamoto (New School for Social Research) with Amy Cullen (John Snow Research and Training) on Japan, and Helmut Freudenschuss (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on the United Nations Security Council.

556. Davis, Eric. “The Persian Gulf War: Myths and Realities.” In Hooshang Amiramadi, ed. *The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives* (Albany: State University of New York, 1993), pp. 251-284. P. An associate professor of political science at Rutgers University charges that the American propensity to support authoritarian rather than democratic régimes was especially apparent in the Gulf where Washington provided Saddam Husayn with extensive assistance up to his invasion of Kuwait. He rejects the “mythology” that the US intervened to liberate Kuwait to save a small state against a larger, bellicose neighbor without asking for anything in return. Instead, he charges that US action was based on “a desire to offset its declining power in the global economy, an effort to maintain access to oil reserves and the integrity of its alliance structure in the Middle East, and the desire to send a message to the Third World that it now lives under a pax Americana.” (p. 252)


560. Ebraheem, Hassan Ali Al-. “Kuwait and the New World Order.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (May-June 1991), pp. 23-26. A professor at Kuwait University and former Minister of Education believes that if the US had not reacted to Iraq’s threat to world order, then it and its allies would have “found themselves at a loss to preserve peace in the face of an ever growing number of middle range nuclear powers....” (p. 24)

561. Freedman, Lawrence. “Lessons of the Gulf War.” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1993), pp. 273-279. The author, a professor at King’s College, London, begins by noting that wars are generally thought to generate lessons, even though every war is *sui generis*, before briefly cataloguing the “lessons” posed for the United States in the Kuwait War derived from experiences in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and Vietnam. He notes that “most commentators [saw] the return of the United States to a self-confident and an effective role at the heart of the international affairs” as a result of the Kuwait War but cautions against exaggeration. Freedman’s conclusion is that “future conflicts are likely to be politically much more complex from the start and, in consequence, carry with them a higher military risk. ... It is unlikely that the West will find many conflicts in the future in which the principles are so clear cut, or many enemies in the future so ready to take on western military power on its own terms and in circumstances so favourable to its application.” (p. 279)

562. Freedman, Robert O., ed. *The Middle East After Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993. Bard E. O’Neill and Ilana Kass (both of the US National War College) begin this collection of papers delivered at a 1991 conference at Baltimore Hebrew University (and edited by a professor at that university) with an overview of the Kuwait War itself. The roles of external powers are then examined by Robert E. Hunter (Center for Strategic and International Studies) on the United States, Freedman on the Soviet Union/Russia, and Eugene Brown (Lebanon Valley College) on Japan. The impact on regional states is analyzed by Laurie Mylroie (Naval War College) for Iraq, Shireen T. Hunter (Center for Strategic and International Studies) for Iran, and F. Gregory Gause III (Columbia University) for Saudi Arabia. Other Middle Eastern states are the focus of chapters by Marvin Feuerwerger (formerly of the US Department of Defense) on Israel, Helena Cobban (Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East) on the Palestinians, Alasdair Drysdale (University of New Hampshire) on Syria, Adam Garfinkle (Foreign Policy Research Institute) on Jordan, and Louis Cantori (University of Maryland, Baltimore County) on Egypt.


567. “The Gulf Five Years After Desert Storm.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (January-February 1996), pp. 34-36. ●● A collection of five short articles and an interview with the Kuwaiti Minister of Information Shaykh Saud Nasir Al Sabah. Journalist Don North asks Saudi and American participants in Operation Desert Storm to look back at the war’s impact (the first part of the article was published in *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 12, No. 1 [November-December 1995], pp. 36-40), Lawrence G. Potter (Gulf 2000) stresses the need for confidence-building measures in the Gulf, Eric Hooglund reports on his discussions on Gulf security in the UAE, John Duke Anthony (National Council on US-Arab Relations) looks at the threats to the GCC posed by Iran and Iraq, and Michael E. Bonine (University of Arizona) looks at population and labor trends in the Gulf.


   ●● A Washington-based consultant looks at the rebellions in Iraq after its Kuwait War defeat and the effect of economic sanctions on Saddam Husayn’s continued rule. “Iraq succumbed to hubris in 1990: Saddam Husayn hoped to make his country rich beyond belief and infinitely more powerful by incorporating Kuwait.” As a result of the defeat, “one of the most highly developed countries in the Middle East has been crippled and left with limited sovereignty and a limited regional and international role.” (p. 16)

571. Helms, Robert F., II, and Robert H. Dorff, eds. *The Persian Gulf Crisis: Power in the Post-Cold War World*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. ●● An edited volume that places emphasis on the background to and consequences of the Kuwait War, both in terms of regional repercussions and wider implications for US political power and military policy. Among the contributors, Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke University) provides three chapters, which look at the background of US policy and superpower rivalry in the Gulf, as well as America’s requirements for a new and appropriate Gulf policy. Christine M. Helms (an independent consultant) and Alan R. Taylor (American University) look at Arab politics and the impact of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on the region. Kimberly Ann Elliott (Institute for International Economics) discusses economic sanctions on Iraq while James Blackwell (Center for Strategic and International Studies) outlines the military developments that enabled the US to win the Kuwait War. Other chapters examine the history, operation, and future trends in the international system that deal with security.


573. Hilsman, Roger. *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?* Novato, CA: Lyford Books, 1992. ●● The view of an emeritus professor at Columbia University that a principal reason for the Kuwait War was the clash of personalities between the American and Iraqi leaders, both of whom Hilsman sees as “driven men.”


implementing the Damascus Declaration was not merely that the individual members of the GCC showed a preference for bilateral agreements with the Western powers” (p. 48) but that “the various signatories ... have proved divided on how best to deal with Iran and how seriously to view the potential threat from Iraq.” (p. 58)

577. Hooglund, Eric. “The Other Face of War.” Middle East Report, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July-August 1991), pp. 3-7, 10-12. The author judges the Kuwait War as “the single most devastating event in the Middle East since World War I.” (p. 3) He focuses on the numbers of deaths caused by the war, the displacements before the war, and the displacements in Iraq as a result of the Kurdish and Shi‘ah uprisings. Hooglund believes that “The political, social and economic consequences of the US assault on Iraq, and the Iraqi regime’s consequent assault on its own people, will afflict the region and the world well into the next century.” (p. 12)


580. Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 1991). A few months after publishing an issue on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this journal published several articles on the theme of implications of the successful war to liberate Kuwait on the so-called “new international order,” especially in regard to the Middle East. These articles included: Mehdi Noorbakhsh, “The Old and New World Order: the Middle Eastern Perspective” (pp. 453-460); John Chipman, “The New World Order and the Persian Gulf Region” (pp. 461-468); Salim Mansur, “The [Persian] Gulf War: The United States and the Middle East” (pp. 469-482); and Abbas Maleki, “The Content and Necessity of the New International Order in the New International Environment” (pp. 483-489).

581. Kieh, George Klay, Jr. “Western Imperialism in the Middle East: The Case of the United States’ Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-16 An assistant professor at Illinois Wesleyan University contends that “the motivations for the United States’ military intervention in Iraq [sic] emanated from the exigencies of imperialism: pressures from the American political economy and global considerations” and “had nothing to do with the United States’ desire to promote respect for international law, and to ensure democracy.” (p. 15)


586. Lesch, Ann M. “Kuwait Diary: A Scarred Society.” *MERIP Middle East Report*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (September-October 1991), pp. 34-37. ●● An account of a visit to Kuwait in May 1991 for Human Rights Watch. She notes the emotional scars suffered by many Kuwaitis, the situation of Palestinians resident in the country, and the plight of the *bidun* (Kuwait’s stateless residents). A number of Kuwaitis fear that the situation in Kuwait might not improve and worry about collective violence against non-Kuwaitis.


596. Murphy, Richard. “The Effects of the Gulf War on Intraregional Relationships.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 8, No. 5 (May-June 1992), pp. 7-12. A former State Dept. official and ambassador surveys the impact of the war on various Gulf states and concludes that the US should “remain modest in prescriptions about the direction and pace of change in [Arabian Peninsula] political structures.” (p.12)


598. Nye, Joseph S., Jr., and Roger K. Smith. After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War. Lanham, MD: Madison Books for the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1992. Papers from Aspen Strategy Group workshops, edited by the group’s directing staff. Many of the contributions focus on the impact of the Kuwait War on US domestic and military policy, but Martin Indyk (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) and Fouad Ajami (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) contribute chapters on the impact on the Middle East and Richard N. Cooper (Harvard University) examines the impact of oil on the Middle East and the world economy and Bernard E. Trainor (Harvard University) analyzes how and why the war unfolded as it did. Trainor warns that “the U.S. armed forces must not rest on their laurels in the afterglow of their dramatic victory in the Gulf. It is well to remember that a British expeditionary force armed with the high-technology weapons of the day achieved a similar striking victory at low cost at Omdurman in the Sudan in 1898. A year later that same force was pinned down in South Africa, being embarrassed by a motley army of Boer farmers.” (p. 219) A lengthy chronology and the texts of relevant UN resolutions are included.


601. Pimlott, John, and Stephen Badsey, eds. The Gulf War Assessed. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992. Members of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, dissect various aspects of the Kuwait War from the underlying causes and military buildup through the prosecution of the war and its international ramifications, along with examinations of the media’s role and the impact on the environment.


that the ending of the war left Saddam Husayn in power and Iraq with the ability to resist American demands. Furthermore, he contends that the war may have damaged the legitimacy of the GCC states and he concludes that “The Gulf War was a magnificent military victory barren of any significant diplomatic gains. It was fought to repel Saddam Hussein’s challenge to the old order in the Persian Gulf, not to create a new one. Accordingly, future historians may regard the war as a complete failure.” (p. 159; emphasis in original)


607. Salamé, Ghassan. “Le Golfe un an après: un pétro-dinar belligène.” Maghreb-Machrek, No. 133 (July-September 1991), pp. 3-18. The author examines the unsatisfactory state of affairs one year after the invasion, concentrating on the inadequate nature of the sanctions and a look on the continuing impact of the war on a country by country basis, before finishing with observations on the current status of an “American Gulf.”


610. Sterner, Michael. “Closing the Gate: The Persian Gulf War Revisited.” Current History, Vol. 96, No. 606 (January 1997), pp. 13-19. A retired US diplomat appraises the revisionist approach that criticizes the American decision to bring the Kuwait War to an end without deposing Saddam Husayn. He concludes, “from what we now know about the uprising [in Iraq’s south and] the internal situation in Iraq, it is hard to make the case that another day of fighting would have made the difference between Saddam’s survival and ouster.” (p. 19)


615. Trabulsi, Fawwaz. “Harvest of War.” *MERIP Middle East Report*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July-August 1991), pp. 30-32. A contributing editor of MERIP gives a short criticism of the war against Iraq and concludes that “it was an oil crusade [and] Arab people everywhere will not forgive those régimes which not only invited and financed this massacre but also squandered the wealth that could have opened for the Arabs the door to the 21st century!” (p. 32)


619. __________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *United States-Iraqi Relations;* Hearing, 21 March 1991. Includes the testimony of the US ambassador to Iraq at the time of the invasion, April Glaspie.


**The Impact of the War Outside the Gulf**


628. Alpher, Joseph, ed. *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992. ●● The product of a collaborative effort by an 18 member study group within the Jaffee Center, this book was originally published in Hebrew in September 1991 and then updated to late 1991 for publication in English. Attention is given in the first part to the impact of the crisis on the US, Soviet Union, and Arab world, but with special attention to US-Israeli relations. The second part concentrates on military lessons, once again with emphasis on implications for Israel. Part three examines the inter-relationship between the crisis in the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli peace process while the final
part looks at attitudes within Israel during the war, developments on “the home front,” and the impact on the Israeli economy.

629. “L’Après-Guerre du Golfe.” Politique Étrangère, Vol. 56, No. 2 (1991), special section, pp. 411-464. ●● Contributions deal with strategic lessons (François Heisbourg, International Institute for Strategic Studies), the dilemmas of a victorious United States (Robert Hunter, Center for Strategic and International Studies), the shock to Soviet strategy (Roland Lomme, French Assemblée nationale), the role of France (Frédéric Prater), and the situation in the Gulf after the storm (Ghassan Salamé, Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques).


635. Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War.” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 39-75. ●● The authors, all assistant professors of government at Georgetown University, pose the question “why do states contribute to alliances?” and seek to answer it by examining the burden-sharing of six contributors to Operation Desert Storm—the United States, Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, and Japan. They conclude that “few countries other than the United States can lead international coalitions successfully, and even for the United States demanding conditions must be met. American leaders must often take the initiative and solicit contributions from allies who depend on the United States for their security or well-being” (p. 74) This, they perceive, will be difficult in a system of ad hoc coalitions and circumstances in which the public good is not as obvious as it was in the Kuwait War.

637. Bennis, Phyllis, and Michel Moushabeck, eds. *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991. •• A comprehensive treatment of the Kuwait War edited by a journalist with Pacifica Radio (Bennis) and an editor of the Olive Branch Press (Moushabeck), with a heavily left-of-center point-of-view, including a foreword by Edward Said and an introduction by Eqbal Ahmad. Many of the contributions are very brief. The first part consists of historical introduction, including Moushabeck on the Iraqi domestic scene, Hala Fattah (Georgetown University) on Kuwait’s history, Bishara A. Bahbah (Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine) on Iraq’s decision to invade, and Steve Niva (Columbia University) on the course of the war. ¶¶ A second section deals with US foreign policy regarding the invasion and war. Noam Chomsky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) discusses US policy in the Middle East, Barbara Ehrenreich (columnist for Time magazine) compares the situation to the US role in Panama. Sheila Ryan (freelance writer) outlines the US military buildup in the Gulf, Jeanne Butterfield (director of Palestine Solidarity Committee) criticizes continuing US aid to Israel during and after the war, and Phyllis Bennis describes the US domination of the United Nations. ¶¶ The next section is concerned with events and views solely within the US but it is followed by various examinations of regional repercussions. Among these are Ibrahim Abu-Lughod’s (Northwestern University) linkage of the Arab-Israeli Conflict to the war, the impact on the Palestinian occupied territories by Samir Huwaileh (Palestinian economist), the role of the Israeli peace movement by Stanley Cohen (Hebrew University in Jerusalem) and Mordechai Bar-On (a reserve colonel in Israeli Defense Forces and a founder member of Peace Now), Jordan’s response by Mustafa B. Hamarneh (University of Jordan), Egypt’s role by Sherif Hetata (Egyptian poet and novelist), and the Islamist perspective on the war by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (University of Massachusetts). ¶¶ Another section broadens the scope to oil, Britain, Europe’s peace movement, and South Asia. Finally, Naseer Aruri (University of Massachusetts) tackles the issue of human rights, Penny Kemp (former co-chair of the British Green Party) looks at the environmental catastrophe, and Louise Cainkar (Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights) describes post-war Iraq.

638. Bresheeth, Haim, and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds. *The Gulf War and the New World Order*. London: Zed Books, 1991. •• An eclectic collection of articles on the Kuwait War, differing from most of the multitude of the same idea on the same subject in its generally leftist perspective and mixture of more general commentators, such as Noam Chomsky, with well-respected regional specialists. Thus, US policy is a topic of discussion, principally through Chomsky’s criticism and Nira Yuval-Davis’s treatise on women in the US armed forces, as well as in a treatment of Soviet-US relations through the crisis by H.H. Ticktin. Not surprisingly, given the book’s place of publication, there is a contribution on the British role by Barney Dickson. The new world order is analyzed by Haim Bresheeth and Adel Samara. The impact on regional actors is handled by Dina Haseeb and Malak S. Rouchdy (Egypt),
Dario Navaro (Turkey), Maryam Poya (Iran), David Seddon (North Africa), Kathy Glavanis and Yael Lotan (Israel and the Palestinians), Falih Abd al-Jabbar (Iraq), and Moshé Machover (Palestinians). Sami Yousif contributes a peace on the conspiracy theory about the US role in sparking the crisis while Yezid Sayigh explains why much of the Arab World applauded Saddam Husayn. Economic background is provided by Alan Freeman and an analysis of oil by Toby Shelley, while Joni Seager traces the environmental destruction of the war. The economic and political impact on the Gulf is examined by Pandeli Glavanis and Val Moghadam respectively, and Fred Halliday discusses the impact of the war on the Left.

639. Brittain, Victoria, ed. The Gulf Between Us: The Gulf War and Beyond. London: Virago Press, 1991. A wide range of views on the impact of the Kuwait War around the world, many of which deal with events outside the Gulf. But Falih Abd al Jabar (an Iraqi journalist) looks at the Iraqi political dynamics which led to the invasion. Retired US rear admirals Gene R. La Rocque and Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. (both of the Center for Defense Information), discuss how the overwhelming superiority of the coalition armed forces won the war while Haifaa Khalafallah (an oil journalist) looks at Egypt’s contribution.


647. Evans, Eric. “Arab Nationalism and the Persian Gulf War.” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 27-51. A study by an A.M. candidate at Harvard of the impact on the Kuwait war on intellectual trends throughout the Arab world. After examining writings by such Arab poets and intellectuals as Nizar Qabbani, Adonis, and Fawwaz Trabulsi, the author asserts that “The Gulf War revolutionized the intellectual world of Arab thinkers in ways that have not yet become entirely apparent” [p. 27] but concludes...
that “The intellectual establishment of the Arab world has so far not been able to produce new ideologies to replace the ideas discredited during and before the Gulf War.” [p. 28]

648. Fuller, Graham E. “Moscow and the Gulf War.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 55-76. ●● A senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation notes that the Kuwait War had an impact on Soviet interests in many parts of the world as well as on Moscow’s domestic power struggle. He concludes that “The Soviet Union has expressed its firm determination to be part of whatever new order emerges in the Middle East after the Gulf War” and notes that “current Soviet policies – at least on paper – show greater imagination and sensitivity to regional feelings than do those of the United States.” (p. 75)

649. Gittings, John, ed. *Beyond the Gulf War: The Middle East and the New World Order*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, in association with the Gulf Conference Committee, 1991. ●● A collection of short essays deriving from a March 1991 conference organized by the Gulf Conference Committee on behalf of Media Workers Against the War. The papers (some of which were previously published) range from the impact of the war on the Arab world to the impact on Western views towards and treatment of Arabs and Muslims. The contributors are Richard Falk, Alain Gresh, Fadia Faqir, Yezid Sayigh, Haleh Afshar, Khalil Hindi, Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett, Michael Gilsonan, Tim Niblock, Abbas Shibliak, Youssef Choueiri, Fred Pearce, and Rami Zreik.


of the war to the discipline of international relations by a professor of the subject at the London School of Economics. He concludes that the war “did not provoke the need for a ‘scientific revolution’ in the teaching of IR...” but on many questions it “raised issues central to our subject, and nowhere more so than on the ethical ones we have identified, particularly the importance of sovereignty, the new precedent for intervention, and the need to refine our conception of right intention.” (p. 129)


658. Heikal, Mohamed. Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War. London: HarperCollins, 1992. A leading Egyptian journalist and commentator places the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and resulting war in the context of a series of Middle East conflicts and dubs it the “Third Oil War.” He traces the impact of the oil price revolution of the 1970s on the Arab world, the role Kuwait and the other Gulf monarchies played in financially supporting Iraq during its war with Iran, and the faultlines imposed by the intractable Arab-Israeli dilemma. He then details events in the Arab world that surrounded Iraq’s invasion, including an account of the August 1990 Arab summit immediately following the occupation of Kuwait, as well as the war itself. The book ends with an epilogue concerned with the question of how to heal the deep divisions in the Arab world, which concludes by saying “The present generation of rulers could secure their place in history by beginning a long-overdue process of reform, but they seem more likely to be remembered as the Brezhnevs of the Arab world.” (p. 338)

659. Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994. Professors at the University of Calgary present a wide-ranging collection of essays concerned with the impact of the Kuwait War on the Middle East, the United Nations, Europe, Japan, and the United States. Contributions dealing more directly with the Gulf include chapters on Iraq by Marion Farouk-Sluglett (University College of Wales, Swansea) and Peter Sluglett (University of Durham), and on Iran by Scheherazade Daneshkhu (Financial Times).


several weaknesses of American foreign policy. In his view, American foreign policy is determined by public relations as much as well-conceived national interests. Military confrontation, particularly in the post-Cold War era and as vividly demonstrated in the Kuwait War, is the favored course of action, rather than reliance on diplomacy. Application of American policy, acting in the name of international law in the case of Kuwait while ignoring equally egregious violations elsewhere. With the end of the Cold War, the perceived enemy has clearly shifted from the Soviet Union to more dispersed threats, such as the Islamic world. The danger for the US and allies alike, Jobert argues, lies in an increasing American propensity to intervene in arenas such as the Islamic world with force and for the wrong reasons.


674. Nosenko, Vladimir. “Iraq’s Aggression Against Kuwait in the Context of North-South Relations.” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 96-108. “One of the main lessons that the Gulf crisis taught both the West and the Soviet Union is ... a clearer comprehension of the danger inherent in their foreign policy: detachment from the Third World,” (p. 98) says a senior research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. The enthusiasm with which Third World masses greeted Iraq’s action bolsters the view that the invasion of Kuwait was meant as an intentional challenge to the US and is symptomatic of deep divisions in North-South relations. While the demise of the Cold War provided a good opportunity to test American resolve, Russia’s embrace of universal values remains alien to the Third World.


678. Reed, Stanley. “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (1990), pp. 21-35. A journalist with *Business Week* examines dilemma that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait caused for Jordan, its king, and its people. Many Jordanians, particularly the large proportion of Palestinians, questioned the West’s concern about Kuwait when the Palestinian issue remained unsettled. This has been a headache for King Husayn, alongside worsening economic conditions, the growth of Islamic extremism, and expanding links with Iraq. The invasion created crisis because, as the author says, “While some in Washington may appreciate the bind in which King Hussein finds himself, the U.S. Congress and the gulf states do not believe that Amman currently merits their support.” (p. 35)

679. Renshon, Stanley A., ed. *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. A collection of essays on personal psychologies and public belief systems of people and nations involved in the Kuwait War, edited by a City University of New York political scientist. Among the contributions, L. Carl Brown (Princeton University) discusses Middle-Eastern mind-sets, Dankwart A. Rustow (City University of New York) illuminates Arab perspectives of history, Stephen J. Wayne (Georgetown University) analyzes George Bush’s decision to go to war, and Jerrold M. Post (George Washington University) does the same for Saddam Husayn. Janice Gross Stein (University of Toronto) addresses the question of why threat-based strategies of conflict management failed and Jarol B. Manheim (George Washington University) looks at strategic communication during the conflict. In addition, Shibley
Telhami (Cornell University) analyzes Arab public opinion and Marvin Zonis (University of Chicago) looks at relations between Arab rulers and ruled.

680. Sabec, Christopher John. “The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the International Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait.” *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 63-122. The author provides a comprehensive look at the role of the UN Security Council in the crisis. He sees that “the decisive diplomacy that emerged as the Security Council addressed the events in the Persian Gulf was the latest evidence that the forty-five-year-old organization was determined to fulfill its intended role.” (pp. 63-64) Moreover, he concludes that “the resolutions that addressed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait have advanced the capability of international law...” and “numerous opportunities exist for an expanded role for the United Nations.” (p. 101) Relevant resolutions are appended.

681. Sadowski, Yahya. “Revolution, Reform or Regression? Arab Political Options in the 1990 Gulf Crisis.” *Brookings Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1990-1991), pp. 17-21. On the verge of the Kuwait War, a research associate at Brookings regards “the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait [as] only one symptom of a much wider crisis in the Arab world.” (p. 17) and warns that “If we urge Arab to fight Arab, we may revive the Arab cold war. Every Iraqi our troops kill will provide fresh ammunition for the Islamist campaign to expunge Western influence in the region.” (p. 21)


683. Salinger, Pierre. “The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 595-613. A public relations executive and a former US presidential press secretary charges that the United States made no effort to stop the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or to warn the United Nations that troops were on the Kuwaiti border before the war. He discusses the Iraqi-Kuwaiti talks in Jiddah in the days before the invasion and the failure of Arab negotiations with Iraq after the invasion. In his opinion, “the war was not needed. The Bush administration could have prevented Saddam Husayn from invading Kuwait by taking the tough military action that President Clinton took four years later. Even that tough military action would not have been necessary if President Bush had called Saddam Husayn on 28 July and told him that, if his troops crossed the border, the United States would intervene and there would be a brutal war.” (p. 613)


685. Sanad, Jamal S. “Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and UAE’s Political Orientations.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 51-64. A political scientist at the University of the United Arab Emirates reports the results of a survey of the
attitudes of UAE students toward the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war. Among his findings are that the principal identity claimed by respondents was that of Muslim, that nearly 80% said they followed the news about the crisis on CNN and the BBC, and 96% agreed with Egypt’s position on the crisis, 92% agreed with the UAE’s position, 88% agreed with the US position, 19% agreed with the PLO’s position, and only 12% agreed with Jordan’s position.

686. Sayigh, Yezid. “The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed.” *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 67, No. 3 (July 1991), pp. 487-507. ●● A fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, argues that “Iraq invaded Kuwait ... because the rules linking the Arab states in a regional order had broken down into weakness and disarray.” (p. 487) Arab leaders have sought to structure their foreign policies to uphold the status quo and bolster their own personal rule, thus failing to address the real challenge facing the Arab world.


– and –

689. Stork, Joe. “The Gulf War and the Arab World.” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1991), pp. 365-374. ●● A pair of matched articles on the Kuwait War’s impact elsewhere in the Middle East. Segal, a research scholar at the University of Maryland, begins by noting that “The war in the Persian Gulf has put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back on the U.S. foreign policy agenda....” (p. 351) He holds that a series of appropriate moves by the US, Arab states, and the Palestinians is necessary to bring about change – but feels that the Likud government in Israel is unlikely to play a constructive role. He also advises that “If the Palestinians can get a transitional autonomy period with a freeze on settlements, they should take it.” Joe Stork, of the Middle East Research and Information Project, looks at the economic impact of the war on the region and concludes that “Economically, the main winners will be where capital is located: on Wall Street and in London’s financial district.” (p. 373)


attacks the perception in the United States that it has won a great victory over Iraq and reckons that “The Gulf war ... is beginning to look like Bush’s excuse for avoiding America’s problems at home....” (p. 172)


**Environmental Damage, and Economic and Humanitarian Aspects**


706. Akhtar, Shameem. “Spoils of the Gulf War.” *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 1991), pp. 29-42. ●● A University of Karachi professor cites claims that the United States made a net profit on the Kuwait War of $10-$18 billion, that it made certain that American companies would get the lion’s share of contracts for the reconstruction of Kuwait, and that American allies were also allowed to share “the spoils.”


712. Cerutti, Herbert. “Fire’s End in Kuwait.” *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 9 (December 1991), pp. 9-10. ●● A short report dealing with the largest oil field catastrophe in history and the steps taken to bring the fires to an end. “The huge firefighting operation cost Kuwait something in the neighborhood of $2 billion, and the reconstruction of the oil industry will cost at least $5 billion more. It is thought that the fires consumed about 2% of Kuwait’s suspected oil reserves of roughly 100 billion barrels.” (p. 10)


719. Edgerton, Laura. “Eco-terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?” *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1992), pp. 151-174. ●● The author traces legal developments arising from the environmental destruction caused by the war through international environmental law and international warfare law. While she holds that UN Security Council Resolution 687 (which holds Iraq liable for any damage as a result of its invasion) “may ultimately provide a mechanism for recovery in this case, the other legal weapons which could be used against Iraq ... are critically deficient.” (p.173) Environmental law remedies are deficient because Iraq does not have the financial resources to pay recompensation while the few provisions in international warfare law are “too broad to be enforceable or are limited to a particular form of environmental warfare activity.” (p. 174) She calls for a new Geneva Convention to address the problem.


722. Human Rights Watch. *Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War*. New York, 1991. A Middle East Watch Report. Subjects covered include the legal regime governing the conduct of air warfare, the air war against Iraq and its impact on the civilian population, Iraq’s missile attacks against Israel and the Gulf states, including the civilian damages. The conclusion is that while the allies avoided systematic violations of the laws of war, hundreds of Iraqi civilians died as a result of several allied decisions to take less than the maximum feasible precautions to avoid civilian casualties, as required by the laws of war.


725. Peterson, Scott. “The Gulf War Battlefield: Still ‘Hot’ with Depleted Uranium.” *Middle East Report*, No. 211 (Summer 1999), pp. 2-5. A correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* reports on the lingering effects of American use of depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds during the Kuwait War. He cites one expert on the subject that depleted uranium “‘is the Agent Orange of the 1990s.’” (p. 3) He describes its effects on the Iraqi population and observes that clean-up is extremely difficult and expensive.


732. Sullivan, Paul. “The Gulf War, Economic and Financial Linkages, and Arab Economic Development: Iraq – The Pivot?” In Tareq Y. Ismael, ed., *The International Relations of the Middle East in the 21st Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 72-142. An economist at the American University in Cairo examines the pivotal role of Iraq in the Middle East, with emphasis on economics. He surveys trade, oil, the economic impact of the military, and economic stagnation. He also describes the impact of the war on both “remittance sensitive” and “oil sensitive” countries. He guesses that payments from the GCC to the international coalition may have totalled more than $100 billion, with some $65 billion from Saudi Arabia, $20 billion from Kuwait, and $6 billion from the UAE. (p. 111) He concludes that “the Gulf War related economic shocks that harmed many of these Arab states have mostly dissipated” (p. 130) even as the war “seems to have fuelled further domestic and international political turmoil between the rulers of the Arab states and their fundamentalist detractors.” (p. 131)

733. Toukan, Abdullah. “The Gulf War and the Environment: The Need for a Treaty Prohibiting Destruction as a Weapon of War.” *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 15, No.2 (Spring 1991), pp. 95-100. The science adviser to King Husayn of Jordan argues that the environmental destruction wrought in Kuwait demands a treaty to prevent a similar occurrence in the future. He contends that “This planet and its inhabitants cannot tolerate the shocking waste of human and natural resources caused by the destructive violence of war. If a new world order is to arise in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict, the protection of the environment must be a central issue.” (p. 100)


740. Zedalis, Rex J. “Burning of the Kuwaiti Oilfields and the Laws of War.” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1991), pp. 711-755. A law professor at Tulsa University discusses the application of article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (outlawing destruction by an occupying power of property belonging to the occupied state) to the destruction of state-owned oilfields as in Kuwait. He concludes that “this article does not apply beyond situations of destruction inflicted during uncontested occupation.” (p. 711) He judges that Iraq might be unable to justify its actions under article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, which codified international customary law regarding rules of land warfare. Although Iraq, unlike the Geneva Conventions, is not a party to these regulations, the Geneva Conventions preserve the relevant sections and the codification of customary law in the regulations is considered to be binding. He concludes that Iraq may find it difficult to justify its actions on the grounds of military necessity because of its objective of territorial aggrandizement. Finally, although Protocol I of 1977 contains several articles that would apply, it is yet to be universally acknowledged as part of the customary law of armed conflict.

The International Sanctions Régime Against Iraq


743. __________. “Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990-2000.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2001), pp. 205-218. An economist at the University of Vermont looks at Iraq’s desperate economic situation in the 1980s, including the costs of the Iran-Iraq War, the loss of its oil-exporting facilities in the south, damage to its infrastructure, its foreign indebtedness, and its attempt to privatize the economy. He notes that “there is little doubt that the crisis which engulfed the Iraqi economy played a decisive if not the decisive determining factor in the decision to invade, occupy and annex Kuwait.” (p. 343) The consequences of this action, he observes, were the loss of 50,000-120,000 Iraqi soldiers and 20,000-100,000 civilians (on top of the losses sustained in the Iran-Iraq War), as well replacement costs of some £200 billion. Remarking on the bleak economic output, he remarks that “it will be decades before the country can regain the economic initiative it once had.” (p. 350) In his follow-up article, Alnasrawi claims that, despite the ravages of the Iran-Iraq War, the militarization of Iraq’s economy, and the invasion of Kuwait, the sanctions régime bears the major share of responsibility for Iraq's poor economic condition. According to the author, Iraq's GDP per capita in 1999 was estimated to be $883 in 1990 dollars compared to $6151 in 1980. He concludes that “There is a general agreement that the sanctions régime imposed on Iraq was unprecedented in its comprehensiveness, severity and length, and in the enormous human and economic cost which it inflicted on Iraq. Although the severity of the sanctions was made worse by the consequences of the Iraq-Iran war and the destruction of the infrastructure in 1991, the fact remains that the people of Iraq have been suffering for the past 11 years with no prospects on the horizon of an early end to the sanctions, which have transformed Iraq from a country of relative affluence to a country of massive poverty.” (p. 217)

Fisk, Howard Zinn, Kathy Kelly, Barbara Nimri Aziz, George Capaccio, Peter L. Pellett, Huda S. Ammash, Edward Herman, Edward Said, and Sharon Smith. The editor is an editor at South End Press.


746. Byman, Daniel. “A Farewell to Arms Inspections.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 119-132. An analyst at the RAND Corporation argues that the return of UN arms inspectors to Iraq would do more harm than good and might actually help develop Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs over the long term. He suggests that “Surprising as it sounds, an impasse over inspections is actually the best realistic outcome for the United States. A continued standoff will better position the United States to hamper Saddam Hussein’s quest for WMD – and avoid being party to the deliberate flouting of UN resolutions and arms control agreements.” (p. 121) Reinserted inspectors, it is maintained, would not have access to sensitive sights and “If Baghdad defied the inspectors, Washington would soon find itself in a nasty dilemma comparable to what it faced in December 1998 when it launched the Desert Fox bombing campaign: either ignore Iraq’s noncompliance and deception and pave the way for declaring Iraq free of WMD, or use force to demand access.” (p. 122)

747. Carapico, Sheila. “Legalism and Realism in the Gulf.” *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 206 (Spring 1998), pp. 3-6. A professor of political science at the University of Richmond criticizes the sanction régime against Iraq and notes that the policy of containment is not sustainable indefinitely. She concludes that “The uncertain futures of all the Arab governments of the Gulf region, as well as the huge stockpile of weapons in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, should provide strong incentive for prudent policy makers to empower an autonomous weapons inspections apparatus.” (p. 6)

748. Clawson, Patrick. *How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions 1990-93*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993. Clawson, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, examines the impact of sanctions on Iraqi living standards and analyzes the country’s means of financing imports. While noting that it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of sanctions because of the different objectives involved, he reasons that “it would be inappropriate to assume that sanctions will lead to Saddam Hussein’s replacement in the near term.” (p. 74)

749. Cordesman, Anthony H., and Ahmed S. Hashem. *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment. The authors, both of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, examine internal Iraqi political developments since the Kuwait War, including the instruments of state power, opposition movements, human rights, the impact of sanctions, and Iraqi oil exports. They also consider
the country’s external relations, its military developments in the 1990s, and assess the threat from Iraqi conventional forces and from weapons of mass destruction. They see no alternative to continued military containment and assess various scenarios for a change in political power in Baghdad. They argue that economic sanctions “unquestionably weaken Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s current ruling elite, but they have a high humanitarian cost, and it is far from clear that they can force a change in Iraq’s government.” (pp. 357-358) Recognizing that lifting all economic sanctions would be counterproductive, they suggest that “Trading Iraqi agreement on the Kuwait border issue and acceptance of Kurdish autonomy for an end to economic sanctions and end to the threat of war crimes trials, and more realistic proposals regarding reparations and debt repayments is one alternative.” (p. 358)

750. Cordesman, Anthony H. “Iraq and ‘Smart Sanctions’: Reshaping US Policy in the Gulf.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2001. A short paper consisting of the author’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (date not given). Cordesman that “smart sanctions” will work only if they are part of changes in US policy towards Iraq, including stronger pressure on Iraq’s suppliers, coming to grips with the end of the UNSCOM inspection effort, recognizing the ineffectiveness of Iraqi opposition, focus on the continuing need for military containment, a propaganda campaign to counter Saddam Husayn’s efforts, consideration of the future of Iraq’s Kurds, and development of a “clear” energy policy vis-à-vis Iraq.


753. Deaver, Michael V. Disarming Iraq: Monitoring Power and Resistance. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. A visiting lecturer with the Civil Education Project in Russia looks at the problem of disarming Iraq as a case study in power relations and monitoring tactics.

of the UN-administered sanctions policy. Although the policy has numerous deficiencies, the author feels that “The Iraqi case demonstrates that the road to effective international enforcement will be bumpy and is even uncharted in certain respects. But it also demonstrates the importance of attempting the journey.” (p. 195)


756. Drake, Laura. “Why the World Is Blaming the U.S. for Iraqi Suffering.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 16, No. 3 (June-July 2001), pp. 6-10. The author, an adjunct professor at American University, believes that “Washington’s argument – that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and not the United States is to blame for the Iraqi people’s suffering – is losing its cohesion and with it, the rationale for the continuation of Iraqi sanctions.” (p. 6) She contends that “The unspoken, but well-known, truth is that Washington’s intention … is to keep the sanctions on for as long as it can…” (p. 10), regardless of what actions Iraq takes, and that is why the sanctions coalition is falling apart.

757. Graham-Brown, Sarah. Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. London: I.B. Tauris, in association with the Middle East Research and Information Project, 1999. A comprehensive study of the impact of sanctions on Iraq since 1991. The first part details the role of various governments and the United Nations in formulating policy towards Iraq and Baghdad’s response, as well as how the economic sanctions worked in practice. The second part looks at the impact of sanctions inside Iraq, including a discussion of the situation in the protected Kurdish region of the country. The third part concentrates on humanitarian aid programs working in Iraq. The author concludes that “the main lesson of the international community’s policies on Iraq are ... that ‘quick fixes’ do not work. Economic sanctions, military force or humanitarian aid will not resolve the range of complex national and regional problems, of which the current Iraqi Government is one, if there is no clear and agreed sense of what longer-term outcomes are desirable.” (p. 348)

758. Gresh, Alain. “Oil for Food: A Debt of Dishonour.” Le Monde diplomatique, English edition (October 2000). The editor-in-chief of Le Monde diplomatique points out that the “oil for food” program, under which the United Nations permits Iraq to sell its oil internationally, not only provides revenue for humanitarian purposes within Iraq. Since December 1996, a third of Iraq’s $11 billion in export income has been used to compensate companies and individuals for their losses during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Gresh compares the UN’s procedure to the Treaty of Versailles, noting that endless reparations led to Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, and concludes that recent decisions by the UN Security Council meant that Iraq will continue to pay compensation to 2070.

régime against Iraq and terms the British government’s involvement “a callous policy defended dishonestly.” (p. 55) He concludes that “New Labour’s talk of an ethical dimension to foreign policy, humanitarian intervention and ‘smart’ sanctions is all unpersuasive in the case of the sanctions on Iraq. (p. 56)

760. “Iraq: A Decade of Devastation.” *Middle East Report*, No. 215 (Summer 2000), special report, pp. 4-35. •• Nine authors look at different angles of the effects of economic sanctions on Iraq. Phyllis Bennis assesses US policy towards the country, Sarah Graham-Brown writes on the sanctions, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea returns to the Iraqi village in which she lived 40 years previously, Scott Peterson discusses the effects of depleted uranium, Richard Garfield compares the public health impact of sanctions in Iraq to Cuba, Marc Lynch reviews domestic aspects of US policy, David Aquila Lawrence looks at Kurdistan, Faleh A. Jabar describes retribalization, and Joost Hiltermann assesses the obstacles to trying Saddam Husayn for war crimes.

761. “Iraq-Gulf/2000 Conference.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 2000), pp. 58-173. •• Contributions from a July 2000 conference held in Cyprus and sponsored by the Gulf/2000 organization at Columbia University. Gulf/2000 director Gary Sick introduces the topic. Isam al-Khafaji (University of Amsterdam) looks at the impact of sanctions on Iraq and notes that while Iraq can still manufacture weapons of mass destruction, it no longer has any means of delivering them. In comments, Phoebe Marr asks how much change in Iraq can be effected from outside. Ghanim al-Najjar (Kuwait University), while noting that all the GCC states are fully committed to the UN resolutions on Iraq, “The U.S. failure to bring the Iraqi issue to a conclusive close is one major reason why some GCC members are taking a different path.” (p. 99) Ahmad S. Moussalli (American University of Beirut) examines Syrian-Iraqi relations and warns that “Syria wishes to see a regime change in Baghdad, but not according to U.S. and Western desires....” (pp. 108-109) Henri J. Barkey (Lehigh University) points out that Turkey’s approach to Iraq is “influenced entirely by the Kurdish question in northern Iraq and its ramifications for the Kurds in Turkey,” (p. 110) and therefore has adopted a middle course vis-a-vis Baghdad. Alexei Vassiliev (Institute of African and Arab Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences) briefly summarizes Russia’s diplomatic ties with Iraq while Andrew T. Parasisiti and Sinan Antoon (both of Harvard University) conclude that “the Baath party’s relationship with the military has been troubled yet symbiotic.” (p. 139) Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr. (US State Department) states that US policy holds that Saddam Husayn is irredeemable, that Iraq has a potentially bright future without Saddam, and that the US stands behind its support of the opposition Iraqi National Congress, albeit alone. Ghassan Atiyyah (editor of Iraqi File) looks at Saddam’s longevity in power and the options for his rehabilitation, noting that dealing with one of his sons would enable other countries to save face. H.C. von Sponeck (former U.N. Assistant Secretary-General and humanitarian coordinator for Iraq) reviews the effects of sanctions and makes a number of recommendations to break the stalemate. Walid Khadduri (editor of Middle East Economic Survey) believes that “The continuation of sanctions will further damage Iraq and could have an impact on the world oil situation.” (p. 156) Fadhil J. Chalabi (Centre for
Global Energy Studies, London) reviews Iraq’s enormous oil potential and notes that “It seems that the Iraqi government is not in a hurry for investment in its oil, perhaps because it is under the illusion that the world will sooner or later need it.” (p. 173)


764. Marashi, Ibrahim al-. “How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2003), distributed electronically. An examination of the methods used by Saddam Husayn in the decade after the Kuwait War to hide his WMD capabilities from the inspectors of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), written by a research associate at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California. Using captured documents from the Kuwait War, the author points out that a select committee headed by Saddam’s presidential secretary made decisions regarding concealment but that Saddam assigned duties to other agencies in order to produce more competition between them. The author cites the comments of UNMOVIC inspectors on the skill and increasing experience of Iraq’s concealment apparatus throughout this period.

765. Mueller, John, and Karl Mueller. “Sanctions of Mass Destruction.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 43-53. The authors, who teach at the University of Rochester and Maxwell Air Force Base respectively, contend that economic sanctions against Iraq may “have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history.” (p. 51) After remarking on the small impression this has made on the American public to this, and after noting the ineffectiveness of sanctions to alter Saddam Husayn’s policies, the authors suggest that “containment and deterrence have rather good track records as policies for dealing with menaces far more significant than that posed by contemporary Iraq, with its demoralized and potentially mutinous army. There is little reason to believe they would not work in this case as well.” (p. 53)

766. Mylroie, Laurie. “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 1997 Gulf Crisis.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), No. 4 (December 1997), distributed electronically. A research associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute details Iraq’s holdings of WMD and summarizes its efforts to end the sanctions against it. She argues that there can be no end to the problem with Iraq as long as Saddam Husayn remains in power and recommends a policy to overthrow him.
767. Niblock, Tim. “The Regional and Domestic Political Consequences of Sanctions Imposed on Iraq, Libya and Sudan.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Fall 2001), pp. 59-68. A short article by a professor of Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, based on his book, *Sanctions and the 'Pariah States' in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya and Sudan* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). He concludes that “the dynamics underlying the Iraqi polity have not been changed positively by sanctions, and that the potential for the Iraqi state to interact effectively with its neighbours has not been enhanced. The power of the régime as against civil society has been strengthened; the economic conditions facing the population (and the intellectual isolation) have engendered emotions and attitudes ill-suited to democratic transformation; there has been no significant improvement in the respect accorded to human rights; and Iraq has not found a stable role for itself in the wider setting of the Gulf and the eastern Arab world.” (pp. 60-61)

768. Ritter, Scott. “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament.” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 30, No. 5 (June 2000), pp. 8-14. A former weapons inspector for UNSCOM points out that “no one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely no reason to believe that Iraq could have meaningfully reconstituted any element of its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months.” (p. 13) He recommends a new UN Security Council resolution that “redefines the disarmament obligations of Iraq to meet more realistic qualitative benchmarks.” (p. 14)

769. Roubaie, Amer al-, and Wajeeh Elali. “The Financial Implications of Economic Sanctions Against Iraq.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 53-68. The authors, professors at the University of Vermont and Concordia University respectively, conclude that “almost two-thirds of the country’s income has been lost due to the recent sanctions.” (pp. 65-66) They note that this is in addition to the destruction caused by the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.

770. Ruehsen, Moyara. “Fallacy of Sanctions.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (March-April 2002), pp. 31-34. An assistant professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies notes that US trade sanctions have become increasingly common but have never achieved their goals of effecting régime change at the top in the case of unilateral sanctions and rarely in multilateral sanctions.


lead to a bolstering of Saddam Husayn’s internal position and it is unlikely to result in a
massive diversion of resources into arms production or acquisition threatening his neighbors.

Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting a Copy of the
Department of the Treasury’s Kuwaiti Assets Control and Iraqi Sanctions Regulations.

775. White, Paul K. *Crises After the Storm: An Appraisal of U.S. Air Operations in Iraq Since the
Military Research Papers, No. 2. ●● An American air force officer examines the efficacy of
coalition air power vis-a-vis Iraq through four crises between January 1993 and December
1998. The author observes that Operation Desert Fox in 1998 had more effect on deterring
Saddam Husayn than the other strikes because attacks were made on institutions that
maintained his grip on power.

The Debate Over Policy Toward Iraq

2003), pp. 2-18. ●● The Majid Khadduri Professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins
University SAIS warns that an American invasion of Iraq “would be seen by the vast
majority of Arabs as an imperial reach into their world, a favor to Israel, or a way for the
United States to secure control over Iraq’s oil” but adds that “America ought to be able to
live with this distrust and discount a good deal of this anti-Americanism as the ‘road rage’
of a thwarted Arab world.” (p. 2) He argues that no apologies should be made for
“unilateralism” and that the American goal should be modernization and secularization of
the Arab world, as well as nation-building in Iraq.

selection of three articles concerning the yet-to-come Iraq War. Charles Tripp compares US
imprecision regarding “régime change” to the “almost accidental” British invasion of
Mesopotamia in 1914. Faleh A. Jabar speculates on how the Iraqi army will respond to the
fighting and the impact on the Iraqi people. Isam al-Khafaji discusses alternative outcomes
of the war for the future of Iraq.

23, No. 2 (August 2002), pp. 135-148. ●● The Director of the Center for Middle East
Studies at the Indiana University of Pennsylvania argues that US military action to oust
Saddam Husayn will have to deal with both the threat from weapons of mass destruction and
the potential for regime change. He judges that “A palace coup will continue to be the most
likely scenario for a regime change in Baghdad.” (p. 147)
779. Baker, James A., III. “Iraq: Ten Years Later; Sanctions Weaken Saddam’s Threat.” *American Legion Magazine*, Vol. 149, No. 2 (August 2000); as reprinted in GulfWire Special Supplement, 31 August 2000. ●● The US Secretary of State at the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait discusses the difficulty in forcing Saddam Husayn to comply with sanctions. He judges that “Until someone comes up with a better alternative, we should support economic sanctions. They are not perfect, but they deprive Saddam of direct control over billions of dollars that he could otherwise use to strengthen his war machine.” The author concludes that “Saddam is a formidable opponent, but he is also his own worst enemy. Faced with overwhelming military defeat, his best strategy before the Gulf War would have been to withdraw. Instead, he dug in. Faced with economic sanctions after the war, his best strategy would have been to play ball with the inspectors. He would have lost a generation of assets from weapons of mass destruction, but he could have replaced them quickly with the oil money. Instead, he resisted. ... Still, it would be wrong to underestimate him. He is cunning, single-minded and brutal. He can and will do anything to retain power.”


782. Betts, Richard K. “Suicide From Fear of Death.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January-February 2003), pp. 34-43. ●● The director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University warns that the Bush administration’s success in advancing its policy of invading Iraq ignores the possibility that Saddam Husayn might retaliate with weapons of mass destruction against American civilians and asks why Washington has turned its back on deterrence and containment which sustained US strategy during 40 years of the Cold War. The author makes the case that “If no catastrophic Iraqi counterattack occurs, these warnings will be seen as needless alarmism. But before deciding on waging a war, President Bush should consider that if that war results in consequences even a fraction of those of 1914, those results will thoroughly discredit his decision to start it.” (p. 43)

Military Operations” (14 April 2003), in which he notes that the administration submitted a $62.6 billion request to Congress to cover the cost of the operations for fiscal year 2003.


786. Byman, Daniel, Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose. “The Rollback Fantasy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January-February 1999), pp. 24-41. ●● A critique of the idea using the Iraqi opposition to depose Saddam Husayn, written by a policy analyst with the RAND Corporation, a senior research professor at the National Defense University, and the deputy director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations respectively. The authors regard this as wishful thinking. An air power campaign would require massive US assistance but “would be incredibly risky and more likely to box in Washington than liberate Baghdad. (p. 29) Helping the Iraqi National Congress to create an enclave inside Iraq “is militarily ludicrous and would almost certainly end in either direct American intervention or a massive bloodbath.” (p. 29) A third strategy of helping the opposition to mount an insurgency along the lines of the Afghan mujahidin lacks a friendly neighboring country willing to provide a secure base for the insurgents and may result in civil war rather than a clean régime change. The result of any of these would be an Iraqi Bay of Pigs.

787. Byman, Daniel, and Matthew Waxman. Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000. MR-1146-OSD. ●● A report prepared for the Office of the US Secretary of Defense summarizes the confrontation between Iraq and the United States, analyzes the structure of Saddam Husayn’s régime, outlines US objectives in the region, and discusses eight attempts to coerce Iraq since the end of the Kuwait War. With these factors in mind, the authors evaluate Iraq’s vulnerabilities and Baghdad’s strategy to minimize the efforts to coerce it into compliance with US objectives. The report notes that Saddam Husayn “is most vulnerable when his power base is threatened and most intransigent when concessions would decrease support among his power base. Saddam’s primary concerns are domestic, not foreign. Maintaining the support and loyalty of key tribes, Baath party officials, military officers, and other elites is his overriding focus.” (p. 78) It also concludes that legal agreements, strikes on Iraqi infrastructure, and tit-for-tat air campaigns have little effect on Saddam Husayn. “Saddam does not respond passively to U.S. attempts at coercion. Rather, he tries to tailor his response to exploit U.S. weaknesses whenever possible. ... [his countermoves] include exploiting domestic suffering, complying incompletely with demands, trying to fracture coalitions, and repressing dissent.” (pp. 81-82)

788. Byman, Daniel, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman. “Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past.” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 127-152. ●● A RAND analyst (Byman), a professor at the National Defense University (Pollack), and a consultant at RAND (Waxman), examine the success of attempts to pressure Iraq at various junctures
between the 1975 Iran-Iraq border dispute and Iraq’s defiance in 1997-1998. They suggest that successively solving seemingly intractable problems involves “targeting Saddam’s relationship with his power base [including] aggressive containment, decisive military action, support for the Iraqi opposition and measures to neutralise Saddam’s well-refined counter-measures....” (p. 148)


790. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. “Gulf War: The German Resistance.” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 99-116. ●● An explanation of Germany’s 2002-2003 resistance to the Bush administration’s determination to attack Iraq by a professor at the University of Copenhagen. The author believes that “The political style of President George W. Bush has given new life to anti-American stereotypes and rekindled old fears in Germany. The image of an irresponsible, trigger-happy America has re-emerged and, with it, the old German war Angst....” (pp. 110-111)


794. ________. “Iraq and the ‘Bush Doctrine’: Storming the Desert.” World Today, Vol. 58, No. 4 (April 2002), pp. 5-6. ●● A fellow at Chatham House notes that Saddam Husayn has outlasted two American presidents and that the new Bush administration inherits the problem bequeathed to them by the elder Bush. In his first article, he warns that smuggling is steadily undermining sanctions and declares that “The hope of Secretary of State Powell that sanctions can somehow be ‘re-energised’ is far fetched in the present climate. There is simply not the international will to reinforce a policy that has in the last ten years lost its original legitimacy.” (p. 6) ❚❚ The author assesses the intentions of so-called “smart sanctions” in the following article and notes that the intense negotiations within the UN Security Council on the subject “can be seen as recognition that régime change in Baghdad is not going to happen soon.” (p. 9) ❚❚ In his third article, Dodge looks at the failure of the US to achieve its stated goals of victory in Afghanistan and holds that “it is now not a question of whether military action is to be taken against Baghdad in the next stage of its ‘war’ against terrorism, but when and how.” (p. 5)
   An assertion that a 30-year strategy to seize control of Middle Eastern oilfields “is finding its boldest expression yet in the Bush administration – which, with its plan to invade Iraq and install a regime beholden to Washington, has moved closer than any of its predecessors to transforming the Gulf into an American protectorate.”

   The author takes on the critics of the Bush administration’s policy vis-à-vis Iraq and points out that its approach to the world is concerned with traditional security threats such as great powers, rogue states, and proliferation and thus has more in common with the Reagan administration than the Clinton administration. “In the realist view, terrorists need states to operate from; hence the focus on ‘rogue régimes.’” (p. 284) Furthermore, the administration is determined not to be accused of appeasement. He admits that the US has been inconsistent and poorly prepared to present its justification to the world but he also chides Europe for failing to understand US motivations.

   The author, from the University of Sussex, provides background to the US determination to attack Iraq, including brief surveys of the history of American involvement in the Gulf and the Kuwait War and its aftermath. In his opinion, “the administration of George W. Bush will pursue its agenda within or without the Security Council and the United Nations ... with or without the sanction of international law unless such law is convenient to American purposes. The preceding pages have tried to show from the historical record the old and newer American practices which make that judgement a simple truism. The question why Her Majesty’s Government should travel the same route so closely, shoulder to shoulder, must be answered elsewhere.” (p. 277; emphasis in original)

   A correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly interviews government officials, oil company employees, military personnel, and policy experts in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East in order to determine what will be required by a US occupation of Iraq and how well-equipped Washington is to carry out this task. The author discovered that while members of the “war party” saw régime change in Iraq as an opportunity to establish stable democracy in the Arab world in an open-market system, most of those he interviewed were far more pessimistic about the outcome.

   The executive editor of the *National Interest* looks at the 1998 US crisis with Iraq and judges that “With six years of supine behavior the Clinton administration disconnected itself from its own allies and emboldened the Iraqi leadership. Then this past autumn came the serial mishandling of the Iraqi portfolio.” (p. 123)
800. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Getting It Backward on Iraq.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 54-65.  ●● The failure of Operation Desert Fox (the intensive US air campaign against Iraq in December 1998) was followed by continued American insistence on economic sanctions on Iraq that “have neither weakened Saddam’s hold on power nor prevented him from pursuing his WMD programs. They have, however, reduced the Iraqi people to penury.” (p. 55) This article by an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont suggests that the sanctions régime should be revised to lift limits on Iraq’s ability to produce and sell oil, to suspend the country’s obligation to contribute to the UN Kuwait War compensation fund, and to end UN supervision of purchase and distribution of food and medicine in Iraq – while leaving other elements in place in a tradeoff “essentially lifting general economic sanctions in exchange for restoring disarmament operations.” (p. 56) Although the author concedes that such a plan would not remove Saddam Husayn, it “at least holds out the promise of slightly improving the day-to-day life of average Iraqis while recreating serious obstacles to Iraq’s development of WMD.” (p. 65)

801. Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Unknown: The C.I.A. and the Pentagon Take Another Look at Al Qaeda and Iraq.” *New Yorker* (10 February 2003), pp. 40ff.  ●● A journalist interviews Bush administration officials who contend that there is a probable link between Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and al-Qa’idah. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is cited as believing that Middle East analysts are wrong in believing that doctrinal differences prevent Sunnis and Shi’is, and religious and secular Muslims, from pursuing common projects in anti-American terrorism.

802. Gordon, Philip H., and Michael O’Hanlon. “Should the War on Terrorism Target Iraq?” *Brookings Policy Brief*, No. 93 (January 2002).  ●● Two senior fellows at the Brookings Institution note that although the removal of Saddam from power would be highly desirable, there is no evidence of actual links between Iraq and terrorists and that the US would have to undertake any campaign by itself. They conclude that “The United States should not now mount a large ground operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein, given the prospect that it could entail significant casualties, increase the risk of terror attacks against the United States, and require a long and costly occupation even after Saddam was gone. Anything short of a ground invasion, however, would run a high risk of failure.” (p. 7) Deterrence, they feel, is more effective.

803. Gordon, Philip H., Martin Indyk, and Michael O’Hanlon. “Getting Serious About Iraq.” *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 9-22.  ●● Three senior fellows at the Brookings Institution review the American case against Saddam Husayn and argue the need for a “Desert Storm II,” suggesting that much of the Iraqi army would probably desert and that consideration should be given to the idea of offering Saddam exile. After noting the difficulties of reconstructing Iraq after the war, the authors conclude that “The régime in Iraq can be changed, and Saddam deposed. But it is a much bigger, more complicated and more costly task than the Afghan model – or much of the discussion in Washington – would suggest.” (p. 21)
804. Gunter, Michael M. “The Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the Future of the Iraqi Opposition.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-20. ●● The author, professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University, analyzes the INC’s formation, goals and strategy, and relations with non-INC opposition. In his opinion, the “INC has failed to become a viable democratic option for the Iraqi people. The prospects for the remainder of the Iraqi opposition seem similarly bleak.” (p. 20)

805. Haass, Richard N. *The United States and Iraq: A Strategy for the Long Haul*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997. Brookings Policy Brief No. 7. ●● The director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and a former adviser to President George Bush during the Kuwait War, sums up US policy towards Iraq as bent but not broken. He notes that “Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is far weaker than it was at the start of the decade and is better understood as a dangerous nuisance than an actual strategic threat” but also that Saddam remains in office and has partly rebuilt his military. (p. 1) He advocates more intelligence, a more visible US military, effective policy toward Iran, encouragement of friendly nations in the region to reform, work toward resolving the Arab-Israeli impasse, and curb oil imports.

806. Haselkorn, Avigdor. *The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. ●● A study of Iraq’s capabilities in weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and biological warfare. After outlining the threat posed before and during the Kuwait War, he discusses the potential of an Israeli nuclear response and the role of the Soviet Union. He believes that “the ‘solution’ of fighting a limited war to cope with the threat of a CB scenario has assured that a dangerous enemy be left to fight another day.” (p. 224)

807. Hersh, Seymour M. “Saddam’s Best Friend.” *New Yorker* (5 April 1999), pp. 32ff. ●● The author alleges that the US bombing of Iraq in December 1998 was not as claimed the result of Saddam Husayn’s threat to expel the UN weapons’ inspectors. According to Hersh, the UN had been undermined already by US policies and the targets during the bombing were selected in an attempt to assassinate Saddam.


809. ________. “Lunch with the Chairman.” *New Yorker* (17 March 2003), pp. 76ff. ●● A journalist reports on a January 2003 meeting in France between Richard N. Perle, the strongly pro-invasion of Iraq chairman of the US Defense Policy Board and Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi. According to the author, Khashoggi believed that the meeting was to be an opportunity to discuss both Iraq policy and investment opportunities. But Hersh claims that Perle, however, set up the meeting to encourage Saudis to invest in his
company, Trireme Partners, which is involved in selling goods and services for fighting terrorism and defense. This, Hersh avers, constitutes a clear conflict of interest.

810. ________. “Who Lied to Whom?” New Yorker (31 March 2003), pp. 41ff. •• A journalist assesses US intelligence claims that Saddam Husayn possessed weapons of mass destruction as part of the Bush administration’s rationale for going to war with Iraq. The author describes in detail the unraveling of the US and British claim that Iraq sought to purchase uranium from Niger – a claim based on forged documents.

811. ________. “Offense and Defense.” New Yorker (7 April 2003), pp. 43ff. •• A journalist reports on disarray in Pentagon over problems in the Iraq War plan and tensions between the top generals and civilian leadership in the Department of Defense. He also relays critics’ opinions that the US is losing support in Iraq during its military campaign by its inappropriate tactics.

812. Hollis, Rosemary. “Getting Out of the Iraq Trap.” International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 23-35. •• An argument that “Iraq, its government and future, has become an international as well as a regional and domestic affair. The only realistic way to approach the problem of Iraq is at all three levels simultaneously.” (p. 23) The author holds that the hawks in the Bush administration are likely to fail in imposing their agenda on Iraq and the region and she calls for a multi-tiered, multilateralist approach to managing the fallout.

813. Ikenberry, G. John. “America's Imperial Ambition.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September-October 2002), pp. 44-60. •• A professor of geopolitics at Georgetown University examines the George W. Bush administration’s “neoimperial” grand strategy that advocates a more unilateral role for the US and the use of its military power to manage global order, of which Iraq is a prime example. He charges that “America’s commanding unipolar power and the advent of frightening new terrorist threats feed this imperial temptation. But it is a grand strategic vision that, taken to the extreme, will leave the world more dangerous and divided – and the United States less secure.” (p. 60)

814. “Iraq and American Intervention.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 50-82. •• A section of three articles on the debate over whether the United States should wage war on Iraq, beginning with William S. Langenheim on “Give Peace a Chance: First, Try Coercive Diplomacy” (pp. 50-71), and followed by Robert F. Turner, “Military Action against Iraq Is Justified” (pp. 72-75), and Doug Bandow, “It Is Time to Temper Our Excessive Interventionism” (pp. 76-82).

815. Isherwood, Michael W. “U.S. Strategic Options for Iraq: Easier Said than Done.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 145-159. •• An American air force lieutenant colonel outlines three options for the United States in dealing with Iraq: (1) a patient approach emphasizing US strengths and supporting the cessation of economic sanctions, the
phasing out of no-fly zones, renewed access for UN weapons inspectors, and denial to Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2) a strategy of moderation to create a climate for change including support for alternatives to the present Iraqi government in safe havens in the north and south of the country with arms and airpower provided by the US; and (3) a bolder strategy compelling change in Baghdad through an aggressive public relations campaign stressing Saddam Husayn’s threat to peace, use of military operations to remove Saddam and to secure WMD sites, and support for UN sponsorship of a transitional Iraqi government. The author notes that adoption of any of the options involves a balancing of political capital, risks, and benefits. He concludes that option (2) would be as difficult to execute as option (3). On the other hand, option (1) “provides the best match of resources to objectives for the Bush administration. It satisfies the U.S. core interest: regional stability.” (p. 158)


817. Kay, David. “Iraq Beyond the Crisis du Jour.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 10-14. ●● A vice-president of the Science Applications International Corporation and a former chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq claims that the assumptions behind UNSCOM’s efforts to eliminate Saddam Husayn’s weapons of mass destruction were false and charges that Iraq has become “like post-Versailles Germany in its ability to maintain a weapons capability in the teeth of international inspections.” (p. 11) His conclusion is that régime change “holds the only hope of eliminating Iraq’s capacity for producing WMD and reining in the equally dangerous arms race that is about to ignite across the Gulf.” (p. 13)

818. Klare, Michael T. “For Oil and Empire? Rethinking War with Iraq.” Current History, Vol. 102, No. 662 (March 2003), pp. 129-135. ●● A professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College rejects the Bush administrations stated motivations for waging war on Iraq of eliminating the country’s WMD arsenals, diminishing the threat of international terrorism, and promoting democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. Instead, the author charges that “the pursuit of oil and the preservation of America's status as the paramount world power” (p. 132) are the dominant reasons. He contends that the United States can not allow a hostile state to threaten the American access to the Gulf and that Iraq is the only country that provides a viable alternative to dependence on Saudi oil reserves.

819. Laipson, Ellen, Rend Rahim Francke, Andrew Parasiliti, and Patrick L. Clawson. “After Saddam, What Then for Iraq?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (February 1999), pp. 1-26. ●● Edited transcript of a Middle East Policy symposium. Laipson (Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council) defines “after Saddam” as neither Saddam’s family nor the
inner circle of Tikritis remaining in power and sees Iraq remaining united and relatively stable, almost certainly not democratic, and possibly with a stronger Islamist aspect. Clawson (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) believes “a post-Saddam Iraq, where the opposition comes to power with significant U.S. military support, is going to be good for the United States.” (p. 8) Parasiliti (Middle East Institute) points out that “political forces within Iraq, rather than those outside, will determine the direction of change after Saddam Hussein leaves power.” (p. 12) Finally, Francke (Iraq Foundation) notes that any transition in Iraq will be messy and adds an emphatic no to the question of whether that should deter “us” from seeking change.

820. Marr, Phebe. “Iraq ‘the Day After’: Internal Dynamics in Post-Saddam Iraq.” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 13-29. ●● A long-time Iraq specialist observes that “Of all the unknowns facing policy makers in Iraq, the greatest is what kind of leadership is likely to come after Saddam Husayn. Much, of course, will depend on the means of unseating him. However, little hard thought has yet been spent on who might replace him, what orientation and policies alternative leaders might have, and the processes by which leadership can be selected and legitimated over the long term.” (p. 13) She proceeds to outline possible leadership options in various parts of the country and in exile and concludes by noting that toppling the Saddam Husayn régime is the easiest part of the task: “The United States may be about to learn that ‘empire’ cannot be achieved on the cheap.” (p. 28)

821. Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. “An Unnecessary War.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 134 (January-February 2003), pp. 50-59. ●● A professor of government at the University of Chicago and the academic dean at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, take issue with the Bush administration’s contention that Saddam Husayn is irrational and cannot be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction. The authors believe that this conclusion “rests on distorted history and faulty logic” and “the historical record shows that the United States can contain Iraq effectively – even if Saddam has nuclear weapons – just as it contained the Soviet union during the Cold War.” (p. 52)


823. Moore, James W. “Après Saddam, le Déluge? Speculating on Post-Saddam Iraq.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (February 1999), pp. 27-43. ●● An analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence looks at the ways in which Saddam might be removed, judging a coup d’état to be the most plausible, and outlines the challenges posed by transition. He adds that “Many believe ... that the world’s problems with Iraq would be over if only Saddam would disappear from the scene. Unfortunately, this does not seem likely any time soon.” (p. 39)
824. Mohamedi, Fareed, and Raad Alkadiri. “Washington Makes Its Case for War.” *Middle East Report*, No. 224 (Fall 2002), pp. 2-5. ●● The chief economist and the manager of country risk analysis at the Petroleum Finance Corporation respectively review the arguments for and against a US attack on Iraq and observe that while US military action “seems increasingly likely, ... the neo-conservative agenda is not completely secure. While the US military enjoys overwhelming superiority, securing the peace on the ‘day after’ in a manner that suits Washington’s hawks is far from guaranteed. The administration appears to have given insufficient thought thus far to this issue.” (p. 5)


826. Perry, Glen E. “Attacking Iraq and International Law.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 1-14. ●● A professor of political science at Indiana State University looks at the legal implications of US policy towards Iraq and contends that the US government’s “claim that it has the right under ‘existing’ Security Council resolutions to carry out an armed attack on Iraq to force it to stop violating commitments it has made is extremely weak.” (p. 11)

827. Prados, Alfred B. “Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report RS21325, 31 March 2003. ●● A specialist in Middle East affairs at the Congressional Research Service outlines the Bush administration's rationale for going to war on Iraq as including the credibility of UN pronouncements, the threat posed by lethal weapons, terrorist ties, régime change, internal support in Iraq, and growing international support for action. He also lists the objections of critics as including premature action, the effect on the anti-terrorism campaign and alliance relations, operational and logistical difficulties, regional destabilization, adverse economic impact on the US, and uncertain outcomes.

828. Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*. New York: Random House, 2002. ●● A former US government official in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council examines Iraq’s domestic political situation and assesses various US options for dealing with Saddam Husayn, including the erosion of containment, the dangers of deterrence, the difficulty of covert action, the risks of the Afghan approach, and the case for invasion. “This book argues that war with Saddam’s Iraq is well nigh inevitable and that it would be far, far better for the United States to face this challenge sooner rather than later.” (p. xvi) He concludes with a look at the requirements for rebuilding Iraq, noting
that “It is likely to be the most important and difficult part of the policy, and we would be living with the results or suffering from the consequences for many decades to come. ... It would be a tragic mistake if we were to remove the threat of Saddam only to create some new, perhaps equally challenging, threat in Iraq following his demise.” (p. 387)

829. ________. “Next Stop Baghdad?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March-April 2002), pp. 32-47. ●● A former US National Security Council official examines the options for US policy vis-à-vis Iraq. After contending that containment is eroding in its effectiveness and that deterrence (i.e. that sanctions be scrapped and the US rely on threats of intervention) poses too many risks of failure, he concludes that “some form of régime change is steadily becoming the only answer to the Iraqi conundrum.” (p. 37) Noting that a military campaign would be more difficult to carry off than in Afghanistan and would require considerable regional assistance, Pollack assesses that a full-scale invasion of Iraq would cost more lives and force considerable headaches from the aftermath and rebuilding of the country. Still, he judges that an invasion is “the least bad course of action available” (p. 46) and the sooner the better.

830. Rouleau, Eric. “The View From France: America’s Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January-February 1995), pp. 59-72. ●● A French journalist and diplomat contends that the sanctions régime is a failure, that it punishes innocent civilians without hurting the Iraqi régime, that it includes militarily useless items, and that it demoralizes regional allies and costs them money. Instead, he argues, the Clinton administration should follow the same policy of diplomacy instead of coercion as it does towards North Korea and China.

831. ________. “Gulf Scenario Frustrated.” Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition (March 1998). ●● The author charges that US attempts to carry out a war on Iraq were frustrated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Rouleau sees the agreement that Annan reached in Baghdad as marking a turning point “if it succeeds in restoring respect by the international community for UN resolutions. It will deserve to be called ‘historic’ if the climb-down by the world’s only superpower proves durable. For the moment, however, there is no guarantee that the poker-cum-chess game that Washington and Baghdad have been playing for the last seven years will not lead to further trials of strength.”


833. Sadowski, Yahya. “No War for Whose Oil?” Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition (April 2003). ●● An associate professor at the American University of Beirut contends that the slogan “no war for oil” describes the truth about the Bush administration’s motivations more than does its propaganda. He says that a number of the neo-conservative hawks within the administration advanced a plan in 2002 in which a “liberated Iraq” would flood the world with Iraqi oil, leading to an oil price crash and the destruction of OPEC. This was rebuffed
by economists and the Bush family. In the end, Sadowski says, “Oil appears in Washington’s calculations about Iraq as a strategic rather than an economic resource: the war against Saddam is about guaranteeing American hegemony rather than about increasing the profits of Exxon.”

834. Sifry, Micah L., and Christopher Cerf, eds. The Iraq War Reader. New York: Touchstone Books, 2003. ●● A hefty volume similar in coverage and content to the editors’ earlier collection, The Gulf War Reader. Much of the book consists of short comment on US options regarding Saddam Husayn’s régime by mainly American authors and commentators, as well as a sprinkling of activists and scholars, from all sides of the political spectrum. Documentation includes presidential speeches, other administration statements, US Congressional debates, and appendices with relevant UN resolutions and a short guide to the Iraqi opposition. Published as the Iraq War neared an end, the contributions do not cover the war itself.

835. Strauss, Mark. “Attacking Iraq.” Foreign Policy, No. 129 (March-April 2002), pp. 14-19. ●● A senior editor at Foreign Policy summarizes the options facing the US regarding Iraq: the US should have gotten rid of Saddam Husayn during the Kuwait War (twenty-twenty hindsight), if Saddam is overthrown, Iraq will break apart (not likely), Saddam is undeterred (no, but he’s reckless), getting weapons inspectors back into Iraq should be a high priority (yes, but only for political reasons), the Iraqi régime was/was not involved in the 11 September attacks (we may never know), what worked in Afghanistan will work in Iraq (no), the “Arab street” will/will not rise up in response to a US attack (misses the point), now is the best time to attack Iraq (no).

836. Tarzi, Amin. “Contradictions in U.S. Policy on Iraq and its Consequences.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000), distributed electronically. ●● A research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies points out that Saddam Husayn is winning the propaganda battle against the United States and recommends that “Until the United States decides to take firm action to remove Saddam Husayn from power – a very unlikely scenario given the upcoming American presidential election in 2000 – Washington ought to lead the charge in the UN Security Council to re-establish an inspection and monitoring system in Iraq.”

837. Tripp, Charles. “After Saddam.” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Winter 2002-2003), pp. 23-37. ●● A reader in Middle East politics at the University of London SOAS reviews the options for a post-Saddam government. “If Saddam Hussein were overthrown by an internal coup, it seems likely that the patterns of politics characteristic of the recent past would be repeated.” (p. 23) An American invasion undoubtedly would succeed in removing Saddam but it would present the US with considerable problems in “state reconstruction” from the “shadow state” (the networks of power and privilege where real power resides), communal politics, the security forces, and how to handle the country’s oil revenues. This might cause Washington to settle for a reconstruction of the Iraqi economy but to accept much of the status quo. The
result might be “the reassertion of an old and impoverishing pattern of authoritarian rule under a new guise.” (p. 35)


839. Wright, Robin. “America’s Iraq Policy: How Did It Come to This?” _Washington Quarterly_, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 53-70. A correspondent for the Los Angeles Times examines how the drama of Operation Desert Storm eventually turned to a morass in policy toward Iraq that allowed the Saddam Husayn régime to remain in place and splintered the coalition that fought the Kuwait War. While the author suggests that tightening sanctions slippage, aiding Iraqi opposition, improving relations with Iran, and pushing harder for an Arab-Israeli peace would all be helpful, she believes that “the hard truth is that the United States and its allies have few options to easily or swiftly deal with the question of ‘what to do with Saddam’ that has loomed on the horizon since the Gulf War.” (p. 69)

840. Yaphe, Judith S. “Iraq: The Exception to the Rule.” _Washington Quarterly_, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 125-137. A National Defense University researcher considers what to do with a recalcitrant Saddam Husayn. She notes that the US government is willing to pursue the policy options of sanctioning Saddam or seeking to eliminate him but it is not willing to countenance the other options of ignoring him or accepting him as the ultimate survivor. Among her advice for a new US administration is not to declare impossible goals as an objective (i.e., claiming that military operations are intended to eliminate all WMD capability); not to arm an opposition that is neither a credible threat to Saddam; not to link an end to sanctions to a régime change; and to decide what kind of successor that the Washington is willing to accept (i.e., is one of Saddam’s two sons acceptable?).

841. Zunes, Stephen. “Confrontation with Iraq: A Bankrupt U.S. Policy.” _Middle East Policy_, Vol. 4, No. 1 (June 1998), pp. 87-108. An indictment of US policy by an assistant professor at the University of San Francisco. The author cites weaknesses in the administration’s arguments on international law, good US relations with the Iraqi regime before 1990, US actions in exaggerating the potential Iraqi threat, the lack of international support for American actions, the blow to US credibility in the Arab world because of US approval of Israel’s possession of WMD, and domestic US opposition. He concludes by noting that the likelihood of war decreased and that perhaps the “lesson from the recent series of crises is one of profound hope: that international norms, common sense and moral imperatives can ultimately prevail – even when it comes to U.S. policy in the Middle East.” (p.107)

842. ________. “Foreign Policy by Catharsis: The Failure of US Policy Toward Iraq.” _Arab Studies Quarterly_, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Fall 2001), pp. 69-86. A critique of American policy by an associate professor of politics at the University of San Francisco. In his opinion, “Ten years after the Gulf War, US policy toward Iraq continues to suffer from an over-reliance on military solutions, an abuse of the United Nations and international law, and a disregard for the human suffering resulting from the policy.” (p. 69) After noting that the US justifies a
higher military budget to control the “rogue states” of the Gulf and North Korea than it had during most of the Cold War, the author concludes that Iraq’s real offense in the view of Washington is challenging American hegemony in the Middle East.

843. Wurmser, David. *Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999. ** The director of the Middle East studies program at the American Enterprise Institute criticizes US policy towards Iraq, contending that “What has happened in Iraq is not an isolated policy failure; it reflects the failure of the reigning assumptions in Western (first British, then US) policy toward the region since the early 1920s. The policy is to pursue a coup rather than a broad-based insurgency and to prefer a diminished Ba’thist Iraq under Saddam over chaos, since such an entity would still serve as a bulwark against the Islamic Republic of Iran.” (p. 131) He suggests that US policy should be directed towards helping the Iraqi National Congress seize control of Iraq, with support Jordan because of Hashimi ties between the present Jordanian and the pre-revolutionary Iraqi régimes. ¶¶ Wurmser reiterates his arguments in his article, “Saddam is the Problem,” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 64-66, emphasizing that “The effort to remove Saddam therefore, is not an attack on Iraq, but a moral imperative to challenge human bondage.” (p. 66)

**The Iraq War (2003) and Aftermath**

844. Alterman, Jon B. “Not in My Backyard: Iraq’s Neighbors’ Interests.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 149-160. ** A senior fellow and director of the Middle East Program at CSIS contends that the Bush administration's goals of promoting democracy in the Middle East, extinguishing radicalism, and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict – all through the elimination of Saddam Husayn – not only are a “long shot” but are undermined by its own actions in talking about them too much. All of Iraq's neighbors – both friendly and unfriendly – he holds, “find the U.S. vision for the future of Iraq and the region deeply threatening. Even more troubling, they have the means to keep that vision from coming to pass.” (p. 149) Furthermore, he warns that “The more U.S. officials strut and shout, the more they make the United States a target. Rather thanInspiring democracy, they make it more likely that friends and adversaries in the region will move to protect their own interests, thereby frustrating those of the United States in the process.” (p. 160)

845. Ayoob, Mohammed. “The War Against Iraq: Normative and Strategic Implications.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 27-39. ** A professor of international relations at Michigan State University notes that in choosing to wage war against Iraq in 2003, “The United States has not merely demonstrated a lack of concern for the views of its closest allies, it has set itself up unilaterally as the arbiter of the criteria by which such high-sounding goals are to be served and those who violate them punished. ... It undermines the normative consensus underpinning the post-Cold War international order, thereby beginning
the process of its de-legitimization.” (p. 29) He also sees the end result as increasing Arab and Muslim alienation from the US.


848. Byman, Daniel L. “Building the New Iraq: The Role of Intervening Forces.” *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 57-71. ●● An assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University discusses the severe obstacles in the way of US and British military forces seeking to reconstruct and transform post-Saddam Iraq. He notes estimates of required troops for the first year of more than 100,000 (with an in-country presence lasting for a decade) and a final bill for rebuilding the country at over $100 billion. “Simply stated, the goals of intervening forces are to ensure order, to end Iraq’s WMD programmes, to help Iraq build a power-sharing system, to reform its military and to transform the regional security environment.” (p. 58) He concludes that “The burden of occupation is heavy, but failure to build a peaceful and democratic Iraq would be calamitous.” (p. 68)

849. ________. “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities.” *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 47-78. ●● The author begins by noting the near-consensus that Iraq must have a democratic and federal government but also points out that “if Iraq does not receive massive help from the United States and other powers, a range of problems will make democracy hard to establish. Challenges that may arise include a weak government that engenders security fears, a lack of a cohesive identity to unify Iraq’s
different communities, a risk of meddling from Iran and Turkey, bellicose elites who pursue adventurism abroad and whip up tension at home, a poorly organized political leadership, and a lack of a history of democracy.” (p. 49) Steps that would help establish democracy include ensuring domestic security, deterring meddling neighbors, and promoting moderate elites and restricting access to troublesome ones.


851. Cirincione, Joseph, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich. WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004. Associates of the Carnegie Endowment and the Non-Proliferation Project assert that “Iraq’s WMD programs represented a long-term threat that could not be ignored. They did not, however, pose an immediate threat to the United States, to the region, or to global security.” (p. 47) Sifting through the available evidence, the authors demonstrate that: Iraq’s nuclear program had been dismantled; sanctions had destroyed Iraq’s large-scale chemical weapon production capabilities; the record is more ambiguous on biological weapons but capabilities may also have been converted to dual-use facilities; the missile program appears to have been still in active development in 2002; it is unlikely that Iraq could have destroyed, hidden, or sent out of the country the hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons, dozens of Scud missiles and facilities engaged in the ongoing production of chemical and biological weapons; the extent of loss of radioactive and biological material remains unknown; the dramatic shift in US intelligence assessments suggests that intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002; there is no solid evidence of a cooperative relationship between Saddam’s government and al-Qa’idah; Bush administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile programs; and the UN inspection process appears to have been much more successful than recognized before the war. They also argue that there were at least two options clearly preferable to a war undertaken without international support, viz., allowing the UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections to continue until obstructed or completed, or imposing a tougher program of “coercive inspections” backed by a specially designed international force. The authors also recommend that the National Security Strategy be revised “to eliminate a U.S. doctrine of unilateral preemptive war in the absence of imminent threat (that is, preventative war). A true preemptive attack remains, as it has always been, a legitimate tactic to be used when necessary. However, ... a doctrine of unilaterally asserted and executed preventive war does not serve U.S. national security interests.”


in Iraq and its Badr Corps, al-Da‘wah, and the followers of Grand Ayatollah Sistani – by a professor of history at the University of Michigan. He judges that the Sadr Movement, led by Muqtada al-Sadr since the assassination of his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999, is the most important tendency among religious Shi‘ah at present and opines that “It seems clear that the future of Iraq is intimately wrought up with the fortunes of the Sadr Movement.” (p. 566)


855. Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha. “How to Build a Democratic Iraq.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3 (May-June 2003), pp. 36-50. ●● The authors, professor of political science and of Russian studies respectively at Miami University of Ohio, contest that building democracy in Iraq will not be as difficult as critics of the war maintain. They point to the parliamentary system that existed under the monarchy (1921-1958) with political parties and a relatively free press. They argue for a federal system of government wherein Baghdad and the regions serve as equal guardians of the constitution. But rather than create only three federal units (a Kurdish north, a Shi‘ite south, and a Sunni center), they advocate maintaining Iraq’s present administrative structure with the country divided into 18 units. They also suggest creating a system with a weak president and a prime minister, as well as restoring a constitutional Hashimi monarchy. In their view, “A democratic federal system would turn Iraq into the standard against which other governments are judged, and make the country a natural ally of the West.” (p. 50)

856. Day, Graham, and Christopher Freeman. “Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq.” International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 2 (March 2003), pp. 299-313. ●● Using the Balkans experience as an example, the authors (Day is Deputy High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina) contend that “The greatest threat in the immediate aftermath of intervention is a political vacuum.” (p. 300) Thus, they argue for establishment of an international civil administration in Iraq with a policekeeping force primarily composed of Muslims from surrounding countries. The authors suggest that “Nationalization of the oil for food programme can provide as much as $10 billion a year for reconstruction, policing and political reform. With wise planning and prudent spending, Iraq could be much closer to this reality in the same length of time that has been spent inconclusively in the Balkan missions.” (p. 313)


fellow at the University of Warwick and the assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies respectively. Judith Yaphe (US National Defense University) explores the myths advanced about invading Iraq and suggests some hard questions that need to be answered. David Ochmanek (RAND Corporation) briefly reviews some factors in campaign strategy. Toby Dodge looks at the composition of the Iraqi military and assesses its capabilities while Faleh A. Jabar (an Iraqi sociologist in London) considers how the Iraqi military will react politically to the war. Isam al-Khafaji (University of Amsterdam) speculates on what post-Saddam Iraq may look like and Amatzia Baram (University of Haifa) examines the role of Tikriti tribes and groups in Iraq. Gareth R.V. Stansfield (University of Exeter) conjectures on the impact of a possible war on Kurdish self-government while Michiel Leezenberg (University of Amsterdam) examines Kurdish economy and society.

859. Dodge, Toby. “US Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures.” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 103-122. ♦♦ The author applies the question of whether military interventions in failed or rogue states can be successful in rebuilding states to Iraq by examining the earlier British experience in Iraq and summarizing the exercise of politics under Saddam Husayn. He suggests that “US policymakers and their allies will have to decide if they can commit the time (probably as much as ten years), resources and personnel to tackle the underlying structural problems dominating Iraqi politics or if instead they will simply change the Iraqi personnel at the head of government, leaving them to govern in a very similar way to the old regime.” (p. 115)


862. Fisher, Louis. “Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 389-410. ♦♦ A Congressional Research Service analyst examines the Bush administration's decision to go to war against Iraq and charges that “It is quite late to play the innocent, to express shock at troubling new disclosures. For over a year, the administration supplied a steady stream of unreliable statements. At no time did it make a persuasive, credible, or consistent case for war. Much of its rationale was exploded on a regular basis by the press. The campaign for war was dominated more by fear than facts, more by assertions of what might be, or could be, or used to be, than by what actually existed.” (p. 389) The author concludes that “U.S. political institutions failed in their constitutional duties when they authorized war against Iraq. The Bush administration never presented sufficient and credible information to justify statutory action in October 2002 and military operations in March 2003.” (p. 410)


866. Hashim, Ahmed S. “The Sunni Insurgency In Iraq.” Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2003; Policy Brief. A professor of strategic studies at the US Naval War College notes that “the insistent claim by US authorities that the [continuing post-war] attacks in Iraq are solely the work of remnants of the former regime is incorrect.” He divides the myriad groups claiming responsibility into régime loyalists, nationalists, and Islamists who have emerged after decades of suppression. He also notes that little cooperation has emerged as yet between Sunni and Shi’i groups.

867. ________. “Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 29-47. A professor of strategic studies at the US Naval War College contends that “As the dominant power in post-Saddam Iraq, the United States has to address [the] relationship between state formation, security and military power as it begins the process of reconstructing that hapless country. For the United States to succeed, it needs also to avoid the mistakes made by the British, who created Iraq in 1921, and by successive independent rulers.” (p. 29) After outlining the evolution of Iraqi military institutions during the independent era, Hashim describes developments under the American occupation. He warns that “If the United States does not succeed in restoring law and order and security in Iraq, it will not be able to move the country forward [and at] worst, Iraq could become a failed state.” (p. 44)


870. Jervis, Robert. “Understanding the Bush Doctrine.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 365-388. The Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, looks at the invasion of Iraq as a manifestation of the Bush doctrine. He sees the doctrine as comprising four elements: “a strong belief in the importance of a state’s domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary and as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics. It is, of course, possible that I am exaggerating and that what we are seeing is mostly an elaborate rationale for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein that will have little relevance beyond that.” (p. 365) In his view, “The war against Saddam ... already marks out the path on which the United States is embarked and illuminates the links between preventive war and hegemony, which was much of the reason for the opposition at home and abroad. Bush’s goals are extraordinarily ambitious, involving remaking not only international politics but recalcitrant societies as well, which is seen as an end in itself and a means to American security. For better or (and?) worse, the United States has set itself tasks that prudent states would shun. As a result, it will be infringing on what adversaries, if not allies, see as their vital interests.” (p. 386)

871. Katzman, Kenneth. “Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief IB92117, 23 July 2003. A CRS analyst reviews the history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq since 1991 and summarizes developments during and since the Iraq War. Among the latter have been dealing with such issues as the listing of Iraq as a sponsor of terrorism, Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations, reparations, and sanctions. The author also notes that the failure to find WMD after the war has provoked a debate in Congress and in the media “over the quality and presentation of pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and the justification for war.” (p. 1)


873. Marashi, Ibrahim al-. “The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein.” *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 2003), distributed electronically. A research associate at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California, looks at Saddam’s goals and defensive preparations in the Iraq War, which he referred to as the “Defining Battle.” The author argues that “Saddam’s choice of a defensive strategy to force a lengthy war of attrition was his best possible one, based on his hope that his enemies would lack the patience or courage to continue the war and also that domestic and international pressures would force his opponents to let his regime survive.” This strategy would mean that using weapons of mass destruction would be counter-productive, since it would have damaged the image of Iraq as a victim.
874. Metz, Steven. “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter 2003-2004), pp. 25-36. ●● A director of research at the US Army War College contends that “Although U.S. strategists and political leaders may disagree about who is behind the violence in Iraq, the preconditions for a serious and sustained insurgency clearly exist.” (p. 25) In his view, a US counterinsurgency strategy “is unlikely to eradicate the violent opposition to the coalition fully but should at least sufficiently weaken the insurgent opposition and ensure that the new Iraqi regime is not born – as the South Vietnamese government was – with a massive internal security threat on its hands.” (p. 36)


876. Nakash, Yitzhak. “The Shi‘ites and the Future of Iraq.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July-August 2003), pp. 17-26. ●● An associate professor of history at Brandeis University looks at the political role of Iraq’s Shi‘ah and relations with the United States. He observes that “There is a big gap, in short, between the Bush administration’s vision of anew Iraq and the expectations of Shi‘ites for the post-Saddam era. Whereas some members of the administration have envisaged a Western-style democratic Iraq led by a secular pro-U.S. government, Shi‘ites (and many other Iraqis appear to prefer an independent Iraq with a system of government that reflects their own culture and traditions....” (pp. 24-25) He suggests that the US can improve its credibility by apologizing for not support the Shi‘i uprising of 1991.


878. Pollack, Kenneth M. “Securing the Gulf.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July-August 2003), pp. 2-16. ●● The director of research for the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution and a former US National Security Council staffer on the Middle East argues that the removal of Saddam Husayn provides an opportunity for the US to reestablish a framework for Gulf security. The author sees the principal problems as a proper balance of Iraqi power, Iranian nuclear weapons program, and domestic unrest in the GCC states. A return to an offshore US military commitment is unlikely to result in the GCC states actively pursuing reforms and may permit regional powers to create new threats. A regional defense alliance with the GCC and Iraq to assure Iraq’s security while deterring Iran may not wash with the GCC states and Iranian threats to the other side of the Gulf are more likely to be fomenting internal unrest than outright attack. The author leans toward a Gulf security condominium modeled on European arms-control experiences at the end of the Cold War, an advantage of which he feels may be Iranian willingness to participate. “Ultimately, if the security condominium succeeds, peace is maintained, and forces throughout the region are considerably reduced, the road may be clear for a truly over-the-horizon American presence in the Persian Gulf – a development that would be greatly welcomed by all concerned.” (p. 16)
879. ________. “Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong.” *Atlantic Monthly* (January-February 2004), accessed online. The director of research at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy examines the question of why no WMD weapons were discovered in post-Saddam Iraq. The author judges that not only did the intelligence community overestimate Iraq’s WMD capability but that the Bush administration dismissed intelligence assessments it did not like on largely ideological grounds. He recommends better and more independent intelligence, as well as an admission to the world by the US government that it was wrong and is taking action to correct the problems that caused the error.

880. Record, Jeffrey. *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003. A visiting research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute charges that most of the declared objects of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), including “the destruction of al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations, the transformation of Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy, the democratization of the rest of the autocratic Middle East, the eradication of terrorism as a means of irregular warfare, and the (forcible, if necessary) termination of WMD proliferation to real and potential enemies worldwide, are unrealistic and condemn the United States to a hopeless quest for absolute security. As such, the GWOT’s goals are also politically, politically, fiscally, and militarily unsustainable.” (p. 1) He contends that the policy is not realistic in recognizing the limits of American power and recommends that the policy should be refocused directly on al-Qa’idah and its allies, that credible deterrence should be substituted for preventive war as the primary vehicle for dealing with rogue states seeking WMD, and that the US should prepare to settle for stability in Iraq over democracy and for international responsibility for the country’s future.

881. Roberts, Adam. “Law and the Use of Force After Iraq.” *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 31-56. A review of provisions in international law regarding intervention in states without their consent by a professor of international relations at Oxford University. The author notes that when it became likely that the UN Security Council was unlikely to authorize an attack on Iraq, the imminent US-led operation was criticized heavily. Instead, the US relied on an argument of continuing authority arising from previous UNSC resolutions and repeated Iraqi violation of them. He notes that “Paradoxically, even when attempts to obtain UN authorisation for force fail, the appeal to UN principles may have considerable value. In both the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the 2003 Iraq crisis, ... these claims were more than the tribute that vice pays to virtue: they were recognition that even in the new circumstances and hard cases of the twenty-first century, force has an unavoidably close relationship to law.” (p. 53)

883. Samary, Catherine. “States in Protective Custody.” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English edition (May 2003), accessed online. ●● The author argues that the record of “after-care” in nations that the United States has invaded or intervened has not been a success.


885. Yaphe, Judith. “The Legacy of Iraq’s Past and the Promise of Its Future.” In Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-First Century* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), pp. 11-34. ●● A senior research prof. at the US National Defense University looks at the historical factors that contribute to Iraqi politics and describes Saddam Husayn’s policies for maintaining control. She notes the dilemmas for those looking for Iraqis inside the country to overthrow Saddam and observes that “If tribalism remains a factor defining Iraqi political and social behavior, then a successful challenger should bring with him, at minimum, the loyalties of the Sunni Arab center and possibly Shia elements as well.” (p. 30)

886. ________. “War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 381-399. ●● Noting the parallels between the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 with the British occupation during the First World War, the author provides a succinct synopsis of the situation and challenges that the British faced. She observes that now, as then, the campaign is not easy or the people liberated grateful, that achieving policy of goals may be frustrated by clashing policy objectives within the government of the occupying power, that reconstruction efforts face tricky problems in education, remaking the military, and paying off debt, and that it is exceedingly difficult to impose an acceptable system that will endure and permit a harmonious exit. She ends by remarking that in addition to positive accomplishments in Iraq, the British “would also produce a disturbing pattern of military revolts, political repression, ethnic cleansing and civil unrest. Let us hope this pattern does not repeat itself.” (p. 399)

887. Yaphe, Judith, Kenneth Katzman, Omer Taspinar, and Martha Neff Kessler. “Aftershocks of the Iraq War: What Purposes Have Been Fulfilled?” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 1-21. ●● An edited transcript of a symposium sponsored by the Middle East Policy Council on 20 June 2003. Yaphe, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University examines the theories behind the war and judges that what remains important in the aftermath of the war is not who was responsible for starting it but that the United States will “stay the course” in establishing law and order and a return to civil society. Katzman, a Middle East specialist at the Congressional Research Service, declares himself pessimistic about the future, feels that Shi’i Islamist factions will become the power in post-war Iraq, and suggests that if the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq becomes dominant, a future Iraq and Iran may become partners. Taspinar, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings...
Institution, examines the Turkish secularist model for Iraq and concludes that certain aspects such as the strong military role and forced assimilation of minorities will not work in Arab states. Kessler, a consultant and retired CIA analyst, notes that the US action in acting boldly against Saddam Husayn has impressed friends and foes alike in the region but argues that the US occupation of Iraq is likely to replace any gratitude for getting rid of Saddam and may stimulate greater Islamic extremism.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GULF SECURITY

General, European, Chinese, and Other Involvement


889. Alford, Jonathan. “Les Occidentaux et la sécurité du Golfe.” *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 1981), pp. 667-690. •• The author emphasizes the point that the protection of critically important oil supplies in the Gulf has become a central concern of Western security. In his view, Western military forces must provide for the security of the Gulf, deter Soviet aggression, and mitigate the risk of turbulence in the region. The American RDF is a first step, but Soviet advantages in location and lines of communication mean that Europe must also play an active role. Alford suggests that an Allied Deployment Force be created, primarily for use in the Gulf but also in other areas where intervention might be necessary, as in the Mediterranean Basin and Africa. Such an approach, in the author’s opinion, would force European allies to acknowledge their responsibilities in an enlarged definition of Western security, and would provide greater military flexibility.

890. Amirie, Abbas. *The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics*. Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975. •• A collection of papers from a conference held in Tehran in May 1975, edited by the former director of IIPES. The role of the superpowers in the region is discussed by William Griffith, John C. Campbell, T.B. Miller, and Alvin G. Cottrell. Neville Brown reports on Western European interests and Makoto Momoi on Japanese concerns. The views and policies of regional states are covered by Bhabani Sen Gupta (India), Dieter Braun (Indian nuclear policy), R.M. Burrell (Arab Gulf states), and Amir Taheri (Iran). In addition, John Duke Anthony dissects the rebellion in Oman’s province of Dhufar, and Jahangir Amuzegar and Thomas Stauffer present their views on the importance of Gulf oil to the world economy. The remarks of other participants in the conference have been reprinted after each paper.
891. Behbehani, Hashim S.H. *China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955-75*. London: KPI, 1981. Paperback ed., 1985. ●● A political scientist at the University of Kuwait examines three case studies of China’s involvement in the Arab world: relations with the Palestinian resistance movement; its involvement with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the insurrection in Oman’s southern Dhufar region; and relations with the state of Kuwait.

892. Calabrese, John. “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 351-366. ●● A scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute and adjunct professor at American University comments that energy is at the heart of relations between China and the Gulf and that China strengthened its political relations with the Gulf states in the 1990s while expanding its arms sales to the region. But he also notes that these relations have become more difficult to manage because the Kuwait War and American opposition to its commercial ties with Iran. “As the scope of China’s involvement in the Gulf widens, China may encounter many more economic opportunities, but may also incur higher political risks.” (p. 366)

893. Chubin, Shahram. “La France et la Golfe: opportunisme ou continuité?” *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1983), pp. 879-887. ●● The author explains how France’s search for close relations with the Gulf states following the 1973-1974 oil price revolution has led to Mitterand’s recent support for Iraq in its war with Iran and his decision to provide important arms to that country. Chubin argues, however, that French policy transcends commercial considerations and, since it is determined by geopolitical interests, contributes to international security in the Gulf region.

894. Coker, Christopher, and Heinz Schulte. “A European Option in the Indian Ocean.” *International Defense Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1982), pp. 27-34. ●● The authors, both at Oxford University, examine the kinds of equipment and units that American NATO allies can contribute to the RDF and the Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They note that problems exist in the uncertainty of French participation in NATO operations and NATO members’ reluctance to consider contingencies outside the organization’s formal boundaries.

895. Davis, Eric. “The Political Economy of the Arab Oil-Producing Nations: Convergence With Western Interests.” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1979), pp. 75-94. ●● The author, an associate professor of political science at Rutgers University, takes issue with what he sees as a preoccupation with the potential for conflict between Arab oil producers and Western consumers. “Rather than solely emphasizing the potential for conflict between the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the West, greater attention should be given to the nature of the emerging alliance between its conservative members, especially Saudi Arabia, and the dominant Western power, the United States.”
Hartley, Keith. “Can the UK Afford a Rapid Deployment Force?” *RUSI Journal of the Royal United Service Institution for Defence Studies*, Vol. 127 (March 1982), pp. 18-21. A reader in economics at the University of York examines the budgetary implications of the creation of a British RDF, a factor he asserts must be as integral a part of the question as the security needs.

Hurewitz, J.C. *The Persian Gulf. After Iran’s Revolution.* New York: Foreign Policy Association, April 1979. Headline Series, No. 244. A general survey of politics in the Gulf written by the director of Columbia University’s Middle East Institute. The author provides brief background capsules for the eight states of the Gulf, discusses Soviet penetration of the region, explains the factors behind the revolution in Iran, and warns that the Arab-Israeli dispute will continue to hamper US relations with the Arab Gulf states. In the past, says Hurewitz, US policy has been one of improvisation and shift with a noticeable lack of clear and steady leadership. Apparently, the US has chosen to be a “visible balancer” in the Gulf but this role will be a busy one. This study is updated from the author’s “The Persian Gulf: Prospects for Stability,” published as No. 220 (April 1974) in the Headline Series.

Kelly, J.B. *Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; New York: Basic Books, 1980. A noted historian of British imperial policy in the Gulf launches a bitter attack on recent developments and actors in the region. Kelly states from the very beginning that he does “not pretend to be impartial... “ and the chapter titles confirm this: “The Abandonment of Aden,” “The Retreat from the Gulf,” “Sorcerers’ Apprentices” (the Gulf emigrants), “Araby the Blest” (Saudi Arabia), and “The ‘sting’” (OPEC pricing policy in 1973-1974). His multitudinous targets include the Labour Party (for the decisions to quit Aden and the Gulf), the Tories (for not reversing these decisions), the Foreign Office (for not handling the Arabs as firmly as had the Colonial and India Offices), the US government (for eroding Britain’s role in the region), the State Department and American academia (for accepting ARAMCO’s portrayal of a benevolent Saudi Arabia), the National Liberation Front of South Yemen (for being Marxist and opposing the British presence there), the shaykhdoms of the Gulf (for seeking a more grandiloquent station in life than their backwardness justified), and King Faysal and the “Shah of Persia” (for conniving to blackmail Britain into retreating from the Gulf). There is more than a whiff of nostalgia within these pages for the orderliness of times past when only a pax Britannica raised the people of these climes out of their “barbarism”back into which they are “fast lapsing....”

Kelly mounts a savage attack on the British withdrawal from the Gulf and the “pusillanimity” of the Western response to recent developments there. He speaks disparagingly of both the Shah and the régime which replaced him, and regards Saudi Arabia, “the second bulwark of the Gulf’s defense,” as a “dangerous source of instability in the region.” The tenor of Kelly’s attitude is illustrated by his opinion of Western arming of Saudi Arabia: “Through their...
foolish pretence ... that Saudi Arabia could ever serve as a pillar of the Gulf’s security, and through their flaccid accommodation of every one of the Saudi regime’s arrogant demands and petulant whims, they have needlessly increased the dangers of instability in the Arabian Peninsula.”


901. Luciani, Giacomo. “The EU and the Gulf Co-operation Council.” *EUI Review* (Spring 2001), pp. 46-48. The author argues that the European Union has tended to ignore the GCC, paying more attention to a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and, even within the Gulf, to Iran and Iraq. But he suggests a EU-GCC partnership based on such issues and interests as energy, Gulf private investors in Mediterranean development, European assistance in Gulf privatization, and European cooperation in information technology and the new economy.


903. Peterson, J.E., ed. *The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil*. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1983. A collection of over thirty articles, most originally published elsewhere, organized into three parts. The first deals with Middle Eastern oil and its place in the world economy, with chapters on the development of the Middle Eastern oil industry, OPEC and OAPEC, the oil price revolution and its ramifications, and growing interdependence between producers and consumers. The second part concentrates on the oil-induced transformation of the Middle Eastern producing countries, including economic development, social change, and political evolution. The focus of the third section is on the new international political relationships emerging from the oil price revolution. The articles there analyze the changing balance-of-power between the Middle Eastern producers and other actors in the Middle East, the Third World, and the West, and also discuss the emerging concern of both superpowers over control of the Gulf. The numerous appendices include a glossary, chronologies, tables on oil production and foreign aid, and capsule briefs to the Iran-Iraq war and the RDF. A bibliography containing over 400 items is also included.
904. Pridham, B.R., ed. The Arab Gulf and the Arab World. London: Croom Helm, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1988. ●● Another collection of papers from a University of Exeter symposium, held in July 1986. Early and Ottoman history are covered by Michael G. Morony (UCLA) dealing with the Arabization of the Gulf, Farouk Omar (Baghdad University) on the Islamization of the Gulf, and Robert G. Landen (University of Montevallo, Alabama) on relations between the Gulf and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Political aspects of the Arab world-Gulf relationship are handled by Riad N. El-Rayyes (journals) on Arab nationalism and the Gulf, Fred Halliday (London School of Economics) looking at the Gulf in international affairs, and Levon Melikian (University of Qatar) on the sociopolitical impact of the Arab world on Gulf lifestyles. Demographics and financial interchanges are discussed by J.S. Birks (World Bank consultant) on the demographic challenge in the Gulf, Ian J. Seccombe (Mountjoy Research Centre) on Arabization and localization in the Gulf labor market, R.S. Porter (British Ministry of Overseas Development) on Gulf aid to the Arab world, and C.A. Sinclair (Durham University) on migrant workers' remittances in the Arab world. A final section on Gulf security features contributions by Ghassan Salamé (American University, Beirut) on perceived threats and perceived loyalties, Ursula Braun (Scientific and Political Institute, Munich) on the security role of the GCC, and Manfred W. Wenner (University of Northern Illinois) on the 1986 civil war in South Yemen.

905. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. “Security in the Persian Gulf.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 4 (1979), pp. 821-835. ●● Many of the suggestions in this article written immediately after the revolution by a prominent scholar on Iranian politics and foreign policy have been overtaken by such events as the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Nevertheless, the author’s argument that a “comprehensive economic and security partnership between a group of Gulf and OECD countries” would better contribute to regional security than a sole “go-it-alone” American response still merits careful consideration. ●


the cycle of instability and conflict that has plagued the region.” (p. 1) The authors contend that the options of a unilateral US attempt to impose liberal democracy or a return to a balance-of-power approach are not viable. Instead, they recommend a multilateral US-European effort to construct a more durable Gulf security system, underpinned by political reform in the Gulf.

909. Rowe, Donald S. “Collective Security and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.” *Joint Perspectives*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 181), pp. 3-17. An army officer evaluates the possibility of tying the RDF to NATO forces. He concludes that, despite various difficulties, such a policy would provide the advantage of affirming NATO as the centerpiece of US security arrangements and an opportunity to conduct exercises in the area and thereby test the RDF’s effectiveness.

910. Serfaty, Simon. “Bridging the Gulf Across the Atlantic: Europe and the United States in the Persian Gulf.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 337-350. A professor of US foreign policy at Old Dominion University examines the disagreements between the US and the European Union over policies needed in the Gulf, especially the limitations of dual containment. He warns that “More transatlantic discord over the Gulf, whether caused by evidence of the failure of US policy or by a sense in Europe of being left out of the decision-making process, could be seriously disruptive of US-European relations and affect the vital interests of all the Western allies.” (p. 349)

911. Siebert, Michael. “European Perspectives on the Gulf: Similarities and Differences with the U.S.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2002), pp. 94-97. A German diplomat sees “similarities in the U.S. and EU analysis of the [Iraqi] threat. But I see differences in the political debate on how to deal with Saddam.” (p. 95) He also notes that “the quest for legitimacy under international law in the case of an attack against Iraq..., ideally a U.N. mandate, is much stronger in Europe than in the United States.” (p. 95) Unlike George W. Bush’s characterization of Iran as part of the “axis of evil,” Europe has chosen to intensify contacts with Iran after 11 September 2001, which is seen as doing more for “positive internal development in Iran and stability in the region than antagonizing the country.” (p. 96)

912. Snyder, Jed C. *Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1987. SAIS Papers in International Affairs, No. 11. Written while a guest scholar at the Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute, this volume looks at NATO’s potential role in its southern flank, including the Gulf. The latter is analyzed in terms of developments in Afghanistan and the evolution of US doctrines towards the region. The work is most dated in its assessment of regional security issues and the superpower rivalry.

A study prepared for the US Air Force on the conditions under which the US would need substantial contributions from NATO allies for Gulf operations, the power projection capabilities of these allies, and the attitude of European countries towards missions beyond peacekeeping operations in Europe. The authors conclude that “For the foreseeable future, it is likely that the United States will for the most part have to deal on its own with key threats to common interests outside Europe” and that “European governments, with the notable exception of the U.K. and possibly France, will be reluctant to participate heavily in military operations in the Gulf.” (p. xx) Steps recommended to enable Europe to shoulder a larger share of the burden include improvements in allied force planning, improvements in allied forces, increased allied pre-positioning and presence, increased military-to-military dialogue, changes in military exercises, and enhanced interoperability of air forces.


The author (Rhodes College, Memphis) surveys Syria’s relations with the Gulf since its independence with emphasis on Syrian support for Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War and post-war developments. He concludes that Syrian policy towards the Gulf rests on two central questions: what can Gulf actors off in Syria’s attempt to balance off Israel, and how to balance off Iraq. The “Gulf is thus a well from which Asad and Syria draw in time of need. Syria would be wise to remind itself to ask the price of that precious water, and to avoid assuming that it will always be available.” (p. 64)


A critical view of American preparations for Gulf security, by the President of the European American Institute for Security Research. According to the author, the US has underestimated the importance of Soviet influence and domination in many regions, including the Gulf. The West, and especially American allies, must wake up to the grave perils threatening their interests and construct a serious plan of action. Wohlstetter suggests a continual presence of allied forces in addition to the RDF, which he contends would increase the risks for the Soviets and dissuade them from attacking. This would require task groups, fast deployment logistics, advanced technologies, local bases, and help from regional allies. Wohlstetter claims the Soviets have the advantage now because they repeatedly expend considerable military and political effort to ensure direct access to the Gulf and maintain their power there. If the West does not make similar efforts, its inability to defeat the Soviets will be due to a lack of political purpose and not to inherent weaknesses.


The author, a research associate at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at the time of writing, asserts that Japan’s extreme vulnerability to changes in the policies of oil producers led to the pursuit of “resource
diplomacy” after 1973. Yorke maintains that this has resulted in an independent pro-Arab political posture; extensive offers of developmental assistance to OAPEC states; and closer Japanese cooperation with Washington’s views on consumer strategies.

917. Zakheim, Dov S. “Of Allies and Access.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1981), pp. 87-96. This article by a former Congressional Budget Office analyst maintains that assistance in protecting the Gulf by US allies in NATO and OECD would not only free US resources for military needs elsewhere, but would provide a graphic, while politically discreet, image of a West collectively determined to protect its interest in the Gulf. Zakheim suggests that allied contributions might take the form of: (1) peacetime contributions of naval forces and perhaps surveillance aircraft in the region; (2) providing the US with the use of airfield and port facilities to facilitate American deployment in the Gulf; and (3) financial support for military construction programs in the Gulf, such as British upgrading of their original facilities in Oman or West German refurbishment of airbases in western Turkey.

**Superpower and Great Power Rivalry in the Gulf**

918. Aliboni, Roberto. “The Strategic and Regional Balance in the Middle East and the Red Sea Region.” Translated by Richard Walker. *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1981), pp. 37-49. This rambling article by the director of the Instituto Affari Internazionali covers three distinct subtopics. The first discusses relations and the strategic balance between the superpowers, noting that Western interests are centered on oil while the Soviet Union wants to guarantee its national security. But superpower interests in the region are expected to clash if it becomes necessary for the USSR to import oil in the future. The author contends that the strategic balance in the region has changed in Moscow’s favor in recent years, alleging increased capabilities in Afghanistan and the Gulf. Meanwhile, as the second section notes, the regional balance has also shifted because of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, leading to increased destabilization. Finally, Aliboni contends that a vacuum has appeared in the Red Sea due to a schism between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Israel. It is up to the US, he says, to play its cards correctly in filling the vacuum and thereby redressing the unfavorable regional balance.

Defence and Regional Security in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States

for Strategic Studies) discusses Moscow’s interests and position in the Gulf and claims that “The outlook for the USSR in the region is promising.” C.D. Carr assesses the US-Iranian relationship between 1948 and 1978, and Lewis A. Dunn (on the senior professional staff at the Hudson Institute) discusses the prospects for the spread of nuclear weapons to the Gulf. Steven L. Canby (President of C & L Associates) discusses the requirements for the territorial defense of Iran against the Soviet Union and concludes that the Shah’s armed forces “were ill-suited for all but one of their intended tasks: political symbolism.” Stephanie G. Neuman (a senior research associate at Columbia University) looks at the relationship between arms transfers, indigenous defense production, and dependency in the case of Iran.

¶¶ In papers focusing more directly on the politics of the region, Richard Haass (a research associate at IISS and later Department of Defense official) discusses the complementary roles played by Pahlavi Iran and Saudi Arabia as the “twin pillars” of the Gulf and contends that with the fall of the Shah, “the stress on the remaining pillar is much greater, and stability all the more difficult to maintain.” John Duke Anthony (then associate professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) outlines political interaction among the Arab states of the Gulf, the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Iranian drive for hegemony. Edmund Ghareeb, writing before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, surveys recent politics in Iraq and its foreign policy in the Gulf, suggesting that “Iraq never has had, in its recent history, such a fortunate opportunity to play a leading role in Gulf and Arab affairs.” L.P. Elwell-Sutton (professor of Persian at the University of Edinburgh) examines the contributions to the Iranian revolution made by the Shah’s policies and charges that “The unpredictable collapse of the Shah’s régime precipitated the religious leadership into a situation that they had never expected, and for which they were quite unprepared.” Finally, Fereidun Fesharaki (a research associate at the East-West Center in Honolulu) assesses the impact of the revolution on Iran’s oil and gas policies.

920. Ayoob, Mohammed. “The Superpowers and Regional ‘Stability’: Parallel Responses to the Gulf and the Horn.” World Today, Vol. 35, No. 5 (May 1979), pp. 197-205. ●● This short article, written while the author was still a senior research fellow at the Australian National University, maintains that the superpowers have developed similar policies toward Third World clients, as exemplified in Iran and Ethiopia. The US, utilizing Iran as a regional surrogate under the Nixon Doctrine, put its full weight behind the Shah in an unsuccessful attempt to preserve the status quo. Similarly, the Soviet Union has been trying to preserve an equally unpopular regime and surrogate in Ethiopia. Furthermore, Ayoob contends that both superpowers fear “native” change in the Third World and hope to retain a manageable equilibrium. This results in recognition of spheres of influence and tacit agreement not to interfere in each other’s sphere. Thus, Moscow refrained from embarking on any action that might alienate the Shah and the US, while Washington has limited its response in the Horn of Africa to verbal condemnations.

two distinct halves. The first traces influence in arms relationships between a superpower and a Gulf state in three cases: the US and Iran, the US and Saudi Arabia, and the USSR and Iraq. The second part is concerned with conflict management in the Gulf. Chubin first discusses the superpowers’ contribution to the problem and considers that their role in the Gulf will be more direct in the future as their interests there grow, their relationship becomes more hostile and competitive, and no obvious substitute in the region exists to handle conflict management chores. Next, he provides a short history of attempts at regional cooperation. Chubin’s suggestions for US policy go beyond improved coordination and a greater US sensitivity: “A greater readiness to make quiet suggestions and to point out the manifold implications and interrelationships between the various strands of the development programmes underway is essential.”

922. Cottrell, Alvin J. “The Political-Military Balance in the Persian Gulf Region.” In Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O’Neill, eds., The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 125-138. The late Director of Research at Georgetown’s Center for Strategic and International Studies discusses the impact of British withdrawal from the Gulf, the intrusion of Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean, and prospects for the protection of US interests, particularly through the emerging role of Iran as a regional military power. The limits of Cottrell’s powers of prognostication are suggested by his observation that the “absolute king ships” in the region-especially on the Arab littoral—are anachronisms and that the only one likely to survive is Pahlavi Iran.

923. “Defending the Gulf: A Survey.” The Economist, 6 June 1981, survey pp. 1-38. An overview of the strategic situation in the Gulf at the beginning of the 1980s, with emphasis on the interplay between the superpowers, this volume contains sections on the state of Afghani resistance, the possibility of Soviet intervention in either Iran or Iraq, Saudi Arabia’s balancing act between self-policing of the Gulf and dependence on the US, Oman’s role as custodian of the Strait of Hormuz, the United States’ response in the RDF, and Egypt’s potential as an American stepping-stone to the Gulf.

924. Farid, Abdel Majid, ed. Oil and Security in the Arabian Gulf. London: Croom Helm, for the Arab Research Centre, 1981. The papers in this volume result from a symposium in October 1980 sponsored by the Arab Research Centre in London, and were edited by the center’s director. The participants are a combination of writers and government officials; as a consequence, some contributions consist of full fledged papers while others are more in the nature of reproduced spoken remarks. The papers focus on the Iranian revolution in international affairs (by Fred Halliday, Transnational Institute), oil and US policy in the region (Robert J. Hanks, former commander of the US Navy’s Middle East Force), oil and Soviet policy (Ruben N. Andreasyan, Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences), and an Arab view of oil and Gulf security (Mohammad El-Rumaihi, University of Kuwait). Also contributing are Abdullah al-Tariki (former Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources), Robert Pranger (American Enterprise Institute), James Akins (former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia), Ahmed Baha el-Din (then editor-in-chief of al-‘Arabi
magazine of Kuwait), Douglas Hurd (British Minister of State at the Foreign Office), Michael Field (British journalist), Michel Jobert (former French Minister of Foreign Affairs), Pierre Desprairies (Director of the French Petroleum Institute), Indu Prakash Singh (Deputy High Commissioner of India in London), and Tim Niblock (then Deputy Director of the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies). Also included is a summary of a roundtable on the Iran-Iraq war, held at the Arab Research Centre in December 1980.

925. ________, ed. *The Red Sea: Prospects for Stability*. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984. ●● A collection of papers from a 1983 conference organized by the Arab Research Centre and edited by the centre’s director. Zaki Mustafa (Saudi-Sudanese Red Sea Joint Commission) looks at Red Sea resources, J.M. Doviak and Gary Gimson (both of the Seatrade Academy, Cambridge) examine trade and shipping in the region, Prince Abdullah al-Faisal al-Turki al-Sa’ud (Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu) looks at Saudi development plans along the littoral, Geoffrey Marston (Cambridge University) outlines potential legal problems, and Hassan el-Badri (Al-Ahram Political and Strategic Center) assesses local conflicts. The papers by Gerald Blake (Durham University) and Hassan el-Bazzaz (Baghdad Research Centre) deal with the links between the Red Sea and the Gulf while Louis Fitzgibbon examines the straits. The perspectives of individual countries on the Red Sea’s importance are discussed by Michael Sterner (former US ambassador to the UAE) on the US, Fred Halliday (Transnational Institute) on the USSR, Amin Hewidi (former Egyptian minister of defense) on Egypt, and Noah Lucas (Sheffield University) on Israel.


927. Peterson, J.E. *Conflict in the Yemens and Superpower Involvement*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, December 1981. Occasional Paper. ●● This monograph is concerned with politics in the two Yemens and the impact of their often-stormy relationship on relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. The background to politics in both North Yemen and South Yemen is discussed first, followed by analysis of the critical events of June 1978 (leading to the death of both countries’ presidents) and the border war of early 1979. A final section traces both American and Soviet involvement with the two states. It is suggested that a more productive American policy towards this corner of Arabia involves “a more realistic recognition of the many constraints on Yemen Arab Republic leadership” and a renewed effort at dialogue with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.
928. Rubinstein, A.Z., ed. The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia. New York: Praeger, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983. ●● The result of a Foreign Policy Research Institute conference at Bellagio, Italy, in 1982. Adeed Dawisha (Deputy Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs) begins the volume with a discussion of social and political change in the countries of the Gulf, and suggests that the states of the Arab littoral stand a good chance of surviving the challenge of the Islamic revival and Iranian revolution, just as they have the earlier radical nationalist one. Michael Sterner (a Washington consultant and former ambassador to the UAE) outlines the Gulf states’ perceptions of Gulf security, and passes on their observation that the last 30 years in Middle East have seen “more pro-Western governments destroyed through internal upheaval than as the result of external aggression.” Gary Sick (a retired navy captain and National Security Council staffer, presently with the Ford Foundation) provides a thumbnail sketch of the evolution of US policy toward the region over the last several decades and concludes that “it has been neither farsighted nor particularly wise.” ¶¶ The editor, Alvin Z. Rubinstein (Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania), surveys the Soviet relationship with key actors in the region and notes that “what Washington does in the region may count for more than what Moscow wants.” Shahram Chubin, of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, discusses European relations with the Gulf and points out that European contribution to a Western security policy there is complicated “first by differences within Europe and second by strains between the two sides of the Atlantic.” Shirin Tahir-Kheli (of the State Department Policy Planning Staff at the time of publication) discusses area transfers to Iran, India, and Pakistan, observing that reduction of arms transfers to the Third World depends on major suppliers offering regional solutions to security problems. Keith Dunn (a strategy analyst at the US Army War College) examines US military strategy for the region and stresses the desirability of collective rather than unilateral action, noting that “an alliance approach has a better chance of being acceptable to an American public ... more interested in domestic than in foreign affairs issues.” The volume also includes papers by Bhabani Sen Gupta, Aswini K. Ray, and Barry Buzan. ✪

929. Smart, Ian. “Oil, the Super-powers and the Middle East.” International Affairs (London), Vol. 53, No. 1 (January 1977), pp. 17-35. ●● The author, Deputy Director and Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, examines the question of “what effects have the events in the oil market since 1973 had on Middle East conflicts and the attitudes of the superpowers to those conflicts?” He argues that the impact has been more uneven and sometimes less powerful than at first thought and concludes that the oil factor has not been a determinant of Middle East policy for either superpower: “It casts a shadow, but it does not draw lines.” ✪

930. Thompson, W. Scott. “The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces.” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 157-180. ●● The author, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy when this article was written, contends that recent developments have resulted in a shift in the correlation of forces in the Soviet Union’s favor, thus weakening the West’s position in the Gulf. There are two poles to the debate over Soviet intentions in the
Gulf. While pointing out the “maximalist” position (Soviet moves are the result of a master plan), Thompson is more concerned with countering the arguments of the “minimalists” (conflicts in the Gulf result from local causes and Soviet actions are taken solely to prevent spillover into the Soviet Union). The author’s working assumption is that basic Soviet strategy is to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. He implies that the minimalists seek to downplay or “redefine” the Soviet threat to the Gulf to make it appear less dangerous and thus requiring a lesser response from the West. In contrast, Thompson argues that “If upon the Cannutelike [sic] commands of civilian strategists, the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf fails to recede, then Western forces must be adjusted upward to the threat....” The RDF, while important, should be considered as only part of the American response to the Soviet threat: “most important is the restoration of American strategic threat, to which all such events at the theater level are related....”


932. Wall, Irvin M. “The French-American War Over Iraq.” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter/Spring 2004), pp. 123-139. ●● A visiting scholar at New York University points out that since 11 September 2001 and especially because of the Iraq War, many French have been saying “that the old United States is gone, replaced by a new unilateralist United States, willing to dispense with the United Nations and ignore NATO, trying to divide a Europe that it once did so much to unify, destroying the international order that it built after World War II.” (p. 123) As a consequence, they conclude that the unity of Europe is more urgent than ever in order to provide a counter-weight to the US.

933. Yetiv, Steve A. “The Evolution of U.S.-Russian Rivalry and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 13-31. ●● An assistant professor at Old Dominion University describes the US-Russian rivalry as a continuation of “the ‘Great Game’ in modern times” (p. 14) He judges that the Iran-Iraq War had a strong impact on the rivalry and “clearly disposed Moscow to cooperate with Washington, and to take a stronger line against its ally, Iraq.” (pp. 29-30)

The United States and the Gulf

Strategic Interests and Goals

A program officer at the US Institute for Peace, describes changes in the Gulf over the past two decades and traces their impact on US foreign and security policy in the region, culminating since 1993 in the policy of “dual containment” for Iran and Iraq. He concludes that “the last two decades of U.S. policy in the Gulf have been driven by military threats. The next two decades, however, are more likely to be dominated by political challenges in the Gulf monarchies.”


The president of the National Council on US-Arab Relations provides an overview of US and GCC military arrangements to bolster security in the Gulf. He charges that “The inclination of many in the Reagan administration to downplay local initiatives in international crisis areas, and to use armed intervention when U.S. interests have appeared indirectly or potentially threatened, does not bode well for what is at stake with regard to long-term American interests in the Gulf.” (pp. 430-431)


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Atkeson, a retired US Army officer, notes that the Gulf is not comparable to Europe and Japan in strategic importance to the US and argues that Western dependence on Gulf oil is vastly overstated. The result, in his eyes, is a disharmony between national interests and the military strategy that grew out of the Carter Doctrine. Cossa, a US Air Force officer, takes issue with this point of view and declares that Atkeson has understated “The importance of the region, the nature of the Soviet threat, and the ability of the forces of the US [CENTCOM] to respond to this threat....” (p. 58)


A basic survey of US policy in the Gulf since 1971, which assumes that the reader has had no prior introduction to the subject. The author is generally critical of US policy on a number of grounds, including the overemphasis on military power, the doubtful effectiveness of the RDF, and the failure to come to grips with “Islamic fundamentalism,” seen as the area’s major threat. Bradley is concerned principally with American requirements and policy developments. He tends to downplay the importance of Gulf politics, describing the Arab Gulf states at one point as “obsolescent forces with uncertain political tenure.”

Defense during the Carter administration, currently a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, outlines potential setbacks for US interests in the Gulf and discusses the problems of building an effective security structure in the region for those interests. He contends that the overall military balance in the area is not very favorable to the US and recommends substantial additional air and sealift. In addition, Brown calls for American assistance in strengthening the political structure of the region and for movement toward a resolution of the Palestinian issue. He concludes that “It will be necessary to balance these overlapping, often conflicting factors to create the political and economic structures and military capabilities that, together, constitute a security framework, a security policy, and a security capability for the Persian Gulf region and Southwest Asia.”


941. Byman, Daniel L., and John R. Wise. *The Persian Gulf in the Coming Decade: Trends, Threats, and Opportunities*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002. ⚫ RAND Corporation analysts assess likely challenges to US interests in the Gulf over the coming decade, concentrating on the declining conventional threat from Iran and Iraq and internal threats to the GCC states. The authors suggest that the US should focus more on the risk of WMD than on conventional military threats, recognize the risk of instability in the GCC states, and understand that partners in the region may be less willing to cooperate openly with the US in the future.

942. Chadda, Maya. *Paradox of Power: The United States in Southwest Asia, 1973-1984*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1986. ⚫ A well-organized and comprehensive chronological narrative of the evolution of US policy towards the region, which the author, a professor of political science at William Paterson College, defines as stretching from Israel to the Indian subcontinent. The author contends that although the American emphasis on military options may have gained temporary advantages, it failed to build structures of enduring influence. She concludes that, by President Reagan’s second term, “The United States was learning, albeit after inflicting great cost on the nations of the region, that at best war was an extension of diplomacy; it could never be a substitute for it.” (p. 252)

Chubin, Shahram. “U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s.” *Daedalus*, Vol. 109, No. 4 (1980), pp. 31-65. The former Director of the Regional Studies Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies discusses conflicting American and Soviet interests in the Gulf and points out how Western interests can be safeguarded. Since the Soviet Union thrives on disorder, it need only cultivate neutrality to gain influence and deny Western powers access. The West, on the other hand, prefers order and the status quo, which makes for a far more difficult task of maintaining stability and protecting friendly regimes. The author maintains that military power is a necessary precondition for Western influence in the region, although he recognizes that it is not sufficient by itself. Consequently, the RDF is held to be indispensable in contributing to both the deterrence of aggression and the defense of local allies (and American military efforts should be joined by European and Turkish allies). Simultaneously, the West should pursue political strategies aimed at the amelioration, if not prevention, of sources of regional tension and conflict and then their containment and resolution.


Cordesman, Anthony H. “The ‘Oil Glut’ and the Strategic Importance of the Gulf States.” *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 121, No. 3 (October 1983), pp. 30-47. Heavily sprinkled with oil statistics, this article emphasizes that the energy crisis has not gone away but has simply taken other forms. Cordesman points out that oil is still of major importance to the US and its allies, and Saudi Arabia remains the key state. He argues that the West must remain a strong counterbalance to Soviet intrusion in the Gulf, by assisting the Gulf states in acquiring defense capabilities and by acting as an over-the-horizon insurer of US interests.

Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Gulf in Transition: US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 October 2000 (working draft). Described as a “working draft,” this massive study features a 59-page executive summary aimed at informing the next American administration. Cordesman outlines key issues that the new administration will need to address: an effective energy policy because of growing dependence on Gulf oil, redefinition of dual containment, restructuring US military capabilities in the Gulf, recognition of the impact of the Arab-Israeli arena on the Gulf. The author notes that “The US needs to recognize the demographic, economic and internal political problem sin the Southern Gulf, but the US cannot restructure the society and economies of its allies. The United States can only encourage its allies’ own efforts towards internal reform.” (p. 5)

to both regional turbulence and inappropriate policies pursued by previous administrations. The authors briefly examine Soviet-American naval competition in the Indian Ocean, Western interests in Saudi Arabia, the triangular relationship between the US, NATO, and the Gulf, and the RDF, before calling for enhanced maritime and RDF capabilities to defend US interests in the Gulf. Cottrell was Director of Maritime Policy at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) before his recent death and Moodie was associated with CSIS before his appointment as Special Assistant for Public Affairs at the US Mission to NATO.

949. Dickman, François M. “Economic Realities in the Gulf.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 7 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 50-54. The author, a former US ambassador to Kuwait, stresses the strong economic basis of the relationship between the US and the Arab states of the Gulf. The impact of the oil glut on these states is noted, and the point made that they have become increasingly concerned that their oil revenues be transformed into reproducible assets. At the same time, Dickman warns that the US should not be lulled by the oil glut into diminishing the importance of the Gulf. Instead, greater interdependence is emerging as the West continues to depend on Gulf oil and cooperation in international monetary affairs, while the Gulf states still need Western goods, services, and technology.

950. Djerejian, Edward P. “The Arc of Crisis: The Challenge to US Foreign Policy.” *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 32-33, 65-66. A former State Department official and director of the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University examines the ties between US foreign policy and Islamic movements. He notes that the official US position towards “Islam” during the Clinton administration was that Islam was not considered the next “ism” confronting the West but that the US opposed those who resort to violence and violate international standards of human rights.

951. Dunn, Michael Collins. “Five Years After Desert Storm: Security, Stability and the U.S. Presence.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 30-38. A senior analyst of the International Estimate looks at the five years following the Kuwait War in terms of Gulf security and the US presence, the question of whether Iran and Iraq continue to pose a threat, and the impact of the war on the domestic stability and future of the GCC states. He concludes that “The changes in the Gulf have been real, but limited. The US presence appears to be long-term [and] the effect of the war seems to have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” (p. 38)

of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Factors within the region are seen as either vertical in nature (which consist of the Arab-Iranian rivalry and the division between Sunnis and Shi’is) or horizontal (i.e. arising from within a littoral state). While the development of an American military response is natural, and may even help deter a Soviet thrust, “...the major challenges confronting the United States in the Gulf are regional and political in nature, not external and military.”

953. Friedland, Edward, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky. *The Great Detente Disaster: Oil and the Decline of American Foreign Policy.* New York: Basic Books, 1974. ●● A hysterical cry that “America has allowed the intolerable to become tolerable.” According to the authors, first came Vietnam, then recognition of China, the surrender at SALT I, the American-imposed defeat of Israel, and finally OPEC’s discovery that crime pays. “What can be done?” The US should cut its imports of oil at a rate of one-third per year, build up reserves and invade the Arab oil producers if necessary (and preferably under the cover of an Arab-Israeli war) to “save civilization from disaster.” Do the authors have an explanation of how civilization has managed to survive the ensuing decade since publication of this book without American “intervention” in the Gulf? ●

954. Frum, David, and Richard Perle. *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror.* New York: Random House, 2003. ●● An extremely aggressive view of what the determinants of American foreign policy should be. The arch-conservative authors, a former presidential speechwriter and a former assistant secretary of defense respectively, attack the American intelligence system for being ineffective and the State Department diplomats for being too cozy with their counterparts. The authors are hostile to the United Nations and call for France and Saudi Arabia to be treated as adversaries, rather than allies, in the war on terror.

955. Fuller, Graham E., and Ian O. Lessor. “Persian Gulf Myths.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 42-52. ●● The authors, senior political analysts at the RAND Corporation and formerly officials in the CIA and State Department respectively, examine the increasing difficulties for US foreign policy in the Gulf, noting that the greatest challenges to Gulf stability will come from within and criticizing Washington’s “dual containment” policy for its “parallel treatment of two disparate régimes that present sharply different problems calling for different solutions.” (p. 47) They warn that “the United States can judge opposition groups and successor régimes – especially Islamists – by their behavior, and it can avoid policies that make hostility toward Washington a self-fulfilling prophecy.” (p. 52)


958. Indyk, Martin. “Back to the Bazaar.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January-February 2002), pp. 75-88. A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former ambassador to Israel justifies American priorities in the Middle East over the 1990s. He holds that “the Clinton administration fashioned a bargain with America’s Arab allies that held, more or less, until September 11, 2001. Moderate Arab states would provide the US military with access to bases and facilities to help continue the ‘rogues’ and would support Washington’s efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict; in return, Washington would not exert significant pressure for domestic change.” (p. 77) The September attacks, he contends, demonstrated the weakness of the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments in confronting radical Islam, thus compromising US national security. His short-term solution is to press Saudi Arabia to persuade “all the state sponsors of terrorism in its neighborhood ... to end [their] support for terrorism and subversion....” (p. 84) and dry up sources of funding for al-Qa’idah while the US acts to “calm” the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. Longer-term strategy involves confronting the dilemma of political change in the Arab world. In the author’s view, “In the Egyptian and Saudi cases the dilemma has now been exacerbated. The United States backed their régimes and they begat al Qaeda. But insisting on political reform in Cairo and Riyadh could help bin Laden achieve his ultimate objective: toppling these régimes even after he has gone.” (p. 86) Indyk suggests that the US work with Egypt and Saudi Arabia “to promote political and economic reform — even if doing so requires them to loosen some controls and take some risks. They have to be persuaded that opening political space for the encouragement of civil society in their countries can help to legitimize their régimes rather than destabilize them.” (p. 86)

959. Jabber, Paul. “U.S. Interests and Regional Security in the Middle East.” *Daedalus*, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Fall 1980), pp. 67-80. An overview of US policy in the Middle East at the outset of the 1980s, written while the author was in the Department of Political Science at UCLA. Jabber contends that this decade began with an enunciation of new US policy providing for a major expansion of its political and military presence in the area. US interests are seen to consist of securing access to oil, assuring the survival and prosperity of Israel, promoting friendly relations and economic ties with the Arab states, and avoidance of a major regional war. Critical challenges to these interests include nationalism, Soviet expansionism, and the Palestinian issue. In addition, the author asserts that the US itself has made the fulfillment of these interests more difficult by its constant policy shifts, incorrect assessments of the nature of threats, and lack of attention to the priorities and perceptions of regional partners. Consequently, Soviet victories have been achieved, not in spite of Western regional defensive efforts but because of them. Jabber concludes that the protection of American interests in the 1980s will require mutually cooperative relations between the U. S. and the Arab countries. A necessary prerequisite for this, however, is solution of the Palestinian problem and the inclusion of the strongest and most effective Middle Eastern power, Israel, into security arrangements.

961. Jones, Clive. *Sailing Without an Anchor? Contemporary Determinants of US Policy in the Gulf*. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001. Emirates Lecture Series, No. 33. A senior lecturer on the Middle East at the University of Leeds reviews US policy towards Iran and Iraq through the early days of the George W. Bush administration and judges that dual containment “can no longer be justified by reference to the collective will of the ‘international community’” and that “Washington’s ability to redefine the means by which it seeks to ensure the security of the Gulf remains constrained by powerful domestic considerations.” (p. 23)

962. Katzman, Kenneth. “The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL30728, February 2003. A Middle East specialist at the Library of Congress’ CRS discusses US policy towards Iraq, Iran, and the GCC states, as well as the latters’ domestic stability. On the eve of a new US administration, Katzman notes that there is some prospect of Iraq breaking out of some of its international isolation, some signs that Iran may be more willing to engage in political dialogue with the United States, that succession in some of the GCC states might affect relations, and that Israel-Palestine conflict might force them to downgrade ties with the US. The paper was refashioned after the Iraq War and titled “The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003,” CRS Report RL31533, 14 July 2003. The author estimates that “Over the longer term, with Iraq no longer a major power and the United States likely to sharply reduce its Gulf presence once Iraq is stabilized, the Gulf states might try to fashion a new security architecture for the Gulf that is based more on regional states and less on the United States. On the other hand, a reduction of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf might benefit the Gulf states by easing internal opposition to close cooperation with the United States.” (Summary)

963. ________. “US Options in the Gulf: Considerations for the Next Administration.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 49-52. A senior analyst at the US Congressional Research Service looks at the security situation in the Gulf and its impact on the US. He opines that “U.S. security concerns in the Gulf defy instant ‘magic bullet’ solutions, but patient and careful calculation on the part of the United States can improve the security picture over time.” (p.52)

at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) and a staff member on the National Security Council, Kemp reviews the strategic importance of the Gulf and contends that “The Carter Doctrine does not go nearly far enough toward dealing with the overall global problem the United States faces in confronting Soviet military power.” He calls for an increase in defense spending and an expansion of US military capabilities in the Gulf region. In addition, he maintains that a viable American counter to potential Soviet intrusion requires “an infrastructure of bases extending far beyond the immediate area of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East itself,” as well as greater assistance from American allies, particularly Japan and Turkey.

965. Khalilzad, Zalmay. “The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony.” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 95-120. A RAND analyst sees the driving force behind US policy in the Gulf as being prevention of regional hegemony. He suggests as measures to promote this objectives encouraging a balance of power between Iran and Iraq, aligning strategy and objectives in Iraq, focusing on stabilizing the GCC states, promoting an Arab-Israeli peace, pressuring the G-7 to contribute its fair share, improving regional cooperation, and sustaining US power.

966. Klare, Michael. Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome”: U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981. This series of articles originally appeared in the The Nation, The Progressive, and Harper’s. Klare, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and Director of its Militarism and Disarmament Project, ties recent American policy in the Gulf to what he sees as a broader trend of US “interventionism.” In this regard, he takes issue with the “Brown Doctrine” (elevating the threat of Third World turbulence to near parity with the Soviet threat), the “Carter Doctrine” (creating the military capability to intervene in the Gulf), and the “Haig Doctrine” (using military force to insure access to scarce minerals). He regards the RDF as an army in search of a war and likely to find one—with disastrous results. Klare concludes that Washington is resurrecting an emphasis on “counter-insurgency,” in mothballs since Vietnam, through its activities in the Middle East and El Salvador.

967. Koury, Enver M., and Emile A. Nakhleh, eds., with Thomas W. Mullen. The Arabian Peninsula, Red Sea and Gulf: Strategic Considerations. Hyattsville, MD: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1979. A collection of five articles published on the eve of the Iranian revolution. Robert J. Pranger (Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute) notes that American interests in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula are set against the forces of local nationalism and Islamic traditionalism. Enver Koury (Associate Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland until his death) examines geopolitical linkages between four zones: the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean, and the Gulf. Thomas A. Pianka (then a senior fellow at the National Defense University) examines US naval policy in the Gulf and Indian Ocean, and recommends a modest US presence with a surge capability as being appropriate for the area, together with limited forward support facilities. Dale R. Tahtinen (then Assistant
Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at AEI) looks at US arms transfers to the area and contends that most security implications for the US in the region spring from its massive arming of Iran and the supplying of arms to Israel. Finally, Emile Nakhleh (Chairman of the Department of History and Political Science at Mount St. Mary’s College) examines the direction of US policy in the Gulf through four periods: 1968-1972, 1972-October 1973, October 1973-March 1975, and March 1975-1978.

968. Kuniholm, Bruce R. “The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia.” *International Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 342-361. An associate professor of history at Duke University analyzes US security policy in the Gulf and examines the divergence between the US and friendly states in the region over perception of which are the key strategic issues. He believes that relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia “will probably deteriorate over the next ten years” (p. 359) and that “The GCC ... will be effective provided that it is able to dissociate itself from the United States and gain legitimacy as a regional organization.” (p. 360)

969. Leffler, Melvyn P. “From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 245-266. The author, an assistant professor of history at Vanderbilt University, criticizes the Carter administration for over drawing parallels to the Truman era in order to justify the Carter Doctrine. “As the Truman Doctrine foreshadowed hazy concepts of national security and locked the US into indiscriminate and costly efforts to limit Soviet influence, the Carter Doctrine threatens to do likewise.” Leffler charges that the Carter administration overemphasized the threat of Soviet military power in the Gulf, instead of focusing on Soviet intentions, and magnified and distorted the Gulf’s importance in the panoply of vital American interests.

970. Lessor, Ian O. *Oil, the Persian Gulf, and Grand Strategy: Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, for the Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command Joint Staff, 1991. The author, a RAND analyst, gives the purpose of the report to “assess the role of oil and the Persian Gulf region in grand strategy, and the manner in which this role has evolved in the twentieth century.” (p. 1) To this end, he has written brief chapters explaining the grand strategic approach and its relevance to the Middle East and tracing the change in strategic perceptions from coal to oil. He concludes that “The coalition approach to oil supply security in the Gulf, which has characterized U.S. strategy from the Carter Doctrine through Operation Desert Storm, is solidly within the liberal-maritime tradition of safeguarding critical overseas sources of supply.” (p. 30) In addition, “The recent rise of potent regional actors represents a departure from the traditional strategic environment in the Gulf.” (p. 31)

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American response. He suggests that the Carter Doctrine may have been an overreaction in view of the relatively limited ability of the US to protect the Gulf militarily. Malik regards the Soviet move into Afghanistan as the first step toward the Strait of Hormuz and argues that the US should organize an effective counterforce to meet this threat.


973. Meo, Leila, ed. *U.S. Strategy in the Gulf: Intervention Against Liberation*. Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, October 1981. AAUG Monograph Series, No. 14. A collection of leftist essays attacking US policy in the Gulf, in the Middle East, and in general. Michael Parenti (a visiting fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies at the time of publication) excoriates the “interventionist” mentality of the “capitalist ruling class” in the US without discussing the Gulf. Thomas M. Ricks (a historian then at Georgetown University) discusses US military relations with Iran, with emphasis on the period of the 1940s and early 1950s, and charges that US military missions to that country effectively constituted a different kind of intervention. James F. Petras and Robert Korzeniewicz (sociologist and doctoral candidate respectively at SUNY Binghamton) contend that American policy in the Middle East is determined by its economic interests there. Michael T. Klare (a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies) concludes the volume with two short essays, one, a comparison of the planning for the RDF with similar efforts during the Kennedy administration, and the other warning of the dire consequences that could arise from the belief that the US might find it necessary to go to war to defend oil supplies from the Gulf.

974. Montgomery, Robin N. “The Questionable U.S. Strategy for the Middle East.” *National Defense*, No. 65 (May-June 1981), pp. 64-68, 196; No. 66 (July-August 1981), pp. 34-38. The author, an associate professor at Southwestern Oklahoma State University, contends that the Carter Doctrine lacks a preventive aspect, a socio-political element that would neutralize adverse trends before military force was required. “Hailed as wedded to a pre-emptive strategy, the [RDF] is actually tied to a reactive strategy. It can only wait for a propitious set of events, largely beyond its control, to beckon it ashore.” In order to establish a preventive policy, Montgomery suggests US emphasis on the modernization of Gulf states, leading to more effective security cooperation.
975. Nakhleh, Emile A. *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1982. ••• An American scholar looks at Gulf security and US policy in the region with emphasis on the view from the Arab states of the Gulf. It is Nakhleh’s thesis that US policy must be guided by the realization that it cannot control the destiny of the region, and that “it would be the height of naiveté to believe that US interests in the Gulf would ever be secure without a Palestinian homeland.” Among the integral elements of Gulf security explored by the author are the issue of political participation (with emphasis on Bahrain’s parliamentary experiment as a case study); the promise of the GCC and the attitudes toward it held by the rulers and elites of the GCC countries; the triangular relationship between the US, Israel, and the Arab world (particularly the role played by Saudi Arabia in reconciling its position regarding the Palestinians and its “special relationship” with the US; and the evolution of the relationship between the US and the GCC states over the past several decades. ✤


977. Newsom, David D. “American EnGulfed.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 43 (Summer 1981), pp. 17-32. ••• The author, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs during 1978-1981 and presently at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, criticizes the policy background to the Carter Doctrine, charging that the doctrine itself “grew out of last minute pressures for a presidential speech.” He downplays the imminence of a Soviet invasion, outlines the logic of regional states’ aversion to foreign forces, points out the severe constraints on US ability to move forces rapidly into the area, and judges that, relative to Soviet combat advantages in the Gulf, the US presence amounts to a tripwire. Newsom concludes by arguing that “a strategy that places US ground forces in the Persian Gulf should not be undertaken without a thorough national and congressional debate. That debate has yet to begin.” ✤

second edition, examines the collapse of Pahlavi Iran and its impact on the security picture. Noyes concludes that “Only a sustained and consistent US commitment will provide the Gulf states with a real alternative to Soviet hegemony.”


980. Palmer, Michael A. Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992. New York: Free Press, 1992. •• A largely descriptive survey of the United States and the Gulf by an assistant professor of history at East Carolina University. The author adopts a chronological approach, beginning in the early 19th century and continuing into the oil era. Several chapters cover the involvement of the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations, and the final chapters review the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war from the viewpoint of American foreign policy. The author advises readers that the future undoubtedly will hold “more of what Americans have witnessed and dealt with successfully over the past few decades. There will be problems and crises aplenty, but they should be manageable.” (p. 249)

981. Patrizia, Charles A. “U.S. Policy in the Arabian Gulf – A Long-Term View.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 22 (Fall 1987), pp. 45-55. •• A lawyer and former legal adviser to the US Special Negotiator for Middle East Peace suggests directions for long-term US policy in the Gulf. With regard to Iran, he suggests accepting the legitimacy of the current régime while resisting its right to overthrow neighboring governments, making American opposition to terrorism clear, and seeking a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War. On the other side of the Gulf, he recommends encouraging the GCC states to form an American-armed combined armed force.
982. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. “The Genesis of the Carter Doctrine.” In George S. Wise and Charles Issawi, eds., *Middle East Perspectives: The Next Twenty Years* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 165-180. ●● The Iranian revolution, the hostage crisis, and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the principal stimuli for the Carter Doctrine, according to the author. Ramazani argues that US policy toward the region conceptually changed in 1979 to embrace a willingness to defend a Third World region and to use force to ensure the flow of oil. He points out that “...even before the hostage crisis the American position had begun to change. The United States had started to flex its military muscle, whereas it had been reluctant to do so previously.”

983. ________. “Gulf Peace and Security: Rethinking U.S. Policy.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 3-8. ●● The author suggests that “Paradoxically, the postwar Persian Gulf could conceivably pose a greater threat to American interests in the region than prewar Gulf, while simultaneously providing greater opportunity to protect and promote those interests.” (p. 3) He advocates a rethinking of US policy in the Gulf to include: supporting a UN role, reassessing the Soviet threat, desatanizing Iran, recognizing GCC desires for a return to the old “over-the-horizon” presence, and limiting the arms race.

984. ________. “Future Security in the Persian Gulf: America’s Role.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (July-August 1991), pp. 25-30. ●● A University of Virginia professor charges that US policy has become part of the problem “mainly because of the administration’s obsession with balance of power, its wanting to keep Iraq sufficiently strong as a counterweight against revolutionary Iran” which led to the war and resulted in a “moral failure that sullied our nation’s military victory in an avoidable war.” (p. 30)

985. Reich, Bernard, and Stephen H. Gotowicki. “The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration.” In *Royal United Services Institute and Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1991* (London: Brassey’s UK, 1991), pp. 249-266. ●● A political scientist at George Washington University and a US Army officer respectively review the background to US policy vis-à-vis the Gulf and discuss recent developments. They note that “The future of the United States’ approach to the Persian Gulf as well as other policy areas will depend to a significant degree on its assessment of the Soviet Union and its intentions [and] Domestic considerations will also serve to limit America’s strategy in the Persian Gulf.” (p. 262) Their article was updated as “The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration After the Gulf War,” in *Royal United Services Institute and Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1992* (London: Brassey’s UK, 1992), pp. 145-164. They observe in the latter that “Facing major cash flow problems, a horizon free from threat, and historical timidity in foreign relations, the Saudis may have decided to follow a course that would cost them the least and allowed them to rely on American security guarantees rather than on guarantees from other Arab states.” (p. 161)

raised by Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war. The author relies heavily on personal observations and anecdotes.

Contending that the United States has managed avoided a nightmare in the Gulf, a fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies reviews the history of US interests in the region and seeks a re-evaluation of US policy. In his view, “U.S. policymakers will need to show a good understanding of Iranian and Arab politics to locate opportunities for positive change and avert potential disasters. Above all, Washington must not drive Iran into Soviet arms, while at the same time it must avoid all-out war in the region.” (p. 134)

A professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania judges that “President Bush’s triumph in the Gulf War is in danger of becoming a footnote in contemporary history, not the turning point it should be.” (p. 53) Pax Americana, he argues, is not the answer to the problem of the international system hurtling out of control. The goal of security in the Gulf is dependent, he says, on the realization that only nation-states with armies are capable of disrupting regional security (not the Palestinians or the Kurds), on the United States remaining focused on the Gulf and not Arab-Israeli questions, the United Nations Security Council must not be marginalized again, and the flow of arms to the region must be slowed.

A former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and subsequently president of AMIDEAST charges that the American policy of containment of Iran and Iraq is not achieving its objectives and makes four suggestions to improve it: ① offer amnesty to the Iraqis around Saddam Husayn to encourage his overthrow; ② ease off on economic confrontation with Iran; ③ focus on the foreign policies of Iran and Iraq, rather than internal politics; and ④ intensify diplomatic campaign to generate more cooperation from US friends and allies.

A visiting fellow at the US Naval Postgraduate School looks at the impact of post-war Iraq on Gulf security but concentrates on implications for US policy. In his view, the major concerns for the US should be assessing US interests in the Gulf, judging how much Iraq can provide a balance to Iran, determining the optimal role and configuration of the US military presence in the region, and devising the role of the region’s countries in providing for their own self-defense.

992. Singer, S. Fred. “Limits to Arab Oil Power.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 30 (Spring 1978), pp. 53-67. The author, affiliated with the University of Texas at the time of publication, contends that there are numerous misconceptions about what the Arabs can do in terms of their “oil power.” He notes that the effect of the 1973 embargo was exaggerated, although the psychological impact was considerable, and suggests that a future embargo is less likely than attacks on oil supplies by terrorists or saboteurs. Singer concludes by stressing the importance for US policymakers to realize the truly limited nature of Saudi Arabia’s ability to influence the international oil market.


995. Szaz, Z. Michael, ed. *The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon Persian Gulf and United States Security*. Washington, DC: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979. Studies on Middle East Problems. A collection of articles focusing on the way in which the revolution in Iran affected the security of the other states of the Gulf. Most of the contributions concentrate on individual countries, although Robert J. Hanks (former commander of the US Navy’s Middle East Force) provides a geopolitical survey of the region and Jesse A. Helms (Senator from North Carolina) criticizes the Carter Administration’s Middle East policy. The countries are covered by: R.K. Ramazani (University of Virginia), the Iranian revolution; Edmund Ghareeb (journalist and press advisor for the UAE Embassy), Iraq; J.E. Peterson, Kuwait and Oman; James E. Akins (former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia), Saudi Arabia; Emile Nakhleh (Mount St. Mary’s College), Bahrain; Robert G. Neumann (former US ambassador to Afghanistan and Morocco), Afghanistan; and Enver M. Koury (then at the University of Maryland), the UAE.

997. Tucker, Robert W. *The Purposes of American Power: An Essay on National Security*. New York: Praeger, 1981. A Lehrman Institute Book. The author, a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, sees two “momentous developments” affecting American security in the last decade: a military balance increasingly favorable to the Soviet Union and a steady erosion of Western power and position in the Gulf. Because of the global rivalry of the superpowers, he argues that the Soviet Union naturally can be expected to challenge the US in the Gulf and has already done so in Afghanistan. But the American decline in the region has not been due to Soviet probing but the result of a mystifying willful abandonment. The consequence has been the emergence of a power vacuum, which cannot be filled by local states. Tucker draws a parallel between Europe of 1945 and the Gulf today: if the US will not step in to defend its vital interests, then the Soviet Union will take over. What the US needs in the Gulf, Tucker contends, is both a conventional defense (to deal with all contingencies short of a determined Soviet assault, which the US cannot prevent conventionally) and a tripwire policy (to deter a Soviet attack by threatening to respond with nuclear weapons). He brands the Carter Doctrine’s failure to address other than external threats as appeasement of Gulf states “that have managed to outmaneuver and to intimidate Western powers for over a decade.” In the author’s opinion, the only way to secure access to Gulf oil is to restore American status and credibility in the Gulf, which can be accomplished only by “a visible demonstration of [American] power and the more impressive the demonstration the better.” This requires bases and if the US cannot secure them in the Gulf itself, then it should turn to Egypt and Israel on the periphery. The acquisition of bases in the northern Sinai would have no repercussions in the region, Tucker seems to feel, since the Palestinian issue has been “mistakenly” connected to Gulf security. This essay draws on the author’s articles, “The Purposes of American Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (1980-1981), pp. 241-274; and “American Power and the Persian Gulf,” *Commentary*, Vol. 70, No. 5 (November 1980), pp. 25-41.

998. ________. “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention.” *Commentary*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 21-31. Professor Tucker claims that the 1973-1974 oil crisis can be distinguished from past international crises by the absence of the meaningful threat of the use of force. He proclaims himself pessimistic about the chances of success for the recycling of oil revenues and the reduction of oil consumption – both of which have subsequently come to pass. Instead, he advocates military intervention, which he claims would be technically possible with only slight risk of Soviet counter-intervention, although the American public would have to be persuaded of the differences from Vietnam. Similar articles by Tucker


1000. ________. “U.S. Interests in the Arabian Gulf.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 21 (Summer 1987), pp. 1-14. A visiting professor at The Citadel and former State Department official reviews American regional interests in terms of commerce, finance, military, politics, and especially oil, and assesses them in light of the Iran-Iraq War. He suggests that “If the United States and the Soviet Union could merely find some areas for working constructively together to help end the Gulf war, all concerned would benefit.” (p. 14)

1001. ________. “America and the Gulf Arabs.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 25 (Summer 1988), pp. 126-156; No. 26 (Fall 1988), pp. 107-124. A visiting professor at The Citadel and the first American resident ambassador to Bahrain reflects on a quarter-century of involvement with the Gulf. He surveys the history of American diplomatic, commercial, and economic relations with the region and then traces the progress of the Gulf states through seven fat years and seven lean years. He observes that “In the late 1980s America and the Gulf Arab states are involved in one another’s welfare to a degree that would have been inconceivable half a century earlier when American oil men began to follow American missionaries into this ‘far-off land.’” (p. 123)


1005. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 
*Developments in the Middle East, October 1986*; Hearing. Washington, DC: USGPO, 
1986.

1006. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 
*Developments in the Middle East*; Hearing, 1 October 1992. Washington, DC: USGPO, 
1993.

1007. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 
*Developments in the Middle East, July 1993*; Hearing, 27 July 1993. Washington, DC: 
USGPO, 1993. 103rd Congress, 1st Session.

1008. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East. 
*U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf*; Hearings, 2 February, 7 June, 
8 and 15 August, 1972. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1972. !! These hearings, the first in a 
long line of Congressional considerations of events in the Gulf, were held in the first 
few months following British withdrawal at the end of 1971. They are focused on US 
military, economic, and diplomatic ties with the states of the region, and energy issues, 
particularly the relationship between international oil companies and the Arab members of OPEC. 
Witnesses include James H. Noyes (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near 
Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs), Herbert Hansen (Vice-President of Gulf Oil), 
Joseph J. Sisco (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), 
and Lee F. Dinsmore (former US Consul General in Dhahran). ✯

1009. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East. *U.S. Interests 
and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf*; Hearings, 2 February, 7 June, 8 and 15 August, 1972. 
Washington, DC: USGPO, 1972. ●● These hearings, the first in a long line of 
Congressional considerations of events in the Gulf, were held in the first few months 
following British withdrawal at the end of 1971. They are focused on US military, 
economic, and diplomatic ties with the states of the region, and energy issues, particularly 
the relationship between international oil companies and the Arab members of OPEC. 
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Joseph J. Sisco (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), 
and Lee F. Dinsmore (former US Consul General in Dhahran). ✯

1010. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East. *The United States 
first of a long list of committee prints on the Gulf, this report surveys trends in the 
world petroleum market, with emphasis on future US consumption, and briefly outlines 
recent developments in the Gulf and the state of US Gulf relations. It recommends that US 
relations with the Gulf states should continue to be low-key and practical, that the US 
should not try to fill the “vacuum” left in the region by British withdrawal in 1971, and that 
the function and value of the US Navy’s Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) should be 
reviewed at the highest levels of government. ✯

1011. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. 
*New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*; Hearings, 6 June, 17, 23 and 24 July, and 28 
expressions of Congressional concern about the Gulf, this set of hearings concentrates on 
considerations over the sale of US military equipment to Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia;
non-oil trade relationships between the US and the Gulf states; and the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Witnesses include Joseph J. Sisco (State Department), James H. Noyes (Department of Defense), Robert E. Hunter (Overseas Development Council), Marvin Zonis (University of Chicago), Alvin J. Cottrell (Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies), and Richard W. Cottam (University of Pittsburgh). The final session of hearings took place in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 and consequently the publication concludes with a discussion of possible measures to bring the oil embargo to an end.

1012. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *U.S. Interests in, and, Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf, 1980; Hearings, 24 March, 2 April, 5 May, 1 and 28 July, and 3 September 1980. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1980.* A lengthy series of hearings on developments in the Gulf in late 1979 and early 1980, and particularly on the meaning and ramifications of the Carter Doctrine (first enunciated in President Carter’s state of the union address of 23 January 1980 and reprinted here). The witnesses include: Harold H. Saunders (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), Robert Komer (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), James M. Montgomery (counselor, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), John J. Ruszkiewicz (retired army officer and former US military attaché in North Yemen), Marvin Zonis (University of Chicago), William B. Quandt (Brookings Institution), James S. Moose (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Energy Analysis), Joseph W. Twinam (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), Gerald A. Rosen (Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Energy Policy), and Hermann F. Eilts (Boston University, and former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Appendices include additional questions submitted to the Department of Defense, together with responses, correspondence relating to Ruszkiewicz’s testimony on US policy during the 1979 border war between the Yemens, and questions submitted to the Department of State, along with the responses.

1013. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. And U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. *U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf; Hearing, 10 May 1982. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1983.* The joint committee hearing was called to follow up on extensive correspondence between the Joint Economic Committee with the Departments of State and Defense on various elements of US economic, military, and political policies toward the Gulf. Testimony is provided by Nicholas A. Veliotes (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) and Robert H. Knickmeyer (Deputy Director, Office of Energy Producer Country Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State). The correspondence noted above, along with comments by the Congressional Research Service, is reprinted in an appendix, as are additional written questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the State Department, along with the latter’s responses.
1014. ________. Committee on International Relations. Special Subcommittee on Investigations. *The Persian Gulf 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales;* Hearings, 10, 18 and 24 June, and 29 July 1975. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1976. •• As indicated in the title, these hearings focused on the growing US military supply relationship with various Gulf states, the necessity of providing those countries with sophisticated arms, and the dangers of generating a regional arms race. Included are country-by-country tables detailing the extent of US military supplies and training programs. Testimony was given by Joseph J. Sisco (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Amos A. Jordan (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Lee H. Hamilton (Chairman of the House Special Subcommittee on Investigations), Philip J. Farley (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), and James E. Akins (US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia).


1016. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Persian Gulf Situation;* Hearing, 17 September 1981. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. •• Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in a prepared statement before the committee, outlines his conception of a “strategic consensus” in the Middle East among the US and its friends against gathering Soviet encroachment: “the United States regards the peace process and the effort to counter Soviet and regional threats as mutually reinforcing. If our friends are more secure, they will be more able to take risks for peace. If there is progress in the peace process, security cooperation will be facilitated-cooperation that is essential to deter intervention by the Soviets and their proxies.” The majority of the subsequent questioning focused on the then-proposed sale of US AWACS to Saudi Arabia, although Haig was also asked to comment on other non-Middle Eastern issues.

1017. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. *U.S. Security Interests and Policies in Southwest Asia;* Hearings, 6, 7, 20, and 27 February, and 4 and 18 March, 1980. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1980. •• The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, often overshadowed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in consideration of events and policy in the Middle East and Gulf, here took the initiative in holding an extensive series of hearings on the 1979-1980 developments in and around the Gulf and the potential impact of the Carter Doctrine. Testimony relating to American foreign policy in the region was given by Clark Clifford (former Secretary of Defense), Joseph J. Sisco (Chancellor, American University, and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), John P. Richardson (National Association of Arab Americans), Ray Cline (Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies), and David D. Newsom (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs). Witnesses on regional aspects of US-Soviet relations were George F. Kennan (former US ambassador to the Soviet Union) and Helmut Sonnenfeldt (former counselor in the Department of State), and John C. Sawhill (Deputy Secretary of Energy) spoke on


1019. Van Hollen, Christopher. “Don’t Engulf the Gulf.” *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 59, No. 5 (1981), pp. 1064-1078. A former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (who is presently Director of the American Institute for Islamic Affairs) assesses the policies of the then five-month-old Reagan administration and suggests that the logic behind them remains obscure. Even more, Van Hollen claims that “the policies themselves are contradictory and self-defeating; unless modified, they won’t work.” Instead, he urges less preoccupation with the Soviets and the projection of military power coupled with a more flexible and pragmatic approach based on regional needs. In short, “a ‘laid-back’ rather than a forward military posture will better serve the interests of the United States.”

1020. Vernant, Jacques. “L’Occident et la sécurité du Golfe.” *Défense Nationale,* Vol. 37 (May 1981), pp. 135-141. A historical overview of the problem of Gulf security and unsuccessful Western attempts to create defense policies for the region. Vernant maintains that these schemes failed because they ignored the sensitivities of and the domestic and regional constraints on the rulers of the Gulf states. He also contends that the US continues to firmly believe that bases are needed to counter Soviet expansionism and maintain peace, despite the hostility of Arab states to a permanent US presence.

1021. Walker, Martin. “The U.S. and the Persian Gulf Crisis.” *World Policy Journal,* Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 791-799. A correspondent for the *Guardian* (London) comments on the American search for a new role in the post-Cold War (but pre-Kuwait War) era. He notes that Saddam Husayn “has chosen the precise moment – after the Soviet retreat but before the Pentagon budget cuts – when the US military machine was at the peak of its ability to impose its strategic will upon an uncertain future. The United States is using this last chance to establish strategic bridgeheads, secure the Gulf, and ensure that it retains a virtual monopoly on global violence.” (p. 796)

fostering economic development. The group concludes that “An American policy which more actively promotes political change in Kuwait or Iraq might well cause unease in neighboring states...” but “it is extremely difficult to restore the status quo ante; and ... the attempt to do so may well be fraught with greater risks than a policy of accommodating ... the new political forces unleashed by the Gulf crisis.” (p. 52)

1023. Wilson, Desmond P. *The Persian Gulf and the National Interest*. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1982. ●● A short, superficial paper arguing that the importance of Gulf oil has not been diminished because of the oil glut. Consequently, the Carter Doctrine was justified in declaring the Gulf to be a region of vital interest to the US. ✍

1024. Wolfe, Ronald G., ed. *The United States, Arabia, and the Gulf*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1980. CCAS Studies in Arab-American Relations. ●● A collection of papers from the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) fifth annual symposium, held in April 1980. The first section looks at social and political conditions in the region, with contributions by Ahmad Bahaeddine (then editor of Kuwait’s al-‘Arabi) on political dynamics, Yousuf al-Shirawi (Bahrain’s Minister of Development and Industry) on the impact of development, and Asad Abdul-Rahman (Kuwait University) on the Palestinians in Kuwait. Then Ibrahim M. Oweiss (Georgetown University) examines economic integration in the Gulf and Thomas Stauffer (Harvard University) assesses the political uses of Arab oil. The late Charles W. Yost (who had a distinguished career in the US State Department) introduces the last part on international political and strategic dimensions, focusing on the superpower rivalry on the Gulf. Hussein Sirriyeh (a doctoral candidate at Oxford University) discusses the background to US policy in the Gulf and Marmaduke G. Bayne (a former commander of US Naval Forces in the Middle East) outlines US strategic planning there. In addition, David D. Newsom (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs at the time of publication) and William J. Porter (former US ambassador to several Arab states) critique current US policy in the region. ✍

1025. Yetiv, Steve A. *America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. ●● A political scientist at Old Dominion University seeks to show “how regional conflict, through its impact on the Middle East and on world politics, affected U.S. security and power in the Persian Gulf region.” (p. 3) He concludes that Iraq, Iran, and the Soviet Union, by using force, “closed off certain paths in the historical process that if chartered might have benefited their welfare significantly,” “missed opportunities to undermine U.S. regional security and to strengthen their own position,” and figured prominently “in the rise of U.S. power and standing.” (p. 138)

1026. __________. “U.S. Security in the Persian Gulf: Planning for the Future.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 30-38. ●● A fellow at Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies argues that the US must develop a long-term strategy in the Gulf no matter what happens with Iraq. He advances a three-tiered strategy based on a UN
peacekeeping force, an Arab-Islamic force (including the GCC, Egypt, and Pakistan), and a back-up role played by the US to ensure against major attack.

1027. Zartman, I. William. “The Power of American Purposes.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 163-177. The author, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, responds to the assertion that US power in the Middle East has declined dramatically. Zartman argues that military means need political backing, and that the US objective should be working towards cooperation in the region rather than towards military bases and intervention. He points out that a greater military presence in the area would not have prevented such recent developments as the Soviet-Syrian friendship treaty, the Soviet Union’s entry into Afghanistan, or the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, he asserts that security concerns are best served by reducing the threat of conflict, rather than preparing for a military response to it.

1028. Zunes, Stephen. *Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press; London: Zed Books, 2003. An associate professor of politics at the University of San Francisco examines the role of US Middle East policy in contributing to terrorism, including the rise of al-Qa’idah. He charges that elements in the George W. Bush administration are using recent events to advance their right-wing ideological agenda and he calls instead for more effort to address the root causes of terrorism. The US, he avers, should do more to coordinate its policy with Europe, and work harder to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much of his material is drawn from previously published articles.

The Attacks of 11 September 2001, al-Qa’idah, and the Gulf


1030. AbuKhalil, As’ad. *Bin Laden, Islam, and America’s New “War on Terrorism”*. New York, Seven Stories Press, 2002. A short book by an associate professor of political science at California State University at Stanislaus dealing with the aftermath of 11 September 2001. The author discusses Western prejudice against Islam, the deterioration of US policy in the Middle East and Islamic world prior to 11 September, a background to Afghanistan’s politics, background to Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, an explanation of the rise of Usamah bin Ladin, and a critical view of America’s war against terrorism. He asks whether “there could have been a wiser and more prudent response to the September 11 attacks. It may
find that its military war cannot eradicate the desperate conditions which spawn terrorism; very likely, its war will only serve to produce more violence, on all sides.” (p. 97)


1035. Byman, Daniel L. “Phase Three in the War on Terror?” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 28 August 2003. Middle East Memo, No. 2. •• After the campaigns against al-Qa‘idah and the Taliban and against Saddam’s Iraq, there is speculation about the Bush administration's intentions of a third front in its “war against terror.” The author speculates that this could involve seeking régime change in Iran or Syria, or significant changes within the régimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. But he points out that such a strategy will prove far more difficult and that the régimes in Riyadh and Islamabad “are far more pro-American and hostile to radicals than any likely alternative. Their cooperation has proven vital to the many successes against al-Qa‘ida so far.” He reminds the reader that that the US is overstretched militarily and politically after its Iraq campaign and the operations against al-Qa‘idah remain far from finished.


1038. Chossudovsky, Michel. “Who Is Osama Bin Laden?” *Global Dialogue*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Autumn 2001), downloaded from <http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109C.html>. A quick-reaction article from the day after the 11 September attacks by a professor of economics at Ottawa University. The article says little about Usamah bin Ladin, focusing instead on the relationship between the United States government and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), alleging that US support for Islamic opposition to the Soviets in Afghanistan – and later the Taliban government – was funded by the CIA and ISI.

1039. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RS21529, 23 May 2003. A terrorism specialist at CRS summarizes reports on the status of al-Qa’ida after the 12 May 2003 terrorist attack in Riyadh. She concludes that “While the long term trajectory is very difficult to assess, for the time being it seems that Al Qaeda (or its successors) has emerged from a period of inactivity and remains a very serious threat, requiring concentrated attention and vigorous countermeasures on the part of its prospective targets.” (p. 6)

1040. Doran, Michael. “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al Qaida: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 177-190. An assistant professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University examines the pragmatism of Usamah bin Ladin’s strategy and concludes that al-Qa’ida’s defeat “appears as but one in a series of Middle Eastern military miscalculations that includes, among others, the Egyptian remilitarization of the Sinai in June 1967 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. ... [T]his kind of military disaster occurs with relative frequency in the Middle East as a consequence of the complex balance of power in the region. Fanaticism, therefore, played no role in al Qaeda’s miscalculation.” (p. 177)

1041. Dunn, Michael Collins. “Usama Bin Laden: The Nature of the Challenge.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October 1998), pp. 23-28. The editor of the Estimate analyzes the fallout of the US attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the bombings of the two US embassies in East Africa. He concludes that “The desire to strike at Bin Laden is an understandable one, but the response delivered seems to have alienated some US friends without doing any permanent damage to Bin Laden. Whether that is the best means to preventing future terrorist attacks is debatable.” (p. 27)


1043. Eickelman, Dale F. “Bin Laden, the Arab ‘street,’ and the Middle East’s Democracy Deficit.” *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 651 (January 2002), pp. 36-39. A professor of anthropology and human relations at Dartmouth College reworks a short article published earlier in the *Daily Telegraph* (London) to illuminate the propaganda skills shown by al-Qa’ida in appealing to the Arab masses. The author advises that “We must recognize that the best way to mitigate the continuing threat of terrorism is to encourage Middle Eastern
states to be more responsive to participatory demands, and to aid local nongovernmental organizations working toward this goal.” (p. 39) Another version of this article appeared as “The Arab ‘Street’ and the Middle East’s Democracy Deficit” in the Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 39-48.


1045. Furnish, Timothy R. “Bin Ladin: The Man Who Would Be Mahdi.” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 53-59. ●● A historian at Georgia Perimeter College speculates on the possibility that Usamah bin Ladin might declare himself either caliph or Mahdi, thus acting upon the “apparent yearning among many contemporary Muslims for a divinely guided leader to direct the present Islamic revival.” (p. 53)


1047. Hashim, Ahmed S. “The World According to Usama Bin Laden.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 11-35. ●● An associate professor of strategic studies at the US Naval War College seeks to explain the political, social, and cultural context behind Usamah bin Ladin, as well as his personal background and radicalization. He cautions that “It is not, however, in the interest of the West to view this as a clash of Western and Muslim civilizations...” (p. 29), since this would only strengthen bin Ladin’s hand and it would have negative impact on Western societies due to the presence of large numbers of Muslims.


1058. Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003), pp. 343-361. An associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago examines 187 acts of suicide terrorism since 1980 and 2001. He argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, “suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic ... to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support, or both.” (p. 344) He believes that all attacks were carried out against modern liberal democracies and counsels that “States that face persistent suicide terrorism should recognize that neither offensive military action nor concessions alone are likely to do much good and should invest significant resources in border defenses and other means of homeland security.” (p. 344)


1062. US. Congress. House of Representatives. Select Committee on Intelligence. And US. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. *Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*. Washington: USGPO, December 2002. An exhaustive compilation of information regarding to the organization and execution of al-Qa’idah’s hijacking of the four airliners on 11 September and their use in attacking the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. The report examines the shortcomings in US security arrangements that allowed the attacks to be carried out successfully. It concludes that “While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. [Furthermore,] the Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have been established.” (p. xi) The report was declassified from “Top Secret” but there are many security deletions and the committees note the refusal of the executive branch to release many documents.

**Bilateral Relations with Gulf States**

**Dual Containment Policy**

1063. Ben-Meir, Alon. “The Dual Containment Policy Is No Longer Viable.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 58-71. “The US policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq has run its course,” judges a professor at the New School for Social Research. (p. 58) His advice to the Clinton Administration is to adopt new measures in addition to the UN sanctions against Iraq and to switch to a policy of engagement with Iran. The new measures he advocates include organizing the leadership of Iraqi exile groups, creating a government-in-exile, and pursue improved opportunities for covert action to overthrow Saddam Husayn, in conjunction with European and Arab allies.

administration’s containment policy had led to the rebuilding of relations with Iraq before the Bush administration appeared on the scene. She places the blame for this with the Clinton administration’s almost exclusive reliance on military-to-military relations. Bronson points out that the “force posture of the United States heavily depends on these countries, and their location makes them crucial to all future plans in the region. But at the same time, their deep structural problems, burgeoning populations, unpredictable economic growth rates, an unstable oil market, domestic debt, outdated education practices, and immense expatriate labor populations are becoming impossible to ignore and could undermine close security relations” (p. 194) The consequences of not addressing these concerns, she concludes, could be revolutionary change or continued fracturing of the Desert Storm coalition with increasing constraints on US action.

1065. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy. “Differentiated Containment.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 20-30. • • • The authors, two former Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and a former ambassador (Murphy), report on a Council on Foreign Relations task force on security in the Gulf. They assert that the Clinton administration’s strategy of “dual containment” for Iraq and Iran was “more a slogan than a strategy ... and the policy may not be sustainable for much longer [because it] lacks strategic viability and carries a high financial and diplomatic cost.” (p. 20) They advocate a more nuanced approach and “creative tradeoffs, such as the relaxation of opposition to the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for rigid and comprehensive inspection and control procedures.” (p. 29)

1066. Clawson, Patrick. “The Continuing Logic of Dual Containment.” Survival, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 33-47. • • • The Director of Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy contends that the dual containment policy “offers an excellent way for the West to deter external aggression until rogue regimes no longer pose a threat....” (p. 33) He argues that the policy is better than the alternatives, that it provides effective pressure against fragile “rogue” régimes, and that it deters Iran and Iraq from external aggression, and that the obstacles of either country in arming itself has saved them money. He dismisses the impact of sanctions on the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and ascribes allied disagreement over the sanctions régime to the failure of the US government to explain the security rationale behind the sanctions well. He concludes that weakened containment of Iran would work to Saddam Husayn’s advantage and suggests that the US government should carry out its policy without regard to any coalition if necessary.

thinking on the region, and Rugh (AMIDEAST) provides some suggestions for improving achievement of US goals in the region.

1068. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “The Illogic of Dual Containment.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 56-66. ●● A highly critical assessment of the Clinton administration policy towards Iraq and Iran. The author charges that “The dual containment policy is shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistencies and is based on faulty geopolitical premises. It is hard to see how either Iraq or Iran could be contained ... without the cooperation of its hostile counterpart. American allies in the region and elsewhere have shown no enthusiasm for dual containment, making its implementation highly problematic. Dual containment offers no guidelines for dealing with change in the Gulf, and it ties American policy to an inherently unstable regional status quo.” (pp. 56-57) This article is a response to the preceding article in the same issue by Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” pp. 45-55.


1070. Katzman, Kenneth, Richard Murphy, Fraser Cameron, Robert Litwak, Gary Sick, and Thomas Stauffer. “The End of Containment: Iraq, Iran, and Smart Sanctions.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 71-88. ●● Edited transcript of a Middle East Policy symposium. Katzman (Library of Congress) contends that “what is needed are creative ways to persuade Iran to enter into dialogue rather than creative thinking about smart sanctions.” (p. 74) Murphy (Council on Foreign Relations) notes that “Iran’s own mismanagement may well have done as much or more damage to its economy than our actions, but we’ve succeeded in hurting the Iranian economy.” (p. 76) Cameron (Delegation of the European Commission) reiterates Europe’s emphasis on dialogue with Iran, rather than ILSA (the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act). Litwak (Woodrow Wilson Center) cautions that “It will be difficult to break out of dual containment and to pursue differentiated approaches towards these countries as long as the rogue-state policy remains part of the U.S. foreign-poliy lexicon.” (p. 82) Sick (Columbia University) notes that the traditional view of the Gulf as a triangle (Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf states) must now include the US as a permanent major player. Stauffer (international energy consultant) points out that containment is inconsistently applied (Iraq and Pakistan have been sanctioned but Israel and India have been indulged) and discusses the policy’s economic costs to the US.

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1072. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “The Illogic of Dual Containment.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 56-66. These two articles present opposing opinions on the value of the Clinton administration’s announced policy vis-à-vis Iraq and Iran. The author, an Assistant to the (US) President for National Security Affairs, argues that US policy “must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values.” (p. 45) These outlaws are comprised of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Lake alludes to George Kennan’s classic enunciation in 1947 of an American policy of “containment” of the Communist world in claiming a logic of “dual containment” whereby the US, rather than building up one to counter the other, would establish a balance of power in the Gulf without depending on either Iraq or Iran. On the other hand, Gause is highly critical, charging that “The dual containment policy is shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistences and is based on faulty geopolitical premises. It is hard to see how either Iraq or Iran could be contained ... without the cooperation of its hostile counterpart. American allies in the region and elsewhere have shown no enthusiasm for dual containment, making its implementation highly problematic. Dual containment offers no guidelines for dealing with change in the Gulf, and it ties American policy to an inherently unstable regional status quo.” (pp. 56-57)

1073. Lichtblau, John H. “Dual Containment.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (May - June 1999), pp. 57-58. The chairman of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation argues that “Over the long term, there is a compelling interest in normalizing relations with both Iran and Iraq [particularly because of their oil reserves but] In the short term, there will probably be a continuation of the ongoing military and political confrontation....” (p. 58) The same issue provides opposing viewpoints on the effectiveness of US sanctions against Iran: California congressman Howard L. Berman claims they are working while the CEO of Conoco, Archie W. Dunham believes they are hurting American interests.

1074. Noyes, James H. “Fallacies, Smoke and Pipe Dreams: Forcing Change in Iran and Iraq.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (June 2000), pp. 28-50. A former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs notes the Clinton Administration’s goals of preventing Iran’s acquisition or development of WMD, support for terrorism, and opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its goal of engineering regime change in Iraq. He observes that “current U.S. policy has created an illusory option suggesting our ability to solve the problem by helping Iraq’s exiled opposition oust Saddam” and that “It is time to begin lowering the profile of Iranian-U.S. alienation.” (p. 47)
Pelletière, Stephen C. *Landpower and Dual Containment: Rethinking America's Policy in the Gulf*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1999. A Middle East specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute points out that the US policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran “is over 5 years old. This is too long for America to be focused on two states that really should not be of such great importance to it.” (p. 1) Furthermore, contends that it has failed because it has not respected the principle of power-balancing, as George Kennan applied the concept of containment to the Cold War. He advocates removing the sanctions on Iraq and Iran, scrapping the no-fly zones over Iraq, and allowing the balance of power to come into play. Since oil is so important to the US, it should devote its efforts to safeguarding sources in the Gulf by establishing bases or – if that is impossible, it should undertake a robust program of military exercises and other contacts in friendly Gulf states. In the end, protecting American interests in the Gulf will require the insertion of American land forces.

Sajjadpour, Seyed Mohammad Kazem. “The Policy of Dual Containment in Theory and Practice.” *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 104-118. A look at the political, academic, and bureaucratic origins of the American dual-containment policy which concludes by stating that “If the intention is the same as the containment practiced against the Soviets during the Cold War, then the policy of dual containment is blatantly in contradiction to the interests of our country. Hence, a more detailed understanding of this policy is a strategic necessity.” (pp. 115-116)

Sick, Gary G. “Rethinking Dual Containment.” *Survival*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-32. An adjunct professor at Columbia University contends that “The US dual-containment policy has failed to produce its intended result in either Iran or Iraq. ... With regard to Iran, the policy eventually lost sight of its objectives and became an end in itself. In Iraq, the policy has thus far failed to produce the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.” (p. 25) He concludes that “The comfortable status quo of 1993 is not sustainable, and US efforts to institutionalise it with the dual-containment policy have created a looming crisis with many of its closest allies.” (p. 26)

Weitz, Richard. “After Dual Containment: U.S. Policy in a Changing Gulf.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 30-38. A research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses poses the question of what the security situation would look like should Iraq and Iran both moderate their policies, thus ending the need for dual containment. Noting that the US would still face serious security challenges in the Gulf, Weitz suggests that the curtailing of WMD proliferation should hold priority over promoting democratization and that the US should try to minimize its military presence in the Gulf.

question of the future of Iraq and Iran after Arab-Israeli peace in the context of requirements for a change of perspectives in Arab-Muslim relations. Carpenter (Cato Institute) holds that dual containment is “in my view, one of the most impractical, illogical policies ever adopted by a great power.” (p. 7) Peck (former US diplomat in Iraq) poses the question of “how the concept of dual containment will advance our interests in an area we consider to be strategically significant if we have absolutely nothing to do with two of the most important countries there.” (p. 10) Fuller (RAND Corporation) attacks the use of the term “rogue states” and suggests that the emotional support that Saddam Husayn enjoys in many parts of the world may derive from a failure of American policy.

Iran

1080. Alikhani, Hossein. Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. ●● The head of the Centre for World Dialogue in Cyprus notes that “In the decades since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States has tried to isolate Iran diplomatically, militarily and economically, relying on wide-ranging unilateral sanctions and export controls. ... Following the release of the hostages [in the US Embassy in Tehran], the United States’ objectives in using sanction tools were to alter what it regarded as the unacceptable political and military behaviour of Iran.” (p. 23) A final chapter listing the 19 US statutes which form the legal basis of American sanctions is subtitled “a policy defying logic” and the author concludes that “nearly all existing sanctions against Iran have been motivated by domestic political considerations – the accommodation of the interests of the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States.” (p. 402)

1081. Amuzegar, Jahangir. “Adjusting to Sanctions.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 31-41. ●● An examination of the US sanctions imposed against the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Supporters of the policy claim that the cost to Iran has been immense, even greater than expected; critics dismiss the policy as self-defeating and divisive. What is certain, however, is that the economic, psychological, and political impact of the American sanctions has not produced the anticipated results or transformed the régime.” (p. 31) The author suggests that, “Assuming that Iran’s territorial integrity and political independence are in the United States’ own long-term national interests, a change in the containment policy may be a reasonable insurance premium.” (p. 41) This might consist of reactivation of a dialogue along the lines of reciprocal response, with offenses dealt with on a quid pro quo basis without jeopardizing the overall dialogue.

1082. Askari, Hossein. “It’s Time to Make Peace with Iran.” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 72 (January-February 1994), pp. 50-52ff. ●● A professor of international finance at George Washington University looks at recent political and economic developments in Iran and argues that “By continuing to insist on Iran’s isolation, we indulge in a pointless vengefulness, endanger our geopolitical interests, and waste business opportunities as great as any in the developing world.” (p. 63)
1083. Bernstein, Alvin H. “Iran’s Low-Intensity War Against the United States.” *Orbis*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 149-167. The chairman of the Strategy Department at the US Naval War College charges that “Waging a successful war against the United States, Iran has all but driven an American presence from Lebanon.” (p. 149) He claims it is not state-sponsored terrorism but low-intensity war and calls for an aggressive American strategy to counter it.


1086. ________. “Iran and the United States: A Clash of Hegemonies.” *Middle East Report*, No. 212 (Fall 1999), pp. 44-46. A professor of government at the College of William and Mary traces the continuing antagonism between the US and Iran to the conflict in interests between a global hegemon and a regional hegemon. He sees US-Iran détente as inevitable but “it will require the global hegemon to communicate diplomatically with the regional hegemon as a sovereign, independent member of the community of nations and not as a client state. For its part, the regional hegemon, Iran, will have to rein in its revolutionary rhetoric and its extremist activities at home and abroad.” (p. 46)

1087. Carswell, Robert. “Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (1981-1982), pp. 247-265. A New York lawyer observes that the economic sanctions imposed by the US apparently succeeded in forcing a resolution of the hostage crisis. Carswell examines the ramifications of blocking Iran’s $12 billion in US-held assets and describes how American allies, under US pressure, took part in the sanctions. He also reviews the negotiations which led to the release of the frozen assets. Carswell affirms that these sanctions were notable because they were effective and short-lived, in contrast to
earlier efforts. However, he believes that unilateral economic sanctions should be considered as a last resort and imposed only after other forms of multilateral cooperation have proven unsuccessful in resolving a crisis. 

1088. Chubin, Shahram, and Jerrold D. Green. “Engaging Iran: A U.S. Strategy.” *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 153-169. ⬤ Chubin (Geneva Center for Security Policy) and Green (Rand Corporation) lay out a strategy for the US to engage, rather than confront, Iran. They conclude that after Khatami’s election, “The US has every reason to encourage the new and more civil atmosphere characterising exchanges between the two countries. On the other side, the US has to ensure that atmospherics do not substitute for substance, that concessions are reciprocated and not pocketed.” (p. 167)

1089. Clawson, Patrick. *U.S. Sanctions on Iran*. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997. The Emirates Occasional Papers, No. 8. ⬤ A research professor at the National Defense University examines the background to and impact of Washington’s US sanctions policy. He notes that many outside the US government have harshly criticized the sanctions, instead favoring dialogue to bring Iran back into the international community. The author believes “that not only will sanctions be maintained for the indefinite future, but Iran as well will not change any of its policies.” (p. 7)

1090. Cottam, Richard W. *Khomeini, the Future, and US Options*. Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, 1987. Policy Paper No. 38. ⬤ A professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh concludes that “US policy not only can have a significant impact on political succession in Iran but probably will have such an impact even if the present ambivalence prevails. The Iranian government sees the United States as initiating conspiracies against it ... and its most dangerous opponent. But it has demonstrated as well a willingness to enter into a relationship....” (p. 38)

1091. Cottam, Richard, David Schoenbaum, Shahram Chubin, Theodore H. Moran, and Richard A. Falk. “The United States and Iran’s Revolution.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 34 (1979), pp. 3-34. ⬤ An early discussion of the impact of the Iranian revolution on the US. Cottam (the University of Pittsburgh) traces the historical background of the revolution, with emphasis on the growth of anti-Americanism. Schoenbaum (the University of Iowa) notes the failure of the Carter Administration, Congress, and the press to anticipate the revolution, emphasizing that flawed perceptions were grounded in dubious policy. Chubin (then at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) discusses the personal role of the Shah in the development of modern Iran and explains why Iran’s close relationship with foreign powers alienated most of the population. Moran (Georgetown University) looks at the revolution’s effect on oil flows and the consequences for the Iranian economy. Falk (Princeton University) criticizes the American role in Iran and its reaction to the revolution: “Washington has managed always to stay several steps behind events on the ground, thus appearing as clumsy and hamhanded as it has Machiavellian.”
1092. Cottrell, Alvin J., and Robert J. Hanks. “The Strategic Tremors of Upheaval in Iran.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 50-56. ●● A look at the strategic implications of the Iranian revolution, published immediately after the fall of the Shah. The authors contend that the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty seriously undermined US policy and interests in the area and suggest three options for the future: total reliance on Saudi Arabia to safeguard US interests in the Gulf; promotion of a regional security alliance among pro-Western Gulf states; and a “go-it-alone” strategy assigning the U.S. primary responsibility for protecting Western security interests in the Gulf.

1093. Earl, Robert L. “A Matter of Principle.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 109, No. 2 (February 1983), pp. 29-36. ●● A Marine Corps officer criticizes the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission by comparing planning for the mission with “the ten generally accepted principles of war.” He contends that a number of weaknesses in the plan may have contributed to its failure: inadequate and ineffective command and control; a lack of drive and determination in the leadership during the execution phase; excessive emphasis on operational security; concentration on a short-term emergency rescue to the detriment of a possible long-term, deliberate rescue; underestimation of the benefits of organizing and training the units involved as a team; and approval of a minimalist rescue plan rather than a bolder hostage situation-resolving plan, thus reducing the chances for a successful raid.

1094. Hajjar, Sami G. “Framing a Rogue: U.S.-Iran relations in the Gulf.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Fall 1997), pp. 19-28. ●● A professor at the US Army War College cautions the Clinton administration that it should act to reduce the probability of military confrontation between the US and Iran as a result of the Khubar Towers bombing of 1996. He suggests that Washington’s hard-line policy should be replaced by an incremental process of accommodation.

1095. Hersh, Seymour M. “The Iran Game: How Will Tehran’s Nuclear Ambitions Affect Our Budding Partnership?” *New Yorker* (3 December 2001), pp. 42ff. ●● An examination of Iran’s role in assisting the United States in its fight against al-Qa’idah, but with emphasis on Israel’s opposition because of allegations of Iranian efforts to produce nuclear weaponry.

1096. Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief IB93033, 26 June 2003. ●● A CRS foreign affairs analyst looks at Iran’s WMD capabilities, strategic capabilities (including WMD), the country's foreign policy and involvement in terrorism, human rights concerns, and issues in US-Iranian relations, particularly with regard to economic sanctions. The author notes that “Iran was also quietly helpful in the US effort to oust Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003, although Iran reportedly is supporting Shiite Islamic factions there that could greatly boost Iran’s influence in post-war Iraq. Some Al Qaeda activists are reportedly in Iran as well, although their relationship with the regime, if any, is unclear.
The Bush Administration has warned Iran not to meddle in Iraq, to expel any Al Qaeda in Iran, and to curb its nuclear program, but the Administration has sought to dampen speculation that the United States might take major military action against Iran to change its regime.” (Summary)

1097. Kemp, Geoffrey. Forever Enemies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. ●● A view of US-Iranian relations following the Kuwait War by a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Much of the short volume is taken up by domestic developments in Iran and Tehran’s relations with its neighbors, other regional states in South and Central Asia, and a review of Iran’s military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction, and support of terrorism. A note on the Salman Rushdie fatwa is also included, along with a number of recommendations for US policy. The author suggests that, “while the United States should support some sort of constructive engagement with Iran, the prospects for an early dialogue are slim [and thus] a dialogue should be regarded as the beginning of a long process to restore normalcy to relations between two countries too important to ignore each other.” (p. 78)

1098. ________. America and Iran: Road Maps and Realism. Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2000. ●● A senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace examines the history of US-Iranian relations, Iran’s domestic problems and relations with its neighbors, and assesses the security danger it poses. Following his recommendations for US policy, the author concludes that “while the United States should support some sort of constructive engagement with Iran, the prospects for an early dialogue are slim. Indeed, to change Iranian behavior to the point where its leaders will see that such a dialogue is in their interests will require the close cooperation of allies and may mean intensified economic and political pressures on the Teheran régime.” (p. 79)

1099. ________. “Iran: Can the United States Do a Deal?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 109-124. ●● The director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center points out that Iran is the only country in the world that refuses to have formal contact with US officials and, until this obstacle is overcome, “it is difficult to see how several ‘red button’ issues that bedevil the US-Iranian relationship can be addressed, let alone resolved.” (p. 109) He identifies these “red button” issues as: historic grievances, terrorism, the US military presence in the Gulf, Iran’s weapons programs, Iran’s opposition to Israel and the peace process, and US energy sanctions on Iran.

1100. Khalilzad, Zalmay. “The United States and Iran: Beyond Containment.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 6, No. 6 (November–December 1989), pp. 3-10. ●● A RAND Corporation political scientist and former US government official contends that “For much of the past ten years, Iran’s relations with the West – especially the United States – have been abnormal and hostile. Both the scope and the extent of the hostility have been surprising because Iran and the West have many common interests.” (p. 3) He argues that steps should be taken on both
sides to normalize relations. For Iran, this would mean forcing Hizbullah to release American hostages in Lebanon while the US should end all sanctions against Iran directly related to the Iran-Iraq War.

1101. Kurzman, Charles. “Soft on Satan: Challenges for Iranian-US Relations.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 1998), pp. 63-72. An assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) argues that the improvement of US relations with Iran is undermined by continuing hostile rhetoric, regarding negotiations as a way to alter Iranian policy or overthrow the regime, and refusing to negotiate with Iranian hardliners. “Unless Khatami or the U.S. administration is able to involve the Iranian isolationists in the currently proposed negotiations, we may well witness another [American-Iranian] crisis.” (p. 63)

1102. Laipson, Ellen, Gary Sick, and Richard Cottam. “US Policy Towards Iran: From Containment to Relentless Pursuit?” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 4, Nos. 1 and 2 (September 1995), pp. 1-21. Edited transcript of a Middle East Policy Council meeting in May 1995 on the impact of the Clinton Administration’s tightening of trade relations with Iran, with contributions by the director of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (Laipson), a former NSC member and adjunct professor at Columbia University (Sick), and a professor emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh (Cottam).

1103. Ledeen, Michael, and William Lewis. *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran*. New York: Knopf, 1981. A detailed account of the unravelling of American policy in Iran along with the Pahlavi regime. There is more than a hint that the emergence of this “foreign policy failure” at the time of the Carter Administration was not entirely coincidental: “The wandering Shah was symbolic of the lack of clear direction from Washington that characterized the entire American debacle in Iran... “ This book is expanded from the authors' “Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside Story,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1980), pp. 3-40.

1104. Lissakers, Karin. “Money and Manipulation.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 44 (Fall 1981), pp. 107-126. A former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff contends that the freezing of Iranian assets by the US in 1980 amounted to a recognition that oil money could be used as a weapon. The author maintains that the major reason for the freeze was to prevent Iranian disruption of financial markets, not to retaliate for the seizure of the hostages.

1105. Ostrich, Ralph. “U.S. Policy Initiatives in Post-Khomeini Iran: Toward a New Course in U.S.-Iranian Relations.” *Global Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1987), pp. 119-134. A staff member at the BDM Corporation speculates on how the imminent departure of Ayatollah Khomeini will affect US relations with any successor regime. He maintains that, although the US cannot influence future events in Iran, it can provide essential and military assistance. He divides possible policy into political-diplomatic, military, economic, and
“quiet” initiatives, and he defends his activist approach by declaring that “American public opinion will readily accept the cost of easing tensions in the Gulf and ensuring a more moderate and democratic Iran.” (p. 134)

1106. Pranger, Robert J., and Dale R. Tahtinen. “American Policy Options in Iran and the Persian Gulf.” *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979), pp. 1-29. Written as Iran was engulfed in revolution, this study looks at the history of US policy in Iran, weighs the possible impact on that country of various conflicts around the Gulf, assesses the state of Iran’s defense organization, reviews US defense commitments and involvement in Iran, and suggests a series of options for future US policy. The authors, both at the American Enterprise Institute at the time of publication, recommended compensating for the shift in Iran by drawing closer to Saudi Arabia through a defense alliance and/or a direct military presence. They also foresee a possible Iranian move toward an extreme position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and counsel the US to develop an initiative encompassing the shared interests of Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, as well as avoid direct military intervention and alliance with Israel for access to the Gulf.

1107. Rafizadeh, Mansur. *Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran*. New York: William Morrow, 1987. The memoirs of the head of SAVAK, the Iranian secret police, in the United States for nearly 20 years and, at the same time, a CIA agent. It is a critical account of the Shah’s rule, with much gossip which the author says he relayed regularly to the CIA.

1108. Ramazani, R.K. *The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence*. New York: Praeger, 1982. Studies of Influence in International Relations. US-Iranian relations between 1941 and 1979 provide a case study for examination of the role of influence in relationships between superpowers and Third World states. The author, a professor of government at the University of Virginia, considers characterization of the relationship in terms of US domination of Iran as simplistic, insisting that “the flow of influence between the two states was more reciprocal than unilateral, although not necessarily equal.”

1109. __________. “Who Lost America? The Case of Iran.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 1982), pp. 5-21. The author attacks the conceptual fallacy that raw power can be equated with influence, and points out that many Americans (as well as Iranians) mistakenly assumed that the US had the capability to exercise unlimited influence over Iran prior to the 1979 revolution. Ramazani notes that just as US support for the Pahlavi régime was built up slowly, so it gradually diminished. He concludes that the US could not have saved the Shah from the shortsightedness of his own policies and that “The Shah wooed, won, but also lost America.”

US was “transformed in Iranian eyes from their nation’s savior, in the 1940s, to the world-devouring satan of the Khomeinist era.” In so doing, Rubin outlines the US campaign to remove Soviet forces from Iran after World War II; American intervention to undermine prime Minister Mossadegh in the early 1950s and restore the Shah to power; Washington’s appreciation of the advantages of a US-Iranian alliance, stemming largely from Iran’s location on the borders of the Soviet Union; the US strategy to utilize Iran as its regional surrogate in the 1970s; and finally, unsuccessful American efforts in 1978-1979 to avert the impending revolution. Rubin also examines the flight of the Shah, the establishment of the Islamic republic, and the hostage crisis which led to the abortive rescue attempt. Appendices include an essay on the role of the media during the deterioration in US-Iranian relations, and a detailed chronology.

1111. ________ . “Iran, the Ayatollah, and U.S. Options.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 142-168. The author sees contradictions in US goals in Iran: “The U.S. interest in an Iran strong enough to oppose ... the expansion of Soviet power southwards conflicts with U.S. efforts to prevent the strengthening of Iran’s regional position.” Rubin feels that prospects for an improvement in US-Iranian relations are poor and advises against further US involvement in Iranian internal affairs. Instead, the American role should consist of countering the Soviet threat, maintaining a low profile in the Iran-Iraq war, and bolstering the security of the Arab states.

1112. Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter With Iran. New York: Random House, 1985. Reprinted New York: iUniverse, 2001. An adjunct professor at Columbia University and the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis draws upon his personal experience to write a comprehensive history of the Iranian revolution and the impact on the United States government. As the author notes, “Whatever the excesses of the revolutionary authorities in Tehran, and whatever judgment history may reserve for this unique social experiment, it seems indisputable that Iran has been permanently, irrevocably changed. Curiously enough, so has the United States of America.... Not since the fall of Saigon had a series of foreign policy events so shaken the United States.” (p. vii)

1113. Sobhani, S. Rob. “U.S. Iran Policy at a Crossroads.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 16, No. 3 (June-July 2001), pp. 15-16. An adjunct professor at Georgetown University briefly reviews US-Iran relations before concluding that “the United States must engage those forces inside Iran that want to work with Washington, in order to enhance the geopolitical and economic interests of both countries.” (p. 16)

post-Taliban Afghanistan. Noting that “for the foreseeable future, the United States will face not a single global challenge, but a series of local contenders for power. Iran is such a contender: a medium-size power....” (pp. 34-35) He argues that “Through a multifaceted approach, the United States can best deter Iran’s provocative policies in the short-run and cultivate a democratic transition in the long run.” (p. 27)

1115. Tahir-Kheli, Shirin. “Proxies and Allies: The Case of Iran and Pakistan.” *Orbis*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 1980), pp. 339-352. ●● The author, a political scientist at Temple University at the time of writing, points out that Iran and Pakistan in the 1950s were allies of the US and not its proxies. With the application of the Nixon Doctrine, Iran became a US proxy, but “The fall of the Shah closed an era when proxies would act to preserve U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.” Tahir-Kheli asserts that the US still needs regional allies but contends that few can be counted upon to protect US interests. She suggests that Pakistan seems to be the best candidate in this regard. ●

1116. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Iran’s Seizure of the United States Embassy; Hearings*. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. The stated purpose of these hearings was to draw lessons from the Iran experience for protecting US diplomats abroad, for dealing with terrorism, and for responding to and handling similar crises in the future. A summary of the hostage crisis is included, as are the Algiers documents leading to its solution. Testimony is given by Harold Saunders, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, Warren Christopher, Walter Stoesssel, Anthony Quainton, Peter D. Constable, Mark Feldman, and several of the former hostages. ●


1119. ________. Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. *Iran-Contra Investigation; Joint Hearings in Executive Session as Declassified Before the House Select Committee and Senate Select Committee....* Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988.

hostages in Iran, argues that the need for surprise and secrecy precluded consultation with Congress under the War Powers Act, and gives an evaluation of the situation in Iran at that time. 

1121. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Iran Agreements; Hearings. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● Various former State Department officials testify about the intent and ramifications of the Iran agreements, as do representatives from the Treasury and Justice departments. Other testimony is heard from corporate executives and lawyers representing American concerns with claims against Iran. A lengthy appendix reprints legal materials and press reports on the agreements. 


1125. Wright, Robin, and Shaul Bakhash. “The U.S. and Iran: An Offer They Can’t Refuse?” Foreign Policy, No. 108 (Fall 1997), pp. 124-137. ●● A plea for the United States and Iran to attempt to improve their relations in light of the upset election of Mohammed Khatami as Iranian President, written by a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times and a professor of history at George Mason University respectively. The authors advocate that the two sides actively take difficult steps through four phases, involving an opening round of mutual moves, a second round of agreeing to remove more difficult hurdles, a third round of direct engagement, and an “end game” of restoring full commercial ties and diplomatic relations – which the authors concede “will probably have to wait until Khatami’s second term, pending his reelection, and a new U.S. administration.” (p. 136)

Iraq

War and assesses the consequences for US relations with Baghdad. He argues that US policymakers should become aware that “Iraq’s leaders are shoring up the country domestically at the same time that they are locking it into a web of accommodating, responsible regional relationships.” (p. 89) Furthermore, he advocates a short-term US policy to help Iraq avoid defeat in the Iran-Iraq War and a long-term policy “to encourage Iraq to maintain its moderate, nonconfrontational stand in regional affairs [by developing] a broader foundation of political understanding ... between Washington and Baghdad.” (p. 102) Expansion of commercial relations would facilitate American entry into the last major unpenetrated market in the Middle East.

1127. ________. “U.S.-Iraqi Relations: A Status Report.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 13 (Summer 1985), pp. 1-9. ●● A fellow in Middle East studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies observes that “The most pleasant surprise in the recent history of U.S.-Arab relations is the accelerating improvement in U.S. relations with Iraq.” (p. 1) He traces the background and progress of this development and observes that its success is still complicated by the issue of export financing because of Iraq’s involvement in the Iran-Iraq War.

1128. Byman, Daniel. “After the Storm: U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Since 1991.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), pp. 493-516. ●● An analyst at the RAND Corporation traces the evolution of US policy toward Iraq since the Kuwait War, evaluating US objectives and constraints. The author argues that much of the criticism of US policy is “overstated and fails to appreciate many of the accomplishments of the Bush and Clinton administrations and their allies.” (p. 494) His overall assessment is that US policy has been a qualified success since, most obviously, Iraq has been contained. But he also sees as potential future problems four weaknesses in the US stance: being able to maintain sanctions and allied military strikes only as long as Saddam continues to make mistakes, committing itself to UN inspections that could lead to an end to sanctions and thus assist Iraq’s WMD programs, neglecting regional allies especially if American backing of the Iraqi opposition is not handled well, and over-reliance on a short-term strategy of getting rid of Saddam without devising a blueprint for the long-term integration of Iraq into a regional security structure.


1130. Dawisha, Adeed. “Iraq: The West’s Opportunity.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 41 (1980-1981), pp. 134-153. ●● The Iran-Iraq war may offer an opportunity for the West to encourage Iraq to strengthen its ties to moderate Middle Eastern forces, says the author. He notes that Baghdad had reoriented its foreign policy away from the USSR and moderated its attacks on the Arabian Peninsula states before the outbreak of the war. The war may hasten a rapprochement between Iraq and the West since many of Iraq’s interests run parallel to
those of the West. At the same time, Dawisha notes, Baghdad and Washington remain as far apart as ever on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Nevertheless, he counsels that “Iraq’s massive oil reserves, its strategic location, its growing influence with the Gulf states, and its potential for Arab leadership make it imperative that policy makers in the West encourage Iraq’s drift away from the Soviet Union.”

1131. Hersh, Seymour M. “A Case Not Closed.” *New Yorker* (1 November 1993), pp. 80ff. An examination of the Clinton administration’s decision to bomb Baghdad in June 1993 as a result of an Iraqi plot to assassinate former President George Bush while on a visit to Kuwait. The author claims that his “own investigations have uncovered circumstantial evidence, at least as compelling as the Administration’s that suggests that the American government’s case against Iraq ... is seriously flawed.” (p. 80)


1134. Russell, Richard L. “CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq.” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 191-207. A professor at the National Defense University and a former CIA analyst argues that while the Iraqis lacked accurate strategic intelligence, “the American intelligence community provided its consumers one of the broadest and clearest pictures of an adversary that any American president and high command has ever had in the nation’s history ... which is hard to reconcile with the disparaging postwar assessments of CIA’s performance made by Schwartzkopf and other CENTCOM commanders.” (p. 204) Russell asserts that “postwar analysis showed CIA analysis to be superior.” (p. 203) On the other hand, he assesses that “The greatest weakness of CIA’s performance was its lack of human assets inside the Iraqi regime able to report on Saddam’s plans and intentions.” (p. 205)

1135. Sweet, Catherine. “Mixed Signals: U.S.-Iraqi Relations and Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait.” *Jusur*, Vol. 11 (1995), pp. 33-53. The author discusses theories on whether the US could have prevented the invasion before outlining US relations with Iraq in the 1980s, including the “downward spiral” in relations in 1989-1990, and concludes that the US sent ineffective signals which were interpreted by Saddam Husayn as “the Americans would simply make threats, not deliver.”

Frigate Engines to Iraq: Hearing, 14 May 1980. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● The administration’s decision, without informing Congress, to permit the export to Italy of eight gas turbine engines for use in frigates being built for the Iraqi government, prompted the scheduling of this hearing. Deane R. Hinton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, testified that the export license had been granted because of the availability of the engines from other sources and the need to maintain good relations with Italy.

Saudi Arabia

1137. Armitage, St. John. “The Keystone of the Partnership, Saudi-American Relations: An Englishman’s View.” *Middle East Insight*, “Special Edition” (1995), pp. 57-59. ●● A retired British diplomat outlines the history of the Saudi-American relationship and judges that “The American contribution to, and involvement in, the life of the Kingdom, now in its seventh decade, has established America as Saudi Arabia’s major, perhaps, natural, partner in safeguarding the world’s largest oil reserves.” (p. 59) Still, he says, “perhaps the greatest threat to the present relationship is the fact that oil is of greater importance than all other considerations.” (p. 59)

1138. Armstrong, Scott. “Eye of the Storm: The $200 Billion Reason We Had to Go to War in the Middle East.” *Mother Jones* (November-December 1991), pp. 30-35, 75-76. ●● A former *Washington Post* reporter and founder of the National Security Archives alleges that the United States and Saudi Arabia have developed a web of secret oral understandings, which include a “super-base” network and a permanent US presence in Saudi Arabia. They oblige the US military to protect the Saudi royal family from all internal and external threats and therefore make US involvement in future Middle East conflicts unavoidable. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, President Bush was insistent, Armstrong says, in pushing American assistance on Saudi Arabia because he “saw the need both to breathe life into the partially dormant network and to ensure that Saddam would not be able to seize it.” (p. 75)

1139. Awaji, Ibrahim Mohamed Al-. “U.S.-Saudi Economic and Political Relations.” *American Arab Affairs*, No. 7 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 55-59. ●● The Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of the Interior notes that the US and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a close economic relationship for over fifty years. While oil provides the foundation, there are other important facets as well: Saudi Arabia is the United States’ sixth largest trading partner; over 1,000 American companies operate in the kingdom; and Saudi Arabia has invested over $70 billion in sectors of the American economy. In addition, while the two countries agree on many international questions, they differ over what Al-Awaji describes as the Saudi commitment to Palestinian self-determination and the US blind commitment to Israel. ●
1140. Bahgat, Gawdat. “Managing Dependence: American-Saudi Oil Relations.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 1-14. The director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania argues that “Instead of energy independence, the United States should consolidate a strategy to manage its growing dependence on foreign oil suppliers, particularly from Saudi Arabia – the world's largest oil producer and exporter.” (p. 1) He advances this idea in particularly by demonstrating the mutual benefits of stabilizing oil prices and by advocating the successful return of US oil companies to the upstream oil and gas sectors in Saudi Arabia.

1141. Bahgat, Gawdat. “Oil and Militant Islam: Strains on U.S.-Saudi Relations.” *World Politics*, Vol. 165, No. 3 (Winter 2003), pp. 115-122. The author argues “that militant Islam is as much of a threat to the Saudi government as it is to the United States [and therefore] Riyadh has strong incentives to remain committed to the war on terror.” (p. 115) Furthermore, he regards the kingdom as a reliable ally in this endeavor and sees its apparent reluctance to cooperate as the result of the Saudi government's “attempt to reconcile the two contradictory pillars of its survival: a military alliance with Washington and the conservative Islam that dominates its society.” (p. 122)


Riyadh to turn to Britain for Tornado aircraft. Cordesman also puts forth a substantial list of key issues affecting Western-Saudi relations, among them the problem of Saudi stability, the impact of Saudi arms needs on Israel’s security, the long-term impact of the 1985-1986 experience on US arms sales to the kingdom, and improvements to the Saudi army and National Guard. In conclusion, he notes that “In many areas of the world, the West can only improve its security through dramatic changes in policy. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and Southwest Asia, the challenge to the West is to enforce its existing policy consistently.” (p. 261)

1146. ________. “The U.S. and Saudi Arabia: A Strategic Partnership.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (May-June 2002), pp. 14-18. ●● The holder of the Arleigh Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies reviews the essential elements in US-Saudi relations and suggests that “Americans need to be educated both in the reasons for the US alliance with Saudi Arabia and as to the character of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi state. The Saudi people need an equally frank effort by the Saudi government to explain the kingdom’s security problems and economic needs and the reasons for an alliance with the United States and a limited U.S. military presence.” (p. 18)


1149. ________. “Contemporary Realities in Saudi-American Relations.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 26 (Fall 1988), pp. 82-91. ●● Another speech by the Saudi deputy minister of information reiterating the common ground between Saudi Arabia and the US and noting that “Because the Palestinian-Israeli problem is central to politics in the Middle East and because America plays a pivotal role in her support of Israel, it is necessary for us to consider Saudi-American relations in the context of America’s policy towards Israel.” (p. 86) He remarks that Saudi Arabia has been tireless in its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the problem and suggests that it is in both countries’ interests to do so.

domestic public opinion in codifying that relationship in an open military alliance or in formally and publicly permitting U.S. military bases in the kingdom.” (p. 310) He notes that this tension predated the war and is a permanent facet of the relationship.

1151. ________. “Be Careful What you Wish For: The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations.” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 37-50. An associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont asserts that “No country has more vexed Americans in the crisis that began on September 11 than Saudi Arabia.” (p.37) He asks the question of why Saudi cooperation with the US has appeared grudging and deduces that “Rather than running the risk of alienating [domestic public opinion] through unstinting support for the United States, the Al Saud have chosen to hedge.” (p. 37) The author reviews factors in the kingdom’s security and the charges against it by American media in the post-11 September period. As for the future of Saudi-American relations, Gause suggests that “it would be in the interest of both sides to seek a return to the kind of relationship the kingdom had with the United States before 1990 – close, but ‘over the horizon.’”

1152. Grayson, Benson Lee. *Saudi-American Relations*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982. A historical survey, basically descriptive in nature, of American interests in and relations with Saudi Arabia since the 1930s. Based on secondary sources, this book was written by a longtime Foreign Service Officer. Despite Saudi Arabia’s importance to the US, the author suggests that there will be no significant improvement in relations even though both countries will remain close. He also argues that the US cannot exclude consideration of direct military intervention to prevent the overthrow of the current régimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf by anti-Western forces.

1153. Hoagland, Jim, and J.P. Smith. “Saudi Arabia and the United States: Security and Interdependence.” *Survival*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (March-April 1978), pp. 80-83. A short look by two journalists at the increasingly interdependent relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia, reprinted from articles in the Washington Post on 22 and 27 December 1977. The authors point out that Saudi Arabia has come to play an important role in world politics and contend that this significantly influenced the Carter administration. An unnamed US diplomat is quoted as worrying that “We are reaching the point where we are more dependent on them than they are on us.”


1155. Lacey, Robert. “Saudi Arabia: A More Visible Role in the Middle East.” *World Today*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1982), pp. 412. A popular writer sees the successful conclusion of the AWACS aircraft sale as representing a number of important developments: an Arab victory over the pro-Israel lobby, a reassertion of presidential authority in the conduct of
US foreign policy, and the enhancement of Prince (now King) Fahd’s position in domestic Saudi politics.

1156. Long, David E. *The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. MERI Special Studies, No. 3. A survey of bilateral relations by a member of the US State Department’s Policy Planning Staff but written while the author was a senior fellow at the Middle East Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. The author discusses these relations in terms of oil, military cooperation, economic and commercial ties, politics and diplomacy, and regional security. He emphasizes the continuity of linkages between the two countries but also remarks on the ambivalence in the relationship. He believes that mutual interests demand that policy goals should be achieved through cooperation rather than confrontation and stresses the importance of personal diplomacy. He sees a weakness in US policy by visits of American officials “who have focused on substantive issues during what the Saudis consider ceremonial visits for the purpose of instilling personal mutual trust.” (p. 145)

1157. ________. “U.S.-Saudi Relations: A Foundation of Mutual Needs.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 12-22. A State Department official points out that bilateral relations between the US and Saudi Arabia have developed on the basis of oil, politics, security, and economics. The US has come to view Saudi Arabia as a stabilizing and moderating force in the region and an integral part of any Arab-Israeli peace settlement. On the other side, Islam and geographic isolation are the two dominant factors influencing Saudi perceptions of international relations. Long concludes that ambivalence, cooperation, and security are recurring themes in US-Saudi relations.


1159. McMillan, Joseph, Anthony H. Cordesman, Mamoun Fandy, and Fareed Mohamedi. “Symposium: The United States and Saudi Arabia: American Interests and Challenges to the Kingdom in 2002.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 1-28. Edited transcript of a Middle East Policy symposium. Joseph McMillan (National Defense University) briefly reviews the reasons behind the strain in US-Saudi ties, including different attitudes towards social values, different communications styles, the lack of a shared strategic vision, and the erosion of grass-roots contact. Anthony Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies) notes that “we’ve had these crises before and ... they tend to be two-sided and involve mistakes on both sides.” (p. 5) Mamoun Fandy (National Defense University) observes that “the more criticism of Saudi Arabia from the United States, the more consolidation and circling of the wagons.” (p. 9) Fareed Mohamedi (Petroleum Finance Company) believes that “While the kingdom has serious problems, we
believe that the Saudis are still likely to be the dominant oil player and manager of global oil prices over the medium to long term,...” (p. 12)

1160. Mednicoff, David M. “The Maturing of the Saudi-American Relationship.” Middle East Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 1984-1985), pp. 33-41. ●● A doctoral candidate at Harvard University contends that “The United States and Saudi Arabia have entered a phase where each takes the other for granted [because] each country feels more confident of getting what it wants from the other [security for oil], a number of developments in the region have put limits on open Saudi-American political disputes [and] the two countries no longer believe that the closeness of their cooperation requires either general agreement mutual repudiation.” (p. 33)

1161. Muttam, John. “U.S. Attempts to Resurrect the Surrogate Model in the Persian Gulf.” Asian Profile, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1982), pp. 1-13. ●● The author, a political scientist at the University of Kerala, makes a number of questionable assumptions in this look at American reliance on surrogates in the Gulf. He opines that oil constitutes the sole reason for US interest in the Gulf and that since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, successive US administrations have refrained from establishing a direct presence for fear of an adverse reaction from an American public wary of another Vietnam quagmire. The US originally chose Iran over Saudi Arabia as its Gulf surrogate because it was stable, pro-Western, politically conservative, and had been the predominant power in the region. Since the fall of the Shah, the US has tried unsuccessfully to make the Kingdom its chief bulwark in defense of American interests in the Gulf, as a result of the Saudi royal family’s reluctance to align itself too closely with the US. The author further posits that should the royal family agree to act in this capacity, it will likely suffer the same fate as the Pahlavis of Iran. ●

1162. Pollack, Josh. “Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Saudi Arabia.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 7, No. 4 (December 2003), distributed electronically. ●● A Washington consultant declares that “anti-American sentiments and actions have played an important but episodic role in Saudi politics and foreign relations” in the past but in recent years “anti-Americanism in word and deed has become one of the central features of the Saudi political landscape.”

1163. Pipes, Daniel. “The Scandal of U.S.-Saudi Relations.” National Interest, No. 70 (Winter 2002-2003), pp. 66-78. ●● A conservative complaint that “For decades, U.S. government agencies have engaged in a consistent pattern of deference to Saudi wishes, making so many unwonted and unnecessary concessions that one gets the impression that a switch has taken place, with both sides forgetting which of them is the great power and which the minor one.” (p. 67)

The director of programs for the joint commission outlines its purpose, organization, and accomplishments. The commission’s mandate is to promote programs of cooperation in the fields of industrialization, trade, manpower training, agriculture, and science and technology.

1165. Prados, Alfred B. “Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief IB93113, 4 August 2003. This frequently updated study by a Library of Congress CRS analyst provides a brief background to US-Saudi relations and discusses current issues in the relationship, including Gulf security concerns, the Arab-Israeli conflict, arms transfers to the kingdom, trade and investment, and concerns relating to human rights and democracy. The author also discusses matters of US Congressional interest in Saudi Arabia. Among these are Congress’s interest in the resolution of the al-Khubar bombing investigation, challenges to major arms sales to the Saudis, actions opposing Saudi participation in the Arab boycott of Israel, and procedures for reporting on US-Saudi commercial disputes. This study was formerly titled “Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations.”

1166. Rawls, Lucia W. “Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO and the American Political Process: Cause for Concern?” American-Arab Affairs, No. 18 (Fall 1986), pp. 92-105. A Ph.D. candidate at the University of South Carolina looks at ARAMCO as a case study in the role that multinational corporations play in the influencing of US foreign policy. The author’s guiding question is “whether the conviction of American businessmen (who have financial interests in Saudi Arabia) that U.S. policy in the Middle East should be changed is invalid because it coincides with the interests of Saudi Arabia.” (p. 104) In her opinion, the answer seems to be no.

1167. Twinam, Joseph. “Controversial Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: An American Tragedy in Possibly Four Acts.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 29 (Summer 1989), pp. 47-55. A retired American Foreign Service Officer looks at the ramifications of an expected major arms sale to the kingdom and notes that Israel’s supporters marshaled considerable Congressional opposition to the 1978 F-15 sale, the 1981 AWACS sale, and the 1986 missile package. After assessing the probable scenarios regarding a new sale, Twinam states that “if Act IV is played out there will be no winners, whatever the outcome” and suggests that since American interests in the Middle East require strong relations with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, the “trick is to assure that proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia do not come to be targeted as ‘controversial.’” (p. 55)

1168. Unger, Craig. “Saving the Saudis.” Vanity Fair (October 2003), pp. 162ff. A journalistic article asserting that four flights carrying about 140 Saudis, primarily from the Al Sa’ud royal family and the Bin Ladin family, were allowed to leave the US for Saudi Arabia a few days after the 11 September attacks, when US airspace was still restricted. The author claims that the planes were allowed to leave because of the special ties of President Bush to the Al Sa’ud and that the passengers were not interrogated by the FBI, or perhaps not
even fully identified, although he acknowledges that White House has denied that the flights ever took place.

1169. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1982*; Hearings. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. Part 2 contains testimony regarding the proposed sale of AWACS aircraft, F-15 enhancement equipment, and Sidewinder AIM-9L missiles to Saudi Arabia. Among the witnesses supporting the sale were Alvin Cottrell (then of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies), and two former US ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Robert G. Neumann and John West. General George Keegan (former chief of Air Force intelligence) voiced his opposition, contending that the Saudi régime was likely to be overthrown in two to three years. The committee members tended to oppose the sale on the grounds that it would jeopardize Israel’s security.

1170. __________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *Saudi Arabia and the United States: The New Context in an Evolving “Special Relationship”*; Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. The study analyzes US-Saudi relations in light of developments in the region since 1978 and provides an assessment of the importance of Saudi Arabia to the US and of changes that might affect those interests, along with policy options available to the US. It notes that the two countries have common interests in stable oil prices, finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and promoting extensive bilateral trade, as well as general security and stability in the region. At the same time, areas of conflict include the Saudi desire for a more restrictive oil policy and disagreement over the Palestinian question. The downturn in US-Saudi relations following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is mentioned, but the fact that the US remains Saudi Arabia’s principal military supplier is also noted. Finally, the question of an increased US presence in or near the Gulf remains a sensitive issue between the two countries, with Saudi Arabia continuing to press for an “overthe-horizon” presence.

1171. __________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on Europe and the Middle East. *Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia*; Hearing, 12 December 1979. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1980. The hearing was convened to consider the proposed sale of $120 million in armaments for Saudi Arabia’s F-15 aircraft, including Sidewinder missiles, cluster bombs, Maverick missiles, and laser-guided bombs, as the second installment of arms promised in 1976. Testimony was given by Lucy Wilson Benson (Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology), Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves (Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency), and James Montgomery (Deputy Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau). These witnesses assured the committee that the full quantity of arms promised was necessary for Saudi defense requirements, that it would have no impact on the Arab-Israeli military balance, and that it would not pose a serious threat to arms control.
1172. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Military and Technical Implications of the Proposed Sale to Saudi Arabia of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements*; Hearings, 28 and 30 September 1981. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● These hearings are concerned with four questions: (1) the legitimate defense requirements of Saudi Arabia; (2) the threat posed by the package to Israel’s security; (3) the risk of compromise of US military technology if the sale is approved; and (4) the benefits of the sale for improving the US military forces’ potential to protect American interests in the Gulf. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and General James Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide the administration’s justification for the sale.

1173. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia, Part 1*; Hearings, 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15 October 1981. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● The hearings revolve around several issues concerning the sale of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancements to Saudi Arabia: (1) the sale’s relation to US national security interests in the Gulf; (2) the impact of the sale on Saudi Arabian-Israeli relations; (3) the effect of the sale on US power and prestige in the Middle East; (4) the threat the sale might pose to Israel by altering the Arab-Israeli military balance in any significant way; and (5) the possibilities of the sophisticated equipment falling into unfriendly hands. Among those giving testimony are Robert Tucker, Harold Saunders, Robert Drinan, Thomas Dines, Alexander Haig, and Anthony Cordesman.

1174. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia, Part 2*; Hearings, 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15 October 1981. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● The continuation of hearings on the sale of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancements to Saudi Arabia. Those presenting testimony in this part are James L. Buckley (State Department), Congressman Floyd Fithian (Indiana), Congressman William Green (New York), and Senator Daniel Moynihan (New York). Also included is a summary of the major findings of the Senate Armed Forces Committee and administration responses to additional questions submitted for the record.

1175. ________. Committee on Foreign Relations. *The Proposed AWACS/F-15 Enhancement Sale to Saudi Arabia*; Staff Report. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● This report asserts that the AWACS aircraft sale is an essential element in achieving a “strategic consensus” in the region. It also analyzes four scenarios in which the AWACS could be used in a confrontation with Israel, noting that there are technical and political problems associated with each scenario. The report also notes that the Saudi AWACS will contain several items of sensitive equipment which would prove valuable to the Soviets if compromised. Furthermore, the authors point out that the AWACS will strain the manpower capabilities of the Royal Saudi Air Force and increase the number of Americans resident in Saudi Arabia. Finally, the sale is not seen as entailing a draw-down or diversion of US systems,
although it is liable to entice badly needed American military personnel to the private sector.


1178. Walsh, Elsa. “Louis Freeh’s Last Case.” *New Yorker Magazine* (14 May 2001), pp. 68ff. An analysis of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s investigation of the 1996 truck bombing of a US air base at al-Khubar in Saudi Arabia. The account is sympathetic to Louis Freeh, the FBI director until 2001, focusing on his alienation from President Clinton and his efforts to get the Saudi government to co-operate with FBI requests.

1179. ________. “The Prince.” *New Yorker Magazine* (24 March 2003), pp. 48ff. A profile of Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, with lots of personal details and based on interviews with various people who have dealt with him politically. Particular focus on Prince Bandar's role in Arab-Israeli negotiations and his relations with the Bush administration following the 11 September 2001 attacks.


**GCC, Other Gulf States and the Yemens**

1181. Aburdene, Odeh. “U.S. Economic and Financial Relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 7 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 76-84. The author, a vice-president of Occidental Corporation, points out that the US and the Arab oil exporters are locked into an interdependent relationship from which neither side can escape. Aburdene also points out that a major feature of this relationship is the inflow of funds to the US via (1) the repatriation of profits and dividends by American oil companies; (2) the Arab states’ purchase of non-military and military goods and services; and (3) the investment of Arab financial assets in the US capital market.

1183. Almadhagi, Ahmed Noman Kassim. *Yemen and the United States: A Study of a Small Power and Super-State Relationship, 1962-1994*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996. Tauris Academic Studies. Derived from a doctoral thesis at the London School of Economics, this study traces US-Yemeni relations from the time of the Yemeni Imamate through unification in the early 1990s. The author notes that US-North Yemen relations after the 1962 revolution were dominated by the Cold War (especially since South Yemen was a client of the Communist bloc), the relations of both countries to Saudi Arabia, and by regional developments. The promise of better ties following Yemeni unification was tempered by Yemen’s refusal to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait but, the author notes, “the Saudi-mediated US antipathy towards Yemen was mitigated, at least in part, by US companies’ involvement in Yemeni oil and by unified Yemen’s progress towards pluralism and parliamentarism.” (p. 9)


Although he does not report overall scores, he concludes that “the majority of the Kuwaiti society stands by the United States against Iraq and that they endorse the policy of the Kuwaiti government in dealing with these crises. The results also show that the Kuwaiti society believes that Iraq still poses a major threat to Kuwait.” (p. 18)


1189. Dunford, David. “The US and Oman: An Enduring Partnership.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 12, No. 1 (November-December 1995), pp. 62-64. •• A former US ambassador to Oman describes the nature of relations between the two countries, particularly in the military sphere and regarding regional issues. Although, “Given our common interests in Gulf security and Middle East peace, and our common abhorrence of Islamic or any other kind of extremism, there is a strong basis for continued US-Omani cooperation” but “there is a tendency for busy Washington policy-makers to take Oman for granted.” (p. 64) The Sultan’s escape from an automobile accident in 1995 is a reminder of how closely tied Oman’s stability and prosperity is tied to one man.

1190. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States.” Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 2 (May 2003). •• An associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont argues that US policy towards the Gulf is in the midst of an important change from dependence on Saudi Arabia to increased reliance on the smaller GCC states to provide US with military facilities. He warns that reform in Saudi Arabia needs to come from Saudi leaders and not Washington to be credible and acceptable. In the smaller states, “The United States role needs to be minimally acceptable in local public opinion. This will depend enormously on how overall American policy is viewed there on larger issues in the Arab and Muslim worlds, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict.” (p. 3)

1191. Greig, Ian. “The Security of Persian Gulf Oil.” Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (19811), pp. 193-200. •• A plea for greater Western attention to the key position Oman occupies at the entrance to the Gulf, made by the Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Research Institute in London. Greig places heavy emphasis on the threat that South Yemen and the Soviet Union pose for Oman, and on the sultanate’s requirements for extensive military assistance to help it meet this threat. He also stresses Oman’s need for minesweepers for defense of the Strait of Hormuz, and for Western resolve to stand behind its friends in the region. He concludes by stating that “The West will only have itself to blame for any disasters that befall it, if it refuses to support the guardian of the vital Strait of Hormuz.” •


1194. Hersh, Seymour M. “The Spoils of the Gulf War.” New Yorker (6 September 1993), pp. 70ff. •• An account of how two of former US President George Bush’s sons and several former staffers attempted to negotiate business contracts with the Kuwaitis while accompanying the former president on his April 1993 Kuwait trip.

1195. Kostiner, Joseph. “The United States and the Gulf States: Alliance in Need.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1998), distributed electronically. •• An associate professor of history at Tel Aviv University reviews the history of US military relations with the GCC States. While taking note of increasing tensions in these ties, he notes that the relationship strengthened in the 1990s because of the precedent of large-scale US intervention in the region with the approval and cooperation of the GCC states, and what had been “a potential alliance was now implemented as a very real and strategically important one for both sides.”

1196. Nakhleh, Emile A. Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1975. Foreign Affairs Studies, No. 17. •• plus •• Nakhlef, Emile A. The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Policy Analysis. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1975. •• Two short monographs examining the nature of the political systems and ideologies along the Arab littoral, the international relations of the region and comparative military strengths, and the role of oil in international trade and in regional development. Nakhleh, a professor of political science at Mount St. Mary’s College, advises that the key element of any future American policy in the Gulf should the partnership and that partnership “must be multidimensional, functioning simultaneously on at least two levels: political and economic.” ✪

1197. Peterson, J.E. “American Policy in the Gulf and the Sultanate of Oman.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 8 (Spring 1984), pp. 117-130. •• The article discusses US and Omani security interests in the Gulf and outlines the emerging ties between the two countries over the past decade. The author warns of the “dangers of a suffocating embrace.” “Military cooperation can be only one small part of a productive US-Omani relationship. Recognition of this is the key to an enduring and mutually satisfying friendship between peoples as well as governments.” ✪

1198. Rouleau, Eric. “Gulf States: Ambivalent Allies.” Le Monde diplomatique, English edition (December 2001). •• A prominent French journalist notes that the Taliban régime was thoroughly disliked throughout the Gulf but both leaders and their populations roundly
condemned the American campaign in Afghanistan. He repeats the assertions of Gulf politicians that ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would go a long way towards undermining political terrorism in the region. US foreign policy, Rouleau contends, is creating an abyss between the Gulf people and the US government.

1199. Rumaihi, Mohammed al-. “Kuwaiti-American Relations: A Case of Mismanagement.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 77-80. The editor-in-chief of Kuwait’s al-‘Arabi magazine addresses the reasons for recent Kuwaiti-American disagreements (culminating in the US refusal to sell Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Kuwait as well as Saudi Arabia) and defends Kuwaiti policies. In his view, “the American position simply means that US policies toward the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular are still marked by reaction to events and missing opportunities when they arise. This position does not reflect a real understanding of current developments in the Gulf region.”

1200. Shayeji, Abdullah al-. “Dangerous Perceptions: Gulf Views of the U.S. Role in the Region.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 1-13. An assistant professor at Kuwait University points out that the American policy of dual containment contains two contradictions “that could come back to haunt American policy makers as they deal with the Gulf in the future.” (p. 1) The first contradiction is between GCC governments and their own populations whose sympathy for the US after the Kuwait War is dissipating. The second derives from policy debate within the US, whereby people in the Gulf feel that a dual containment policy that generates criticism in the US and fails to change either Iraqi or Iranian behavior must have a hidden rationale. Many Gulf observers, al-Shayeji says, regard American interest in the Gulf states as based on money and pressure to normalize relations with Israel.

1201. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *Proposed Arms Transfers to the Yemen Arab Republic*; Hearing, 12 March 1979. One US reaction to the outbreak of fighting between North and South Yemen in early 1979 was the administration’s decision to provide North Yemen with fighters, tanks, and other military equipment. In order to expedite delivery of these arms, the administration chose to invoke waiver provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, thereby bypassing Congressional approval. As a consequence, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East called this hearing since “some members do not ... fully understand ... why a national security waiver was needed.” The administration’s position was argued by William R. Crawford (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), Alan A. Platt (Chief of the Arms Transfer Division of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), David M. Ransom (Deputy Director for the Near East and South Asia Region of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), and James H. Michel (Deputy Legal Adviser in the Department of State).
The Development of US Rapid Deployment Forces for the Gulf

1203. Bates, E. Asa. “The Rapid Deployment Force—Fact or Fiction?” *RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, Vol. 126, No. 2 (June 1981), pp. 23-33. The author, a retired Royal Air Force colonel and freelance journalist, provides some background on the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), its organization, the problems it faces in prepositioning supplies and strategic lift advance facilities in the region, and recent exercises involving RDF. He also notes some of the arguments advanced against the RDF by its critics, including problems in command structure.

1204. Bell, Raymond E., Jr. “The Rapid Deployment Force: How Much, How Soon?” *Army*, Vol. 30 (July 1980), pp. 18-24. The author, an army officer, points out that the Rapid Deployment Force faces a major gap in capabilities between its light forces, which can be moved to a crisis area quickly but are unable to confront large enemy armored forces, and its heavy components, which take time to move and thus require the holding of beachheads for the time it takes them to arrive. Bell’s solution is to add wheeled armored fighting vehicles, which are more easily transportable than tanks and better suited to movement in Middle Eastern terrain. Their addition would ‘‘‘heavy up’ a medium force package or ‘lighten up’ a heavy force package.”


1207. Cover, Martin L. “FMF [Fleet Marine Force] for the RDF.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 108, No. 6 (June 1982), pp. 51-55. The author, a naval officer, discusses some of the difficulties associated with the Rapid Deployment Force and offers suggestions for improving its capabilities: (1) providing it with assigned troops (rather than designating forces that are also earmarked for other contingencies); (2) restructuring the Marine Corps so that it has no role other than in the RDF; (3) disbanded the 2nd Airborne Division (since the helicopter has replaced the parachute as the means of putting men behind enemy lines); (4) designing strategic airlift solely on the basis of moving troops and not equipment (the RDF’s tanks should be prepositioned in the region and resupply carried out by the fast SL-7 ships); (5) providing a Marine Amphibious Unit for availability in the Indian Ocean on a full-time basis (to protect overemphasis on landing in a benign environment); and (6) upgrading mining countermeasures (to stop Soviets from closing off the Strait of Hormuz).


1210. Gordon, Michael R. “The Rapid Deployment Force-Too Large, Too Small or Just Right for Its Task?” *National Journal*, 13 March 1982, pp. 451-455. Essentially summarizes views on US military options in the Gulf and the role of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) as presented by a number of observers, most of whom are represented elsewhere in this bibliography. Gordon’s discussion includes the composition of the RDF, its ability to withstand a Soviet thrust into the Gulf, and the even more problematical question of the RDF’s effectiveness in dealing with internal political disruptions.

associate professor of political science at the US Air Force Academy, first examines the role of force planning for a limited contingency within the evolution of US strategic concepts over these two decades, then analyzes the shortcomings of the two principal resultant organizations, STRIKE Command and Readiness Command. His third area of focus is on strategic mobility, pointing out that the US never had the capability of supporting rapid deployment for a limited contingency simultaneously with a major force movement to Europe. Based on this three-pronged historical examination, Haffa concludes that construction of a coherent limited-contingency force requires it to be: (1) made contingencyspecific; (2) designated a unified command with multi-service components; (3) sized against the major threat; (4) adequately supported with strategic lift, prepositioning, and access to regional facilities; and (5) based on a revised strategic concept. The US must be prepared to deal with multiple crises simultaneously in areas deemed vital to US interests.

1212. Halloran, Richard. “Poised for the Persian Gulf.” *New York Times Magazine*, 1 April 1984, pp. 38-40, 61. A New York Times reporter looks at the problems facing the new US Central Command in carrying out its mission in the Gulf. The necessity of first having an invitation from a state in the region is pointed out and then, the author asserts, “Once the order had been given, the Central Command’s problems would begin.” It is expected that a fighter squadron, 800 Army paratroopers and B-52 bombers could be in action in the area within 48 hours, with another 3000 troops to follow by the end of a week. Further reinforcements would be slowed down in insufficient existing air and sea lift, and major problems would then arise in sustaining a formidable force in the region with a steady flow of reinforcements, fuel, ammunition, and supplies. Halloran goes on to discuss the facilities acquired by the US in Morocco, Egypt, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and Diego Garcia, as well as the joint training exercises held in these countries. He ends by noting continuing deficiencies in intelligence and communications, in addition to the lift problems, but notes the progress made since the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force four years ago.

1213. Holzbauer, Joseph R. “RDF-Valid and Necessary, But Some Negative Implications.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 64 (August 1980), pp. 33-38. A Marine Corps officer provides an early assessment of Rapid Deployment Force planning and charges that “In its present form, however, this concept is detrimental to the Marine Corps and does not capitalize upon the full advantages of amphibious warfare.”

with military force in the Gulf. The Reagan administration, however, tended to view Soviet actions in any regional arena as part of a drive for global hegemony and therefore American response in the Gulf should not be limited to a “go-it-alone” capability but should include the enhancement of regional states’ defense postures. Second, the author briefly looks at the military aspects of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and urges NATO and Japanese participation in Gulf defense. Finally, the development of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) is examined step-by-step and its capabilities in relation to projected goals are assessed component-by-component. It is the author’s relatively optimistic contention that the RDJTF gradually has overcome many of its logistical obstacles and although problems continue to exist in a number of areas such as inadequate sea and airlift, lack of hospital ships, and limited supplies of water and fuel, they too will be worked through. Johnson concludes by affirming that the RDJTF is a “valuable instrument of American foreign policy and a capable military force because it can make a positive contribution to regional security as an ‘over the horizon’ deterrent against Soviet adventurism.” He also urges that cooperation be pursued with the states of the region and the GCC and cautions that “any temptation to use the RDJTF unilaterally ... to seize oil fields ... should be resisted at all costs.” See also Johnson’s “U.S. Strategic Options in the Persian Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 107 (February 1981), pp. 24-26.

1215. ________. “Force Projection in Southwest Asia: The Role of Maritime Based Strategy.” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 68 (February 1984), pp. 64-68. The author points out the benefits of reliance on maritime forces in the Gulf region. He argues that they not only can protect US interests at sea but are also able to project forces ashore, and reinforce and sustain them as well. In addition, he states that “Unlike forces stationed ashore, maritime forces can provide a credible, over-the-horizon presence as an expression of U.S. interest without impinging upon the cultural or political sensitivities of the region.”

1216. Johnson, Thomas M., and Raymond T. Barrett. “The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 106, No. 11 (November 1980), pp. 95-98. An army officer and a naval officer assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff justify the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) on the grounds of “discord within the Middle East” which provides the Soviets with opportunities, as demonstrated in Afghanistan. (The lesson of Afghanistan, the authors assert, is not so much that the Soviets acted but that they were able to do so with so little effort, raising the question of where they will hit next). After “briefly summarizing the development of the RDJTF, its requirements and accomplishments, Johnson and Barrett note that rapid deployment demands “mobility assets” and/or prepositioned equipment and forces in the immediate area, not easy to obtain in the Indian Ocean region. But “Until these nations fully grasp the Soviet threat and the value of their help to the United States’ capability to deny that threat...” the authors contend that “We must be clever and find ways to get around...” these obstacles.


1219. Kingston, Robert C. “C’I and the U.S. Central Command.” *Signal*, (November 1983), pp. 23-25. •• The commander-in-chief of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) points out that USCENTCOM faces several C’I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) challenges that do not apply to other unified commands. One problem is distance, since the command is over 7000 air miles or 12,000 sea miles from its area of responsibility. In addition, USCENTCOM’s headquarters, component commands, communications and support facilities, and equipment are not even located in the region of responsibility. According to Kingston, “The mission success of this over-the-horizon projection concept will depend directly on our capability to quickly deploy a sizeable force; to promptly receive, process and use intelligence from national, strategic and tactical sources, to exercise effective command and control over forces deployed across a large geographical area, and to sustain that force logistically.”

1220. ________. “From RDF to CENTCOM: New Challenges?” *RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, Vol. 129 (March 1984). •• In a lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institute, the commander of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) briefly summarizes the history behind his one-year-old command, and stresses that the purpose of USCENTCOM is not intervention but deterrence. Kingston ends by declaring that “We need assistance from our allies for over-flight and landing rights; for refuelling and bunkering facilities; for the use of staging bases and under certain threats for allied air and naval assistance.”

1221. Krulak, Victor H. “The Rapid Deployment Force: Criteria and Imperatives.” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1980), pp. 39-43. •• A retired Marine Corps general emphasizes that the successful operation of any rapid mobile force must overcome the obstacles of space and time posed by geography. Specifically, he stresses five criteria which the Rapid Deployment Force must fulfill: (1) a genuine readiness achieved through joint training and rehearsing; (2) tactical and logistical viability created by bringing together all the necessary operational units and their logistic support under a single operational command; (3) forward positioning of equipment and supplies, together with tactical air and sea bases, in
proximity to the anticipated area of crisis; (4) the follow-on increments of tactical and logistic power necessary to sustain the initial momentum; and (5) most importantly, a “hard and fast” decision-making process. He concludes by remarking that this last criterion was unfortunately lacking in both the Afghanistan and Iranian crises.


1223. Manning, Robert A. “America’s Newest Tripwire.” *Inquiry* (San Francisco), Vol. 6 (January 1983), pp. 22-25. ●● A journalist criticizes Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) planning following observation of the “Gallant Eagle 82” exercises. He charges that the RDF is riddled with bureaucratic infighting and interservice rivalry. Furthermore, he feels that there are cheaper ways to meet contingencies and that die RDF could be a dangerous tripwire leading to a nuclear showdown. ●


1225. O’Ballance, Edgar. “The Rapid Deployment Force-Another Look.” *National Defense*, Vol. 66 (February 1982), pp. 34-36, 62. ●● A military writer argues that the early pessimism about the abilities of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the reluctance to embrace this defense concept by American friends in the Gulf was reversed by the success of the Bright Star exercises in late 1981. He comments that the RDF has survived, against heavy odds, as a completely American project. Moreover, “facilities,” “stockpiling,” and “joint exercises” are becoming accepted in the region. Finally, the initial idea that the RDF should have a “pre-emptive” role has been discarded in favor of a “reactive” strategy, dependent on an invitation from a regional state. ●

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officer, contends that “Naval forces, including the Marine Corps, provide unique capabilities that suit them best for the role of rapid deployment.” Among these are forcible-entry capabilities, especially through amphibious assault, and an existing capacity for rapid reinforcement. He also suggests that if the Rapid Deployment Force mission were turned over to the Marine Corps, a Marine expeditionary headquarters might be formed.


1229. Record, Jeffrey. The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf. Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 1981. Special Report. ●● The author, a senior fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, considers the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) a “fatally flawed military instrument” and a “standing invitation to military disaster.” He singles out such problems as the RDF’s dependence on forces already committed to other contingencies (notably for NATO use), inadequate strategic (“getting U.S. forces to the Gulf in time”) and tactical mobility (ability of US forces to hold their own on the battlefield against a heavier, fully mechanized enemy), command problems arising from “vicious interservice rivalry,” and an unrealistic reliance on the cooperation of friendly régimes in the Gulf for bases and airfields. Record argues that the present RDF should be replaced by a small, agile, tactically capable intervention force, based at and supplied from sea. His specific recommendations include the following: (1) transferring RDF responsibility to the Marine Corps (“the only service suitable for the mission”); (2) establishing a 5th Fleet for the Indian Ocean and Gulf (to reduce existing confusion in the command structure); (3) increasing reliance on maritime prepositioning of equipment and supplies (to circumvent existing lack of adequate airlift capabilities); (4) acquiring lightweight armored fighting vehicles and adopting a “maneuver warfare” doctrine (to enhance tactical mobility); (5) developing sea-based capabilities to supply and maintain RDF forces (also for reasons of tactical mobility as well as to prevent the emergence of an “ugly American” presence); and (6) improving amphibious shipping and naval gunfire support capabilities (for help in the
forcible seizure of beachheads). Although a few of the author’s objections have been superseded by events in the three years since publication (for example, the evolution of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in the US Central Command), most still stand. Record appears to be concerned principally with perceived drawbacks in the planning process for military intervention (and perhaps as well with overall problems or deficiencies in US defense planning). While one section briefly outlines the range of potential threats, the requirements for coping with each of these threats are never really discussed. Furthermore, the Gulf states remain cyphers: their attitudes, policies and constraints are mentioned only in passing. The points raised in this study are summarized in the author’s “The RDF: Is the Pentagon Kidding?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1981), pp. 41-51; and “The Rapid Deployment Force: Problems, Constraints, and Needs,” in “National Security Policy for the 1980s,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 457 (September 1981), pp. 109-120.

1230. ________. “Effective Intervention in Southwest Asia.” Policy Review, No. 25 (Summer 1983), pp. 69-71. The author reaffirms his earlier published criticism of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) charging that it is “incompatible with the political, logistical, and operational requirements of armed US intervention outside Europe and northeast Asia.”

1231. Schoch, Bruce. “Sea Lift for the RDF.” National Defense, No. 65 (May-June 1981), pp. 71-74. An army reserve officer notes that with the advent of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) the Department of Defense seems to have discovered the “roll-on, roll-off” vessel; it also discovered that it had too few for RDF needs. Schoch explores options in building new vessels, taking over existing private ones and purchasing foreign ships, and concludes that a successful sealift program will require “a blend of different types of ships, both military and civilian, domestic and foreign, old and new.”

1232. Stewart, Richard A. “Tactical Mobility for Rapid Deployment Forces: The Solution is at Hand.” Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 117 (March 1980), pp. 70-72, 83. The author, a Marine Corps officer, argues the merits of lightweight, wheeled, armored vehicles for meeting the tactical mobility requirements of the RDF. He points out that if, for example, Saudi Arabia were attacked near its borders with the Yemens, US reinforcements would have to travel hundreds of miles from the nearest Saudi airfields and ports to reach the combat zone. The above vehicles, he suggests, best meet the requirements for the immediate future, if not the long term as well, since they possess adequate firepower, are easily transportable by strategic airlift, can quickly travel long distances under their own power, are relatively inexpensive and easy to maintain (especially important if prepositioned aboard ships), and are already being produced in various countries.

begins with a short historical survey (1977-1980) of the development of the idea of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and goes on to list the forces allocated to the RDF in 1980 and the Carter administration’s proposals for enhancing air and sea-lift capabilities. The author indicates some of the alternatives to the RDF that have been suggested and discusses some issues that might be raised in congressional debate. In part, the issue of the RDF reflects a wider, political concern over the implications for an American interventionist policy, in which some critics oppose the RDF because they feel that acquisition of the capability to intervene might in fact create a proclivity to do so. The author also points out that the conceptual basis for the use of the RDF has not been adequately delineated and introduces a number of pertinent questions on the role, requirements, and circumstances for use. This issue brief was reprinted in: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Security Interests and Policies in Southwest Asia; Hearings (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1980), pp. 327-336.


1235. U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios and Options. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1978. An evaluation of US planning needs for projection forces to meet various “half-war” contingencies in non-NATO areas, prepared by former Congressional Budget Office analyst Dov S. Zakheim. Emphasis is on Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean crises, specifically US support of Iran against a Soviet-supported Iraqi attack, and US intervention in an Arab-Israeli war. For each contingency, alternative requirements are outlined, based on the anticipated size and purpose of US projection forces, the extent of Soviet capabilities, and the degree of assistance and/or opposition that can be expected from local forces. The study is dated due to recent developments in US and Soviet military capabilities and because of changing circumstances in the region, especially the Iranian revolution and the nature of the Iran-Iraq war.

1236. The Marine Corps in the 1980s: Prestocking Proposals, the Rapid Deployment Force, and Other Issues. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1980. This study contemplates changes in the Marine Corps function away from its traditional amphibious role, due to its inclusion in Rapid Deployment Force planning and its proposed use as a reinforcement force in Norway and Denmark. It is noted that either one of these options, or both, is likely to require the prestocking of equipment and extensive construction in the Indian Ocean and/or northern Europe.

1238. Committee on the Budget. Military Readiness and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF); Hearings, 30 September and 1 October 1980. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1980. The committee’s intention in calling these hearings was to prepare for the struggle over national defense funding in the Fiscal Year 1981 budget, but testimony was also solicited on the question of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) readiness. The witnesses included Lt. Gen. P.X. Kelley (Commander of the RDJTF), Robert B. Pirie, Jr. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), and John R. Quetsch (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense [Comptroller]).

1239. West, F.J., Jr. “Limited U.S.-Soviet Conflict and the RDF.” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 64, No. 8 (August 1980), pp. 39-46. An early assessment of strategy regarding the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), written by the Naval War College’s Director of Strategic Research. The author points out that the RDF may serve to: (1) deter enemies and reassure allies; (2) contain regional crises; (3) act as a tripwire to escalate confrontation beyond the immediate region; or (4) act as a local defense force. But he suggests that, in all of these scenarios, the RDF may not be adequate for its task. Instead, West contends that it is necessary to shore up US power on a global level rather than relying on a local, quick-strike force.

US Military Options and Strategies

1240. Acharya, Amitav. US Military Strategy in the Gulf. London: Routledge, 1989. An overview of US policy in the Gulf, apparently based on a doctoral dissertation at Murdoch University, Perth, Australia. The author discusses the evolution of US interests, its reliance on the Shah and the Nixon Doctrine, the disappearance of its Pahlavi ally and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the development of the US Central Command and establishment of military facilities in the region, and threats and contingency planning. He concludes that "The crises in Iran and Afghanistan were a turning point in the U.S. global strategic posture in general and its Persian Gulf policy in particular. They marked the erosion, both in a

1241. Agmon, Marcy. *Post-Cold War U.S. Security Strategies for the Persian Gulf*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. Project Air Force & Arroyo Center, R-4268-AF/A. The author examines four different security approaches that the US could adopt for the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. The first would be to create a unilateral Saudi capability to defend the Arabian Peninsula employing intensive assistance. The second alternative would be to ensure that Saudi Arabia would be capable of holding an aggressor for 10 to 30 days until US forces could deploy to the region. In the third alternative, the United States would rely on regional security arrangements involving the formal participation of only Middle Eastern and South Asian actors (such as Egypt and Syria). In the fourth, the US would disengage from internal affairs of the Gulf states and maintain a stable military balance in the region by regulating arms transfers and/or intervening militarily to deter or defeat potential hegemons. Agmon concludes that the first and third policies would pose high military risks and are highly sensitive to political instability (and of course the Damascus Eight [i.e., the six GCC states plus Egypt and Syria] experiment has long disappeared). She suggests that the US-Saudi security condominium posed by the second alternative would maximize military effectiveness but, on the other hand, an American role as a “disengaged balancer” (the fourth choice) would minimize provocativeness and vulnerability to political instability. The study suggests that regional arms control would provide the least costly and most beneficial course of action but recognizes that a conventional arms control agreement is unlikely to be negotiated in the near-term, even with the disappearance of American-Soviet rivalry.


1243. Ayoob, Mohammed. “Blueprint for a Catastrophe: Conducting Oil Diplomacy by ‘Other Means’ in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.” *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (December 1979), pp. 265-273. A research fellow at Australian National University when this article was published, Ayoob charges that “no other decision, except one which irrevocably committed the US in Vietnam, has had as much potential for catastrophe as a decision regarding the [RDF] and its possible deployment would have.” He goes on to suggest ways in which Australia could play a constructive role in the matter and maximize its influence over the US (as in restricting American use of Australian listening posts).

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at US and Soviet political objectives and military capabilities in the Gulf with the goal of providing a framework for devising an American strategy in and around the Gulf. US goals are identified as deterring Soviet military moves, preventing regional instability, and maintaining Western influence in order to guarantee a steady flow of oil. Soviet objectives include securing its borders, limiting Chinese influence, increasing access to Gulf oil, and expanding its influence at the expense of the West. Threats to American interests are seen coming from the subversion of key pro-Western régimes, aggression by a Soviet client state, Soviet military action, and increasing Soviet influence. The report also discusses the politics of the region and the impact of its geography on the superpowers’ ability to project force into the Gulf. The military forces of the two adversaries are examined and relative capabilities in a number of scenarios assessed. In a direct confrontation of Soviet-American forces, Soviet military strength is judged stronger than that of the US on the condition that the action takes place close to Soviet borders and the conflict remains conventional. In conclusion, challenges to American interests are seen to be more political than military, with military threats more likely to come from within the region than from Moscow. In developing a strategy to meet potential threats, five key issues must be addressed: (1) whether to establish a military presence in the area through bases, the RDF, or temporary deployments; (2) whether to emphasize the Soviet threat or threats emanating from within the region; (3) whether to use a large conventional force or a small force combined with nuclear threats in the case of war; (4) how to balance the costs and benefits of relying on friends in the region; and (5) whether to enunciate or blur public statements regarding American commitment to the Gulf. However, after having raised these issues, the study does not attempt to solve them, nor does it consider the possibility of no intervention.


1246. Cordesman, Anthony H. Saudi Arabia, AWACS, and America’s Search for Strategic Stability in the Near East. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1981. Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. This study by a military analyst and Woodrow Wilson Fellow at the time of publication appeared during the controversy over the Reagan administration’s plans to sell AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Cordesman sees Saudi Arabia as the key pillar in the search for stability in the Gulf. At the same time, it is a country faced by serious military threats, as shown by the Iran-Iraq war. He reaches the singularly unambiguous conclusion that “There can be little doubt, given the overall balance of advantages and risks, that the sale of the AWACS package to Saudi Arabia would serve the most important single objective the U.S. has in attempting to improve the
strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.” A similar article on this topic is Cordesman’s “The Search for Strategic Stability in the Persian Gulf,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 119, No. 1 (September 1981), pp. 61, 64, 68, 72, 76, 78-80, 84.

1247. ________. *U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment. The author, co-director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, examines US military capabilities in the Gulf from 1997 to 2001 and the strategic relationships that emerged between the US and the GCC states after the Kuwait War. He also details US planning for a major contingency in the region and ability to counter WMD proliferation. He notes that “there is no simple solution to the problem of maintaining US capabilities in the region, and there is now way to make further major savings in US forces or in related US defense spending.” (p. 130)

1248. ________. “The Persian-Arabian Gulf and the Revolution in Military Affairs.” *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 81-89. A senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that observers in the Gulf do not look at the US as being in the middle of a revolution in military affairs. Instead, military power is part of a larger game that is “driven by largely by the threat posed by Iranian and Iraqi strategic ambitions, Saudi Arabia’s need for status and security, and the desire of the smaller southern gulf states to find a balance between the larger powers in the Gulf that provides them the most security, status, and freedom of action.” (p. 81)


1252. Ederington, L. Benjamin, and Michael J. Mazarr, eds. *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. The editors, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and legislative assistant for an Oklahoma congressman respectively, have assembled a collection of papers that focus on US defense policy, globally as well as in the Gulf, and the future determinants of its military strategy. Thus,
only three contributions focus directly on the Kuwait War: Eliot A. Cohen (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) looks at the air war, John Keegan (Daily Telegraph, London) at the ground war, and John H. Cushman (US Army, retired) on implications of the war for future military strategy. Edward B. Atkeson (CSIS and US Army, retired) also discusses US military strategy in the Middle East.

1253. Eisenstadt, Michael. “U.S. Military Capabilities in The Post Cold-war Era: Implications for Middle East Allies.” *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1998), distributed electronically. A senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy discusses the impact of the end of the Cold War on the US military, as well as the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, and speculates on the role of the Middle East and especially Gulf in US military and security strategy. He speculates that “the eventual transformation of the Persian Gulf as a primary supplier of petroleum for Europe and the United States toward East Asia; the military strain of maintaining a significant forward military presence in the Gulf; and the growing risk associated with maintaining a large forward presence in a proliferated world, could eventually force a rethinking of U.S. strategy toward the Gulf.” But he cautions that “the United States and its allies will need to integrate political, economic, and military policy instruments in order to achieve their objectives in the Middle East.”

1254. Epstein, Joshua M. *Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987. A research associate at the Brookings Institution outlines three basic strategies for the United States to deter Soviet conventional aggression on the Gulf. These are vertical escalation, in which the US responds to violation of a tripwire by threatening to escalate to the use of nuclear weaponry. A second strategy involves horizontal escalation, in which a Soviet threat is met by geographical counterthreats to the Soviet Union outside the Gulf. A third strategy involves conventional defense, requiring an American military build-up to delay a Soviet overland advance through Iran and envisioning a direct confrontation in Khuzestan. The author discounts the viability of the first two strategies and asserts that their attraction rests on the false assumption that conventional defense is unfeasible and he further suggests that establishing the capability to fight a Soviet advance on the Gulf will persuade Moscow not to try it. Several chapters were earlier published as the articles cited below.

1255. ________. “Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent.” *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126-159. The author of this impressively detailed article takes issue with the “general consensus that without using nuclear weapons the United States would stand little chance of handling an all-out [Soviet] invasion of Iran....” Presumed Soviet advantages in having greater force available and a shorter distance to cover are discounted by Epstein. He argues that the rough terrain and extreme vulnerability of a few transport routes allows the US to delay a Soviet overland drive long enough to put four RDF divisions into Khuzistan. These should prove adequate to meet a probable maximum Soviet force of seven divisions, given US advantages in technology, training, mobility,
logistics, coordination and probably even morale. An airlifted assault, Epstein contends, would be just as vulnerable since the Soviet Union does not possess sufficient fighter escort capability and it would be operating outside its normal range of ground control. In addition, even a massed bomber attack on US carriers in the region, in support of a combined overland and airlifted assault, would provide no real assurance of success. Furthermore, the diversion of resources necessary to pursue such a strategy would undermine Soviet defense elsewhere. The author concludes that “The Soviets face the grave threat that the military cost of a move on Iran would vastly outweigh its potential benefits—indeed, the risk that all such benefits would be decisively denied.”

1256. ________. “Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme.” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 19-31. The author notes that President Carter first committed the US to deterrence of Soviet aggression in the Gulf. While this deterrent commitment was affirmed intact by the Reagan administration, the symmetrical thrust of the Carter Doctrine (responding to a Soviet threat to the Gulf by promising military action in the Gulf) was replaced by attraction to an asymmetrical conventional strategy for the Gulf, or horizontal escalation (shifting US reaction to terrain better suited to American strengths, as in matching a Soviet attack on the Gulf for an American one on Cuba). Epstein contends that this policy raises a number of questions that have not been answered, or are perhaps unanswerable. He argues that horizontal escalation is not credible because it is not clear what the targets would be, how they would be determined in wartime, or what military action would be employed against them. Furthermore, it is not clear that such asymmetrical operations would achieve US wartime goals and they run the risk of provoking nuclear escalation.

1257. Fabyanic, Thomas A. “Conceptual Planning and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1981), pp. 343-365. It is the contention of the author, an Air Force officer at the Air War College, that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) represents a watershed in US strategic planning but that “current conceptual planning [for the RDJTF’s use] is leading to some serious oversimplifications about a very complex equation. “ The first priority is to define the essential purpose of the RDJTF. Fabyanic believes that the formulation of this priority may well lead to a force that is neither well suited to ensuring access to oil supplies nor to promoting stability in the region but, rather, to deterring Soviet expansion. The accomplishment of this objective depends on several “strategic assumptions” which may be unwarranted: (1) that the US can and will possess a force of adequate size (the likelihood of several simultaneous contingencies may limit the number of units actually available to the RDJTF in time of crisis); (2) that the US will receive adequate support from major allies during a Gulf crisis (but these allies may not perceive a crisis in the same way as the US); (3) the US will be able to maintain access to the region (but the difficulties of the states in the region in maintaining political and socioeconomic stability may prevent access); and (4) the possibility of containing any Gulf conflict at a certain level of hostilities, however, may
extend beyond the region, and superpower supporting roles may escalate into direct confrontation and even general war.

1258. Hanks, Robert J. *The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East. Problems and Prospects*. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, December 1982. Foreign Policy Report. The author, a senior analyst with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, examines the evolution of the military role of the US in the Middle East since World War II, surveys present US forces in the region, assesses the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and looks at the attitudes of other outside powers. Hanks concludes that the US is at a severe military disadvantage in the Middle East vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He notes with approval the efforts of the Carter administration to create a viable Rapid Deployment Force, and regards the Reagan administration’s emphasis on restoring American military power as a major step toward “an improved future capability for this nation to safeguard its interests in the Middle East.” NATO allies are castigated for their unwillingness to take collective action outside the formal boundaries of the alliance, and American policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict is seen as the principal reason why the Arabian Peninsula states have not already turned to the US for military cooperation. See also his “Rapid Deployment in Perspective,” *Strategic Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1981), pp. 17-23.

1259. Hickman, William F. “Did It Really Matter?” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (March-April 1983), pp. 17-30. Hickman asks the question of whether the presence of two carrier battle groups in the Arabian Sea during the Iranian hostage crisis really mattered as a way of examining the use of naval forces as an instrument of US foreign policy. The author, a naval officer, concludes that the American naval deployment during this crisis served no useful purpose, largely because the Carter administration did not intend to use military force to influence a political situation. Hickman sees two implications for the future of this experience. First, if the use of battle groups to influence a political situation is unsuccessful, their continued presence may produce negative results. Second, deployment of battle groups may make a better signal to the Soviet Union than to local states, since it is likely that both actors in such a case would perceive the signal in the same manner.

1260. Ignotus, Miles (pseud.). “Seizing Arab Oil.” *Harper’s*, Vol. 250, No. 1498 (March 1975), pp. 45-62. A diatribe against “the depredations of OPEC,” asserting that the “only feasible countervailing power to OPEC’s control of oil is ... military power.” The author’s incitement for invasion is justified on the specious grounds that the OPEC states are “extortionists” and the Arabs “blackmailers,” and that “behind the Arabs stand the Russians.” His solution calls for the US to strike quickly, utilizing Israeli bases and assistance, seize Saudi oilfields and turn them over permanently to compliant (presumably American) oil companies.

security situation in the Gulf since the Kuwait War and US military planning for the region. He notes that preparations include combined exercises, security assistance, access agreements, and prepositioning. He concludes that “The Pentagon sees future war in the Persian Gulf as its primary raison d’être in terms of overseas conflicts” and sees “remarkable continuity between the Bush and Clinton administrations.” (p. 442)

1262. Karaosmanoglu, Ali L. “Turkey’s Security and the Middle East.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (1983), pp. 156-175. ●● In recent years, Gulf security has become an increasingly important strategic concern to Turkey, ranking alongside relations with the superpowers and Greece. Turkish policy regarding this “vital interest,” however, has tended to be cautious, according to Karaosmanoglu. While Turkey is willing to cooperate fully with NATO on Gulf matters, NATO’s European members have been notably reluctant to act and Turkey is unwilling to make any formal commitment outside NATO. As part of its NATO obligations, it recently agreed to increased American use of airfields in eastern Turkey which would be particularly useful in interdicting lines of communication in a Soviet strike through Iran. Nevertheless, Turkey retains reservations about American policy in the region, including its handling of Arab-Israeli matters and the possible use of the Rapid Deployment Force for purposes other than prevention of a direct Soviet assault on the Gulf.

1263. MacDonald, Charles G. “The United States and Gulf Conflict Scenarios.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1983), pp. 23-27. ●● An assistant professor of international relations at Florida International University envisages three possible scenarios leading to American use of force in the Gulf: (1) response to the actions of an outside power (the Soviet Union); (2) response to actions of a state within the region; and (3) response to actions of groups within one of the region’s states. Of these, MacDonald sees a Soviet move into Iran as being the most likely scenario with a second possibility being Soviet intervention in South Yemen should the latter decide to move against Saudi Arabia.

1264. McNaugher, Thomas L. *Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. ●● A research associate at the Brookings Institution examines the Soviet military threat to the Gulf and assesses American requirements to counter it. He also looks at the components of Arabian Peninsula states’ security, including their military capabilities and prospects for cooperative defense. The author believes that US security policy in the region should rest on both “a cooperative understated support of the GCC’s traditional security mechanisms, and the possibility of the offensive use of force.” (p. 161) With this in mind, he outlines the requirements for both concerns and concludes that “A massive reorganization of U.S. forces or a reorientation of the U.S. position on the Arabian Peninsula is less crucial than a refinement of relationships among the United States, the GCC states, and those regional and Western powers intimately involved in peninsular security. Cooperation must be improved on margins where the payoffs are likely to be the highest.” (p. 198) An earlier article adapted
from this book was published as “Arms and Allies on the Arabian Peninsula.” *Orbis*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall 1984), pp. 489-526.

1265. __________. “Deterring Soviet Forces in Southwest Asia.” In Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., *National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits* (New York; Praeger, 1984; Foreign Policy Research Institute Series), pp. 125-154. •• The author suggests that the only feasible US response to the new strategic situation in the Gulf is one of deterrence. In his view, a Soviet drive into northwestern Iran must be met by US forces at that point. This requires an effective air interdiction campaign, the insertion of US ground forces by air into northwestern Iran, and adequate air and sea strategic lift to provide the necessary support. To be successful, improvements must be made in strategic lift capabilities and in acquiring access to regional facilities, a process which requires more diplomacy and tact in dealing with Gulf states than hitherto shown by the US. “Against the backdrop of pessimism that so often surrounds the comparison of U.S. and Soviet military power in the Gulf, this stands as a relatively sanguine assessment of the problem. Especially at the level of force posture, it suggests that in general the problem of balancing Soviet power in the Gulf is not an overwhelming one, and in particular that current planning for ... CENTCOM ... is not fundamentally wrongheaded.”

1266. O’Neill, Bard E. *Petroleum and Security: The Limitations of Military Power in the Persian Gulf*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, October 1977. Research Directorate Monograph 77-4. •• The author, a faculty member at the National War College, examines the threat of a Soviet seizure of Gulf oil sources, and possible interference with the flow of oil to the West by revolutionary groups supported by the USSR. He notes a number of factors affecting the use of force as a weapon of statecraft, including public opinion, military capabilities, the international structure of power, international values, and institutional restraints or bureaucratic factors. O’Neill contends that these factors do not rule out the use of military force but may act as restraints on intervention. As an alternative to full-scale military involvement, the author advocates arms sales.

1268. Roche, James G. “Projection of Military Power to Southwest Asia: An Asymmetrical Problem.” In Uri Ra’an’an, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions and Problems (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), pp. 218-225. The author contends that there are two kinds of asymmetries in power projection to Southwest Asia that favor the Soviet Union over the US. The first is in infrastructure, by which he means Soviet military preparations along the southern border and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as involvement with opposition groups in various countries of the region. The second kind, which Roche asserts is more fundamental, involves differences in purpose and style. “Power projection” means not only invasion and counter-invasion but also the provision of military aid and advisers, sabotage, and insertion of small military units. This kind of power projection favors the Soviet Union in the Gulf, since the US, its allies and friends, trying to hold on to things they have, are on the defensive. As a consequence, Roche contends that the US must not only deter the Soviets from invasion but also be capable of other means of “counter-power projection” as well.


1272. Terasawa, Katsuaki L., and William R. Gates. “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications for the Future.” Defense Analysis, Vol. 9 (August 1993), pp. 171-195. Proceeding from the assumption that Operation Desert Storm may be the most likely form of future US deployment, the authors, professors of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, examine burden-sharing in future contingencies. Noting the impossibility of accurately measuring the comparative costs and benefits to coalition members during the Kuwait War, the authors conclude that the debate should be reoriented from “outcomes” to “processes.” They suggest that contributions to common causes might be increased through bargaining between long-run considerations and short-run concessions or by the alternatives of matching grants or extensive networks of formal alliances which set out each member’s obligations.

The report examines eight countries in the Gulf and Red Sea region (Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iran, and Ethiopia), and analyses the security environment of each country, its military capabilities, and its military relationship with the US, and indications for future US policy. In its conclusions, the report notes that the region’s governments tend to regard Department of Defense surveys of their military requirements as indications of US willingness to sell arms. Limited trained manpower is seen as the major obstacle to the effective integration of new weapons. On the US end, problems are noted in the frequent lack of familiarity of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) personnel with either the countries to which they are assigned or the Foreign Military Sales and MAAG programs in which they take part.

1274. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf; Report of a Staff Study Mission to the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Horn of Africa, 21 October-13 November 1980.* Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. An assessment of US policy requirements and constraints in the Gulf in the Carter Doctrine era, based on the visit of the report’s authors to nine states in the Gulf region (Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, North Yemen, Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel). The report notes the importance of regional military cooperation in implementing the Carter Doctrine and the problems that this involves. Questions arise over the capability of these states to absorb US arms and military equipment, and the necessity of granting assistance to some of these countries is stressed. The report also points out that the Soviet Union is not the only significant threat, and outlines some of the more serious factors threatening the internal stability of the Gulf states. As regards US military power, the report notes the present inadequacies of the RDF and the limited nature of negotiated facilities agreements. The authors make the following additional recommendations as part of an overall strategy to protect U.S interest in the region: the assumption of greater Gulf responsibilities by American allies in Western Europe and Japan; the improvement of the abilities of the Gulf states to withstand attacks by hostile neighbors and to delay a Soviet assault; the incorporation of Egyptian, Israeli, Sudanese, and Turkish assistance in a US Gulf deterrent strategy; increased prepositioning of US equipment in or near the Gulf; and institution of a high-level review to “determine whether U.S. security needs in the Gulf can be accomplished adequately short of a permanent American military presence in the area.”

1275. U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations;* Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, DC: GSGPO, 1979. Foreign policy and defense objectives, major US military facilities and installations, and US policy alternatives for the Indian Ocean, Arabian Peninsula, and Gulf are discussed on pp. 84-121. The authors conclude that “Essentially, the United States would seem to have two broad alternatives for pursuing its political, economic and military objectives in the region: (1) reliance on regional systems
to secure U.S. objectives and, (2) a resources-oriented forward naval strategy.” Present policy is seen as constituting one variation of the first alternative.

1276. Waltz, Kenneth N. “A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force.” *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1981), pp. 49-73. The author, a political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, contends that while much has been written about the design of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), not enough has been said about the problem of devising a strategy for its use. He argues that the proper strategy should be the creation of an “asset-seizing, deterrent force [as] an alternative to a war-fighting defensive force. The RDF should be designed to defend against countries of the Middle East and to deter the Soviet Union.” Keeping the RDF force structure lean and solely directed at securing oilfields would not only obviate the need for a military base in the Gulf but would make the Soviet Union less likely to test U.S. defenses there and would also help Washington resist the temptation to use force, if available, to intervene in various crises. Waltz does not indicate how his conception of a deterrent force differs from present planning, arguing instead that “This essay is about the strategy of the RDF, and not about its design.”

1277. Wasielewski, Philip G. “Sea Power and Counterinsurgency.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 112 (December 1986), pp. 62-66. A US Marine Corps officer observes that “Most of the Arabian Peninsula’s population and oil works are within 100 miles of the sea” and suggests that “a military strategy of low-key counterinsurgency characterized by the projection of sea power ashore is feasible for Southwest Asia.” (p. 62)

1278. Weeks, Albert L. “The Risks of Far-Flung Deployment.” *Military Science Technology*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1982), pp. 50-59. The author begins by recalling Thucydides’ account of “how not to deploy forces at too great distances.” Similarly, it is pointed out that although the US is committed to using the Rapid Deployment Force in certain eventualities, it faces considerable difficulties in doing so. This problem is compounded by relative Soviet advantages in projecting force into the Gulf, and in particular by their emphasis on upgrading their equivalent of the RDF. Weeks asserts that the Soviets first chose to build up their strategic clout and conventional forces and only lately have developed a full-fledged “forward-reach” capability, the timing of which the author links to the gradual retreat of the US from overseas commitments and the “Vietnam syndrome.”

1279. Wohlstetter, Albert. “Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf.” *Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 1980), pp. 128-188. A long, rambling discourse on how threats to the Gulf posed by the Soviet Union and by “radical” states in the region have been taken far less seriously than they should be, especially by American allies who have far more to lose. The author suggests that there are four alternative strategies to reducing the danger to American and Western interests in the Gulf and dismisses as unfeasible the first three: “(1) the futile hope that alliance dependence on the Persian Gulf can be eliminated; (2) the wan and discredited hope that regional powers will be willing and able to protect the persistent, critical alliance interests there; and (3) the reliance on desperate and unconvincing threats of escalation,
possibly to nuclear war.” Instead, Wohlstetter contends that the West is left with no alternative but to meet a conventional threat on its own terms. This requires a continuous and substantial allied combat presence in the region and not merely a force rapidly deployed from the US. Wohlstetter suggests that the least obtrusive presence would be a naval one and he proposes several steps for creating a viable combat presence: (1) increasing the force structure of the US Navy; (2) improving the way in which naval forces are constructed; (3) building up forward floating depots; (4) building faster logistic and other ships; (5) improving basing on Diego Garcia for use by B-52s (to strike against Soviet targets); (6) securing many alternative base facilities in the region (since the states there tend to be undependable); and (7) increasing the contribution by extraregional allies within NATO. In particular, Wohlstetter details the advantages of increased military assistance to Turkey, not only in defending the Gulf against a Soviet attack but also in protecting the eastern Mediterranean and Sixth Fleet. Virtually the same article was published as “Half-Wars and Half-Policies in the Persian Gulf,” in W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), pp. 123-171.

The Soviet Union/Russia and the Gulf

Strategic Interests and Goals


1281. Blank, Stephen. “Russia, the Gulf and Central Asia in a New Middle East.” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1994), pp. 267-281. Russia’s preoccupation with the security of the Central Asian republics, principal reason for the Middle East as a key area of its foreign policy, is spelled out in this article. While Moscow seeks to maintain Iraq and seeks to keep on good terms with the Arab world generally, its primary goal is a mutually reinforcing relationship with Iran. Iran is of key importance to Russia because of the possibility of its influence in Central Asia, Russia’s desire to see Iran play a constraining role in Afghanistan, and because the linkage facilitates Russian penetration of the Middle East. But the ties with Iran strain the viability of Russia’s overall design for the Middle East because of Arab suspicions of Iran and may force Moscow to choose between them, despite Iran’s importance for Russia’s borderlands’ security. Blank concludes that “The idea that Russia will renounce its historic interests in a vital area to obtain increasingly doubtful Western benefits is not a basis for viable policies.” (p. 278) See also the same author’s “Russia and the Gulf,” Perceptions, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1996-1997), pp. 30-55.
1282. Chubin, Shahram. “Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East.” *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1982), pp. 122-152. The author claims that the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East is largely a function of the West’s handling of the Arab-Israeli dispute: “Soviet attractiveness is only relative, but it may meet short-term security needs.” The Soviets, he says, are optimistic that the disruptive process of modernization will benefit them, since it is here that the West is most vulnerable. Chubin points out that Soviet policy has both offensive and defensive aspects: to establish military dominance and to protect the homeland. At a minimum, Moscow seeks recognition as co-manager of the region. He also points out that some progress has been made toward better relations with Saudi Arabia and contends that Iran’s international isolation virtually provides the Soviet Union with a free hand to establish its influence there.

1283. Cigar, Norman. “The Soviet Navy in the Persian Gulf: Naval Diplomacy in a Combat Zone.” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 56-88. A Middle East desk officer on the US Army staff examines the deployment of Soviet warships to the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War in the context of Soviet relations with littoral states and the consequent reaction of the United States. He regards the entrance of Soviet vessels as setting a precedent for their legitimate use there and says that “the success and low political and military cost of the Soviet deployment to the Gulf is likely to reinforce Moscow’s willingness to consider using its naval forces in similar situations elsewhere in the future.” (p. 81)

1284. Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha, eds. *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives*. New York: Holmes & Meier, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982. Based on papers delivered at Chatham House during 1980-1981, this collection does not directly address Soviet policy or intentions in the Gulf but most of the contributors do touch upon the subject. Authors include Jonathan Alford (International Institute for Strategic Studies), Shahram Chubin (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), Adeed Dawisha (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Karen Dawisha (then at the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics), Edwina Moreton (The Economist), Robert Patman (University of Southampton), Alan H. Smith (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London), Anthony Stacpoole (British Petroleum), and Malcolm Yapp (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London).

1285. Dawisha, Karen. “Moscow’s Moves in the Direction of the Gulf—So Near and Yet So Far.” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1980-1981), pp. 219-234. The author notes the limits on Soviet policy options at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war: “The presence of troops in Afghanistan may have put the Soviets so near to the Gulf in geographic terms, yet not for many years had Moscow been so far from influencing events in that region.” An almost identical version of this article was published as “Moscow and the Gulf,” *World Today*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1981), pp. 8-14.
1286. ________. “Soviet Decision-Making and the Middle East: The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War.” *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 57, No. 1 (1980-1981), pp. 43-59. ●● The author contrasts the Soviet experience in these two Middle Eastern wars by pointing out the institutional differences in Soviet decision-making between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. Differences between the two cases were due as well to the short duration of the 1973 war and Moscow’s preoccupation with Poland in 1980. In neither case, Dawisha points out, was the USSR able to significantly influence or control its clients.

1287. Dunn, Keith A. “Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis.” *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 607-629. ●● The author, an analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, points out that constraints on US military capabilities in Southwest Asia have received considerable attention but that there have been few systematic attempts to discuss Soviet constraints in the region. In the author’s view, noteworthy constraints include: (1) Soviet ground forces (most of the 25 divisions along the border are unprepared, undermanned and lack adequate logistical support for a sustained campaign); (2) Soviet tactical air support (many of the aircraft the Soviets could put into action in Southwest Asia would be less than frontline quality and are limited in their ability to perform close air-support functions); (3) Soviet naval forces (the USSR has only recently moved from a coastal defense force to a globally deployed navy, with only limited deployment in the Indian Ocean); (4) geography (the mountainous and desert terrain of Iran does not favor Soviet tank and mechanized divisions with limited logistical support); (5) distance (it may be only a short hop from Soviet territory to Azerbaijan but it is nearly 1200 miles to Hormuz and 2000 to Aden; furthermore, not all Soviet tactical planes can reach Hormuz even from Afghanistan, while Soviet naval reinforcements have nearly as far to travel as the US); (6) risk (the USSR faces the same problem as the US in depending upon regional clients). Dunn concludes by contending that the main constraint is political: “It involves a lack of friends and allies; a lack of guaranteed access to facilities; and a general dislike and distrust for not only the Soviet Union but also the communist system. Therefore, the primary U.S. response to the Soviet threat must continue to be essentially political, bolstered by military capabilities—and not the reverse.”

1288. Dunn, Michael Collins. “Soviet Interests in the Arabian Peninsula: The Aden Pact and the Other Paper Tigers.” *American Arab Affairs*, No. 8 (Spring 1984), pp. 92-98. ●● The managing editor of *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly* describes the background to the August 1981 Aden Pact between South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya, and outlines the subsequent developments that have worked to make the pact a “paper tiger.” In Dunn’s view, the “key military and strategic positions of Soviet forces in the region have been neither enhanced nor harmed by the Aden Pact” and it “has been far less destabilizing than events elsewhere....” “If there is a threat to the security of the Gulf at the moment, it appears to be from Tehran, not directly from Moscow.”
1289. Freedman, Robert O. “Russia and the Middle East: the Primakov Era.” *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998), distributed electronically. The president of Baltimore Hebrew University looks at the influence of Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov (appointed January 1996) on Moscow’s policy in the Middle East, including Iraq and Iran. The author sees that “His policy ... has closely resembled that of his predecessor, with the exception of Russian policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict which has acquired a special flavor under Primakov,” i.e. a chilling of relations.

1290. Fukuyama, Francis. *The Soviet Threat to the Persian Gulf*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, March 1981. Rand Paper, No. P-6596. The author, a Rand analyst, asserts that the threats to Western access to Gulf oil posed by the Soviet Union are military intrusion, subversion, and Moscow’s ability to exploit purely internal developments for its own purposes. After a brief summary of Soviet policy toward each of the major Gulf states, Fukuyama discusses the record of Soviet threats to intervene in the Middle East and concludes that until Afghanistan they were bluffs, with Soviet restraint due largely to fear of an American response. But he warns that this may not hold true in the future and contends that the US and its allies must increase their capabilities to project power into the Gulf.

1291. Gawad, Atef A. “Moscow’s Arms-for-Oil Diplomacy.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 63 (Summer 1986), pp. 147-168. A journalist contends that the Iran-Iraq war has provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to swap arms for oil that is then exported to the West for much needed hard currency. By doing this, “the Soviet Union seems to be delicately balancing its strategic advantages against the economic and Islamic factors. The Iran-Iraq war demonstrates how these interests can conflict.” (p. 148)

1292. ———. “How the Gulf Was Won: Oil and Islam in Soviet Foreign Policy.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 22 (Fall 1987), pp. 56-62. A journalist working on his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics charges that the Soviet Union has redoubled its efforts to seek influence in the Gulf because of its dwindling oil production and desperate need for hard-currency earnings. The Iran-Iraq War has been a bonanza for Moscow since it is able to sell arms to both sides. He concludes that “After years of political eclipse, the Soviets are returning to the Middle East, not through their traditional allies among the radical Arabs but through the conservative anticommunist régimes of the Gulf.” (p. 62)

1293. Halliday, Fred. *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981. Revised and republished as *Threat From the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1982. The author, a fellow at the Transnational Institute and a prolific writer on the Middle East and leftist movements in the Third World, takes issue with conventional Western assumptions which view Soviet-inspired political upheavals in the so-called “arc of crisis” as part of a grand design. Instead, he contends that the principal sources of political change in these countries have resulted from internal causes, exacerbated by the actions of both
the US and the Soviet Union. He supports his argument by first tracing the emergence of a “new cold war” in the late 1970s which resulted in a reemphasis on a Soviet threat, this time directed at Southwest Asia rather than Western Europe or the Far East. Halliday points out that Moscow has cause for concern over the vulnerability of its southern frontiers (the only place where the USSR adjoins the non-communist world). For the Soviet Union, Southwest Asia represents a permanent geopolitical problem while American interests there derive from a two- or three-decade concern with oil. Halliday rejects the idea that gradual implementation of a Soviet master plan for domination of the region is behind developments in Iran, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia over the past decade. Current arguments for a Western counter-offensive, he contends, are based on the mistaken assumptions that the Soviets instigated these events as part of a grand design, that US influence in these areas has been benign and that the US has lacked the will to contest Soviet aggression. Instead, Halliday argues that a “balanced analysis” must be based on recognition that the primary causes of political unrest in the region have been internal. However, he charges the US with primary responsibility for most of the external causes (as in its long support for the repressive régimes of the Shah and Haile Selassie), and views the Soviet role as essentially one of reacting to advantageous developments. Furthermore, he points out that the Soviets do not control the policies of these countries, just as they were unable to control their clients in the Arab world during the past thirty years. In conclusion, Halliday writes that “the West’s alarmism turns out, on closer examination, to be at least as much a product of its own purposes as of the visible actions or probable intentions of the Soviet leadership.”


1298. Lenczowski, George. “The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf: An Encircling Strategy.” International Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1982), pp. 307-327. •• A well-known, conservative scholar on the Middle East, now retired from the University of California at Berkeley, suggests that while the Soviet Union ultimately would like to expand to the Gulf, it will
Defens e and R egi ona l Secur ity in the Arabi an P eni nsula an d G ulf States

settle for weakening and removing the Western presence. He identifies four major thrusts of Soviet policy towards the Gulf: (1) to discredit the role of the US through propaganda and diplomacy; (2) to expand its own influence through a chain of pro-Soviet strongholds (in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Afghanistan); (3) to support revolutionary and subversive movements in the region (as in the Dhufar rebellion and Iran’s revolution); and (4) to exploit the Islamic revolution in Iran for its own purposes. Lenczowski concludes that Soviet penetration of the immediate Gulf region has thus far been averted, but Moscow will increasingly attempt to encircle the region.

1299. Luttwak, Edward. “Cubans in Arabia? Or, the Meaning of Strategy.” Commentary, Vol. 68, No. 6 (December 1979), pp. 62-66. ●● The author, a senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, discusses the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and the Carter administration’s reaction to this set of circumstances. Luttwak charges that the brigade fits into a strategy to upgrade Cuban intervention capabilities and contends that there is only one possible theater of operations for Cuban armored forces: the Arabian Peninsula (anywhere else, the Cuban force would be too small or armor would not be necessary). Luttwak alleges that the Cuban brigade is bound for South Yemen, with the eventual target being Oman.

1300. Nosenko, Tatiana V. “Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf.” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 71-77. ●● This look at Soviet policy by a research fellow in Moscow points out that “the Soviet Union’s response to Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait constitutes one of the most spectacular demonstrations of a sweeping turn in Soviet foreign policy.” Instead of articles in the Soviet press a few years ago denouncing the antipopulist régime in Kuwait and praising the forces of progress in Iraq, “Moscow has condemned the Iraqi aggression ... and joined the international community in imposing sanctions against the aggressor.” (p. 74) Instead of generating antagonism between the Soviet Union and the West, Iraq has prompted the establishment of high-level dialogue between the two leaderships.

1301. Page, Stephen. The USSR and Arabia: The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes Towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula. London: Central Asian Research Centre; New York: International Publications Service, 1971. ●● This early study examines Soviet involvement with the states of the Arabian Peninsula “from its beginnings in the 1920s, through its flowering in the mid-1950s, until the death of President Nasser in September 1970.” Page concludes that the USSR has always acted with great caution in the area, and that Moscow’s policies in the region generally have been reactive. Although dated, this volume provides a solid background to the events of the last decade.

1302. ________. “Soviet Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula.” In Philip H. Stoddard, ed., The Middle East in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1983), pp. 88-98. ●● Page notes that despite growing Soviet interests in the Arabian Peninsula over the 1970s, Moscow was able to take advantage of only one
opportunity to expand its influence—that of South Yemen. In looking at Soviet prospects for the 1980s, Page notes such obstacles to an expanding Soviet influence as Moscow’s occupation forces in Afghanistan, its identification with national liberation movements which prevents the establishment of normal relations with the conservative oil states (except for Kuwait), and the relative unattractiveness of its technology and culture for these states. He sees the Soviet course in the future as embracing a cautious policy aimed at establishing normal relations with as many governments as possible. “Their aim, as in the past, will be to reduce Western influence in the region, and particularly to prevent the expansion of the United States’ military presence.”

1303. ________. “Moscow and the Arabian Peninsula.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 8 (Spring 1984), pp. 83-91. The author, professor of international relations at Sheridan College in Ontario, surveys Soviet relations with various states of the Arabian Peninsula and analyzes Moscow’s reactions to developments in recent years. With the demise of detente, he sees the Soviet Union exhibiting more rapid and forceful responses to opportunities, although it has “still reacted cautiously when no opportunities presented themselves or when confronted by firmness.”

1304. ________. “Patterns of Soviet Activity in Southwest Asia.” *International Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 300-323. An international relations specialist at Sheridan College in Ontario summarizes Soviet policy vis-à-vis Iran, Iraq, the two Yemens, and Afghanistan. He observes that “The Soviet Union clearly considers Southwest Asia important and is willing to devote significant military and political resources to attain its objectives there, whether defensive, imperialist, or influence-building. Its approach might be characterized as patient incrementalism....” (pp. 321-322)


1306. Phillips, James A. *Moscow Stalks the Persian Gulf*. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1984. Backgrounder No. 333. A senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation paints an alarmist picture of Soviet designs on the Gulf: “The Soviet Union has encircled the Gulf with military strongholds and is biding its time for an opening in the center. Given the prevailing trends, the Soviets have little reason to rely on brute military force to kick open Gulf doors – these doors may be opened for them from the inside.”

1307. Price, David Lynn. “Moscow and the Persian Gulf.” *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (March-April 1979), pp. 1-13. The author, editor of *Arab Oil* (Kuwait), claims that Moscow improved its position in the Gulf spectacularly as a result of recent events there. Nevertheless, he believes that Moscow still tends to follow rather than direct events in the Gulf, and only if radical régimes stay in power for some time will the USSR prepare a long-term political strategy for the region. Those Gulf states worried about Soviet advances may try to play the “China card,” but Price suggests that China is unable to provide much military assistance and therefore is of little help. The US will probably be preferred as a
bulwark against the Soviet threat. “The regional states will look for signs of a determined American policy in the area as they decide what course to follow in their search for security.”

1308. Ross, Dennis. “Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf.” *International Security*, Vol. 6, No 2 (1981), pp. 159-180. Written while the author was an assistant to the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this solid article points out that Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf derive from the proximity of the Gulf to the Soviet Union’s periphery, its geopolitical importance as a bridge to Africa and the Indian Ocean basin, Western dependency on the region’s oil, and also by increasing Soviet bloc oil needs. Given Soviet cautiousness and a low propensity to take risks, along with a wide range of options for indirectly advancing its goals in the Gulf, Ross feels Moscow is unlikely to use military force to achieve those goals. In addition, a preferred Soviet strategy of using airborne divisions to create a fait accompli in the Gulf faces the difficulties posed by the considerable distances involved and the extreme vulnerability of Soviet air cover. The author suggests that the US needs significant air presence in the lower Gulf and Turkey to threaten this vulnerability, as well as greater ability to defend critical points in the region. Furthermore, American efforts in this direction would also demonstrate US seriousness to defend its interests, an important consideration in dealing with more likely but less direct Soviet options. If the “United States is to bolster its local friends and also give the Soviets incentives to exercise restraint, it needs a strategy that permits it to do more than only react to threats; the United States needs a strategy that is designed to position it to cope with threats but also take advantage of (and even create) opportunities....”

1309. Rubenstein, A. Z. “Soviet Persian Gulf Policy.” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter 1977-1978), pp. 47-55. The author judges that Soviet policy toward the Gulf has not shown impressive results. “Soviet achievements have not come close to matching their ambitions, and their prospects are not promising.” Rubinstein asserts that there has been negligible spillover from the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Gulf, thus preventing Moscow from exploiting that issue, and the Soviets also were unable to capitalize on the oil embargo because of Saudi opposition. He sees some Soviet ability to make inroads in the Gulf through arms sales, but notes that this cannot necessarily be equated with increased political influence.

1310. ________. “The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula.” *World Today*, Vol. 35, No. 11 (November 1979), pp. 442-452. A brief survey of the course of Moscow’s relations with the Arabian Peninsula leads the author to conclude that Soviet influence there is presently limited and is likely to remain so. Although Moscow seeks influence and not instability, it will not be above exploiting and aggravating the latter in the quest for the former. “Opportunism, not ideology, impels Soviet policy, which has taken advantage of, but not determined, the setbacks to Western interests.”
1311. Saivetz, Carol R. *The Soviet Union and the Gulf in the 1980s*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. •• A visiting fellow at Harvard University provides an overview of Soviet interest and policy in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, including an assessment of Gorbachev’s leadership. She concludes that “If one were to sum up Soviet policy toward the Gulf since Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power, it would be opportunism plus polish. The Soviet tilt toward Iran has been a function not only of the fortunes of war, but also of Moscow’s clear desire to regain what was a beneficial political and primarily economic relationship.” (p. 110)

1312. Sherbiny, Naiem A., and Mark A. Tessler, eds. *Arab Oil: Impact on the Arab Countries and Global Implications*. New York: Praeger, 1976. •• Two contributions are of particular relevance here. Robert O. Freedman of Baltimore Hebrew College examines “The Soviet Union and the Politics of Middle Eastern Oil” (pp. 305-327), focusing on the extent to which Soviet oil policies form part of their overall policy of undermining Western influence in the Gulf. He concludes that the Soviets have been successful in reducing the influence of Western oil companies but they failed to capitalize on this success. He also notes that they gained from the oil price rises. Freedman suggests that the Arabs’ preference for Western arms and technology may reduce Soviet influence in the future. However, the West, in taking any military action in the Gulf to safeguard the oil fields, may undermine its own position there vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Elsewhere, John P. Entelis of Fordham University discusses “Oil Wealth and Prospects for Democratization in the Arabian Peninsula: The Case of Saudi Arabia” (pp. 77-111), using Saudi Arabia as a test case for the hypothesis of whether the democratization process is proportionately linked to the level of socio-economic development within a country.

1313. Smolansky, Oles M. “Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential.” *Orbis*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 92-108. •• An early look at Soviet policy in the Gulf, assessed in terms of costs and benefits and risks and gains. Smolansky concludes that any drastic Soviet move in this sensitive area is highly unlikely. Rather, he suggests that a sustained effort at chipping away at Western influence is more probable. A “cold war” in the Gulf region, he feels, would best serve Soviet interests, and the Soviets need a new strategy that will promote stability, particularly in those areas where they have achieved a measure of influence.

1314. Stern, Jonathan P. “Gulf Oil Strategy.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1980), pp. 67-72. •• A consultant and analyst for Conant and Associates deems unrealistic the view that the Soviets intend to take over Gulf oilfields. Instead, he argues that while the US was even more vulnerable to oil cutoffs in 1979 than it had been in 1973, the Soviets had increased their production, resolving their energy needs as well as those of Eastern Europe. Stern concludes that the likelihood of Soviet intervention in the Gulf had decreased with events in Afghanistan. The element of surprise has been lost and NATO resolve has been galvanized.
1315. Yodfat, Aryeh Y. *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet Policy Towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia*. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. ●● Essentially a descriptive survey, organized chronologically, by an Israeli writer who has published a number of previous works on the subject. Yodfat divides his subject into four distinct periods of time: 1917-1975, when the Soviets made a few early approaches but only gained significant inroads during the 1950s and 1960s with obvious Soviet-Arab differences subsequently leading to a decline in Soviet interests in the mid-1970s; 1975-1978, when the Soviets lost ground in the Middle East but gained in the periphery, including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Libya; January 1979-September 1980, when Soviet positions around the Gulf created the impression that they were trying to encircle it but without much success; and September 1980-early 1982, when the Iran-Iraq war helped to weaken the Soviet position since Moscow was rebuffed by Iran, relations with Iraq cooled, and no gains were made elsewhere in the region. The author concludes that the Soviet Union has “a constantly growing interest in the Gulf” for a number of reasons and that it sees Iran and Saudi Arabia as its main targets, hoping to influence events in Iran after Khomeini and to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and build a presence there. ✿

1316. ________. “The USSR and the Persian Gulf Area.” *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (April 1979), pp. 60-72. ●● The author surveys Soviet policy toward each of the Gulf states and concludes that the Soviet position in the area is not very strong and that it would be difficult for Moscow to improve the situation. In addition, Yodfat perceives four basic Soviet aims in the Gulf: (1) increased conflict between local regions and the West; (2) the undermining of traditional pro-Western regimes; (3) the complete removal of Chinese influence from the area; and (4) expansion of the region’s ties to the USSR. ✿

1317. ________, and Mordechai Abir. *In the Direction of the Persian Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf*. London: Frank Cass, 1977. ●● A short, chronological survey of the evolution of Soviet involvement and concern with the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf, written by two Israeli analysts. Following a short recapitulation of Tsarist interests, the authors discuss the first stages of Soviet involvement (from 1917 to the late 1940s), the “breakthrough” of the 1950s and 1960s, and then redoubled efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A chapter on Soviet relations with South Yemen is included, as is one on emerging superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Yodfat and Abir suggest that there is some correlation between the interests of the area’s oil producing states and the Soviet Union, particularly in regard to oil, and that Soviet policy suffered reverses in the early and mid-1970s. Writing before the chain of events in the last half-dozen years, they assert that Moscow has decided at least temporarily to diminish its efforts to gain footholds in the Gulf, partly because “they continue to consider the area outside their sphere of influence and essential to the West.” ✿
Bilateral Relations with Gulf States

Iran

1318. Beeman, William O. “Iran and the United States: Postmodern Culture Conflict in Action.” *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 671-692. An anthropologist at Brown University observes that the American engagement with Iran is one of the longest stand-offs the US has had with any other nation and argues that it “constituted the opening volleys in what promises to be an extended conflict with oppositional forces throughout the Islamic world.” (p. 672) He argues that the bases of foreign-policy formulation in the United States ignore the essential factor of cultural differences and he suggests that “As world politics becomes more multi-centered in the next decades, it will be increasingly necessary for American politicians to deal with the nations of the world on a one-to-one basis, taking their cultural sensibilities into account. Labeling nations and their leaders ‘criminal,’ ‘outlaw’ or ‘crazy’ because the cultural underpinnings for their actions are difficult to understand does nothing to promote real solutions to political differences creating problems in the world today.” (p. 689)

1319. Chubin, Shahram. “The Soviet Union and Iran.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 921-949. The author, Director of Research for the Program for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, charges that there is a tendency in the US to regard Soviet policy toward Iran (or Turkey) in the same light as Soviet policy toward the Arab states. Instead, Chubin points out that Soviet interests in the adjacent states are paramount and longstanding and its policy there is motivated “both by calculations of profit and damage limitation, of opportunism and conservatism.” After a brief discussion of Iran’s recent political evolution, Chubin looks at Soviet policy there and analyzes prospects for Soviet influence. Iran’s revolutionary government, while not pro-Soviet, is not as staunchly anti-Soviet as it is anti-American. Chubin sees a willingness on the part of the Tehran régime “to defer to the USSR when necessary and to exploit it when profitable.” Moscow, for its part, has sought to radicalize Iran and pose as its protector, but has received very little permanent benefit from this approach (as illustrated by Tehran’s crackdown on the Tudeh Party). Nevertheless, it remains keenly concerned about developments in that country and military action against Iran cannot be discounted. See also Chubin’s *Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980. Adelphi Papers, No. 157.


gained, influence in Iran in the last few years. This has been due to Iran’s ideological hostility toward the USSR; its fear of Soviet intervention (especially through the Tudeh Party); heavy-handed Soviet tactics; Iran’s desire not to become too economically dependent on its northern neighbor; and conflict over the two states’ regional policies. While the author sees a Soviet invasion of Iran as possible due to developments in Iran or Soviet setbacks in superpower competition, he expects Moscow to maintain its present course of supporting clandestine pro-Soviet groups within Iran.


1323. Smolansky, Oles M. “Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan.” *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 468 (October 1981), pp. 321-324, 339. The author, a professor of international relations at Lehigh University, analyzes the impact of recent developments in Iran and Afghanistan on the Soviet Union. He points out that the overthrow of the Shah does not fit into the zero-sum theory of international relations. While the US lost influence, Moscow did not gain significantly and Soviet-Iranian relations deteriorated further as a result of the Afghanistan invasion. Then, the Iran-Iraq war presented Moscow with a no-win situation, even though it did serve to refocus world attention away from Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Occupation of the latter country was an admission of the Soviets’ failure to control events in Kabul by less drastic means. As a consequence, the Soviets have sustained large numbers of casualties, been shouldered with the burden of the Afghan economy, and have suffered an enormous loss of goodwill throughout the world.

1324. Yodfat, Aryeh Y. *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran.* London: Croom Helm: New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984. The author, an analyst at the Lavon Research Institute of the Israel General Federation of Labor, provides a carefully documented survey of Soviet relations with Iran over the course of the twentieth century. As with his companion volume on The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula, the emphasis is on a recitation of events, agreements, and public statements and Yodfat does not really delve into broader policy concerns or the underlying motivations of either side.

**Iraq**

1325. Freedman, Robert O. “Russia, Iraq, and the Oil Conundrum.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 57-58, 64. An author on the Middle East observes that “Iraq’s decision to withhold oil from the international market, following reports that Russia was willing to be ‘flexible’ in its policy on the question of Iraqi sanctions, underlines the deterioration of Russian-Iraqi relations that occurred in 1999.”
1326. Fukuyama, Francis. *The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1980. Note N-1524-AF. A Rand analyst suggests that Iraq, at first glance, looks like an ideal location for the expansion of Soviet influence: it is a major regional power; it occupies an important geographic position; the régime is based on a radical, anti-Western ideology; and it needs Soviet weaponry. Nevertheless, close Soviet-Iraqi collaboration is seen existing only between 1972 and 1975 (because of the nationalization of the oil industry, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, difficulties with the Kurds, and the Shah’s increasing militarization). Fukuyama examines the nature of the Iraqi Ba’thist party and traces Soviet-Iraqi relations from 1968 to 1980, then suggests some future prospects. The study is dated, as it was written before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and focuses primarily on the Iraqi side of the relationship. c. Other Gulf States

1327. Smolansky, Oles M., with Bettie M. Smolansky. *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991. Professors at Lehigh University and Moravian College respectively look at Soviet-Iraqi relations over the period of 1958 to 1988. The first part concentrates on domestic issues, including nationalization of the oil industry, the Kurdish question, and the Iraqi Communist Party, while the second part focuses on security issues in the Gulf and the Iran-Iraq War. The prism of the authors’ analysis is the Soviet interest in exerting influence over Iraq, a quest that the Smolanskys view as having mixed results due to the “inherent instability of such relations...” (p. 289) As a consequence, the two countries frequently displayed conflicting interests in the Gulf and “the Kremlin consistently refused to endorse Baghdad’s claim to leadership in the Gulf region.” (p. 228)


**The GCC States**

1329. Abir, Mordechai. “Saudi-Soviet Relations and the Iran-Iraq War.” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Fall 1989), pp. 10-16. After a brief historical background to Saudi Arabia and its relations with Moscow earlier in the 20th century, a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem discusses the warming of relations as a result of both countries' support for Iraq during its war with Iran. The author notes significant obstacles to closer ties, such as the kingdom’s opposition to the Soviet Union’s atheism, Moscow’s inability to match Riyadh’s needs from Washington, and Moscow’s perceptions of Iran as the greater prize. As a consequence, the author asserts that “Riyadh is also aware that Soviet oil production may peak in the 1990s, and that unless Moscow is able to economically develop its Arctic circle oil reserves, it may be sorely tempted to turn to the Persian Gulf.” (p. 16)

1330. Goldberg, Jacob. “Saudi Arabia’s Attitude Toward the USSR, 1977-80: Between Saudi Pragmatism and Islamic Conservatism.” In Yaacov Ro’i, ed., *The USSR and the Muslim*
An Israeli researcher examines Saudi Arabia’s view of the Soviet Union and its perceptions of a Soviet pincer movement endangering the kingdom. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put an end to a burgeoning Riyadh-Moscow rapprochement and, in the process, temporarily buried Saudi pragmatism in relation to what was regarded as a state “wicked and hostile to religion.” (p. 269) [The rapprochement was resumed in the mid-1980s although diplomatic relations with Moscow were not established until 1990.]

A former State Department official and professor at The Citadel at the time of publication reviews various interpretations of Soviet foreign policy towards the Gulf. A defensive school holds that “the primary Soviet objective [is to prevent] the region from becoming a source of military or political threat to the Soviet Union” (p. 244) while the offensive school “believes that the Soviets seek some degree of domination of the Gulf....” (p. 245) A middle school views Soviet policy as being more pragmatic and reactive. In addition to ideology, the author sees Soviet policy as being driven by military and Arab-Israeli aspects. Finally, Twinam posits that Tehran’s acceptance of a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War may signal a new opportunity for superpower relations vis-à-vis the Gulf.

The Yemens

A desk officer on the US Army staff looks at the Soviet reaction to the 1986 South Yemeni civil war and its decision to support the opponents of President ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad. He sees that “Despite its frustration with the Aden government and desire to reduce its financial commitment, the USSR nevertheless is likely to view the retention of its position in the PDRY as of continuing interest.” (p. 35)

The author, associate professor at the Monterey Institute, looks at the evolution of Soviet attitudes towards Oman’s Dhufar rebellion. He concludes that “throughout the course of the rebellion, Moscow reluctantly provided only minimum support for the rebels” and opines that the Soviet Union probably was relieved at its escape from “this potentially explosive episode with a minimum of damage to the Soviet position in the Gulf area.”

While the strong relationship between the Soviet Union and South Yemen is well known, the longstanding ties between Moscow and Sanaa (the capital
of North Yemen, or the Yemen Arab Republic) have been often overlooked. Katz, a Rockefeller Foundation international relations fellow and guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, outlines the history of Soviet interest in North Yemen, which stretches beyond the establishment of the republic in 1962. He also discusses the stormy relationship between the Yemens and the dilemma it has posed for the Soviets. He concludes that, for the Yemenis, “building and maintaining friendly relations with the USSR is an important means of assuring North Yemen’s survival.” On Moscow’s part, aid to North Yemen helps to reduce Saudi and American influence and it may restrain Sanaa from attacking South Yemen.

1335. Page, Stephen. *The Soviet Union and the Yemens: Influence in Asymmetrical Relationships.* New York: Praeger, 1985. Studies of Influence in International Relations. An international relations specialist at Sheridan College in Ontario divides his study of Soviet influence in the Yemens in two parts. The first examines Moscow’s relations with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen), focusing on the Soviet Union’s hesitation to back the newly independent state because of its ideological weakness and personality clashes. Relations improved as the left-wing emerged triumphant in the PDRY’s leadership but the failure of the revolutionary movement in southern Oman led to South Yemen’s eventual establishment of diplomatic relations with Oman. He concludes that “In the PDRY, Soviet actions and presence have been important in the creation and preservation of a ruling group whose goals are essentially similar to the Kremlin’s; thus on most issues the Soviets have hardly needed to exert influence.” (p. 213) The second part deals with Soviet ties to the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the author notes that while the Soviets played a role in ensuring the survival of the YAR in the low days of the 1962-1967 civil war, “they were never able to make an impact on the political, economic, or social fabric of the country.” (p. 206) Furthermore, Moscow’s relations with the north were inevitably limited because of Moscow’s close relations with the south.


1338. Vasiliev, Alexei. “State Interests of the USSR in the Red Sea Basin and the Horn of Africa in Connection with the Gulf Zone.” *Arab Affairs*, No. 12 (Autumn 1990), pp. 34-42. The author, deputy director of the Institute of African Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, notes that the interests of Moscow and the Western countries could hardly be expected to coincide. On the other hand, “it is difficult to find even one aspect in which state interests of the USSR and countries of the region would contradict each other.” (p. 42)
REGIONAL ASPECTS OF GULF SECURITY

Regional Bilateral Relations


1340. Bahgat, Gawdat. “Iranian-Saudi Rapprochement: Prospects and Implications.” World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Winter 2000), pp. 108-115. A professor at Indiana University of Pennsylvania looks at the “stunning” rapprochement and deduces that falling oil prices was a major spark. He also covers Iranian-UAE relations and the Gulf role of Israel and Turkey. Finally, he concludes that “the rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran cannot be understood without reference to the relations each has with Washington.” (p. 113)

1341. Chubin, Shahram, and Charles Tripp. Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, November 1996. Adelphi Papers, No. 304. The authors, executive director for research at the Geneva Center for Security Policy and a lecturer at the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies respectively, see Iran and Saudi Arabia as being the key actors in regional security and contend that “regional order in the Persian Gulf is a function of domestic political developments in Iran and Saudi Arabia.” (p. 8) Furthermore, “For Iran to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on matters of regional security it would need to accept the role of the US in the Gulf, which is improbable under present circumstances.” (p. 8) In the end, the authors say, regional security in the Gulf depends on the state of US-Iranian relations.

1342. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. “Iran-Iraq Relations After Saddam.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 115–129. A professor of international relations at the University of Durham argues that the overthrow of Saddam Husayn will transform the foreign-policy framework and political system of Iran. In particular, It will allow Iran and Iraq to strengthen the trend in bilateral cooperation that the two countries have pursued since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. But the author also notes that, “although the United States has finally delivered on the most important of Iran’s goals in its eight-year war with Iraq – the removal of the Ba’thist régime – the tensions between Washington and Tehran have presented the removal of the Iraqi regime as a new ‘poisoned chalice’ with which Tehran must contend.” (p. 121)

Revolution as a challenge to Saudi Arabia in terms of the struggle between Sunni and Shi‘i Islam, intensified by the outlook of Ayatollah Khomeini and his view that the Arab Gulf regimes were illegitimate. But there are also tensions within Saudi Arabia between its reliance on the Wahhabi expression of Islam and the influx of rapid wealth and development. Among other things, change affected the Shi‘ah of the Eastern Province less than elsewhere and exploitation of this by the Iranian republic led to clashes during the annual hajj (Islamic pilgrimage to Makkah). The author concludes that “Iran’s reliance on confrontational tactics and violence in its bid to export its ideology was counterproductive.” (p. 138)

1344. Fuller, Graham E. “Iran and Iraq: The Battleground of Cultures.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 7, No. 6 (May-June 1991), pp. 16-22. ●● A RAND Corporation political scientist views Iranian-Iraqi relations in the context of cultural confrontation over racial identity and religion, and Kurdish relations. He notes the potential common interests in the Kurdish question, the threat from Russia, cooperation against external intervention in the Gulf, and cooperation against Israel.

1345. Katz, Mark. “Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992), pp. 117-135. ●● An assistant professor at George Mason University reviews the history of Saudi-Yemeni relations through the Kuwait War and suggests ways in which to improve them. He contends that Riyadh’s existing policy undermines Saudi security and recommends for the US that “Constructively engaging Yemen so that it will not cooperate with others in threatening or weakening the kingdom is a more promising method of ensuring Saudi security than isolating Yemen.” (p. 135)

Regional Disputes and Conflicts

General


challenges to stability in the Gulf. He judges “the general resurgence of Islam and ... the existence of a revolutionary message in neighboring Iran” to be the most serious of the external threats. Others he points out include the modernization syndrome, Israeli policies and US support for that country, and the potentially destabilizing roles of both superpowers. He concludes with the observation that “The 1980s is a decade in which the traditional political systems in the Persian Gulf will face unrelenting pressure.”

1349. Dawisha, Adeed. “Iran’s Mullahs and the Arab Masses.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1983), pp. 162-168. The article begins with an explanation of how the alternative to pan-Arab nationalism, following the debacle of 1967, gradually evolved into a radicalized version of political Islam. The prospect of a grassroots revolution overthrowing a secularized and Westernized tyrant had immense appeal to the Muslim masses of the Arab world, but the initial intoxicating effect of the “mullahs” on the masses has begun to wear off as the frailties of the new Iranian regime appear and as the war between Iran and Iraq grinds on. Even in Iran, the “state” has gained ascendancy over “revolution.”


1351. Helms, Christine Moss. “The Arab Cooperation Council: Redefining Strategic Depth.” *Defense & Diplomacy*, Vol. 7, No. 10 (October 1989), pp. 51-55. A writer and consultant on the Middle East examines the reasons for the establishment of the Arab Cooperation Council, formed by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen in early 1989. She notes that “ACC members went out of their way to forswear publicly any political rationale. The avowed *raison d’être* for union was economic, yet there is remarkably little evidence that anything more than a wish list, if that, ever existed.” (p. 55)

1352. Hurewitz, J.C. “The Middle East: A Year of Turmoil.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1981), pp. 540-577. The author, director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, reviews events in the Middle East during 1980, concluding that it was a grim year for American policy there. Among the developments he touches upon are the hostage crisis, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.

1353. Litwak, Robert. *Sources of Inter-State Conflict*. London: Gower, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. Security in the Persian Gulf, Vol. 2. A short monograph providing a descriptive overview of the various territorial disputes and other sources of inter-state tension in the Gulf region, written by a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies at the time of publication. The author divides his survey into four parts: (1) the “northern tier” (by which he means Iraq-Iran disputes); (2) northern Arabia and the upper Gulf; (3) the lower Gulf states; and (4) southern Arabia.
1354. Price, David Lynn. *Stability in the Gulf: The Oil Revolution*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976. Conflict Studies, No. 71. ●● A survey of internal and international developments in the Gulf in the mid-1970s, written by a British journalist. Price lists the continuation of oil supplies, commercial and financial interests, and the containment of Soviet influence as being among the West’s interests in the Gulf. Several observations have been overtaken by events. For example, although the author saw Iranian domination of the Gulf as being a source of conflict, he predicted that Arab-Iranian cooperation was likely to continue. In addition, Price believed that Moscow had directed its interest away from the Gulf to the Indian Ocean, because the Gulf offered little hope of naval facilities. Finally, Price points out that limitations to oil as a political weapon have become apparent and notes that British withdrawal has forced coordination among states. In his view, cooperation is likely to be the key to a future regional policy.

1355. Quandt, William B. “The Middle East Crises.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (1980), pp. 540-562. ●● A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution discusses the various points of conflict in the Middle East, and explains how each affects the others and the West. Included are the Iranian revolution, the challenge of Soviet power, the stalemate in Arab-Israeli relations, the insecurity of moderate Arab states, and the problem of continued access to oil.

1356. Rubin, Barry. “The Gulf Arab States and Iran.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (January-February 1983), pp. 36-38. ●● The author, a senior fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out that the Iranian regime views its foreign policy posture as essentially defensive in nature, but that its radical rhetoric has alarmed neighboring states in the Gulf, where its fundamentalism has a certain appeal. Rubin concludes that Iran has too many domestic preoccupations for it to attempt to export its revolution.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Gulf

1357. Abadi, Jacob. “Israel’s Relations with Oman and the Persian Gulf States.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 46-73. ●● A history professor at the US Air Force Academy begins by stating that Oman and Israel began to cooperate in the early 1970s, particularly in water desalination and irrigation, long before the establishment of an Israeli government office in Muscat and the visit to Oman of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1994. In addition to Oman, Abadi chronicles the history of Israel’s relations with the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. He reasons that “the normalization process will depend... on what the Gulf states regard as a fair solution to the Palestinian problem, and that could be nothing less than the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and an agreement with Syria. Meanwhile, however, Israel’s
commercial relations and unofficial contacts will continue with all states of the Gulf region, no matter how hostile their official policy remains.” (p. 73)


1359. Bligh, Alexander. “Toward Israeli-Saudi Coexistence?” *Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 35 (Spring 1985), pp. 24-35. ●● A researcher at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem reviews the history of Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Israel and Israeli objections to its arms purchases. He proposes that it is in both countries' interest for “mutual recognition: by Israel of Saudi Arabia’s legitimate security needs; and by Riyadh of Jerusalem’s apprehensions. Israel can help set in motion such a dynamic if it is prepared to consider a policy other than outright opposition, and if it will give due consideration to the political and economic advantages that it can derive from Saudi Arabia as a country close to the US.” (p. 35)


1361. Dawisha, Adeeed. “Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Ups and Downs of Pragmatic Moderation.” *International Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 674-689. ●● Saudi Arabia was freed from Egypt’s psychological and ideological blockade by the 1967 defeat. At the same time, however, Riyadh’s commitment to provide financial assistance to the confrontation states entangled the kingdom in Arab-Israeli politics, and its decision to employ the “oil weapon” in 1973 brought it to center stage in the drama. But in this new role, Saudi maneuverability was severely restricted and Riyadh found it necessary to act in unison with the Arab majority, hence its condemnation of the Camp David accords. Saudi Arabia’s own initiative in the Arab-Israeli arena was the “Fahd Plan,” which was waylaid by radical Arab opposition, US disclaimer of the Palestinian provisions, and Israeli actions. Dawisha contends that these factors have combined to expose “the limitations of Saudi Arabia’s capacity to imprint its own brand of pragmatic moderation on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” ●

problems, Islamic fundamentalism and the Iranian threat, communal conflict, and the quest for political participation. His assessment is that “For the time being, the GCC countries have managed to contain Iran’s subversive and propagandistic efforts to destabilize the ruling monarchies. In [the] GCC’s view, the first priority is to settle the Iran-Iraq war – a task that remains beyond the capabilities of the United States.” (p. 104)

1363. Doran, Michael Scott. “Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January-February 2003), pp. 19-33. ●● An assistant professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton argues that while Palestine provides a central symbol for Arab politics, the Bush administration seems to understand better than its critics that its influence in Arab-Israeli matters derives from its status as the dominant power in the region. “If an American road to a calmer situation in Palestine does in fact exist, it runs through Baghdad.” (p. 22) This, he contends, is because extremist Islamists will not be satisfied by any change in US policy toward Palestine. He describes an “intifadah” in al-Jawf region of Saudi Arabia as an example of how the Palestinian plight is used to attack internal politics and will continue to do so until larger issues are resolved. His answer is to establish a Pax Americana by “demonstrating forcefully that challenges to its authority in the region will be defeated. Its near enemies can be met in no other way, since their opposition to the present order is deep-rooted and total.” (p. 32)


1365. Tessler, Mark. “Israel, Arms Exports, and Iran: Some Aspects of Israeli Strategic Thinking.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 99-126. ●● Farhang, a professor of politics at Bennington College and revolutionary Iran’s first ambassador to the UN, argues that under the paradoxical surface there are a number of reasons for common interests between Iran and Israel, such as collaboration during the Iran-Iraq War and mutual involvement via the Reagan Administration in the Iran-Contra affair. He notes that “the silent complicity between Israel and Iran is based on exploitation and opportunism. Each sees the other as an instrument of its policy in the region.” (p. 93) Tessler, of the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, analyzes Israel’s involvement in the Iran-Contra affair by examining its policy of arms exports and its continuing interest in Iran, both before and well after the revolution.

1366. Feldman, Shai. “The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited.” *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1982), pp. 114-142. ●● A post-doctoral fellow at the Stanford University Arms Control and Disarmament Program examines the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor from an Israeli point of view. He suggests that the raid can be justified if it delayed nuclear proliferation in the Middle East until after solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Feldman also maintains that the attack, by underlining Israel’s military superiority, may have contributed to the peace process if it helped to convince the Arabs that they cannot win militarily. He ends
by speculating on the possibility of future Israeli attacks on other Arab nuclear installations.

1367. Fuller, Graham E. “The Saudi Peace Plan: How Serious?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 27-30. ⚫⚫ A RAND consultant evaluates Prince ‘Abdullah’s peace plan and observes that the plan “offers something fresh when the world craves something fresh, bold in its simplicity. More stunningly, however, the entire Arab world signed onto the plan, including even Iraq and Libya. ... Yet the stark reality is that the plan is totally unacceptable to the Likud government of Israel.” (p. 28)


1369. Gold, Dore. America, the Gulf, and Israel: CENTCOM (Central Command) and Emerging US Regional Security Policies in the Middle East. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Study No. 11. ⚫⚫ The author, at the Jaffee Center, looks at the development of the US Central Command and discusses the implications of the decision to exclude Israel from inclusion in its area of responsibility. He observes that “the Arab world has come to accept US-Israeli strategic cooperation” and that “the link between the Arab-Israeli conflict and Gulf security has hurt the GCC states by serving to block US arms sales to countries failing to support the peace process.” (p. 104)

1370. Khalilzad, Zalmay M., David A. Shlapak, and Daniel L. Byman. The Implications of the Possible End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Gulf Security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997. MR-822-AF. ⚫⚫ Three RAND analysts examine such topics as Israel’s influence on the US presence in the Gulf, the value of Israeli participation to the US Air Force in a crisis in the region, and regional scenarios involving a US military response. They note that “A comprehensive peace should help gain access to the region if a crisis occurs, ease frictions arising from arms transfers, and permit streamlining of the US military command structure. Peace will also decrease the pressures on Gulf leaders and their sensitivities to a U.S. presence in the region.” (p. 81) They suggest that the US should encourage cooperation between the GCC and Israel on Gulf security and extend the US Central Command’s area of responsibility to include Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.

1371. Mallison, W. Thomas, and Sally V. Mallison. “The Israeli Aerial Attack on June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or SelfDefense?” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 417-448. ⚫⚫ After reviewing the arguments on both sides, the authors contend that Israel’s attack was not legally justifiable. In addition, they assert that the attack has convinced the Arab states of the importance of developing a nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent to Israel’s nuclear threat. In their opinion, this escalation can be stopped only by the pressure of the world community on
Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The text of the Security Council’s resolution on the matter is included.

1372. Nydell, Matt S. “Tensions Between International Law and Strategic Security: Implications of Israel’s Preemptive Raid on Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor.” *Virginia Journal of International Law*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Winter 1984), pp. 459-492. The author, a member of the editorial board of the Virginia Journal of International Law, asserts that the raid on Osirak casts doubt on the efficacy of the international legal regime to constrain states from using force following unilateral determination that they are threatened. In determining the legality of Israel’s actions, Nydell examines the context of the raid, including Iraqi-Israeli hostility, the capacity of Osirak to produce nuclear bombs, and the adequacy of international non-proliferation safeguards. He concludes that as Israel acted before an imminent threat was posed, it could not justify the raid by self-defense.

1373. O’Brien, William, John Norton Moore, and W. Thomas Mallison, “Israel’s Attack on Osirak.” *Freedom at Issue*, No. 63 (November-December 1981), pp. 3-11. The authors present different assessments of the Israeli action. O’Brien, a government professor at Georgetown University, concludes that Israel was justified in its attack and adds that the international community “must take measures to remove the continuing threats to Israel’s existence.” Moore, Director of the Center for Law and National Security at the University of Virginia, feels that there is not sufficient public evidence available to adequately judge Israel but gives substantial weight to the Security Council condemnation. In addition, he charges France and Iraq with irresponsibility in the building of the reactor and assails the lack of adequate international safeguards. Mallison, Director of International and Comparative Law Programs at George Washington University, concludes that the “Israeli claim of actual necessity has not met the demanding criteria of international law and has been explicitly rejected by the community of states.”


1376. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *The Israeli Air Strike; Hearings*, 18, 19 and 25 June 1981. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981. ●● These hearings, held in the aftermath of Israel’s raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, attempted to review several related questions: (1) did Israel act in self-defense or was its action a violation of US laws governing the use of American arms; (2) did Iraq have the capability and/or the intention of building a nuclear weapon for use against Israel; (3) what are the implications of the raid for international law concerning preemptive strikes; and (4) what are the implications of the raid for worldwide efforts to control nuclear proliferation? Testimony ranged from claims that Israel had no choice but to act, to accusations that the raid was blatant aggression. Others focused on the requirements for building a nuclear bomb, or on the difficulties of preventing nuclear proliferation. ✽

1377. Wilson, Richard. “A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq.” *Nature*, Vol. 302 (31 March 1983), pp. 373-376. ●● The head of Harvard’s physics department describes his visit to the reactor bombed by Israeli jets in June 1981. Although the author states he does not have the expertise necessary to know whether the facilities could have been used for making a nuclear bomb, he points out that if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were abrogated by Iraq, then the substantial changes to existing facilities required to build a bomb would make starting from scratch easier. ✽

**The Kuwait-Iraq Crisis (1961)**

1378. Alani, Mustafa M. *Operation Vantage: British Military Intervention in Kuwait 1961*. London: Laam, 1990. ●● A London-based writer-researcher of Iraqi origin provides a comprehensive treatment of the Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961 and the British military response, utilizing British documents and interviews with participants as well as published sources. The book originated in a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Exeter. The author concludes that “the claim that the British action in Kuwait was motivated by the desire to protect Kuwait against an Iraqi military attack is a poor and unsubstantiated argument.” (p. 248) Instead, he sees the operation as a deliberate attempt to restore British credibility in the region after the 1956 Suez débâcle and to maintain the dependence of the Kuwaiti ruler on Britain. “Britain not only created the Iraqi military threat, she has also been credited for deterring that threat. It could, of course, be a case of ‘mistaken assessment’ — or an intentional, deliberate and artful deception.” (p. 254)


1380. ________. ‘Britain and the Kuwaiti Crisis, 1961.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 163-181. ●● The author, from the University of Liverpool, provides a narrative account of Britain’s largest mobilization in the post-Suez era. He discusses both
the political and the military aspects of the crisis and charges that “the extraordinary economic importance of Kuwait to Britain at this point seemed ample justification for a politically perilous intervention. Subsequent official attempts to put flesh on the bones of the Iraqi threat, however, seem rather unconvincing in hindsight.” (p. 179)


The Dhufar Rebellion

1384. Akehurst, John. *We Won a War. The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975*. London: Michael Russell, 1983. ●● The reminiscences of a British army officer who commanded Oman’s Dhufar Brigade during the final 18 months of the long Dhufar rebellion. As reasons for the Sultanate’s success in this conflict, Akehurst singles out four enemy mistakes: the attempt to replace an Islamic outlook and way of life with a Marxist-inspired one, attacks on tribalism, a cumbersome command and communications structure, and reliance on a single supply line. He also outlines “six things that [the Sultan] and his Armed Forces got right”: the coup of 1970 and subsequent reforms, efforts at winning the support of the Dhufari population, joint civil/military control, interruption of the enemy’s supply line, air power (especially helicopters), and intelligence. ♠


1386. Fiennes, Ranulph. *Where Soldiers Fear to Tread*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975. ●● The British explorer provides a vivid first-person account of the years he spent fighting with Omani forces against Dhufari rebels. Also included is a dramatized account of the experience of several rebels with whom Fiennes later spoke. ♠

with an overview of British military assistance, including both materiel and personnel, to various countries of the Middle East, and then concentrates on the British role in the Sultanate of Oman, particularly in regard to the Dhufar rebellion. Halliday’s opposition to these British activities and his sympathy for the Dhufari rebels is clearly stated.

1388. Jeapes, Tony. *SAS: Operation Oman.* London: William Kimber, 1980. Another in a long tradition of British military officers’ accounts of campaigns in the service of the sultans of Oman. This book relates the contribution of the 22nd Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment to the Sultanate’s victory in the Dhufar rebellion, and was written by the regiment’s commander from 1974 to the end of the war (he also commanded an SAS squadron in Dhufar in 1971). Jeapes ends with the observation that “Winning a counter-revolutionary war is like clearing a garden of weeds: it is what you plant afterwards that matters.” He poses the question of whether socioeconomic and political development in Oman will proceed fast enough to satisfy the aspirations of an increasingly better educated population.

1389. Perkins, K. “Oman 1975: The Year of Decision.” *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution,* Vol. 124, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 38-45. A detailed account of the last ten months of the Dhufar rebellion in 1975, written by the British commander of the Sultan of Oman’s armed forces at the time. Perkins points out that “The Dhofar War combined conventional war with counter-revolutionary operations so that the lessons are both military and political.” One of the suggested lessons is that “a counter-revolutionary war cannot be won by military means only.” In Dhufar, this meant a concerted effort by the government to develop the hitherto neglected province even as the army regained control.

1390. Peterson, J.E. “Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar.” *World Affairs,* Vol. 139, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 278-295. This article sketches the social and historical background to the province of Dhufar before tracing the origins of the rebellion there, the changes in government policy following the 1970 coup d’état, and the ultimately successful efforts of the Sultanate’s armed forces, aided by British, Iranian, and Jordanian troops, to put down the nationalist and Marxist rebels, who were assisted by South Yemen, China, and the Soviet Union. In conclusion, the article argues that true success in Dhufar will depend on more than military superiority: “By the time of the virtual cessation of military action in late 1975, the Sultanate’s leadership had shown its willingness and determination to attack the social and economic problems of Dhufar.”

the Sultanate’s military and civil responses to the rebellion, and assesses prospects for the future.

**Yemen Civil War (1994)**

1392. Dunn, Michael Collins. “The Wrong Place, The Wrong Time: Why Yemeni Unity Failed.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1994), pp. 148-156. The editor of *The Estimate* newsletter looks at the reasons behind the Yemen civil war of 1994 and notes that “The restored unity of Yemen is a unity of conquest, not the negotiated merger of 1990.” (p. 148) He sees as reasons why Yemeni unity failed the following: differences between the existing states were underestimated, the idea of a federal system was rejected, there was a precipitate rush to unity, the old leadership was retained, the coalition between all three leading parties was unworkable, there was a failure to unite the former two states’ armies, the leaders were inadequate, Saudi Arabia was opposed to unity and Yemen ran afoul of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and inability to agree on how to share oil between the north and the south.

1393. Hudson, Michael C. “Bipolarity, Rational Calculation and War in Yemen.” In Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, ed., *The Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences* (London: Saqi Books, 1995), pp. 19-32. Also published under the same title in *Arab Studies Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), pp. 9-19. The Seif Ghabash professor of Arab studies at Georgetown University examines the causes behind the civil war. He points out that when Yemen unified in 1990, there was widespread optimism for its success but by the spring of 1994 “the democratic order was breaking down and the new found national unity threatened. What was going wrong?” (p. 20) After detailing the opposing views in the north and the south, the author notes that “the ‘logic of the situation,’ as the two main antagonists perceived it, made it only ‘rational’ for them to behave in mutually threatening ways” (p. 31) and the institutional matrix constructed to nurture unity was unable to override this logic.

1394. Schmitz, Chuck. “Civil War in Yemen: The Price of Unity?” *Current History*, Vol. 94 (January 1995), pp. 33-36. A doctoral candidate at the University of California at Berkeley believes that “It is not clear which side started the war. Both were preparing for one, though the south was not ready for a full-scale conflict.” (p. 36) The south’s efforts to enlist international support were countered by the north’s diplomacy, having learned from its mistake of alienating the international community in 1990. “It remains to be seen whether Ali Abdulla Saleh can forge a political alliance that will gain legitimacy among Yemen’s varied regions and ideological strands, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces where the [Yemeni Socialist Party] ruled.” (p. 36)

a conference held in Abu Dhabi a few months after the 1994 civil war, edited by the director of the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research. Michael Hudson (Georgetown University) discusses the role of bipolarity in the leadership of the unified Yemen and the conflicting views of southern and northern leaders. Paul K. Dresch (Oxford University) rejects the idea of a tribal factor in the crisis but outlines the place of tribes and tribalism in Yemen’s recent history. Charles F. Dunbar (former US ambassador to Yemen) postulates five possible scenarios for Yemen’s future development (status quo, tribal resurgence, Islamic radicalism, southern separatism, or increased democracy). Robert D. Burrowes (University of Washington) considers the impact of the war on the Arab Gulf states and Mark Katz (George Mason University) looks at the role of external powers, those that sided with the north and those that sided with the south.

1396. Warburton, David. “The Conventional War in Yemen.” Arab Studies Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), pp. 20-44. ●● A detailed account of the 1994 Yemeni civil war by the resident director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies in Sanaa. The author points out that “The primary goal of the Southern military defense was to win international political support. Northern political stalling tactics parried this threat, while their strategically well-placed forces gained ground and proved capable of adapting to an unexpected war of attrition.” (pp. 42-43)


Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands Dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates

1398. Amirahmadi, Hooshang, ed. Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in Iranian Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. ●● A treatment of the dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over ownership of three Gulf islands from an Iranian perspective. The editor (Rutgers University) places the dispute in the context of Gulf security, Iranian-Arab relations, and the United States’ “dual-containment” policy. Pirouz Mojtabah-Zadeh (University of London) reviews the history of the dispute over the last two centuries, Davoud H. Bavand (Imam Sadegh University, Tehran) provides the legal basis of Iran’s claim to Abu Musa Island, and Guive Mirfendereski (Tufts University) contributes a similar analysis of the Iranian claim to the two Tunb Islands.

1399. Caldwell, Dan. “Flashpoints in the Gulf: Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 50-57. ●● A political scientist at Pepperdine University surveys the secondary sources touching on the islands dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates and contends that these islands “have served as indicators of Iranian policy and motivation for much of the twentieth century.” (p. 57)

1401. Mehr, Farhang. A Colonial Legacy: The Dispute Over the Islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997. ♦♦ A lengthy historical overview of Iran, the nomenclature of the Gulf, the origins of the Qawasim family of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaymah, and the role of the British constitutes the first half of this book. The author then examines the record of published materials and British archives to assess the validity of conflicting Iranian and UAE claims to these islands, ending with the Iranian occupation of the islands in 1971.

1402. Mobley, Richard A. “The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain’s Perspective.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 627-645. ♦♦ A re-examination of Britain’s attempts to reconcile Arab and Iranian claims to the islands in the period before British withdrawal from the Gulf in late 1971. The author, a former US naval officer and now an intelligence analyst with the US government, draws upon British archival materials to conclude that London strove energetically for a settlement but failed because of the issue of sovereignty. As a result of the Ruler of Ra’s al-Khaymah’s refusal to give up his claims to the two Tunbs, London “simply wrote them off.” (p. 644) A temporary resolution regarding Abu Musa was more successful but only lasted until 1992 when Tehran forcibly asserted its control.

1403. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. “The Issue of the UAE Claims to Tumbs and Abu Musa vis-à-vis Arab-Iranian Relationships in the Persian Gulf.” Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 601-626. ♦♦ The author provides a historical review of events leading to the agreements over the three islands in 1971 and Iran’s strengthening of control over Abu Musa in 1992 and concludes that (1) Iran holds sovereignty and that the UAE’s claims in recent years are politically motivated.

1404. Roken, Mohamed Abdullah Al. “Historical and Legal Dimensions of the United Arab Emirates-Iran Dispute Over Three Islands.” In Edmund Ghareeb and Ibrahim Al Abed, eds., Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates (London: Trident Press, 1997), pp. 139-159. ♦♦ A lecturer in law at the University of the UAE outlines the history of the dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and then provides a legal analysis of the conflicting claims to ownership and attempts at mediation. Since Iran has rejected referral to the International Court of Justice, he suggests that the only remaining avenue “is to submit the issue to the UN Security Council, which would pass a recommendation referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice, this being the appropriate channel for resolving it peacefully.” (p. 155)
Boundaries and Other Disputes

1405. Badeeb, Saeed M. *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962-1970*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Council, 1986. A deputy minister in the government of Saudi Arabia examines the triangular relationship between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen during the 1950s and 1960s and the Egyptian role in Yemen’s 1962 revolution. He then turns his attention to the Saudi-Egyptian war by proxy in the subsequent Yemeni civil war and the eventually successful agreement between Riyadh and Cairo that led to their disengagement and an end to the war. A final chapter reviews Saudi-Yemeni relations following the war. He emphasizes that “the Yemeni dilemma could have been prevented if Egyptian military intervention had not materialized and Saudi assistance to the royalists had not taken place.” (p. 110) But Egypt felt justified in acting because of its revolutionary image in the Arab world and Saudi Arabia found it necessary to become involved because of Yemen’s importance to the security of the kingdom and the Arabian Peninsula as a whole.


1407. Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. “Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Hanish Islands Dispute.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 367-385. An associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut analyzes the dispute between Eritrea and Yemen over ownership of the Hanish Islands and external involvement, including French mediation in the dispute. The author maintains that “In order to avoid entanglement in the Saudi-Yemen dispute, and in order to remain focused on more important US security commitments in the Persian Gulf, ... Washington has looked to France to act as the primary guardian of the southern Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab.” (p. 385)

1408. Martin, Lenore G. “Policy Implications of Boundary Disputes in the Persian Gulf.” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2 (1982-1983), pp. 25-32. A basic survey of the major border problems between the states of the Gulf, by a political scientist at Emmanuel College (Boston). She concludes that the US has five options for Gulf security: (1) an international peacekeeping force (which could protect the oil routes but would not decrease conflict on land); (2) the RDF (which is not yet up to strength and would take time to move in an emergency); (3) bilateral agreements (which are not stable and could be labelled imperialist); (4) regional alliances (but the states of the region are weak and short of manpower); and (5) a NATO-type alliance involving the conservative Gulf states, the US and other Western allies. Martin holds that the last option would require a longterm commitment to building trust and coordination, but would increase Arab political stability, insure Western oil supplies, and stop Soviet aggression. See also her *The Unstable Gulf: Threats From Within* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath/Lexington Books, 1984).
1409. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. *Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Maritime Political Geography* Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1999). ●● An examination of boundary disputes between the Arab states of the Gulf and between these states and Iran, including the issue of maritime boundaries. Several chapters discuss boundary relations between Qatar and Bahrain (although this book was published before the dispute was settled). But the main focus of the book is to justify Iranian claims to islands in the Strait of Hormuz and especially the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, hotly contested between Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

1410. Plaut, Martin. “A Clash for Control in the Shipping Lanes.” *World Today*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (February 1996), pp. 46-47. ●● A BBC journalist examines the brief conflict between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea and deduces that settlement of sovereignty over the islands will be no easy task.

1411. Schofield, Richard N. *Evolution of the Shatt al-‘Arab Boundary Dispute*. Wisbech, England: Middle East & North African Studies Press, 1986. Menas Studies in Continuity & Change in the Middle East and North Africa. ●● A study of the dispute between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-‘Arab as a case study in Middle Eastern international boundaries and international river boundaries. The author examines both the history of the dispute over the 19th and 20th centuries and the economic importance and utilization of the waterway. He observes that “It was ironic, however, that even before 1975 Iranian utilisation of her ports in the Shatt al-‘Arab had started to decline, a migrations of port functions to the Gulf which was in the process of being echoed by Iraq, when hostilities started.” (p. 86)

1412. ________, ed. *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*. London: University College of London Press, 1994. SOAS/GRC Geopolitics Series, No. 1. ●● Papers from a May 1991 conference and edited by the deputy director of Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. The opening contributions set the stage as George Joffé (School of Oriental and African Studies) examines concepts of sovereignty in the Gulf while John C. Wilkinson (Oxford University) summarizes Britain’s role in drawing boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula. Julian Walker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) looks at practical aspects of boundary delimitation in the United Arab Emirates, Maurice Mendelson and Susan Hulton (University College London) analyze Iraq’s claim to sovereignty over Kuwait, and Schofield discusses the question of ownership of the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan and Iraqi access to the Gulf. Rodman R. Bundy (Frere Cholmeley law firm) contributes a chapter on maritime delimitation in the Gulf while David Pike (Petroleum Argus newsletter) examines cross-border hydrocarbon reserves. Gerald Blake (University of Durham) looks at shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty, Paul Stevens (University of Dundee) details oil exploration and development policies in the region, and Keith McLachlan (director of the Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre) dissects the role of hydrocarbons in Iranian policies over island and continental shelf affairs.
The deputy director of the Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Center at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies remarks on the great progress made in settling border disputes between the GCC states, filling the glass from half-full to 9/10 full. However, he warns that the remaining problems – such as the Shatt al-‘Arab, the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands, the Iraq-Kuwait boundary, and the Hawar Islands – “are those which have long threatened [the region’s] stability.” (p. 41)

Steinbach, Udo. “Arab Policy Around the Horn of Africa.” *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1977), pp. 302-314. The director of the Deutsches Orient-Institut looks at the increased importance of the Horn/Red Sea area following the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 and the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975. He details the increased assistance that the Arab states have given to the Eritrean rebels, but asserts that the Arabs would not like to see an Eritrean victory. “For the Arabs, Ethiopia and that country’s cooperation with Israel, as well as its future political orientation, are more important than Eritrea.”

Tripp, Charles, and Shahram Chubin. “Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993-1994), pp. 3-27. Tripp, a senior lecturer at the University of London SOAS, and Chubin, a Geneva-based consultant on Middle Eastern affairs, chronicle the territory disputes in the region and note that “focusing on territorial issues may be the consequence of other concerns, but once territory has become a focus for dispute in the framework of the nation-state, it can create a dynamic of its own.” (p. 24)


**Regional Responses to Security Issues**

**General**

Allen, Robert C. “Regional Security in the Persian Gulf.” *Military Review*, (December 1983), pp. 2-11. An army officer provides a superficial overview of the security questions leading to the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the military capabilities of its members. Allen subscribes to the school of thought contending that “The Persian Gulf has historically been the scene of bloody conflicts and political upheaval, and the past four years have been no exception.”

Askari, Hossein. “Management of External Surplus in the Gulf Countries.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 7 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 100-105. The economies of the Gulf states are characterized by two overriding features: dependence on oil and the exhaustible nature of
that resource. Therefore, the author asserts, economic management policies should strive to diversify sources of income and save part of current revenues to develop a sustainable income. One avenue that these states have taken has been the accumulation of foreign assets. However, Askari notes that these largely have been short-term financial assets, and argues that more long-term, diversified assets should be acquired and that there should be greater cooperation among the Gulf states in this regard.

1419. Danziger, Raphael. “The Naval Race in the Persian Gulf.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 108, No. 3 (March 1982), pp. 92-98. A survey of Iran and Iraq’s naval expansion in recent years, with some additional coverage of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. The author, a former professor, regards Western “reliance on local allies in the Gulf region [as] nothing more than a stopgap policy” and suggests that long-term oil security can be assured only if the US can respond rapidly and effectively to any threat in the Gulf.

1420. Jabber, Paul. “Oil, Arms, and Regional Diplomacy: Strategic Dimensions of the Saudi-Egyptian Relationship.” In Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin, eds., *Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1982), pp. 415-447. A former professor of political science at UCLA looks at the origins and evolution of the “special relationship” between Cairo and Riyadh, particularly in the political and military spheres, and its interruption by Sadat’s pursuit of peace with Israel. Jabber concludes that “The special Saudi-Egyptian relationship forged in the 1970s was supported by strong common interests of enduring substance. Because of its strategic centrality to how ruling groups in both countries perceive the threats and opportunities that lie ahead, the Cairo-Riyadh axis will ... probably reemerge in the 1980s as a balance wheel of the inter-Arab regional system.”


1422. Mustafa, Zubeida. “Pakistan and the Middle East.” *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1976), pp. 608-620. A Pakistani writer notes that Pakistan’s relationship with the Middle East has never been so important as it is today, and that its foreign policy toward the Middle East remains largely independent of its relations with the superpowers. After a discussion of Pakistan’s relations with Iran and the Arab world, Mustafa concludes that after 1972 Pakistan changed its orientation to the Middle East and virtually ceased to be a South Asian country. Now, he contends, preservation of Pakistan’s national integrity is of crucial importance to countries of the Middle East.

1423. Nye, Roger P. “Political and Economic Integration in the Arab States of the Gulf.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 3-21. The author, director of political research at Atlantic Richfield, assesses the efforts of the Arab Gulf states toward political and economic cooperation. He points out some steps that have
taken place already, such as discussions on a common currency, the Gulf International Bank, Gulf Air, and the Arab Investment Company. Among the factors supporting future efforts, Nye sees the attitude of the Saudi leadership, the commitment of Gulf elites to integration, the continued viability of OPEC, and a sense of Arab destiny. At the same time, he notes several hindering factors, such as nationalism, manpower problems, the fragility of traditional régimes, and tribalism. On balance, though, Nye expects political and economic integration to proceed in the Gulf.

1424. Peterson, J.E. “The Arab Response to the Iranian Challenge in the Gulf.” In Philip H. Stoddard, ed., The Middle East in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1983), pp. 153-164. ●● This article notes at the beginning that “One principal effect of the sequence of the Iranian revolution, the emergence of an aggressive and combative Islamic Republic of Iran, and the continuing hostilities of the Iran-Iraq war has been a growing Arab fear of entrapment between the twin dangers of Israel on the west and Iran on the east.” The response of the Arab Gulf monarchies to this new threat on the east has been to remain out of the direct line of fire as much as possible. The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on the Arab world is assessed, and the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a response to it is analyzed.

1425. Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, and William O. Staudenmaier. “The Saudi-Pakistani Military Relationship: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 155-171. ●● Tahir-Kheli and Staudenmaier, associated with Temple University and the US Army War College, respectively, at the time of writing, speculate on the nature of military collaboration between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They point out that Pakistan benefits from Saudi patronage and may gain access to US military technology. In addition, notice is served on India and the USSR that Pakistan has a powerful friend. As far as the US is concerned, the authors feel that stationing Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia could be less provocative than deploying US forces there. “The combination of Saudi wealth, Pakistani military power and U.S. military technology can serve the national interests of all three nations....”

1426. Whetten, Lawrence. “Security and South-West Asia: Security Implications of Recent Political Changes.” The Round Table, No. 273 (January 1979), pp. 31-40. ●● The author, Director of the German Graduate Program in International Relations of the University of Southern California, notes that simultaneous domestic difficulties may weaken an emerging collaboration between India, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Whetten notes that if the influence of the superpowers is to be frozen in the area, regional cooperation must be reactivated and he urges the reinstatement of nonalignment. The Iranian revolution in early 1979 and the Soviet entry into Afghanistan in late 1980 have played havoc with the article’s suggestions.

the Gulf during the period 1979-1981 and finds that “A growing sense of insecurity combined with sharp disagreements with the West both on the Palestinian question and on a range of economic issues have compelled Gulf rulers to adopt less blatantly pro-Western policies.”

Foreign Policies of the GCC States and the Yemens

1428. Ahrari, M.E. “Rational Foreign Policy Behaviour of a Weak State: The Case of Kuwait.” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No 1 (May 1993), pp. 131-148. ●● A professor at the US Air War College surveys the history of Kuwaiti foreign policy from 1756 through the 1980s and observes that Kuwait has always been a foreign-policy maverick in the Gulf because it is a “weak” state. He argues Kuwait has succeeded in its strategy because “most decisions (especially involving foreign policy) are made on the basis of discrete — and almost secret — discourse within the ruling elite. When the decision-making apparatus is so close and decisional process is so exclusive, it is considerably easier to bring about swift (or even abrupt) policy changes than in a democratic society....” (p. 147)

1429. Alkim, Hassan Hamdan al-. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. London: Al Saqi, 1989. ●● An analysis of the UAE’s foreign policy and its roots by a professor of political science at the UAE University. After an explanation of the country’s historical background, the author devotes attention to the key elements of foreign policy-making, including political and social structures, political aggregation, the external milieu, and the decision-making apparatus. The heart of the book lies in the three case studies it examines in detail over the same period of 1971 to 1983: UAE-Saudi Arabian relations, UAE-Iranian relations, and the UAE’s commitment to the Palestinian question. He finds that “political fragmentation inherited from the past, coupled with military weaknesses and economic dependence and the fact that there is a large immigrant population, make the UAE subject to regional and superpower pressures.” (p. 209)

1430. __________. *GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of Small States*. London: Al Saqi, 1994. ●● A professor of political science at the UAE University analyzes the foreign policy of the GCC members through two prisms. The first is concerned with how Islam and historical experience, domestic political and social dynamics, geographical and economic factors, and GCC harmony and conflict have shaped foreign policy. Subsequent chapters focus on the regional context and the GCC and Gulf security in “the new world order.” The author’s final chapter looks at who makes foreign-policy decisions, including political élites, the technocrats, the bureaucracy, the news media, and the rising middle class. He notes that “These countries are faced with three compelling issues: coordination of foreign policies, regional security and domestic political unrest. However, their options seem to be limited.” (p. 161) He recommends that GCC states take more steps to coordinate their collective foreign policy; that they adopt a regional security
arrangement based on the three concentric Gulf, Arab, and international circles; and that the GCC members engage in greater political participation.

1431. Assiri, Abdul-Reda. *Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Westview Special Studies on the Middle East. ●● A professor of political science at Kuwait University divides the state’s foreign policy into four periods. Self-defense and survival marked the first years of independence (1961-1963), a time of the Kuwait-Iraq crisis and the foundations of “dinar diplomacy” foreign aid. The second period was one of pragmatism and balance (1963-1979), marked by themes of foreign aid, mediation, support for the Palestinian cause, and more tensions with Iraq. Next came a phase of ambivalence and tilting (1979-1986) provoked by the Iranian Revolution and Kuwait support for Iraq during the subsequent Iran-Iraq War. The final period was one of anxiety and uncertainty (1987-1989), involving the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers and the eventual termination of the Iran-Iraq War. The author ends with the observation that “Kuwait’s external behavior is linked to its financial power and internal stability [but] currently, its oil revenue is decreasing, its budget is in deficit, and it faces some complicated regional and domestic problems. ... One would hope that Kuwait moves toward a more rational spending pattern, works diligently toward national consensus and participation, avoids regional entanglements, and assumes a role proportional to its size and power matrices...” (p. 138)

1432. _________. “Kuwait’s Dinar Diplomacy: The Role of Donor-Mediator.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1991), pp. 24-32. ●● A study of the financial dimension of Kuwaiti foreign policy by a Kuwaiti serving as a faculty member at the University of the UAE at the time of publication. The author surveys the history of Kuwaiti aid-giving and notes Kuwaiti successes in the arena of political mediation. He concludes that “Kuwait employed its dinar diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy goals. Kuwaiti support for regional economic development also reflected a moral aspect.” (p. 32)


1434. Bilveer, S. “Kuwait and the Vulnerabilities of Small States.” *Asian Defence Journal*, February 1991, pp. 4-7. ●● Building from the assumption that small states have limited capability in looking after their own security, the author looks at Kuwait’s vulnerability vis-à-vis its larger neighbor of Iraq and avows that while Kuwait “enjoyed economic security in terms of wealth, it failed, however, to undertake policies which could have protected the country physically and, hence, safeguard its wealth.” (p. 7)
1435. Dietl, Gulshan. “Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: Internal and External Contexts.” *India Quarterly*, Vol. 41, Nos. 3-4 (July-December 1985), pp. 363-375. A survey of the kingdom’s foreign relations by an associate professor of Gulf studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. She concludes that Riyadh’s special relationship with the US “leaves much to be desired as far as the Saudi regime’s survival is concerned.” (p. 374)

1436. Eilts, Hermann Frederick. “Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy Toward the Gulf States and Southwest Asia.” In Hafeez Malik, ed., *International Security in Southwest Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 77-106. A comprehensive survey of Saudi attitudes with regard to its smaller Gulf neighbors – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the UAE – as well as the GCC, Pakistan and India. The author sees Saudi problems with the GCC but feels it is important to the kingdom and “Saudi participation will be a major factor in its success or otherwise.” (p. 100) Saudi relations with the Pakistan are probably the closest of all non-Arab governments in the region and “Saudi-Indian relations are today best described as correct, but hardly cordial. They are likely to remain that way.” (p. 106)


1438. Ghori, Karamatullah Khan. “Kuwait and the Geopolitical Realities in the Gulf.” *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 46, Nos. 3-4 (July-October 1993), pp. 27-35. The Pakistani ambassador to Kuwait review the international relations of the Gulf, past and present, and sees that “until the day a new dispensation is worked out for Iraq and the Iranian revolution is consolidated, the geopolitical equilibrium will continue to defy the area.” (p. 35)

1439. Guazzzone, Laura. “Kuwait’s National Security Policy and Its Influence on the Gulf Region.” *International Spectator*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April-June 1989), pp. 63-71. A researcher with the Instituto Affari Internazionali in Rome provides a historical sketch of Kuwait before describing its situation during the Iran-Iraq War and concluding that diplomacy is the small state’s best defense. She contends that “Kuwait’s national security policy, based on qualified non-alignment, regional cooperation, foreign policy ingenuity and relative domestic democracy, has successfully passed its most serious test....” (p. 71)

in the region, and a search for accommodating allies in the Marxist world, particularly the Soviet Union and China. He concludes that “the PDRY was able to offset its failure to back successful revolution against recognition and acceptance by the other states in the region...” but also remarks that “survival was not itself, however, a necessarily enduring achievement, since internal pressures and conflicts, enhanced by external factors, led to a series of bloody intra-régime crises.” (p. 232)


1442. Kechichian, Joseph A. Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1995. •• A comprehensive look at Oman’s foreign policy, with chapters on the neighboring Arabian Peninsula and Gulf countries, the West, Russia and Central Asia, the Far East, South Asia, and Africa. The author, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, judges that “Oman has become a key country in Middle Eastern and global diplomacy [because of] its geography, the strategic considerations of Western powers, and more important, its government’s unrelenting pursuit of an independent foreign policy.” (p. 257) Extensive appendices reproduce a number of treaties and other documents. An earlier and shorter version of the subject was published as “Oman and the World,” American-Arab Affairs, No. 35 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 135-150.

1443. Nonneman, Gerd. Iran, the Gulf States & the War: A Changing Relationship, 1980-1986 and Beyond. London: Ithaca Press, 1986. Exeter Middle East Politics Series, No. 1. •• Derived from the author’s MA thesis at Exeter University, the study outlines the foreign policy of Iraq and the GCC states before embarking on a detailed chronological narrative of their relationship during the course of the Iran-Iraq War. Emphasis is on political relations but the author also discusses GCC financial aid to Iraq, oil swaps, and other relations. He believes that “The Gulf states, then, intent on preserving their domestic security, will try to maintain friendly relations with both Iraq and Iran, while at the same time remaining aloof from too strong an involvement with either.” (p. 136) This will not prevent structural links between Iraq and the GCC from developing but Iraq will not be admitted to the GCC.

1444. Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and Internal Consolidation.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 113-125. •• A visiting scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and a Fulbright research scholar at the King Faisal Foundation in Riyadh examines the reasons behind the steadily improving relations between Riyadh and Tehran since 1991. She holds that factors for this included common interests in oil and Islam, domestic circumstances, regional conflicts, and disillusionment with the United States. As a consequence, she advises that “For too long, U.S. policy has focussed on the military dimension. A more creative and innovative approach would recognize societies as well as states in the region. ... Indeed, the United States needs to encourage and reward reformists in both Iran and Saudi Arabia.” (p. 124)


1447. ________. “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 57-70. The president of America-Mideast Education and Training Services (AMIDEAST) looks at the security threat that Iran poses to the UAE and the problem of the three disputed Gulf islands (he sees Iran as being the UAE’s major problem for many years), at the UAE’s relations with Iraq after the Kuwait War (no change in relations with Iraq is foreseen until the demise of Saddam Husayn’s régime), at the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and at the Emirates’ relations with the GCC, the Arab world, and the US. He believes that “the UAE will seek to reinforce cooperative security arrangements with Western countries as insurance against future crises, but it will not allow foreign bases on its territory or otherwise allow its sovereignty to be compromised.” (p. 70) See also his “UAE Foreign Policy” in Edmund Ghareeb and Ibrahim Al Abed, eds., Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates (London: Trident Press, 1997), pp. 159-175.


1449. Sayegh, Fatma al-. “The UAE and Oman: Opportunities and Challenges in the Twenty-first Century.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2002), pp. 124-137. An associate professor of history at the University of the United Arab Emirates traces relations between Oman and the UAE (known as the Trucial States before 1971), concentrating first on the three-way dispute at al-Buraymi in the 1950s between Oman, Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia. She continues by dealing with the Oman-UAE border flare-up in the late 1970s and finishes with the border treaty of 1999. In the end, the author concludes, “both Oman and the UAE placed their mutual welfare ahead of political rivalry.” (p. 136)

1450. Teitelbaum, Joshua. “The Gulf States and the End of Dual Containment.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1998), distributed electronically. A research fellow at Tel Aviv University traces the improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations along with some remarks concerning the softening policy of other GCC states toward the Islamic Republic and Iraq. He concludes that “While during the cold war the U.S. was able to count on fear of Soviet aggression to force the Gulf states to follow much of Washington’s regional agenda, it appears that in a unipolar system the leverage of the U.S. has weakened.”
The Impact of British Withdrawal


1452. Balfour-Paul, Glen. *The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. An examination of Britain’s withdrawal from its last three dependencies in the Middle East: Sudan (1955), Aden (1967), and the Gulf states (1971), written by a retired British diplomat experienced in the countries he chronicles. He sums up the subject by commenting that “Withdrawal from the Sudan was dictated initially by the private requirements of Britain’s policy towards Egypt. Withdrawal from South West Arabia was forced upon Britain by a crescendo of much more public pressures. Withdrawal from the Gulf was determined less by political hustling ... than by Treasury calculations and a fading of the imperial will in Westminster.” (p. 6)

1453. Burrell, R.M. *The Persian Gulf*. New York: Library Press, for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1972. Washington Papers, No. 1. An early look at the Gulf in the aftermath of British withdrawal, written by a historian at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies. Iran’s predominant role in the Gulf is discussed in one chapter. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman are covered, as well as the three Arab states of the northern Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Burrell writes that “In many ways the British military withdrawal has opened a new era in the history of the Persian Gulf—one in which local instabilities will take on a new importance as oil wealth continues to increase and external powers become more involved in the area.”

1454. *The Gulf: Implications for British Withdrawal*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1969. Special Report Series, No. 8. The report of a panel sponsored by Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, published one year after the announcement of Britain’s intent to withdraw from the Gulf. Members of the panel included: Bernard Lewis (chairman), Albert Hourani, J.C. Hurewitz, Charles P. Issawi, Walter Laqueur, William Luce, Ian Michie, James Moulton, Hisham Sharabi, J.F. Standish, Thomas R. Stauffer, W.F.K. Thompson, P.J. Vatikiotis, David M. Abshire, and Alvin J. Cottrell. The panel found that “The change of British policy from one of flexible withdrawal in the 1970s to a public declaration of withdrawal and termination of responsibilities in 1971 has increased the danger of instability in the Gulf region....” It also recommended that Britain should maintain staging rights in the region and provide “all possible assistance” in the equipping and training of local military forces. Furthermore, to dissuade Soviet interpretation of British withdrawal as a sign of disinterest, British and American naval visits to Gulf ports should be encouraged.
1455. Holden, David. “The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1971), pp. 721-735. Writing a few months before the British withdrawal from the Gulf, the author notes that “the purpose of the British withdrawal is clear: to disengage, as far as possible, from the military and political commitments which have become increasingly untenable.” Holden contends that Britain left the Gulf on the brink of a period of great upheaval, yet it left at the insistence of all the major powers of the Gulf. Although no power readily filled the resultant vacuum and local security arrangements were ineffective, Holden points out that the best safeguard against disorder is oil and the need to maintain good relations with oil purchasers.

1456. Monroe, Elizabeth, rapporteuse. *The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: The Report of an International Seminar at the International Center for Mediterranean Studies*. Rome, June 26th to July 1st, 1972. Sir Denis Wright, Chairman. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1972. This seminar sets as its task a search for ways in which the commonality of interests between oil producers and oil consumers could be recognized. In part, this involved examination of the points of contention between the Gulf states following British withdrawal and an assessment of whether these states would withstand the strains of the 1970s. The report also details the process of oil-induced modernization in the Gulf, and surveys Soviet and Chinese relations with the Gulf states, as well as Western ties. The findings of the seminar were summarized by a prominent historian of the Middle East then at Oxford University.

1457. Sullivan, Robert R. “The Architecture of Western Security in the Persian Gulf.” *Orbis*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 71-91. The author, Associate Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York at the time of publication, argues that the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf should be rectified by the US. Following the British announcement, Sullivan asserts that the Gulf states began jockeying to assure their security interests, thus allowing the Soviets to intensify their diplomatic efforts in the region. “Stability of sorts has returned, temporarily at least, but it now depends upon a continued balancing of regional power rather than on the firm policing of the British.” Sullivan concludes that if Anglo-American cooperation to police the Gulf is not possible, then the US should step into the vacuum left by the British.

**The Gulf Cooperation Council**

151) Although the organization has produced accomplishments and still stands united, the author points out the diversities and differences and says “They have existed all along but are now becoming more potent as disintegrative factors. They explain why integration has not been forthcoming and why cooperation has been and probably will remain bumpy.” (p. 168)

1459. Anthony, John Duke. “The Gulf Cooperation Council.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-18. The author, a fellow at the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute at the time of publication, provides a succinct background to the impetus for the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its organization. He then discusses the central concerns and themes of the GCC in terms of security, economic and social functionalism, Islam, Arabism and regionalism. He notes that the six members exhibit long-established patterns of cooperation and discusses the validity of questions of their stability, as well as American policies toward the GCC states.


1462. ________. “Report from the Sixteenth GCC Heads-of-State Summit.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October 1996). The summit was notable for the absence of King Fahd for health reasons and Qatar’s decision not to participate. The author notes the importance of border settlements, developments regarding defense and security, the GCC’s views on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the pressing need to deal with the problems of employment and youth.

1463. ________. “Consultation and Consensus in Kuwait: The 18th GCC Summit.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 1998), pp. 137-156. The president of the National Council on US-Arab Relations reports that the December 1997 summit highlighted economic issues more than previous ones. In addition to discussion of security issues, the leaders agreed to establish a Consultative Council for the entire GCC.

1464. ________. “Iran in GCC Dynamics.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1993), pp. 107-120. The president of the National Council on US-Arab Relations addresses the GCC’s perspective on relations with Iran. He notes that interest on oil issues is mixed, many in the GCC consider Iran as the most pervasive threat to the GCC, that the two sides differ on the basis for Gulf security, that Iran feels that the GCC states control too much of the oil
wealth of the Gulf, that Iran resents GCC support for Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War, that the two sides differ in their views on resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that they have opposing objectives towards Lebanon.

1465. Beseisu, Fouad Hamdi. “Sub-regional Economic Cooperation in the Arab Gulf.” *Arab Gulf Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1981), pp. 45-54. The author, a researcher at the University of Durham, contends that the economic planning of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) builds on recent Arab thought regarding movement toward Arab economic integration. In addition, he lists a number of instances in which economic cooperation between the six states of the GCC has been present since 1970. These include bilateral and some multilateral agreements on the transit of goods and joint economic cooperation, as well as ministerial meetings on regional trade, industrial cooperation and development planning.

1466. Bishara, Abdulla Yacoub. “The GCC: Achievements and Challenges.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 7 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 40-44. Based on a conference address, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) outlines the reasons for the establishment of the GCC and its goals. He acknowledges that problems exist in trying to coordinate the national interests of all six members and that the Council’s priorities are often difficult to define. It will take time for the GCC to become a success, he notes, but a beginning has been made. With an eye to his American audience, Bishara affirms that self-reliance is most important and that the GCC seeks to ensure that the Gulf is free from superpower rivalry. At the same time, he contends that it is impossible to separate the security of the Gulf from the question of Palestine and he urges the US to help solve this problem.


1468. Guazzone, Laura. “Gulf Co-operation Council: The Security Policies.” *Survival*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (March-April 1988), pp. 134-148. A SSRC-MacArthur Foundation fellow surveys the formation of the GCC and the security threats it faces, both internal and external. She concludes that “while the GCC represents only one component of a security scheme able to guarantee stability in the Gulf region, it is the only one in place. Therefore, the international community and particularly the West have a clear interest in its survival and development.” (p. 147)

viewpoints on external threat perceptions. He argues that “The most important step toward solving the GCC’s internal troubles – and also toward deterring its external threats – lies in transforming it into a politically unified federal state.” (p. 54) He also advocates membership for Yemen and a collective GCC agreement that accepts current boundaries.

1470. Ispahani, Mahnaz Zebra. “Alone Together: Regional Security Arrangements in Southern Africa and the Arabian Gulf.” *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 152-175. A doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy compares the security arrangements of the Gulf Corporation Council to those of Africa’s Organization of Front Line States. Points of comparison include sources of threats, similarities and differences between cooperating régimes, the effects of dependence on regional cooperation, and the inescapable role of outside powers in either contributing to or lessening threats to these arrangements. In her opinion, such regional security arrangements remain “halfway houses on the road to security cooperation, dependent on the interest and support of outside powers, and absorbed, first and foremost, by their own political and economic instabilities.”


1472. Haj, Abdullah Juma Al-. “A Gulf Citizen’s Viewpoint of the Gulf Cooperation Council: A Critique.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 49-72. The author, associate professor of political science at the UAE University, provides an overview to the formation of the GCC and analyzes its security dilemmas, including internal instability and external threats. He sees as two of the GCC’s most formidable problems “the confusion within its constituents between national and regional interests” (p. 71) and its security role.


1474. ________. “The GCC and the West.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 29 (Summer 1989), pp. 20-31. A study of the differences between GCC and Western policies with regard to four principal issues: oil, the regional role of the Soviet Union, relations with revolutionary Iran, and regional security issues. Kechichian maintains that “GCC states cannot accomplish all of their objectives unless they maintain their political and strategic independence from the West” (p. 29) and calls for the GCC-Western relationship to move beyond military alliances to the establishment of political relations with the regional body.
1475. ________. “The Gulf Cooperation Council: Containing the Iranian Revolution.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 13, Nos. 1-2 (Fall/Winter 1989), pp. 146-163. ●● Kechichian notes that throughout the 1980s, the GCC states regarded Iran as a destabilizing force in the Gulf because of its attempts to export its revolution. The article, written while the author was a fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, details Iran’s politics towards Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In his view, the GCC countered these activities by demonstrating their determination to resist any armed attack, by dealing with legitimate domestic grievances and acting against saboteurs, and by close military cooperation with the West.

1476. Koury, Enver M. “The Impact of the Geopolitical Situation of Iraq Upon the Gulf Cooperation Council.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (January/February 1983), pp. 28-35. ●● The author, a recently deceased professor at the University of Maryland, argues that Iraqi membership is a necessity for the future existence of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Such a move would produce bipolar hegemony within the Council (between Saudi Arabia and Iraq) and help to balance Iran’s regional strength.

1477. Kuwaize, Abdullah El-. “The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Concept of Economic Integration.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 7 (Winter 1983-1984), pp. 45-49. ●● The Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discusses prospects for economic integration among the GCC members. He points out that integration will produce economies of scale and allow diversification of sources of income, which in turn will increase the absorptive capacity of the GCC states. He contends that the similarity of these six countries and the rapid development of their infrastructures will facilitate the integration process.

1478. Lawrence, Robert G. “Arab Perceptions of U.S. Security Policy in Southwest Asia.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 5 (1983), pp. 27-38. ●● The author, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University, points out that “strategic consensus” never had a chance of acceptance in the Arab world where alliance with one of the superpowers is viewed as a step sure to initiate superpower competition in the region. The Arab states, according to Lawrence, view themselves as beleaguered countries surrounded by hostile forces and lacking sufficient guarantees of protection from their Western friends. Lawrence points out that the US needs Arab cooperation as much as the Arabs need American cooperation. The Arabs privately realize they are dependent on the US as the ultimate guarantor of their security, but believe existing military preparations are adequate to respond to the internal and regional threats perceived as most dangerous. They are keen to cooperate with the US in the modernization of regional armed forces but are reluctant to face the political and media barrage questioning their worthiness. On the US part, the author counsels cultivation of a “silent partnership” with the Gulf Cooperation Council in an advisory role and the pursuit of a foreign policy approach based on common interests.
1479. Magnus, Ralph H. “The GCC and Security: The Enemy Without and the Enemy Within.” *Journal of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1997), pp. 72-94. ●● A review of the background to the GCC and the characteristics of its member states by a faculty member at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He also discusses the “twin pillar” policy and the impact of the Iranian revolution and Iran-Iraq War in the GCC. In the aftermath of the Kuwait War, Magnus notes that “the security of the GCC states confronts both greater political and a potentially greater military threats than before... Even more fundamental to the security of the GCC states is their ability to respond to growing demands for internal political change.” (p. 93)

1480. Mainuddin, Rolin G., Joseph R. Aicher, Jr., and Jeffrey M. Elliot. “From Alliance to Collective Security: Rethinking the GCC.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 39-49. ●● The authors (all at North Carolina Central University) argue that to be a viable collective-security organization, it must extend its membership to other key regional actors, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Israel.


1483. Peterson, Erik R. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. ●● A Washington-based consultant examines the political, economic, and defense background to the GCC and its formation and evolution. He looks at its roles in political and economic integration and endeavors in defense and security cooperation. A final chapter looks ahead to the GCC in the 1990s and sees an optimistic forecast, noting that “The commonality of interests that brought about the GCC not only continues to exist but has intensified substantially.” (p. 233) The work also contains nearly 100 pages of appendices, including the organization’s charter, the unified economic agreement, and final declarations of the annual summits.

(a type of “associate membership” may be possible well in the future), and/or Iraq (quite likely when a new régime emerges in Baghdad).

1485. Ramazani, R.K., with the assistance of Joseph A. Kechichian. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988. ●● A study of the GCC’s origins and attitudes towards subversion and terrorism, deterrence, economic integration, and diplomatic activities, concluding with a projection of the organization’s future prospects for confederation. Each chapter is accompanied by copious documentation while appendices include economic and demographic tables, an extensive chronology, and an annotated bibliography. The authors, both of the University of Virginia, conclude that “It remains to be seen whether in the first five years of their cooperation, the GCC states have relinquished enough of their individual freedom of action through the creation of lasting joint institutions to enable them to withstand the challenge of incohesion in the second five years.” (p. 196)


1487. Salem, Faisal al-. “The U.S. and the Gulf: What Do the Arabs Want?” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1982), pp. 8-32. ●● An associate professor of political science at Kuwait University looks at foreign policy factors that constrain Arab-American linkages. He contends that the Arabs wish to pursue the following objectives in their relationship with the US: greater American understanding of the Palestinian problem, economic cooperation and not domination, support for Arab investment in the US in return for having backed the US dollar, and facilitation of Arab students’ education in the US.

1488. Sandwick, John A., ed. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Council, 1987. ●● A collection of essays on the GCC, some of which were also published in the council’s journal, *American-Arab Affairs*. John Christie (Middle East Newsletters) begins the volume with a brief overview of the background and organization of the GCC. Then Joseph Wright Twinam (The Citadel) examines the Bahraini, Qatari, and Omani roles within the GCC and Bruce F. Henderson (UBAF Arab American Bank) details the economic and financial relations between the US and the GCC countries. Abdullah Ibrahim El-Kuwaiz (Gulf Cooperation Council) assesses the GCC’s potential for economic integration while Hossein Askari (George Washington University) and Babak Dastmaltschi (consultant to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance) look at the role of GCC states in OPEC. Nicholas B. Angell (Chadbourne & Parke) reviews the legal systems of the GCC states and the GCC itself and Stephen Page (Queen’s University) traces the Soviet Union’s
relations with the GCC states. J.E. Peterson examines the role of the GCC and its member states in regional security while Ralph Braibanti (Duke University) compares the GCC to other organizations in the Islamic world and Asia. Appendices include the charter and unified economic agreement of the GCC and economic data on the member states.

1489. Sullivan, Denis J. “The Gulf Cooperation Council: Regional Security or Collective Defense?” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer 1989), pp. 39-56. ●● An assistant professor at Northeastern University looks at the dominance of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the GCC and asks whether the end of the Iran-Iraq War will cause Iran and/or Iraq to seek admission into the GCC.


1491. Twinam, Joseph Wright. *The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council: An American Perspective*. Washington, DC: Middle East Policy Council, 1992. ●● A view of the Gulf Cooperation Council, its background, and its relations with the United States, both before and after the Kuwait War, written by a professor at The Citadel and former State Department official. He notes that there is “no sound reason to hope that Kuwaitis would wave American flags forever or that the US-Saudi linkage would stay at the highly charged level of Desert Storm.” (p. 260) He sees many “rocks and shoals” ahead for the US-GCC relationship but feels that it is likely to be stronger in the future than in the past.

1492. ________. “The Gulf Cooperation Council Since the Gulf War: The State of the States.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1992), pp. 96-115. ●● A retired US Foreign Service officer and visiting professor at The Citadel discusses the economic, social, and political implications of the Kuwait War on the GCC states. In his view, “The social and political rumblings in Kuwait [about the reinstitution of the National Assembly] would inevitably reverberate down the Gulf whether or not the six monarchies were bound in union. But the existence and aspirations of the Gulf Council to some degree make it a condit for spreading the impulse for change.” (p. 113)


1494. Yorke, Valerie. “Bid for Gulf Unity.” *World Today*, Vol. 37, Nos. 7-8 (July-August 1981), pp. 246-249. ●● A short article providing the immediate background to the Abu Dhabi summit of May 1981 that marked the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Yorke points out that previous attempts at a Gulf security pact (as at the 1979 Gulf summit in Muscat) failed principally because of differences between the two most powerful states of the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. Since then, the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war have not
only increased the apprehension of the remaining six states, but temporarily removed the
two fractious states from Gulf councils. Yorke also notes that, despite the GCC members’
many common interests, enough significant points of disagreement exist to thwart
cooperation plans.

(July 1980), pp. 239-250. ●● A research assistant at the Royal Institute of International
Affairs at the time of writing points out that the failed rescue attempt of the American
hostages in Iran heightened the Gulf States’ concerns over their security and called into
question US ability and resolve to counter the Soviet threat. Yorke discusses a number of
“preemptive policies” undertaken by these states to distance themselves militarily from the
US to control the destabilizing effects of modernization, and possibly to institute more
nationalistic stances regarding oil policy. She concludes that these policies, however
antagonistic they may appear to the West, may nevertheless be preferable to alternative
régimes in the region. ●
INTERNAL ASPECTS OF GULF SECURITY

General, Political, and Other Considerations

1496. Abdelkarim, Abbas, ed. Change and Development in the Gulf. London: Macmillan, 1999. A wide-ranging collection of papers on the Gulf, some by Gulf authors, edited by a senior lecturer at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Subjects include industrialization, population, gender relations, and social change. Among those contributions directly relevant to this bibliography, Eleanor Doumato (University of Rhode Island) discusses the impact of the Kuwait War and of the rise of the religious right in Saudi Arabia on women in the kingdom and notes that “The rise in Islamic militancy suggests that the Gulf War alignment with the United States is, in effect, contributing to the unravelling of the cohesion of Saudi Arabia.” (p. 207) Paul Aarts offers a “revised and updated version” of his “Les limites du ‘tribalisme politique’: le Koweit d’après-guerre et le processus de démocratisation” (Monde arabe/Maghreb-Machrek, No. 142 [October-December 1993], pp. 61-79) and holds that “the ruling family will not willingly give up anything of importance, but its high-handed behaviour of the past cannot easily be repeated.” (p. 232) Serge Herzog (Swiss Ministry of Defense) reviews the role of arms transfers and international involvement in Gulf security, warning that “bilateral security agreements are fraught with drawbacks that ultimately compromise the stability of the region.” (p. 256)

1497. Abir, Mordechai. Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea and the Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 1974. A collection of four separate essays by an Israeli academic. The first consists of a survey of political developments on the Arab littoral of the Gulf since 1971. The author’s conclusion that stability in these countries, particularly the smaller ones, declined after British withdrawal has not been borne out by events. It is followed by an analysis of the National Liberation Front’s rise to power in South Yemen and the independent PDRY’s relations with China and the Soviet Union, as well as ties to the revolutionaries in Dhufar and the government in North Yemen. Also included is an essay on international relations in the Red Sea, focusing on the role of external powers, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and disputes in the Horn of Africa. The final essay concentrates on Ethiopia and the Eritrean struggle. The tenor of Abir’s approach is indicated by his concluding remarks that the Red Sea and Gulf are like a volcano that occasionally erupts. In the past, “tensions and conflicts” were “easily contained by the Great Powers. Nowadays, however, the ability of the Great Powers to control these conflicts has greatly diminished....”

Alkim, Hassan Hamdan al-. “The Prospect of Democracy in the GCC Countries.” Critique, No. 9 (Fall 1996), pp. 29-41. The chairman of the department of political science at the UAE University analyzes the background to political participation in the Gulf states and observes that because the regimes became more dependent on the US for their security after the Kuwait War, “the ruling families became more reluctant to give concessions and introduce democratic measures.” (p. 40) Still he predicts that “although democracy may not be realized within the coming decade, it is acquiring a significant importance in the GCC states’ political life. Thus, its realization becomes a matter of time.” (p. 41)

Amuzegar, Jahangir. Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999. A former World Bank official and lecturer at Johns Hopkins University examines the background to and formation of OPEC, paying particular attention to the domestic impact on the organization’s members. He notes how the members reacted to the windfall income after the oil price revolution, assesses the economic performance of each country, and compares their performance. He finds that “a majority of OPEC members did, albeit in different degrees, fail to translate their high gross domestic products into corresponding improvements in their peoples’ welfare.” (p. 187) He demonstrates that as the members began facing economic difficulties after the 1980s oil boom, OPEC’s influence and power began to fade and “was substantially reduced by the mid-1990s. Not only did OPEC become an increasingly residual oil supplier, it could not even maintain its initial residual share.” (p. 205) The author concludes by observing that oil nationalization did not produce all the benefits expected, that raising oil prices to their short-term limit encouraged the development of non-OPEC sources, and that OPEC fell prey to internal cheating and loss of membership.

Bahgat, Gawdat. The Future of the Gulf. Washington, DC: Scott-Townsend Publishers, 1997. An examination of future prospects for the Gulf monarchies, Iraq, and Iran. The author concludes that oil will remain the backbone of the economies of the Gulf monarchies and they will continue to rely on Western powers to protect them from Iran and Iraq. He posits four possible scenarios for Iraq. He regards the first two, democratic transition and a long period of turmoil and civil war, as unlikely but gives greater chances
to either a continuation of Saddam Husayn’s rule or a change of leadership within the Iraqi ruling clique. Iran, in his view, adopted a more pragmatic policy under President Rafsanjani and the country has begun to act increasingly like a state and less like a revolution. Still, he does not see it becoming pro-Western or abandoning its Islamic doctrine.

1503. ________., The Persian Gulf at the Dawn of a New Millennium. Commack, NY: Nova Science, 1997. •• A basic overview of recent developments in the Gulf, concentrating on the pivotal role of oil, water scarcity, the situation of the Shi’ah in various Gulf states, the problems of education, unemployment, and the gender gap, the question of succession, political change in Iraq and Iran, a look at Gulf security, and a summary of the role of the US, Europe, Russia, and China in the Gulf.

1504. ________., “Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Fall 1995), pp. 55-70. •• An assistant professor at Indiana University of Pennsylvania examine challenges facing the “rentier” states of the Gulf, in particular stagnating oil prices and high military expenditures. The responses of these states, he says, have been limited political liberalization.


1506. ________., “Gulf Security and Western Policy.” International Spectator, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July-September 1996), pp. 39-49. •• A survey of Western policy to forge political and security arrangements in the Gulf to secure the uninterrupted flow of oil from the region by an assistant professor of political science at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Since the Kuwait War, the author avers, peace in the Gulf “has been imposed mainly as a result of a balance of power between Iran and Iraq on one side, and Western military existence on the other. Since 1991, this balance has prevented the outbreak of another conventional war, but these security arrangements are fragile and do not guarantee a solid basis for a long-term peace.” (p. 49)

1507. ________., “The Gulf Monarchies: Economic and Political Challenges at the End of the Century.” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 147-175. •• The author, from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, reviews economic and political change in the GCC states and judges that they do not face serious crisis. “These governments will continue to rely on the Western powers to protect them from Iran and Iraq. This dependence on foreign troops has a political cost.” (p. 175) He covers the same subject in his The Gulf Monarchies: New Economic and Political Realities (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Conflict Studies No. 296, February 1997).
Bill, James A. “Islam, Politics, and Shi‘ism in the Gulf.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 3, No. 3 (January-February 1984), pp. 3-12. The author sees a gathering storm in the Gulf that is best understood “in terms of the resurgence of Islam – a powerful resurgence of the major ideological force that activates these systems and permeates every aspect of the lives of their citizens.” Bill points to the growth in the number of mosques along the Arab side of the Gulf and the emergence of at least five movements espousing “Popular Islam” (al-Islam al-sha‘bi, as opposed to “Establishment Islam,” al-Islam al-rasmi). In addition to the challenge of “Popular Islam,” Bill sees the Shi‘ah of the Arab littoral posing a potential threat to the ruling elites – a threat produced not by the revolutionary government of Iran but from the Arab Gulf states’ treatment of their Shi‘i minorities. He warns that repression of the Shi‘ah can lead to their alienation and desperation. Even more, “the preoccupation of certain Gulf officials with the Shi‘ah communities deflects them from addressing the much broader and more serious challenge posed by the growing reassertion of Popular Islam in general.”

Bonnefant, Paul, ed. La Péninsule arabique d’aujourd’hui. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, for the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur l’Orient arabe contemporain, 1982. 2 vols. A massive collection of more than 40 contributions on nearly all aspects of life in the Arabian Peninsula, including history, demography, economics, Islam, culture, development planning, urbanization, architecture, anthropology, and politics. Articles most directly relevant for this bibliography include the geopolitics of the peninsula (Pierre Marthelot), ideology and power in Saudi Arabia (Olivier Carré), attitudes towards modernization (Yves Schemiel), the strategic role of the Arabian Peninsula in the Indian Ocean (Henri Labrousse), the formation of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (Michel Tuchscherer), and overview articles and separate chronologies on each of the peninsula’s states.

Chubin, Shahram, ed. Domestic Political Factors. London: Gower, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982. Security in the Persian Gulf, Vol. 1. The four papers in this volume were first presented at a conference in November 1979. Two deal with problems of political change: Arnold Hottinger (a Swiss journalist) briefly discusses Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, while John Duke Anthony (of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies at the time) evaluates the prospects for the future of the United Arab Emirates’ federation (presently at 13 years of age, the Arab world’s longest experiment in integration). The third paper, by freelance journalist Michael Field, is concerned with the economic future of the Gulf’s Arab oil states: how long can the governments’ policies of enrichment of their citizenry last? Finally, Allan G. Hill, of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, looks at immigration in the Arab oil states of the Gulf and how the experience of the past several decades has changed the demographic and urban setting, and possibly the political balance at some time in the future. He also points out the wide panoply of legal and unwritten means by which the immigrants are denied all but the barest civil rights and welfare benefits and concludes that
these states must encourage their nationals to participate more fully in all levels of their economies.

1511. Erb, Richard D., guest editor. “The Arab Oil-Producing States of the Gulf. Political and Economic Developments.” *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4 (1980), entire issue. A systematic collection of articles covering sociopolitical and economic developments in each Arab country of the Gulf (except for Oman). Bayly Winder (New York University) and Richard D. Erb (American Enterprise Institute) discuss Saudi Arabia, Phebe Marr (University of Tennessee) and Basil al-Bustany (then at the World Bank) cover Iraq, and Naseer H. Aruri (Southeastern Massachusetts University) and Carl Bazarian (East-West Group) write on Kuwait. John Duke Anthony (then at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) and Bazarian outline the UAE, and Emile A. Nakhleh (Mount St. Mary’s College) and Bazarian cover Bahrain and Qatar. In addition, Erb and Nebil N. al-Shawaf (doctoral candidate at Johns Hopkins SAIS) discuss nascent linkages toward economic integration, Nakhleh surveys political relations among the Arab Gulf states, and Les Janka (then at DGA International) highlights security risks and reactions.

1512. Halliday, Fred. *Arabia Without Sultans*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974; New York: Vintage Press, 1975. A broad study of “imperialism” and “revolutionary movements” in the Arabian Peninsula, based on a thorough sifting of available sources and first-hand research. The author, a leftist journalist and writer, focuses his principal attention on three countries and case studies. North Yemen, the first, is regarded as significant because of its revolution and protracted civil war in the 1960s, which eventually resulted in one of the world’s most conservative republics. South Yemen is of particular interest to the author because of the liberation movement against British colonialism and the establishment of a Marxist state there. Halliday’s third case study is Oman, where the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) was waging war against the régime in the southern province of Dhufar at the time of publication. Other chapters discuss class struggle and imperialist influences in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf emirates, and Iran, with less effect.

1513. Niblock, Tim, ed. *Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf*. London: Croom Helm, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1980. This collection of twelve papers from the inaugural Exeter symposium on the Gulf focuses on the impact of oil wealth on social, economic, and political change. The late Joseph J. Malone sketches the creation of the modern state of Saudi Arabia and how the American-Saudi relationship was forged. Mohamed G. Rumaihi (associate professor of sociology at the University of Kuwait) looks at the traditional economy and the social relationships of the Gulf before the discovery of oil. A third historical article, by Rosemarie Said Zahlan, examines the socioeconomic impact of British supremacy in the Gulf and the repercussions of early oil agreements on politics there. Four papers concentrate on economic issues: Keith McLachlan (senior lecturer in geography at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies) discusses the impact of oil wealth on the economies of the Gulf, John Duke Anthony (then at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) and Carl Bazarian (East-West Group) write on the economic development of the Gulf emirates, and Les Janka (then at DGA International) highlights security risks and reactions.
Studies) on the relationship between natural resources and economic development, John Townsend (an economist with long experience in the Gulf) on the manifold obstructions to the Gulf’s heavy industrialization, J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair (fellows in economics at the University of Durham) on labor requirements and the increasing importation of labor from Southeast Asia, and Tim Niblock (deputy director of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies) on prospects for integration in the Gulf. Another two papers deal with the phenomenon of extensive social change as a result of oil income: Donald P. Cole (associate professor of anthropology at the American University in Cairo) writes on nomadism in Saudi Arabia, and J.C. Wilkinson (lecturer in the School of Geography, Oxford) on changes in village life in Oman. In addition, Emile Nakhleh (professor of political science at Mount St. Mary’s College) examines political participation in Bahrain and Qatar, Naomi Sakr (economics editor of The Middle East magazine) explores the progress of federalism in the United Arab Emirates, and Fred Halliday (associate director of the Transnational Institute) draws parallels between the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the Iranian revolution of 1979.

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1514. Peterson, J.E. “Legitimacy and Political Change in Yemen and Oman.” Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 971-998. Focusing on the nature of political legitimacy in these two countries, this study points out the basic similarity of Yemen and Oman in geography, economy, society, religious expression, and historical experience-and in their political systems until the last several decades. “Since then, the two countries have proceeded along divergent paths of political change.” The reasons advanced for this divergence include underlying differences between the countries, Oman’s advantage in having oil, the opposite impact of direct external involvement, and the contrast between the seemingly successful adaption of the sultanate in Oman to changing circumstances and the difficulty of the new republic in Yemen to achieve legitimacy.

1515. Plascov, Avi. Modernization, Political Development and Stability. London: Gower, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982. Security in the Persian Gulf, Vol. 3. The author, a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies before his death in January 1982, surveys the effects and strains of rapid modernization on the Gulf states, including brief glances at the role of tribalism, the challenge to traditionalism and Islam, sectarian and ethnic divisions, the impact of immigrant workers, and the dangers of militarization. He sees little success for industrialization policies and downplays the extent of political change. Plascov appears to view these states in a static sense, intimating that basically the same anachronisms exist as did a half-century ago. Rather superficially, he contends that no real adjustments to changing circumstances have been made and therefore these “inherently unstable” states with “authoritarian” regimes are “ill-equipped to withstand” coming challenges.

sociology at Kuwait University points out that “The Gulf is not oil. The Gulf is its people and its land ... Oil is no more than a historical phase in this part of the Arab world....” (p. 11) He proceeds to describe the history of the Gulf, its progress in development, the efforts at unity in the 1970s, the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the region’s culture, the role of women, and the inter-dependence of citizens and immigrant workers. He observes that Gulf societies “are held together by a tripartite alliance of the conservative authorities (the ruling clan), the owners of commercial capital, and the top layers of the educated elite.” (p. 140)

1517. ________. “Arabian Gulf Security.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 23 (Winter 1987-1988), pp. 47-56. •• The editor of Kuwait’s al-'Arabi links Gulf security to wider Arab security and examines the Israeli threat to Arab security, the Iranian threat to Gulf security, and the role of the GCC, the superpowers, and the arms market. He believes that “the security of the Gulf will continue to be unstable in both the short and medium-terms [and] The political development inside the various countries of the Gulf will ... also determine the extent of such instability....” (p. 56)


1520. Tétreault, Mary Ann. “Gulf Winds: Inclement Political Weather in the Arabian Peninsula.” *Current History*, Vol. 95, no. 597 (January 1996), pp. 23-27. •• A brief examination of recent internal developments – including the unrest in Bahrain, the 1995 coup d’état in Qatar, and continuing problems in Kuwait – that concludes with the observation that “Political barometers in the Gulf caution us to watch for continued unsettled weather, but give few hints about the most likely target of the next big storm.” (p. 27)

1521. Yorke, Valerie. *The Gulf in the 1980’s.* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1980. Chatham House Papers, No. 6. •• A short but comprehensive monograph giving a basic outline of six Arab Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) and the problems they face. Then a research associate at Chatham House, Yorke discusses various sources of instability, the effects of modernization, the impact of Arab policies on Israel and oil, and policy choices for the West. Also included is an appendix on trade prospects. ♦

**Resurgent Islam and Islamist Movements**

A CRS analyst in Middle Eastern religions and cultures provides an overview of Islamic religious schools, known as madrasahs, their history and curriculum, and briefly touches upon their alleged financing by Saudi Arabia (without drawing any conclusions). He also notes the September 2002 commitment by US AID to provide $100 million over five years for general education reform in Pakistan.

1523. Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. *The Age of Sacred Terror*. New York: Random House, 2002. The first part of this book by two former National Security Council staffers in the Clinton administration sketches an overview of the roots of Islamic extremism (“jihadism”) from Ibn Taymiyah to Sayyid Qutb, followed by capsules of prominent groups that eventually led to al-Qa‘idah. Much of the remainder of the book is devoted to attacking those parts of the US government that neglected or opposed counterterrorism efforts during the Clinton era and much editorializing about the threats to come and the need to combat them effectively.

1524. Bill, James A. “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall 1984), pp. 108-127. A professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin holds that “The fundamental impulse for resurgent Islam comes from the grassroots of society” (p. 108) and coins the term “Populist Islam” to distinguish this phenomenon from the “Establishment Islam” represented by the ruling elites. He proceeds to outline the various Sunni and Shi‘i manifestations of Populist Islam and observes that the ruling families of the six traditional Gulf states are deeply concerned about its challenge. In addition, he views the US as on a collision course with the forces of Populist Islam because of its uncritical support for régimes that promote Establishment Islam and because of the American-Israeli connection.

1525. Bizri, Dalal. El-. “Mouvement islamiste et guerre du Golfe.” *Peuples Méditerranéens*, Nos. 58-59 (January-June 1992), pp. 23-38. A look at the effect that the Kuwait War had on Islamic movements throughout the Middle East, demonstrating that movements were divided between following popular, Arab nationalist, opinion cheering Iraq and condemnation of the Iraqi action because of its lack of political and civil rights.

1526. Carapico, Sheila. “Yemen and the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army.” *MERIP Press Information Notes*, No. 35 (18 October 2002), distributed electronically. A political scientist at the University of Richmond provides background on dissident politics in Yemen and the possible involvement of the underground “Aden-Abyan Islamic Army” in the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. She notes that the organization probably consists of a loose-knit network of only a few dozen Yemenis and non-Yemenis and warns that “Hasty action to round up suspects in the Cole attack may well serve as a pretext to crack down on peaceful campaigners for democracy in Yemen.”

importance of Islam in the officially Marxist South Yemen state, paying attention both to elements of “official” and “popular” Islam. He discusses the phenomenon of revivalist Islam in the country and notes that South Yemen is one of the few countries in the Middle East where the US is not a target of hostility – rather that hostility is directed at the USSR because of its conspicuous presence and influence. He concludes that “there is likely to be a steady incremental expansion of the Islamic revival.” (p. 200)

1528. Dekmejian, R. Hrair. “The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), pp. 627-643. ●● A political scientist at the University of Southern California looks at the growing Islamist movement that appeared in the kingdom after the Kuwait War, providing information on prominent new Islamists and detailing the government’s response to this challenge. In his view, “The Islamist protest movement and its antithetical liberal constituency, which took concrete form during and after the war, are likely to persist in articulating their conflicting demands for change.” (p. 643)

1529. Esposito, John L. “The Persian Gulf War, Islamic Movements and the New World Order.” *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1993), pp. 340-365. ●● In tying together the threads of Islamic resurgence and the Kuwait War, the Director of the Center for International Studies at the College of Holy Cross concludes that the political costs to all those concerned in the conflict remain incalculable. However, he notes the growing anti-Western and especially anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world and characterizes this as a “legitimate, rational reaction to American hostility and policies.” (p. 361)

1530. Fandy, Mamoun. *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1999. ●● A research professor of politics at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the time of writing, Fandy discusses Saudi Islamist dissidents and their thinking, focusing on Sunni clerics Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-‘Awdah, Shi‘i cleric Hasan al-Saffar, London Islamic opposition figures Muhammad al-Mas‘ari and Sa‘d al-Faqih, and Usamah bin Ladin. The author contends that “Central to the Saudi oppositions’ vision is the idea that ‘Islam’ and its values are under attack both globally and locally and that the Saudi government has failed to protect Islam and Muslims.” (p. 3) He also stresses that much of the success of these movements in getting their message heard can be attributed to their use of new technologies, such as the cassette tape and fax machine. More detail on Hawali and his thinking is provided in Fandy’s “Safar al-Hawali: Saudi Islamist or Saudi Nationalist?” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 5-23, while an investigation of Hasan al-Saffar is contained in Fandy’s “From Confrontation to Creative Resistance: The Shi‘a Oppositional Discourse in Saudi Arabia,” *Critique*, No. 9 (Fall 1996), pp. 1-27.

1531. Ghabra, Shafeeq N. “The Islamic Movement in Kuwait.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1997), pp. 58-72. ●● An associate professor of political science at Kuwait University analyzes the background to the Islamic revival in Kuwait, both before and after the Kuwait
War and the role of the Islamist politicians elected to the National Assembly in 1996. He argues for government appointments to be based on “merit and an ability to halt corruption and favoritism. In the past, these qualities contributed to the ability of the Islamists to attract followers and plant roots, in particular among the less fortunate and alienated segments of the population, primarily Kuwaitis of Bedouin origin.” (p. 71)

1532. Hunter, Shireen T. “Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 730-749. • • The author urges caution in ascribing the spread of revolutionary Islamic movements to Iranian influence, which she terms significant but exaggerated. After discussing Iran’s relationship with various groups and countries, as well as the means by which Iran develops that its influence, Hunter note that “Iran faces a number of serious barriers in its efforts to reach beyond the Shia groups, and some marginal extremist Sunni groups, and to appeal to the broader Islamic movement which is overwhelmingly Sunni....” (p. 749) She concludes that “it is unlikely that an Iranian defeat in its war with Iraq, or even a change of regime in Iran, would mean the end of Islamic movements in the rest of the Muslim world, although an Iranian success will no doubt strengthen the Islamic wave.” (p. 749)

1533. “Islam in the 21st Century.” New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 2002), entire issue. • • Several dozen short articles on Islam, radical developments within Islam, and Western relations with Islam after 11 September. Among them, Samuel P. Huntington (Harvard University) charges that “Osama bin Laden has declared war on Western civilization, and in particular the United States. If the Muslim community to which Bin Laden is appealing rallies to him, then it will become a clash of civilizations. So far, they appear deeply divided.” (p. 5) Shaykh Saud Nasser Al-Sabah (former Kuwaiti minister of oil and ambassador to the US) criticizes Kuwait’s “hesitant and reserved” and declares that political Islamists have hijacked the Arab world. Egyptian writer Gaber Asfour sees a clash between “the tolerant peoples of the ‘Islam of the rivers,’ such as flourished in the Nile delta, and the intolerance of the ‘Islam of the desert,’ practiced by Osama bin Laden.” (p. 41)

1534. Knysh, Alexander. “A Clear and Present Danger: ‘Wahhabism’ as a Rhetorical Foil.” Saudi-American Forum, Essay No. 24 (14 November 2003), published online. • • A professor of Islamic studies at the University of Michigan examines the characterization of Muslim resurgence in the former Soviet Union as a struggle between “Sufi” (i.e. “traditional”) Islam and “Wahhabi” (i.e. “fundamentalist”) Islam. He observes that the activities of disgruntled Muslims in Russia and its “near abroad” who couch their activity in a religious rhetoric, “whether consciously ‘Wahhabi’ or otherwise, [are] then perceived by hostile outside observers as yet another manifestation of the worldwide ‘Wahhabi conspiracy.’ ... Once implemented in practice, the narrative construct named ‘Wahhabism’ acquires a life of its own....” A longer version of the article was scheduled to appear in Die Welt des Islams.
1535. Kostiner, Joseph. “Shi ‘i Unrest in the Gulf.” In Martin Kramer, ed., *Shi’ism, Resistance and Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987; Collected Papers, Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies), pp. 173-188. •• A historian at Tel Aviv University charts the impact of the Iranian Revolution on Shi‘i activism on the Arab side of the Gulf and the resultant Sunni backlash. He concludes that “Most Shi‘is seem to have concluded that the liberation proferred by the radicals can only be had at the price of war which might just as readily bring destruction. Their choice – for now – is to watch and wait.” (p. 185)

1536. ________. “State, Islam, and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post-Desert Storm Phase.” In Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann and Ephraim Inbar, eds., *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 75-89. •• A senior lecturer at Tel Aviv University reviews the activities of opposition groups in Saud Arabia since 1991. He explains the reasons for their emergence as “problems of economic recession, declining leadership and security and the rise of new elites that typified this period.” (p. 88)

1537. Obaid, Nawaf. “The Power of Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Leaders.” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1999), pp. 51-58. •• A Harvard University graduate looks at the role of the Saudi ‘ulama’ (religious leaders) in the decision-making process regarding the 1973 oil embargo, allowing US troops to be stationed in the kingdom in 1990, the decision to permit them to remain, and Saudi support for the Taliban since 1994. He suggests that the Taliban government in Afghanistan offers “a possible glimpse of Saudi Arabia if the traditional balance of power is disrupted in favor of the religious establishment.” (p. 58)

1538. Okruhlik, Gwenn. “Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia.” *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 651 (January 2002), pp. 22-28. •• An assistant professor of political science at the University of Arkansas looks at the impact of Islamic dissent on Saudi Arabia and warns that “if serious structural reforms are not implemented, the call from the most radical flank will almost certainly find an audience among the population.” (p. 22) In the last few years, she contends, “Islamists have successfully captured the discourse in Saudi Arabia” (p. 27) and have forced the ruling Al Sa‘ud into compromise on a number of issues. She also advises that “the maintenance of United States military bases in Saudi Arabia must be reconsidered. The bases are there to protect a stable and cheap supply of oil to the United States and its allies. Yet the presence of the bases fosters opposition to the régime they are there to protect.” (p. 28)

1539. Rasheed, Madawi Al-. “Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition.” *Current History*, Vol. 95, No. 597 (January 1996), pp. 16-22. •• A lecturer in social anthropology at King’s College of the University of London examines the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and Usamah bin Ladin’s Committee for Advice and Reform, as well Islamist figures inside the kingdom. She judges that the rise of Islamic opposition in an Islamic state is related to the impact of the Kuwait War, the country’s economic deterioration, and the expansion of the educational system, especially the growth in students and graduates of the Islamic universities who find themselves unemployed. She notes that “The Saudi Islamic
opposition is also breaking new ground with its indigenous Islamist discourse by forcibly arguing for a change in past practices in the country” (p. 21) and she notes that the Islamists are largely drawn from the Najd and especially its al-Qasim region.

1540. Teitelbaum, Joshua. *Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition*. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. A research fellow at Tel Aviv University looks at the emergence of Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia after the Kuwait War, the founding of the CDLR and the Shi‘i opposition and the bombing of the barracks at al-Khubar. He regards Heir Apparent ‘Abdullah as possibly returning to King Faysal’s more orderly approach and notes the régime’s increasing awareness of social discontent.


**Gulf Military Capabilities and Arms Transfers**


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1545. __________. “Iraq’s Bomb: Blueprints and Artefacts.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (January-February 1992), pp. 30-40. A series of attack on the United States for deliberately seeking backing for military action against Iraq by exaggerating its nuclear threat. Although the authors initially claimed that Iraq was at least a decade away from producing a bomb in 1990, they later admit Baghdad was much closer to producing a weapon.


1548. Carus, W. Seth. “Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses.” *Middle East Review of International Affairs, MERIA Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1998), distributed electronically. An examination of Iran’s holdings of chemical and biological weapons, as well as its reported efforts to attain nuclear capability. The author notes that “Given the enmity that exists between the United States and Iran, and the possibility that military hostilities could erupt between the two countries, these Iranian weapons programs are a source of serious concern to policy-makers in Washington.

1549. Childs, Nick. “The Royal Saudi Navy.” *Navy International*, Vol. 92 (November 1987), pp. 575-577. A writer for the Arabic Service of the BBC provides a brief survey of Saudi Arabia’s naval capabilities, remarking that “the Saudi Navy does not yet approach the proficiency of a major Western navy, but they plainly intend that their fleet should become the major regional naval force, and, with ocean going warships and auxiliaries, also be able to range further afield.” (p. 577)


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1554. _______. After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; London: Mansell, 1993. ●● A pair of comprehensive treatments of the military capabilities of the regional states, their relations with the United States, and American military and strategic issues dealing with the region. The first volume, published as the Iran-Iraq War was ending, also covers the problems involved in US arms sales to Saudi Arabia during the 1980s. The second, published after the Kuwait War, casts its net wider over the entire Middle East and also discusses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

1555. _______. Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. ●● A senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies details the military capabilities of Iraq and Iran and analyzes the threats that both countries pose, including conventional, WMD, and terrorism and subversion. He concludes that “it is clear that the West and the southern Gulf must take every possible action to limit Iran and Iraq’s present and future war fighting options. This involves ... arms control, limits on the transfer of technology and equipment, strengthening the deterrent and defensive capabilities of southern Gulf forces, and building up Western power projection capabilities.” (p. 288)

1556. _______. Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment. ●● A senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies surveys the background, economy, security requirements, and security forces of each of the four countries of the title. He emphasizes that, despite grouping the countries together, that they exhibit as many differences as they do similarities.

1557. _______. Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment. ●● This slim volume is part of a six-volume study on the individual countries of the GCC. The author examines first the external security problems that Kuwait faces, i.e. Iran and Iraq, before turning to internal security questions, along with an assessment of the emirate’s political and economic stability. The subsequent eight chapters focus on the Kuwaiti military, including assessments of each service and the rebuilding of the armed forces after the Kuwait War. According to the author, “Kuwait faces serious strategic challenges. It must develop as effective a self-defense capability as is possible; it must reinforce its strategic ties to the US as the ultimate guarantor of its security; it must do as much as possible to reinforce its ties to other Southern Gulf states; and it must move towards political, social, and economic reform.” (p. 123)

1558. _______. Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment. ●● A senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies looks at internal and external security issues confronting Saudi Arabia and documents the kingdom’s order of battle in each of its services. A final chapter discusses the matter of reform and military cooperation with the West. He warns
that “The West must be careful in pressing for military sales, or aid, in ways which do not meet vital Saudi security needs and which do not take into account Saudi Arabia’s domestic economic situation and social needs.” (p. 195)

1559. ________. *Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. ●● An exhaustive survey of Iran’s military capability, including arms transfers, military manpower, each service, war doctrine, delivery systems, and status of WMD capabilities. In much the same vein as his views on Iraq, Cordesman suggests that the best policy for the West is to continue military containment to hinder and delay Iran’s “creeping” proliferation efforts, even though it is unrealistic to expect to prevent it. The author suggests that it may take a decade or more for the Iranian “moderates” to wrest control of the country’s security establishment from the “conservatives” and counsels patience in the meantime.

1560. ________. *Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. ●● A detailed depiction and analysis of Iraq’s conventional warfare and WMD capabilities, as well as its delivery capabilities, directed to an audience concerned with understanding Saddam Hussein’s strategy and intentions. Cordesman recommends that military sanctions, as opposed to economic sanctions, should be continued but warns that their effect is likely to be containment of a weakened Iraq, not a solution to the problem. He also contends that any successor regime will seek to rebuild military capability and that a worst-case scenario involves a large-scale Iraqi combined operations attack on Kuwait and/or eastern Saudi Arabia.

1561. ________. “U.S. Military Assistance to the Middle East: National Security or Election-Year Politics?” *Armed Forces Journal* (January 1984), pp. 26, 28, 30, 32-33. ●● Consists of an overview of the current military situation in the various subregions of the Middle East, along with a detailed criticism of US military policy towards the states of the area. In the Gulf, the author sees the main problem as being the American refusal to sell advanced or “force structure” aircraft (such as the F-15, F-16, and F-18) to the smaller Gulf states, thus “blocking any further air defense and maritime cooperation among the Gulf Cooperation Countries.” Since they have been forced to turn to France for fighters, the Reagan administration (like the previous one) has been forced to break its own rules regarding arms sales.

1562. ________. “Arms to Iran: The Impact of U.S. and Other Arms Sales on the Iran-Iraq War.” *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 20 (Spring 1987), pp. 13-29. ●● An adjunct professor at Georgetown University notes that arms are the only area of Iraqi superiority in its war with Iran and thus the covert US arms sales to Iran were important but still were only part of the story. The author outlines the pattern in arms sales to the combatants over the course of the war and suggests that the challenge for US policy is to “help force a halt to the fighting without risking the defeat of Iraq or alienating any future Iranian leadership that may have a serious interest in ... diplomatic and economic ties to the United States.” (p. 26)
1563. ________. “The Changing Military Balance in the Gulf: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait and Its Aftermath.” In Royal United Services Institute and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1991 (London: Brassey's UK, 1991), pp. 217-247. •• An adjunct professor at Georgetown University and US Congressional aide surveys the military and strategic impact of the Iraqi invasion on regional security and the role of outside powers (the article was published on the eve of the Kuwait War). The author notes pessimistically that “The sad fact is that the ability to use force is still the only way to achieve security and stability in the region, and that states will only be secure to the extent that they and friendly states have sufficient military force to halt any challenge.” (p. 245)


1566. ________. “The New Balance of Gulf Arms.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (June 1999), pp. 80-103. •• The author reviews the changes in the military arena since the Kuwait War and outlines current threat scenarios, including potential WMD capabilities and the use of terrorism. The second article includes a number of charts.


1569. ________, and Ahmed S. Hashem. Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. •• Two fellows at the Center for Strategic and International Studies collaborate on a study of Iran’s domestic developments, military capabilities, regional security ambitions, support for terrorism and extremism, and WMD programs. The authors argue that there is a continuing need for military containment of Iran but that the US policy of “dual containment” should be replaced by “constructive engagement.”

of the International Research Council at Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Cottrell) and a CSIS research associate (Bray), provide a descriptive, country by-country survey of the defense establishments of each of the Gulf states. A conclusion notes that “The increase in the size and sophistication of Persian Gulf military forces has been taking place at a time when many of the traditional rulers of the area, having witnessed Britain’s withdrawal, see little hope that their security will be provided for by any other large power.” A number of factors have combined to date this study and reduce its usefulness: the revolution in Iran, six years of subsequent arms transfers and military improvements in the Arab states, the Iran-Iraq war, and enunciation of the Carter Doctrine (much of the conclusion focuses on applications of the Nixon Doctrine in light of the then-current Ogaden war). See also Alvin J. Cottrell, Robert J. Hanks, and Frank T. Bray, “Military Affairs in the Persian Gulf,” in Cottrell, gen. ed., *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 140-171.

1571. Cummings, John Thomas, Hussein G. Askari, and Michael Skinner. “Military Expenditures and Manpower Requirements in the Arabian Peninsula.” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1980), pp. 38-49. ●● The authors explore the danger that vastly increased military spending could frustrate economic development plans in the lightly populated oil-exporting countries by diverting manpower from civilian to military applications. They estimate that Saudi arms purchases may require another 75,000 to 100,000 skilled personnel and that the situation in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are proportionately similar. They note that a program of military integration could alleviate some of these problems and they also recommend investigation of the military’s potential as an educational force. Cummings and Askari teach international business at the University of Texas at Austin, and Skinner is a business consultant in Austin.

1572. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. “Oil, Arms Procurement and Security in the Persian Gulf.” *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol. 34, No. 3 (November 2003), pp. 260-270. ●● A professor of international relations at the University of Durham explores the linkage between oil income and arms procurement in the Gulf. The author notes that the region continues to be one of the world’s biggest importers of weaponry, despite falling incomes. While the oil boom is a thing of the past, he says, the arms race is not. He suggests that while oil income was a factor in arms procurement policies in the past, continued high outlays during a period of flat oil prices in the 1990s were more the result of security perceptions and calculations than the price of oil.


Policy. The first, completed just prior to Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait, outlines Iraq’s capabilities in unconventional weapons, long-range strike systems, strategic reconnaissance systems, and also looks at the “deterrent relationship” between Iraq and Israel. The second reviews the control over the state exercised by Saddam Husayn in the post-Kuwait-War era and details the country’s conventional as well as unconventional forces. Eisenstadt summarizes Saddam’s military options and concludes that “Although currently weak and isolated, the regime of President Saddam Hussein remains committed to making Iraq a regional power and rebuilding its military capabilities, and therefore it will continue to pose a threat to regional peace and stability.” (p. 77)

1575. __________. *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions*. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996. Policy Papers, No. 42. ●● A senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy summarizes Iran’s conventional and unconventional forces, as well as its role in terrorism and subversion, and makes recommendations for US policy towards Iran. He observes that only nuclear weapons “can transform it into the preeminent military power in the Gulf and address the long-term threat Tehran perceives from Iraq and the United States....” (p.79) Although a nuclear program will cost billions of dollars, rebuilding its conventional forces will cost tens of billions of dollars. He suggests that the US should continue to focus on containing Iran to prevent it acting like Iraq. He discounts the possibility that Iraq can be built up as a counterweight to Iran or that the two countries may form a strategic alliance against the US.


1577. __________. “Living With a Nuclear Iran?” *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 124-148. ●● A senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests that Iran is indeed pursuing a nuclear option (why else would it emphasize its missile capabilities?). He contends that “The bottom line for the US is that an Iranian nuclear break-out would probably deepen American involvement in the security of the [region and it] would complicate US power projection in the Persian Gulf, and raise the potential risks of a long-term US presence there. And it would challenge Washington to find ways to strengthen its deterrent capability and to reassure allies, without contributing to regional tensions.” (p. 134)

1578. __________. “The Armed Forces Of The Islamic Republic Of Iran: An Assessment.” *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (December 2000), distributed electronically. ●● The author, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near Easter Policy, notes that “Iran’s defense policies have shown remarkable constancy in the decade following the end of the Iran-Iraq War – and even after the 1997 election of reformist President Muhammad Khatami. Iran has continued its plodding efforts to expand and modernize its conventional military forces – increasingly through domestic procurement
— though the main emphasis has been on the development of missiles and non-conventional weapons.”

1579. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Arms Supplies and Military Spending in the Gulf.” *Middle East Report*, No. 204 (July-September 1997), pp. 12-14. An associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont examines the very large role of defense spending in the Gulf states over the late 1980s and 1990s. He notes that all of the Gulf states, except Kuwait, experienced a fall in per capita military expenditure from 1985 to 1995 but cautions that this was from one of the highest levels in the world. In 1995, the military expenditure of every Gulf state except Iran exceeded the world average of 4.2%. The only non-Gulf states above 10% of GDP in military spending were North Korea, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency figures for 1992-1994 gave the Middle East as whole a total of $34 billion in arms imports (or 43% of world total); the eight Gulf states accounted for more than 70% of all Middle East imports.

1580. Goldberg, Jacob. “The Saudi Military Build-up: Strategy and Risks.” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Spring 1989), pp. 3-13. A research fellow at Tel Aviv University assesses the impact Saudi Arabia’s financial difficulties in the late 1980s had in slowing down its arms procurement programs. He concludes that these arms purchases were intended to convince their adversaries that the Saudis had become militarily powerful and since the kingdom did not have the manpower to build a large army, “the Saudis decided that the only way to project power and deter opponents was to procure – and display – large quantities of arms.” (p. 12) This policy, Goldberg argues, is a departure from the pattern set by King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and is short-sighted and counter-productive.

1581. Grimmett, Richard F. “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL32084, 22 September 2003. Although this study, updated at frequent intervals by a national defense specialist at the Library’s CRS, does not deal specifically with the Gulf, it provides a wealth of details on global arms transfers to the Gulf and rankings of Gulf states among the world’s importers of arms.

1582. Hadar, Leon. “The Saudi Armed Forces.” *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy*, Vol. 5, No. 10 (1987), pp. 42-45. A journalist briefly describes Saudi Arabia’s security requirements and its military capabilities. He avers that “the general agreement among most analysts is that the Saudi armed forces, at least in the coming years, are too small, too weak and too widely scattered to defend their country against the major military powers in the Middle East.

1583. Hamdoon, Nizar. “The U.S.-Iran Arms Deal: An Iraqi Critique.” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 35-40. Iraq’s ambassador to the United States disputes the idea that Iran should be courted because it is strategically important and alleges that “If Iran is again to be touted as a major regional power ... and supplied with weapons to pursue
its violent ends, especially its war against Iraq, then little would stand between the region and chaos.” (p. 37)


1586. Kennedy, Edward M. “The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (October 1975), pp. 14-35. The Massachusetts Senator charges that there cannot be a coherent U.S. arms sales policy for the Gulf without a clear Gulf policy-which the US lacks. In his view, the political and military aspects of Gulf security often have been over looked in favor of economic aspects, even though increasing arms sales involve the US in Gulf politics and military issues. Kennedy contends that conditions do not exist in the Gulf for a stable balance of military power and therefore arms transfers increase political tensions and the chances of conflict. He recommends the decoupling of arms sales from oil supplies and the coordination of military transfers to the region with other supplies.

1587. Kostiner, Joseph. “Counterproductive Mediation: Saudi Arabia and the Iran Arms Deal.” Middle East Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 41-46. A scholar at Tel Aviv University, visiting in the United States, criticizes Saudi Arabia’s contradictory policies of participating in the US-Israeli-Iranian arms deal of 1985-1986 while continuing to support Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. As a result, the author claims that “the Saudis found themselves forced to accept the military strengthening of their main foe [which] has not only contradicted the established Saudi policy of supporting Iraq, but has actually rendered Riyadh’s own search for security counterproductive.” (p. 46)

1588. Levi, Michael. “Will the Saudis Go Nuclear?” New Republic (2 June 2003), accessed online. A fellow at the Brookings Institution suggests that if the US-Saudi alliance disintegrates, Saudi Arabia might well develop a nuclear arsenal based on its purchase of Chinese missiles and a close Pakistani connection. He also argues that Riyadh's leadership may prefer a nuclear option rather than a conventional build-up because the latter could pose a coup-making threat to the régime. He suggests that the US might extend an explicit security guarantee to Saudi Arabia, just as it did to Europe during the Cold War to keep it non-nuclear.

A pessimistic survey of the military capabilities of the Gulf states and their political stability, written by an unidentified “former State Department official with intimate experience in the Persian Gulf.” The author points out that the Gulf area has been the world’s largest importer of military goods and services since 1974, but argues that these purchases have not really provided the Gulf states with security. The totals of military personnel and equipment in these states are misleading because of the hodgepodge of purchases, the lack of trained and committed personnel, and reliance on foreign contract personnel and mercenaries. Even more important is the lack of internal stability in all the states, according to the author: “Many, if not most, Gulf nations are likely to become ‘radical’ and potentially hostile states by 1990, and probably earlier.” One table includes a “Stability Index” which ranks, for example, the UAE regime’s survivability through 1985 at 20% and through 1990 at 5%. Much of the article is taken up by individual assessments of the military capability of each state and the author concludes with the warning that “While the West can scarcely abandon the Gulf, it cannot afford to count on it.”

Rathmell, Andrew. *The Changing Military Balance in the Gulf*. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1996. RUSI Whitehall Papers, No. 38. After first surveying the military capabilities of each of the GCC states, the author, a member of the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London, seeks to use quantitative methods to measure the strategic balance in the Gulf. He concludes that the conventional military balance in the Gulf is not static, especially between Iran and Iraq and, to a lesser extent, between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, “Over the next five to ten years the combined GCC forces will outstrip Iraq’s combat potential. The differential becomes more striking if the GCC forces are given credit for higher readiness rates.” (p. 105) He notes several caveats but, nevertheless, “the changing military balance should reassure the GCC states and their Western allies that their current force-building efforts are not in vain.” (p. 107)

The author charges that “it is debatable whether the Saudi build-up will serve its avowed function of deterring threats from Iran, Iraq or Yemen [and at] the same time, the build-up has served to accelerate the regional arms race.” (p. 500) Rather than buying security, he avers that the kingdom may be merely exacerbating its political problems.

A research associate at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy speculates on the possibility that Saudi Arabia might seek nuclear weapons capability without providing any evidence or clues that the kingdom actually has considered such a policy.

Tahtinen, Dale R. *Arms in the Persian Gulf.* Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974. Foreign Affairs Studies, No. 10. An early assessment of the comparative military power of the Gulf states, written while the author was a research associate at the American Enterprise Institute. Tahtinen also takes a look at US military policy options. Despite being heavily outdated, the author’s calls for a reversal of the superpowers’ arms sales to Gulf states and for a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict still remain relevant.


U.S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *Proposed Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia; Hearing and Markup, 22-23 April 1986, 99th Congress, 2nd Session on H. Res. 589.* Washington, DC: USGPO, 1986. This committee print contains testimony regarding the sale of several thousand Sidewinder air-to-air, Harpoon air-to-sea, and Stinger ground-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. Congressman Mel Levine of California, a member of the subcommittee and the primary sponsor of House Resolution 589 to prohibit the sale of missiles, explains his opposition “because of the antipathy Saudi Arabia has shown for fundamental American national security interests in the Middle East.” (p. 2) Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, argues that “Strengthening Saudi air defense capabilities will help ensure that Saudi Arabia, and other moderate Arab Gulf States, are not caught up in an expansion of the [Iran-Iraq] war and the spread of Khomeini-type radicalism. It will complement our own regional security objectives, and reduce the probability of future direct U.S. military involvement.” (p. 14) This view is supported by Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, who in his prepared statement notes that “The simple fact is that Saudi Arabia needs these weapons, which are purely defensive in nature, to meet the threats they – and we – perceive they will face in the early nineties.” (p. 36)
1598. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *Presidential Certification on the Delivery of AWACS to Saudi Arabia;* Hearing, 15 July 1986. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1986. •• Examines the degree to which the certification meets the terms and conditions of the sale as presented to congress in 1981. Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, states that “The AWACS aircraft are an integral part of the ambitious and effective Saudi defensive system that we have helped plan and build. Implementing the Saudi AWACS program serves the interest of both our nations.” (p. 4) Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, continues by stating that US requirements regarding the security of technology, US access to AWACS information, access by third-country nationals, restrictions of AWACS fights to within Saudi air space, and satisfactory Saudi command structure. He also stresses that the transfer of AWACS presents no threat to Israel.

1599. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *Proposed Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia;* Hearing, 10 May 1988. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988. •• The subcommittees consider the proposed sale of maintenance and training packages for AWACS and refuelling aircraft and of 200 Bradley M02 infantry fighting vehicles and accompanying TOW II missiles in light of the recent revelation of Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missiles. The two State Department witnesses, Richard Murphy and Edward Gnehm maintain that the missiles do not improve Saudi security and were obtained principally as a deterrent in the face of Iranian gains in its war with Iraq and its use of Scud missiles against Iraqi targets. There is additional questioning on the appearance of Stinger missiles in Qatar, apparently from stocks provided to the Afghanistan mujahidin (resistance).

1600. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science. *Proposed Arms Sales to Kuwait;* Hearing, 7 July 1988. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988. •• A hearing regarding the proposed $1.9 billion sale of 40 F-18 aircraft, weapons systems, and support services to Kuwait, with testimony from Peter Burleigh (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) and Edward W. Gnehm, Jr. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs).

1601. ________. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East. *Proposed Tank Sale to Saudi Arabia;* Hearing, 7 November 1989. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990. •• Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, informs the subcommittee of the Administration’s intention to sell Saudi Arabia 315 M-1A2 Abrams tanks (for a total of $3.1 billion including other equipment) to replace an aging AMX-30 tank inventory. He is accompanied by Edward W. Gnehm, Jr. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs), and Arthur H. Hughes (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs).


1606. ________. “New-Era Threat: Iraq’s Biological Weapons.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (June 1999), pp. 104-117. ●● A correspondent for some of Jane’s publications observes that “it is clear that an embattled Iraq was able to demonstrate an astonishing level of enterprise in getting as far as it did” in developing a nuclear device. (p. 56) Much of its near-success, he avers, came through Western help. In his other article, Venter traces Iraq’s development of biological weapons in his second article, noting the importance of the Al Hakam [sic] site near Baghdad and tracing the history of Iraq’s efforts, including the Soviet Union’s role.

1608. Zabih, Sepehr. *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*. London: Routledge, 1988. ●● A study of the development of the Iranian armed forces since the revolution and especially the impact of the Iran-Iraq War. Although the book essentially ends before the resolution of the war, the author judges that “U.S. policy toward the Gulf played a critical part in precluding Iraq’s defeat and forcing Iran to accept truce. Again the critics of the policy ... proved shortsighted and partisan.” (p. 263)

**Iran – The Revolution and the Islamic Republic and Their Impact on Gulf Security**

1609. Afrasiabi, K.L. *After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. ●● The author, at Boston University, examines Iranian foreign policy during the republic, beginning with a case study of Iran’s strategy during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and consequent war. Other chapters concentrate on Iran’s Gulf strategy, its Central Asia-Caucasus policy, and its place in the post-Cold War environment. He notes first that “On the surface, Iran’s behavior during the Kuwait crisis ... appears as straightforward and relatively easy to comprehend: the Islamic Republic wisely insulated itself from the neighboring crisis, adopted a neutral stance, cooperated with the United Nations’ resolutions aimed at reversing Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait, and sought to take advantage of this crisis’s ‘windfalls.’” (p. 57) He reiterates the invasion’s demonstration of the inability of the GCC to defend itself and discusses the merits of a “GCC seven” to include Iran.

1610. Ahrari, Mohammed E. “Iran and the Superpowers in the Gulf.” *SAIS Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1987), pp. 157-168. ●● A look at revolutionary Iran’s relations with the superpowers by an associate professor of political science at Mississippi State University. He asserts that confrontation arises because of Iran’s belief that it is rightfully the preeminent power in the Gulf and because of its desire to export the Iranian revolution. This has led the Arab states of the Gulf to create the GCC and to increase their reliance on the United States, although simultaneously de-emphasizing it by insisting on an “over-the-horizon” presence.

1611. Akhavi, Shahrough. “Post-Khomeini Iran: Global and Regional Implications.” *SAIS Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1990), pp. 149-162. ●● A professor of government at the University of South Carolina expects that “As it is likely to do with Saudi Arabia, it is probable that the Islamic Republic will adopt less confrontational attitudes and conduct toward Kuwait in the post-Khomeini era. Iran will modify its policy towards Kuwait if only to prevent a strongly pro-Iraqi attitude by the latter.” (p. 159)

examines the evidence regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions and concludes that Iran has no nuclear bomb as yet. But he advises that “Stopping Iranian nuclear weapon capabilities, even if the evidence is not irrefutable, must remain a high priority. If Russia and China lend assistance, they have a responsibility to insure that Iran does not misuse it. If not, they will need to stop.” (p. 26)

1613. Amirahmadi, Hooshang, and Nader Entessar, eds. Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf. London: Routledge, 1992. ●● A collection of papers that focuses on Iran, its domestic changes, its economic reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq War, and its relations with the United States. Nikki R. Keddie (UCLA) starts off the collection by posing the question “why has Iran been revolutionary?” George Linabury (Western Connecticut State University) discusses Khomeini’s Islamic legacy and Augustus Richard Norton (US Military Academy, West Point) looks at the politicization of Lebanon’s Shi’ah community. Iran’s reconstruction is discussed by Hooshang Amirahmadi (Rutgers University) in two chapters. Iran’s relations with the Arab world are covered by Anoushiravan Ehteshami (University of Exeter) while relations with the GCC are reviewed by M.E. Ahrari (US Air War College) and Nader Entessar (Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama) examines alternatives to arms build-up in the Gulf. Mohsen M. Milani (University of South Florida) analyzes US relations with the Islamic Republic while Mohiaddin Mesbahi (Florida International University) does the same for Soviet relations.


1615. Amuzegar, Jahangir. “Islamic Fundamentalism in Action: the Case of Iran.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 4, Nos. 1 and 2 (September 1995), pp. 22-33. ●● A study by an international economic consultant and former minister in the Shah’s government assessing the impact of the Islamic Republic on Iranian democracy (civil society and individual liberties are absent) society (no pervasive change), on the economy (less economic independence than before the revolution), perceptions of a threat to the non-Islamic world (highly exaggerated). “History shows systems that ignore human proclivities will not work, and systems that are unworkable tend to implode. Islamic fundamentalist regimes are no exception.” (p. 33)

1616. □□□□□. “Iran’s Crumbling Revolution.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January-February 2003), pp. 44-57. ●● An international economic consultant and former Minister of Finance in the pre-1979 Iranian government contends that the future of Iran will be determined less by the struggle between reformists and conservatives and more by a “Third
Force,” the generation born after 1979 who are discontented by the economic failure and bankrupt ideology of the Islamic Republic. The best policy for the US, he advises, is to wait and see. “Washington would be best served by letting the currently accelerating process of democratization run its course. The theocracy’s days are numbered...” (p. 57)

1617. Ansari, Ali M. “Continuous Regime Change from Within.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 53–67. ●● A lecturer in Middle East history at the University of Durham contends that “Far from the monolithic, totalitarian police state described by some commentators, Iran’s politics reflect an intensely complex, highly plural, dynamic characteristic of a state in transition that incorporates the contradictions and instabilities inherent in such a process.” (p. 53) He traces the process of political change in Iran from the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 through the new reformers after Khatami. Noting that many Iranians are sympathetic to the US, he advises that “the United States should recognize that change will be indigenous and thus not align itself with overseas opposition groups whose understanding of politics on the ground in Iran is limited.” (p. 66)

1618. Bill, James A. “The Resurrection of Iran in the Persian Gulf.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (March-April 1992), pp. 28-35. ●● A professor at the College of William and Mary notes that “After the massive American-led destruction of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iran today looms larger than ever as a major power in the Middle East.” (p. 28) He adds that Iran has moved beyond the extreme stages of its revolution and stands as the “superpower of the Gulf,” which means that “U.S. cooperation with Iran is essential to future stability in the Middle East....” (p. 35)


1620. Chubin, Shahram. *Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. ●● An independent scholar based in Geneva examines Iran’s security perspectives in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War and the Kuwait War. He focuses on the questions of professionalization and technology in the armed forces, arms policies and procurement, security concerns vis-à-vis Gulf neighbors, the United States, and Israel, and on the process of decision-making in security policy. The author contends that “There is no clear relationship between Iran’s threat perception, force structure, missions, doctrine, and procurement policy on the one hand and what it can afford on the other. Iran’s scramble to buy whatever arms are available today is a response to a decade of near-total embargo and a sense that it might be reimposed again at any time.” (p. 76) One consequence, according to Chubin, is that “Iran’s national security has been threatened as much by its overweening ambitions and excesses as by aggressive neighbors.” (p. 78)
1621. ________. “Leftist Forces in Iran.” *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July-August 1980), pp. 1-25. Written a little more than a year after the Iranian revolution took place, this article traces the background of the three major leftist groups in Iran at the time: the Tudeh Party (which embraced Khomeini during the revolution, encouraged the anti-Western attitude of the new regime, and maintained close ties to the Soviet Union); the Feda‘iyin-e Khalq (an offshoot coalition from the Tudeh but with no ties to Moscow; a guerrilla organization under the Shah, it went undercover again in the summer of 1979); and the Mojahedin-e Khalq (also a coalition with anti-Shah guerrilla roots; unlike the other two groups, it is avowedly Islamic and may be perceived as a more serious competitor to Khomeini). Chubin’s conclusion that the left has political potential in the Iranian republic on the death of Khomeini must be considered in light of the debilitating effects of several years of bloody purges against all three groups.

1622. ________. “The Islamic Republic’s Foreign Policy in the Gulf.” In Martin Kramer, ed., *Shi‘ism, Resistance and Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987; Collected Papers, Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies), pp. 159-171. A director of research at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva examines the first years of the Iranian republic’s attitude towards its Gulf neighbors and sees that “Iran’s foreign policy in the Gulf is principally driven by the exigencies of its war with Iraq. For the foreseeable future, the Gulf will remain a prime area of concern. If the war continues, attempts will be made to weaken the pro-Iraqi tilt of the Gulf states, stop or at least reduce their financial contributions to Iraq’s war effort, and more generally to encourage whatever fissiparous tendencies exist within the GCC.” (p. 169)


1624. ________, and Robert S. Litwak. “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 99–114. The director of research at the Geneva Centre for Security Studies and the director of international studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars assess the evidence for claims that Iran is engaged in building a nuclear weapons program and they lay out the possibility of inculcating a public debate in Iran over the country's nuclear politics. The authors argue that “The United States should lead the attempt to energize such a debate in Iran by providing the data and encouraging forums required for such discussions, which, after all, are largely technical and specialized. ... U.S. policy choices are delicate, as Washington cannot appear to dictate terms or to bully, nor should it interfere in an internal debate. Rather, it needs to help foster that debate.” (p. 111)

Iran’s military are the focus of contributions by Shahram Chubin, Michael Eisenstadt, and Ahmed Hashim. The editor is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies.

1626. Cottam, Richard W. “Revolutionary Iran and the War with Iraq.” *Current History*, Vol. 80, No. 462 (January 1981), pp. 5-9, 38-42. A short survey of trends in Iran after the first year or so of the revolution. A former US Foreign Service Officer in Tehran, now at the University of Pittsburgh, concludes that secular, rationalist, and liberal influences, as well as minority ethnic groups, have all lost ground in the post-revolutionary state. Cottam is of the opinion that the war with Iraq will change the nature of the Iranian revolution, reviving the need for reliance on secularist technical competence and possibly creating war heroes to rival Khomeini’s popularity.

1627. Esposito, John L., ed. *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990. A number of contributions to this volume deal with the domestic side of the revolution and its impact on areas other than the Gulf. R.K. Ramazani (University of Virginia) and Farhang Rajaee (Iranian Academy of Philosophy) provide discussions of the political and ideological underpinnings of Iran’s desire to export its revolution. Philip Robins (Royal Institute of International Affairs) looks at the impact on Iraq and notes that “From the beginning the perception of the Iranian revolution in Iraq was one of narrow sectarianism.” (p. 97) David E. Long (Coast Guard Academy) examines the impact on the Gulf States, concluding that 10 years of the revolution produced little disaffection amongst citizens on the other Gulf littoral but that it has resulted in increased Arab-Persian antipathy, largely as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. (R.K. Ramazani’s contribution was also published as “Iran’s Export of the Revolution: Its Politics, Ends and Means,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1989), pp. 69-93.)

1628. Feste, Karen. *The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Arab World*. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996. The Emirates Occasional Papers, No. 4. An associate dean at the University of Denver looks at the impact of the Iranian revolution on political protest in the Arab world and observes that “Although protests have increased and economic conditions have worsened in countries of the Middle East, most of the governments have neither collapsed nor become completely closed and repressive. The pro-Islamic ideology wave across the region has achieved some success in affecting government policies.” (p. 30) She does not discuss the impact on the Gulf states.

1629. Fuller, Graham E. *The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. A Rand Corporation Research Study. A survey of Iran’s views and relations with its neighbors, other regional actors, and the great powers by a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. The author provides historical background for each relationship, the ties and/or conflicts, and determinants of Iran’s foreign policy toward each country. He ends with a more reflective chapter on the anatomy of Tehran’s foreign policy, present and future, and observes that “The national interest of the country will
eventually, of course, push any Iranian régime to benefit from close economic ties with the
West. But the national political heritage will likely prevent any government from
identifying itself too closely with the West, and especially the United States, in the way that
the shah did.” (pp. 270-271)

1630. Green, Jerrold D. “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Between Enmity and Conciliation.” Current
History, Vol. 92 (January 1993), pp. 12-16. ●● The director of the Center for Middle
Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona sees a “distinct dualism in Iran’s regional
foreign policy, which combines aggressive policies toward some of the region’s actors with
a more conciliatory stance toward others. It is largely because of its regional policies that
Iran has earned reprobation from so many in the international community, and approval
from so few.” (p. 12)

2nd ed., 1979. ●● A study of the political and economic nature of the Shah’s regime
during the 1960s and 1970s. The author admits that “the stance of this book is antagonistic
to that of the present Iranian government [i.e. that of the Shah] and its international allies,
and is written in solidarity with those opposed to it.” The book was completed in
September 1978, with the second edition including an afterword to cover developments
through March 1979. After a brief survey of the events of early 1979, Halliday expresses
the opinion that “A hated system of political dictatorship, armed and supported by the west,
has been destroyed by a heroic and protracted popular movement. For the first time in their
history, the Iranian people now have the possibility of deciding their political destiny.”

1632. ________. “The Iranian Revolution in International Affairs: Programme and Practice.”
author feels that “international factors played a significant part in determining the context
in which the revolution occurred ... yet outside powers played rather a small part in the
revolution itself.” Two major external impacts of the revolution have been the dissociation
of Iran from the pro-West alliance system and the provision of ideological encouragement
to radical Islamic movements. Halliday sees the revolution reinforcing American fears,
rooted in the Vietnam experience, of another foreign military entanglement and creating
an overriding concern in Moscow over direct US military intervention in Iran.

Adelphi Paper, No. 296. ●● A senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies looks at the “grim” crises that Iran faced in the 1990s and its international security
situation. He analyzes the Islamic Republic’s challenges in rebuilding conventional armed
power and its position on weapons of mass destruction. In conclusion, “The Islamic
Republic no longer has the ability to draw up or implement domestic or foreign polices that
would lead to the emergence of a flourishing and vibrant society and an economy worthy
of emulation by the rest of the Muslim world.” (p. 73)

1635. Hough, Harold. “Iran Targets the Arabian Peninsula.” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Vol. 8, No. 10 (October 1996), pp. 458-461. ●● A freelance journalist examines Iran’s basing options for its Scud missiles and for the longer-range Nodong missile that Iran was attempting to purchase from North Korea. In particular, he uses Russian satellite photography to discuss the possibility of using Qeshm Island for these missiles. He concludes that “Iran has managed to pose a serious threat to the Gulf region. Although the anti-ship missiles and ‘scuds’ can be countered, they can cause the nations of the area to hesitate when decisive action is in their best interests.” (p. 461)

1636. Hoveyda, Fereydoun. “The West and Iran’s Paradox.” *Global Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 119-133. ●● A former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations chronicles Iran’s political predicament under the republic and exhorts his readers that “It is imperative that democratic countries help the Islamic modernizers to win their battle against fundamentalists and refrain from strengthening the latter.” (p. 133)

1637. Hunter, Shireen T. *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. ●● A comprehensive survey of Iranian foreign policy, including both a historical survey and thematic analysis of Iranian policy by geographical region: the United States and the Soviet Union, the Arab World and Israel, Pakistan, India, and Turkey, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Third World and international organizations. A final chapter deals with the impact of terrorism and subversion on foreign policy. The author determines that four basic points have shaped Iran’s foreign policy: “complex and multiple factors have determined Iran’s behavior since the Islamic revolution; there has not been a complete breach with the Iranian past in its external behavior; Iran’s world view has neither been purely Islamic nor entirely novel, especially when viewed in terms of Third World intellectual trends; and its behavior has not been radically different from that of ‘normal’ states, especially Third World states at a revolutionary stage of development.” (p. 184)

1638. ________. *Iran After Khomeini*. New York: Praeger, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992. Washington Papers, No. 156. ●● Although primarily concerned with Iran’s domestic political, military, economic, and cultural/social issues, the author has written a chapter on the various stages in Iran’s foreign relations since the revolution, including the impact on Iran of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. She notes that, although Iran benefitted from Iraq’s acceptance of Tehran’s peace terms for ending the
Iran-Iraq War as a result of the invasion, Saddam Husayn’s championing of the Palestinian cause and invocation of Islamic rhetoric also posed him as a potential rival to Iran. “Thus, Iran adopted a two-pronged and fairly balanced policy on the Kuwait problem. It condemned categorically Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and voted for the UN resolution calling for Iraqi withdrawal and ... It pursued peace and the normalization of relations with Iraq.” (p. 129)

1639. ________. “After the Ayatollah.” Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring 1987), pp. 77-97. ●● The deputy director of the Middle East Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies examines the geopolitical importance of Iran, American and Soviet interest in the country, and potential developments after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. She believes that “A successor régime in Iran is likely to be more radical, left-leaning, and Soviet-influenced than the Khomeini régime” (p. 93) but advocates changes in US policies that undermine the moderates.

1640. ________. “Islamic Iran and the Arab World.” Middle East Insight, Vol. 5, No. 3 (August-September 1987), pp. 17-25. ●● As the author, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, remarks, “for the first time in recent history, Iran has become a factor to be considered on the Arab political scene, not just at the level of inter-state relations, but also that of Arab populations.” (p. 17)

1641. ________. “Iran: Renewed Threat in the Persian Gulf.” World & I, Vol. 8 (April 1993), pp. 80-87. ●● The deputy director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies looks at developments in Iran two years after the Kuwait War and observes that “Until Iran has abandoned certain aspects of its behavior, a Western policy of containment toward it is inevitable. For the West, the challenge is to mix this containment policy with measured and appropriate rewards, in order not to play into the hands of the Iranian hard-liners.” (p. 87)

1642. ________. “Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy.” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 133-148. ●● The director of the Islam program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies examines the competition between Iran and Turkey for influence in the newly independent ex-Soviet states of Central Asia. She notes that the US campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 removed the Taliban as a security threat to Tehran but also led to an enhanced US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Attainment of Iranian goals in Central Asia require a modus vivendi with the US but it is unclear whether Washington is willing to reach an understanding with Tehran under current leadership.


Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. The author places the clashes in the context of Shi‘i activism and the disintegration of Saudi-Iranian relations. He concludes that there is no evidence that either side acted deliberately and judges that “a group of undisciplined Iranian pilgrims ... wished to enter the Great Mosque as demonstrators [and] Saudi security authorities ... employed excessive force to thwart the Iranian crowd.” (p. 245)


1649. ________. “A Geopolitical Triangle in the Persian Gulf: Actions and Reactions Among Iran, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.” Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1994), pp. 47-59. ●● A research fellow at the International Boundaries Research Centre of London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies uses the alleged reappearance of Iran’s claim to Bahrain to outline the issue’s history. The author concludes that “Bahrain is undoubtably on its way to becoming a dependency of Saudi Arabia, and the use of scare tactics by exaggerating the threat of Iran’s ‘territorial and revolutionary’ ambitions, eases this geopolitical transition for the Saudis.” (pp. 57-58)

1650. Nonneman, Gerd. “The GCC and the Islamic Republic: Towards a Restoration of the Pattern.” In Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh, eds., Iran and the International Community (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 102-123. ●● A researcher at the University of Exeter examines the views of the GCC states towards Iran, arguing that the Iran-Iraq War steered them away from a policy of accommodation but that “the end of the war, and growing evidence of Iranian goodwill towards these states, will eventually lead to a restoration of the 'natural' pattern. (p. 102)
1651. Pipes, Daniel, and Patrick Clawson. “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1992-1993), pp. 124-141. ●● The director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an affiliate of the institute regard Iran as the principal threat to US interests in the Gulf, caution Washington “to view Saudi Arabia as a temporary ally with whom numerous and profound differences remain...” (p. 134), trumpet Turkey as a dependable ally, urge the US to encourage Central Asia’s ties to Turkey or Russia to prevent closer relations with Iran, and deem Turkey and the Gulf as more important in economic and security terms than the Arab-Israeli theater.

1652. Ramazani, R.K. *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. ●● The Harry Flood Byrd Jr. Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia examines Iranian foreign policy and the continuing impact of the Islamic republic around the Middle East. An opening section looks at the geostrategic balance, the ideological crusade, and the sociopolitical explosion. The following section concentrates on the Gulf itself, with an analysis of the cause and continuation of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s role in stimulating the creation of the GCC. The next section looks farther west with studies of the relationships of Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon. The author then turns his attention to the impact on and the impact of oil before finally analyzing the United States’ role in the region. He suggests that the US temper its containment of Iran, adopts an active peace strategy in the Gulf, prepare for the possibility of an Iranian victory in its war with Iraq, emphasize diplomacy as much as military deterrence, encourage the strengthening of the GCC, and prevent Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the end, he contends, referring to the United States, “we often find ourselves talking about encouraging ‘peaceful change,’ whereas in practice we are trying to maintain the status quo. To this extent we have in fact, become part of the Middle Eastern problem.” (p. 252)

1653. ________. “Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf.” *Current History*, Vol. 84, No. 498 (January 1985), pp. 5-8, 40-41. ●● The Harry F. Byrd professor of government at the University of Virginia analyzes Iran’s efforts to export its revolution, particularly in light of the Iran-Iraq War. He believes that “As long as Khomeini rules, Iran will try to export its revolution [but] it is possible that in post-Khomeini Iran the present overemphasis on dogma and doctrine will give way to more pragmatic considerations.” (p. 41)

1654. ________. “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 202-217. ●● The author explains that “Tehran’s foreign policy has been shaped largely by an acute interplay between its domestic situation, not merely factional politics, and its external environment, not merely superpower behavior.” (p. 202) He notes that control of policy is contended between revolutionary idealists and revolutionary realists and recommends that the new Bush administration adopt a more conciliatory tone to enable both countries to stop “their mutual and destructive smear campaigns as a first step in the direction of a constructive and open dialogue.” (p. 217)
1655. __________. “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 393-412. ●● The author updates his analysis of Iran’s foreign policy after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and the Kuwait War. The north and south of the title refer to Iran’s emerging interests in Transcaucasia and Central Asia to the north and the Gulf to the south. In addition, Ramazani observes that the disintegration of the Soviet Union has taken wind out of the “neither East nor West” policy but “Iran still has to deal with the reality ... of the preeminence of the West, that is, the European Community and the United States.” (p. 412)

1656. __________. “The Shifting Premise of Iran's Foreign Policy: Towards a Democratic Peace?” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 177-188. ●● The Edward R. Stettinius Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia argues that President Khatami appeals to young Iranians because of his view of the interdependence of reforms at home and peace abroad. The author advises that “as part of a new conception of vital US interests in Iran, we should also realize that an ancient autocracy now has a popularly elected leader who is ... firmly committed to engineering an open society....” (p. 187)

1657. __________. “The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated U.S. Policy in the Middle East?” *Middle East Policy*. Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 1998), pp. 45-62. ●● A professor at the University of Virginia observes that Iran’s hosting of the 1997 Organization of Islamic Conference “provided a fortuitous platform for the leaders of both Iran and member states of the [GCC] to tell the world about their emerging rapprochement.” (p. 45) He goes on to suggest that “the opportunity for devising an integrated policy for the entire Middle East region may have finally arrived.” (p. 56)

1658. __________. “Khumayni’s Islam in Iran’s Foreign Policy.” In Adeed Dawisha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), pp. 9-32. ●● The Edward R. Stettinius Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia links revolutionary Iran’s foreign policy to instability in domestic politics and notes that Khumayni’s interpretation of Islam prevails on both the domestic and international levels. Ramazani points out that Khumayni’s worldview rejects the contemporary international system as it exists: “Khumayni’s ideology is neither pan-Shi’i nor pan-Islamic; it aims at the establishment of what could be termed ‘Islamic world order.’” Iran’s foreign policy is also destabilized by the official-unofficial division in the foreign-policy-making process (as exemplified in the taking of the American hostages by Tehran street crowds), and the decimation of both the skilled diplomats and the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ramazani argues that the future of the Iranian revolution and its foreign policy is unpredictable beyond Khumayni. “It could nevertheless be argued that there is one major aspect of the political culture that the ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’ has not so far been able to escape; namely the ancient habit of Iranian leaders to set unrealizable goals and to use inappropriate means in both domestic politics and foreign policy.”
1659. Ricks, Thomas M. *The Iranian People’s Revolution: Its Nature and Implications for the Gulf States*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, April 1979. CCAS Reports. •• The author, assistant professor of history at Georgetown University at the time of writing, outlines the long process leading to revolution in Iran and briefly attempts in its immediate aftermath to assess its implications for the rest of the Middle East. “Overall, Iran’s revolution has served notice upon all Middle Eastern leaders and heads of state that no amount of arms, economic development, or political alliance can save one from the demands of the people as a whole.” This paper was first presented to the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1979. •


1661. Sariolghalam, Mahmood. “Understanding Iran: Getting Past Stereotypes and Mythology.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 69–82. •• An associate professor at the Shahid Beheshti (National) University of Iran outlines the differences in bilateral perceptions between the US and Iran, resulting in a deterioration of mutual understanding since the 11 September 2001 attacks. He contends that Iran possesses a relatively stable polity but with policies that are subject to change because of internal pressures. He calls on the US to recognize that the Islamic republic is here to stay but will continue to evolve. This, he believes, could lead Washington to “focus on trying to persuade [Iran’s] leaders to change policies rather than attempt to alter its structure, just as President Richard Nixon accomplished with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during the Cold War.” (p. 70)


1663. Schahgaldian, Nikola B. *Iran and the Postwar Security in the Persian Gulf*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994. MR-148-USDP. •• A RAND analyst looks at Iranian policy following the Kuwait War in terms of internal developments, the Iranian attitude towards the US presence in the Gulf, Gulf security arrangements, the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and postwar relations with Iraq. He reasons that “Iran can tolerate bilateral security arrangements between local Arab states and the United States and can live with the corresponding American presence in the Gulf region. However, Iran should be expected to actively contest and oppose any arrangement that may, in the future, become a means of beefing up Saudi Arabia’s offensive military capability and/or elevating that desert kingdom to a new status of regional hegemony.” (p. viii)
1664. Shahabi, Sohrab, and Farideh Farhi. “Security Considerations and Iranian Foreign Policy.” *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 89-103. The authors survey security factors in Iranian foreign policy, including regional instability, military build-up, and the economic dimension. In their opinion, the end of the Cold War has enhanced potential for regional decision-making even as the active physical presence of outside forces inhibits a regional dynamic for handling problems. In addition, the intense militarization of the region is worrying.

1665. Sick, Gary. “Iran’s Quest for Superpower Status.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 697-715. An international affairs program officer at the Ford Foundation notes that Iran has long desired to be the superpower of the Gulf and the prospect is less improbable now than in the past. He traces the domestic developments that have had an impact as well as Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union and the Gulf monarchies. He warns that a decisive Iranian victory in its war with Iraq would lead to a shift in the Middle East’s center of gravity. “The Middle East could become polarized between two hostile regional superpowers – Israel in the west and Iran in the east – with dangerous and unpredictable consequences.” (p. 715)

1666. Suwaidi, Jamal S. al-, ed. *Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability*. London: I.B. Tauris for the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996. This volume begins with a number of articles on Iranian politics and institutions before turning to the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Mohsen M. Milani (University of South Florida) traces the evolution of Iran’s Gulf policy from idealism and confrontation to pragmatism and moderation. James A. Bill (College of William and Mary) analyzes the Gulf in terms of a “rectangle of tension” and declares that “The alternative to future violence and conflict in this explosive rectangle ... is for a lower US profile in the region and some kind of rapprochement between the global hegemon and the Islamic Republic.” (p. 116) Geoffrey Kemp (Carnegie Endowment) surveys the impact of Iranian foreign policy on regional security and notes that two competing trends exist in the Middle East: “the pro-West, pro-peace movements ... and the more theocratic, conservative movements that stress
separateness from the West.” (p. 134) Anwar Gargash (UAE University) discusses relations between Iran and the GCC, especially the UAE, noting that Iranian-UAE relations started off on a rocky note and have been exacerbated by the dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Saleh al-Mani’ (King Saud University) examines the ideological dimension of Iranian-Saudi relations and argues that the rift between the two countries should be healed through a Sunni-Shi’i dialogue. Kenneth Katzman (US Congressional Research Service) and Anthony H. Cordesman (Georgetown University) both look at the nature of Iranian threats, with Katzman concentrating on Iran’s military build-up and Cordesman detailing Iran’s military expenditures, arms transfers, WMD capabilities, and military capabilities. The editor, Jamal al-Suwaidi (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research), provides a final essay that summarizes the Iranian impact on Gulf security, US and GCC policies regarding Iran. His conclusions note that Gulf stability hinges on the triangular relationship between Iran, Iraq, and the GCC states, that the Gulf states must work towards regional solutions for security, and that the Iranian revolution has run its course, forcing Tehran’s leadership to address economic problems.

1668. The director of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research holds that the “Arab nations of the Gulf are threatened by Iranian-encouraged activists who attempt to aggravate domestic tensions that might otherwise have been successfully addressed by these states.” (p. 277) He also cites Iran’s continued occupation of Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands, Iranian programs to develop a conventional military arsenal and to acquire weapons of mass destruction, its sponsorship of extremist groups and covert operations, its attempts to destabilize Arab Gulf governments, its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its nationalist quest to expand Persian influence and hegemony in the Gulf. The security policy of the Gulf States toward Iran, he says, must emphasize reducing the revolutionary rhetoric of the Iranian leadership, assisting Iranian economic development, reducing its military capability, and working towards a reduction of military assets in the Gulf – first Iraq and Iran and then the Western powers.


1670. Tarock, Adam. “Iran’s Foreign Policy Since the Gulf War.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (November 1994), pp. 267-280. A Ph.D. candidate at the University of Melbourne assesses Iran’s foreign policy after 1990 as “a mixture of setbacks and relative successes. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a blessing in disguise for Iran, as it forced Saddam Hussein to accept Teheran’s terms for a peace treaty. It also improved Iran’s image abroad, especially among its Arab Gulf neighbours. However, Iran failed to persuade the Gulf states to form some kind of regional security arrangement comprising regional states, without the participation of foreign powers, i.e., the United States.” (p. 280)
1671. Valdani, Asghar Ja‘fari. “Iran and the Persian Gulf Countries: Prospects for Cooperation.” *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 573-600. ●● A professor at Islamic Azad University in Tehran notes that wars and arms races makes cooperation imperative between Iran and its Arab neighbors across the Gulf and suggests that such cooperation might work best in such areas as agriculture, water and soil resources, fisheries and environment, and oil and gas exploitation and transport. He also advocates the improvement of trade relations.

1672. Von Dornoch, Alex (pseud.). “Iran’s Violent Diplomacy.” *Survival*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (May-June 1988), pp. 252-266. ●● The author discusses Iran’s use of terrorism against regional and Western targets “to impose its will on other states both to achieve specific short-term goals and, more generally, to achieve a reputation for strength and invulnerability after centuries of what it sees as foreign interference and domination.” (p. 265)

**Iraq – Domestic Politics and the Impact on Gulf Security**


1674. Bahgat, Gawdat. “Iraq After Saddam – What Lies Ahead?” *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 39-52. ●● The author, from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, surveys the geopolitical fundamentals of Iraq and concludes “Regardless of who is in charge in Baghdad, the country’s demographic structure and its vulnerability to the goodwill of its neighbors will shape the political orientation of the leadership. Saddam’s successor, when he comes, is likely to be less ruthless, but not a Thomas Jefferson.” (p. 52)


1676. ________. *Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1992. ●● A compilation of 22 speeches, interviews, broadcasts, and other sources involving Saddam Husayn and his policies, mostly consisting of documents translated by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The author includes an introductory essay reprinted from the 1990 *Middle East Contemporary Survey*.
1677. ________. “How Does Saddam Hold On?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July-August 2000), pp. 90-103. ●● The author, a researcher at Tel Aviv University, answers the question by pointing out that Saddam Husayn may be a terrible strategist but is a brilliant tactician. He also displays an astonishing ability to take advantage of his foes’ mistakes. Iraq’s social and political weakness has enabled him to build a strong security apparatus and promote his sons Udayy and Qusayy as potential heirs. How to replace Saddam? “The wisest approach would be to combine containment with a concerted attempt to create the conditions necessary for a successful coup – a putsch from inside Iraq’s government but outside Saddam’s immediately family.” (p. 102) A successor from the Iraqi security establishment is less than ideal, the author concedes, “but more realistic than an opposition uprising and less bleak than Uday or Qusay.” (p. 103)

1678. Byman, Daniel. “Iraq After Saddam.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 151-162. ●● The author, Research Director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, notes that “The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq is, correctly, one of the primary goals of the U.S. government for the Persian Gulf region” and “This focus on Saddam drives many aspects of U.S. policy toward Iraq, including sanctions, arms inspections, and support for the Iraqi opposition.” (p. 151) After discussing the impact and consequences of Saddam’s possible removal, Byman suggests that “Saddam’s removal is desirable but ... considerable risks will remain after his fall” and concludes that “The greatest benefits for the region and for the United States would come from a change in Iraq’s elites, not just Saddam’s fall.” (p. 160)

1679. _______, and Kenneth M. Pollack. “Democracy in Iraq?” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 119-136. ●● An assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University and the director of research at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution respectively disagree with the skeptics of the feasibility of creating democracy in Iraq. Instead, the authors argue, “Iraq is hardly ideal soil for growing democracy, but it is not as infertile as other places where democracy has taken root. ... A properly designed federal system stabilized by U.S. and other intervening powers’ military forces could both satisfy Iraq’s myriad communities and ensure order and security. Creating democracy in Iraq would require a long-term U.S. commitment, but the United States has made similar commitments at far less strategic parts of the world.” (p. 120) The key lies in active leadership by the United States while the authors see a failure to establish democracy in Iraq as being disastrous both for the country and for US policy.

Hashim (Center for Naval Analysis) on Iraqi policies in the region, Paul Wolfowitz (Johns Hopkins University SAIS) on US policy toward Iraq, and Abbas S. Mehdi (St. Cloud State University) on suggestions for a new policy framework.


1682. Fuller, Graham E. *Iraq in the Next Decade: Will Iraq Survive Until 2002?* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. RAND Note, N-3591-DAG. Defense Advisory Group to the National Defense Research Institute. ●● The author contends that “The continued existence of Iraq as a unitary state is deeply threatened; it may not survive intact into the next decade.” (p. v) He considers the problems of the Kurds, the Shi’ah, the repressiveness of Saddam Husayn’s regime, the narrow base of the Ba’th Party and the military for control of the country, and examines the implications of changes in Iraq for the Gulf and the United States. Iraq is not just another major problem in the Middle East, he contends, because (1) it is one of the world’s most dangerous proliferators, (2) it is the first nation in the post-Cold-War era to have been disciplined by the “new world order” and thus has revivified the “clout” of the UN, and (3) it is a significant non-Communist multi-ethnic state whose continuity is now in question.

1683. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 47-70. ●● An associate professor at the University of Vermont judges that Saddam Husayn’s decisions to go to war were based on his belief that foreign forces were working to destabilize his régime and he chose to go to war on both occasions to change his regional and domestic situations. The author also reasons that Saddam did not withdraw in 1991 because “a withdrawal from Kuwait would not end the international pressure on the régime, and might weaken the régime domestically.” (p. 49) In his view, “Régime security considerations provide a better explanation for the Iraqi decisions to go to war in 1990 and 1980 than any suggested alternative.” (p. 70)

1684. Ghabra, Shafeeq N. “Iraq’s Culture of Violence.” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 39-49. ●● A professor of political science at Kuwait University and director of the Kuwait Information Office in Washington contends that many of Iraq’s troubles since the 1958 revolution derive from Baghdad’s mismanagement of the Sunni Arab, Kurdish, and Shi‘i Arab communities. Furthermore, he sees that “Iraq’s failure to achieve internal harmony has contributed directly to its failure to establish peaceable relations with the outside world.” (p. 44) He ends with a look at possible post-Saddam Iraq and models from around the world for the new government.

historical background to the intervention of the Iraqi military in politics and the steps taken by Saddam Husayn to prevent this. But the author notes that Saddam has not succeeded in making the armed forces accept civilian supremacy, largely because of “the pathology of the régime, the military’s perception of itself as the undeniable savior of the Iraqi nation, a view it has held since the founding of the state, and structural pressures.” (p. 39) He also points out that “a US decision to go to war to bring about régime change would ultimately bring to the fore the issue of civil-military relations in a defeated post-Saddam Iraq.” (p. 40)

1686. Hazelton, Fran, ed. Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1994. ●● This book produced for the Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, consists of articles, mostly by Iraqis, on Saddam Husayn and his politics, the negative impact of his rule on women, Kurds, Shi’ah, Marsh Arabs, and the political opposition. Other subjects include the economic devastation of the country, the lack of human rights, attitudes to non-Iraqis, and possible blueprints for the future.

1687. Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984. ●● A research associate at Brookings surveys the background to Iraqi politics and policy. The first part of her book looks at the creation of the modern Iraqi state and the foundations of its political system. In the second, Helms analyzes the present nature of Iraqi politics, with emphasis on the Ba’th Party and President Saddam Husayn, while the third part concentrates on the Iran-Iraq war and Baghdad’s policy options in that regard.

1688. Henderson, Simon. Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein’s Ambition for Iraq. San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991. ●● A British journalist’s investigation of the rise of Saddam Husayn, how he created and strengthened his hold over Iraq, and his armament program and ties to Western suppliers. As the manuscript was completed in January 1991, the book touches only briefly on Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.

1689. Hopwood, Derek, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowki, eds. Iraq: Power and Society. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995. St. Antony’s Middle East Monographs Series, No. 29. ●● Most of the contributions to this comprehensive examination of Iraq concentrate on formation of the new state, politics, economics, and society. But several articles deal with Iraq’s foreign relations with the Gulf. Charles Tripp (London University SOAS), in looking at Iraq and the Iran-Iraq War, concludes that “The impressive edifice of power which Saddam Hussein constructed in Iraq depends ultimately upon his own capacity to service it and to keep it subject to his will. As developments during the years following the end of the war with Iran showed, this is an undertaking fraught with risks....” (p. 115) In his view of Iraq’s role as a regional power, Thomas Koszinowki (Deutsches Orient-Institut, Hamburg) believes that “The economic and military weakness of Iraq [after the Kuwait War] will not continue over long periods of time. Its oil wealth will help Iraq to reconstruct the economy and [to allow it] to bring its political influence to bear on the countries in the
area.” (p. 300) Habib Ishow (IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence) reviews Kuwait’s historical relations with the Ottoman and British Empires as a preliminary to Iraqi-Kuwait relations. He foresees that relations between the two countries “cannot but remain ambiguous and conflict-laden, even if in the near future the two countries settle their differences on the border by means of the accords duly concluded under the aegis of the United Nations....” (p. 317) Andreas Rieck (Deutsches Orient-Institut, Hamburg) provides an overview of Iraq’s tense relations with Saudi Arabia and judges that “Iraqi ‘revenge’ – even if it comes only after decades – and a repetition of the Iraqi-Saudi confrontation under other circumstances is, however, quite conceivable.” (p. 339) Paul Balta (Université de Paris III) emphasizes the pivotal importance of geography in his examination of Iranian-Iraqi relations and especially Iraq’s need for access to the sea as a driving force in its relations with its neighbors. In addition, Elizabeth Picard (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politique, Paris) covers Iraq and Turkey while Eberhard Kienle (London University SOAS) covers Iraq and Syria, and Michel Chatelus (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble) chronicles Iraqi oil policy over 65 years.


1691. Kashkett, Steven B. “Iraq and the Pursuit of Nonalignment.” *Orbis*, Vol. 26 (1982), pp. 477-494. ● The author, a graduate student at Harvard University, contends that “Iraq’s shift toward nonalignment can be explained in terms of ideological, economic, domestic political and foreign policy considerations.” Kashkett suggests that to some extent Iraq’s nonaligned posture is a short-term measure to achieve political and economic benefits. It is also likely, he feels, that Iraq will be friendlier with the European half of the Western alliance than the American half. ✽


1698. Najjar, Ghanim, al-. “The GCC and Iraq.” Middle East Policy. Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 2000), pp. 92-99. ●● A professor at Kuwait University looks at the contradictory ways in which the individual GCC states have dealt with Iraq in the 1990s. He concludes that “they are all committed to the UNSC resolutions. The different positions of the GCC members are the result of various factors, none of which seem to be directly connected with a new understanding of the Iraqi position. The U.S. failure to bring the Iraqi issue to a conclusive close is one major reason why some GCC members are taking a different path.” (p. 99)

1699. Niblock, Tim, ed. Iraq: The Contemporary State. London: Croom Helm, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. ●● A collection of papers from the University of Exeter’s annual symposium, edited by the deputy director of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies. Papers on the economy and development planning are best represented, with Paul Stevens on Iraqi oil policy, Robin Theobald and Sa’d Jawad on problems of rural development, Rodney Wilson on Western, Soviet, and Egyptian influences on Iraqi development planning, J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair on human resources development, and John Townsend on industrial development. H.G. Balfour-Paul examines the attempts earlier in this century at political union in the Fertile Crescent, and Joe Stork analyzes the development of the present political system through a Marxist view of class. Sa’d Jawad covers Kurdish-government relations and Peter Mansfield compares Saddam Husayn’s ideology with that of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir. Amal al-Sharqi and Amal Rassam look at the role of women and Alya Sousa examines the efforts of the régime to eliminate illiteracy. Barry Rubin contributes an essay on US-Iraqi relations over the past quarter-century, and Niblock surveys Iraq’s political policies towards its Arab neighbors in the Gulf while Naomi Sakr looks at the economic side of these relations. ●

1700. Ramati, Yohanan. “Iraq and Arab Security.” Global Affairs, Vol. 5, No.1 (Winter 1990), pp. 116-129. ●● The director of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defense argues that, in the months before its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq sought to use the Arab Cooperation Council (also including Jordan and North Yemen) as part of its strategic goal of undermining Western influence in the Third World. “Strengthening the ACC is a risky policy for Washington. Even strengthening it economically will harm U.S. interests if the result is to accelerate the achievement of Iraqi hegemony in the Persian Gulf.” (p. 128)

1702. Sciolino, Elaine. *The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991. A journalist’s account of Iraq’s politics, how Saddam Husayn came to rule, how he became entangled in the Iran-Iraq War, and why he chose to invade Kuwait. An appendix contains the transcripts of conversations before the Kuwait invasion between Saddam Husayn and American Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie and the American chargé d’affaires Joseph C. Wilson, as edited and released by the Iraqi government. She concludes that “the vision of the new Iraq [after Saddam] was to be found in the old. Not one nation favored the dismemberment of Iraq or the alteration of its borders. There were increasing fears among the coalition members that Iraq would be thrust back into a climate of political instability similar to the 1930s....” (p. 269)


1704. Snyder, Jed C. “The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb.” *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 37, No. 4 (1983), pp. 565-593. The author, a research associate at the Smithsonian’s Woodrow Wilson Center, traces the development of Iraq’s nuclear facilities. Snyder contends that the Iraqis were covertly seeking to establish the capability for nuclear weapons and charges that the Italians and the French acted irresponsibly in supplying the necessary technology.


1707. Wright, Claudia. “Iraq-New Power in the Middle East.” *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 58, No. 2 (Winter 1979-1980), pp. 257-277. An analysis of Iraq and its leadership, written shortly before the Iran-Iraq war. Wright charges that “Washington has seriously misjudged (Saddam Husayn) and underestimated the capabilities of his government. “ She notes that Iraqi oil reserves have steadily increased since the mid-1970s, and points out that Iraq has been well-supplied militarily by the Soviet Union and was able to resolve many of its local disputes in the mid-1970s. In terms of the internal security of the régime, especially considering the 1978 purges, Wright asserts that Husayn has emerged in firm control of the country, helped by a buoyant economy.
Gulf States

One of the earliest and most comprehensive studies of the independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (including treatment of each of the seven constituent emirates), based on extensive research in the Gulf. Anthony analyzes these countries in terms of four principal themes: the clash between traditional and modernizing forces, the changing social and demographic structure of the indigenous and immigrant populations, the shifting alliances between the nine rulers, and the relationships between the shaykhdoms and states outside the area. In analyzing favorable prospects for the future, Anthony notes the minimally disruptive nature of territorial disputes, the support these newly independent states received from their larger neighbors, the clearly perceived common interests and identity of the rulers, the continued informal British presence, and the absence of major internal security problems. At the same time, he points out that the precariousness of Iranian-Arab relations and the potential of Arab radicalism could undercut these moderating elements.


A report by two RAND Corporation researchers assessing the threat of political violence in the states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. They see that such violence arises from general sources of discontent, anti-régime opposition, and the influence of foreign powers. The authors suggest measures that could reduce violence, such as political and economic reforms, reducing US presence in the region, encouraging a greater European role in Gulf security, coercing foreign powers that contribute to violence, strengthening the US-Gulf partnership, and improving military-to-military ties. In the end, the authors hold, “When trying to anticipate the future of violence in the Gulf, Washington must recognize that neither reform nor the status quo offers a perfect way out.” (p. 113)


The authors, both at the RAND Corporation, argue that “social peace in the Gulf, and perhaps more generally, is maintained by the clever, and consistent, use of a variety of government strategies to promote social order.” These strategies include strong security forces, co-optation of potential dissidents, divide-and-rule measures, ideological flexibility, token participation, and accommodative diplomacy. The authors conclude that “These monarchies may seem bastions of a traditional order, but they are also tremendously innovative, with leaders who know how to foster, as well as accommodate, political change.”


A study by an assistant professor of politics at the University of Michigan of the impact of oil on political formation in Kuwait and Qatar, comparing the pre-oil period in both states to the oil era that brought rapid economic change but also maintained political stability. The author answers this paradox
by concluding that “these régimes survived precisely because of transformations [caused by oil]. Beneath the apparent political stability and continuity lie sea changes. ... The key transformations re the emergence of new coalitions and new institutional structures, the transformation of the régime and the transformation of the state.” (p. 171) See also her “Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar” Comparative Politics, Vol. 21 (July 1989), pp. 427-443.

1712. Davis, Eric, and Nicolas Gavrielides, eds. *Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture*. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991. ●● Contributions relevant to this bibliography include Assem Dessouki (Asyut University, Egypt) on Gulf historiography, the editors (Rutgers University and State University of New York at Cortland respectively) on statecraft, historical memory, and popular culture in Iraq and Kuwait, and Noura al-Falah (Kuwait University) on social change, gender relations and education of women in Kuwait.

1713. Dazi-Héni, Fatiha. “Des processus électoraux engagés dans les monarchies du Golfe: les cas du Koweït et du Qatar.” *Monde arabe - Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 168 (April-June 2000), pp. 76-88. ●● A study observing that Kuwait is the most advanced Gulf monarchy in terms of transition to democracy while the Gulf’s youngest ruler, Shaykh Hamad of Qatar, has sought to create a political identity clearly distinct from powerful neighbor Saudi Arabia. The author, of the Institut d’études politiques (Paris) proceeds to analyze the 1999 parliamentary election in Kuwait, paying particular attention to the showing of the liberals and the “tribalization” of Kuwaiti politics. She also examines Shaykh Hamad’s efforts to introduce new liberal policies in Qatar and the municipal election of 1999.

1714. Ebraheem, Hassan Ali Al-. *Kuwait and the Gulf: Small States and the International System*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies; London: Croom Helm, 1984. ●● The author, a political scientist at Kuwait University, looks at the role of small states in international relations, with particular reference to Kuwait and its neighbors. He concludes that small states are here to stay and contends that the uproar about their increase is nothing but a manifestation of the West’s concern over losing its monopoly in the U.N. and other international organizations. Al-Ebraheem notes that Kuwait abandoned 250 years of local neutrality when it joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) but argues that this action reflects the recognition of Kuwait and the other members that they cannot survive on an individual basis. But he also asks the question of whether they can survive even within the GCC. For the GCC to work, Al-Ebraheem contends that GCC foreign policy must be based on neutrality, that its goal of social and economic integration must be viewed as the first step in the integration of all the Arab countries, and that it should strive to reduce the gap between rich and poor Arabs (through adoption of a plan similar to the Marshall Plan). ●

for a re-evaluation of perceptions of the oil monarchies’ abilities to adapt and change. The author argues that not only are reforms being introduced, albeit at different speeds, but that the elites are emerging as the greatest agents for change. He concludes that “We should perhaps recall that Rome was not built in a day, and note in the context of the GCC states that reform from above is still a far preferable route to change than revolution from below.” (p. 75)


1717. Foley, Sean. “The Gulf Arabs and the New Iraq: The Most to Gain and the Most to Lose?” *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 2003), distributed electronically. A Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University argues that “the governments of the GCC states and their peoples have an enormous amount at stake in the development process in Iraq and ... that Gulf Arabs must begin to reform their societies and develop new collective, integrated institutions with their allies to guarantee a secure and prosperous future.” He believes that a “functioning, democratic Iraq under U.S. guidance” could, in combination with the Gulf states’ development of consultative institutions and expanding privatization, create more incentive for better governance.

1718. Fuller, Graham E., and Rend Rahim Francke. *The Arab Shi’a: the Forgotten Muslims*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. The authors state that this book arose out of the West’s increasing interest in the Arab Shi’ah, largely because of the involvement of the community’s adherents in violent activities. They look first at what it means to be Shi’ah and then at the position of Arab Shi’ah in the Sunni state. Subsequent chapters deal with the politicization of the Shi’ah and the connection to revolutionary Iran. Treatment of the Shi’ah in Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and policy implications for the West all receive separate chapters. They conclude by noting that “A key problem is how to keep politics in the region from becoming ‘zero-sum’ in nature between Sunnis and Shi’a. One means is to accept some form of proportional representation or political sectarianism such as in Lebanon.” (p. 259) They also observer that “Shi ’ism is in no way intrinsically hostile to the West [and that] Sunni Islamist radicalism is probably more of a threat to regional régimes than is Shi’ite Islamist radicalism.” (p. 257)

1719. Gause, F. Gregory, III. *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. Building on seminars presented at the Council on Foreign Relations, a fellow at the council and associate professor at Columbia University examines political and security developments in the GCC states. He focuses on “traditional” bases of politics, oil politics, the issues of representation and participation, foreign and defense policies, and the role of American policy. In the latter regard, he advises that “American policy in the Gulf should ... be directed at helping to avoid political outcomes that could interfere with market considerations in the production and pricing of Gulf oil.” (p. 195) He also sees the outlook for the régimes in
these states as being good and advocates that “The best safeguard of long-term stability, through evolutionary change, in the Gulf monarchies is the expansion of autonomous civil society institutions.” (p. 198)

1720. ________. “The Gulf Conundrum: Economic Change, Population Growth, and Political Stability in the GCC States.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 143-165. •• An assistant professor of political science at the University of Vermont looks at the rise of Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia and the unrest in Bahrain, as well as declining prospects for Gulf economies to argue that “Things have changed in the kingdom, and in the Gulf as a whole, creating a new set of political challenges for the six monarchical rulers upon whom the United States has based its regional policy.” (p. 143) He sees the impact of a younger generation (including rulers) as probably being mixed and notes that while these states face no immediate threats to régime stability, the emerging trends will produce challenges unlike those of the past. He suggests that the US should deal with the Gulf states by avoiding the “democracy” question and instead stressing “civil society.”

1721. ________. “The Arabian Peninsula Monarchies from Camp David I to Camp David II.” In Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East Enters the Twenty-First Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), pp. 62-77. •• An associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont observes that the political agenda of the GCC states has shifted markedly from preoccupation with foreign and security challenges during the 1970s through 1991 to domestic political and economic issues since then. He sees that “The American connection is not just a foreign policy issue for the Gulf states; it is also on the domestic agenda. Maintaining that connection at a time when public sentiment in the Gulf is turning against the United States affects the Gulf leaders’ willingness to pursue other controversial and difficult policy courses domestically.” (p. 77)


1723. Hardy, Roger. Arabia After the Storm: Internal Stability of the Gulf Arab States. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992. A Middle East Programme Report. •• The author, from the BBC World Service, examines the impact of the Kuwait War on the GCC states, looking at the need for change within the ruling families, emerging trends within Islam, the role of indigenous Shi’ah, the problems of migrant workers, dissent, and economic stringencies. He concludes by warning that the Kuwait War “was a war which undermined the status quo it was designed to preserve. If the Gulf rulers and their Western allies cling to the illusion of present stability, the warning of the Gulf war will go unheeded.” (p. 36)

University believes that ruling families in the Gulf are too deeply ensconced to be thrown out by Islamists in any moves towards democracy. The author judges that “Full parliamentary democracy in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain will not be achieved any time soon. But the parliamentary life that is underway in Kuwait, and on the way in Bahrain and Qatar, should not be dismissed lightly. Nor will partial democratization lead to an Islamist takeover.” (p. 47)

1725. Kechichian, Joseph A. Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula Through the 1990s. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. Project Air Force & Arroyo Center, MR-167-AF/A. The author, an analyst at the RAND Corporation at the time of publication, looks at Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller states of the Gulf in time, examining their internal security situations and their national security perspectives. A short chapter summarizes key future Gulf security issues, including regional security, political stability, regional disarmament, economic development, and preservation of the existing nation-state system. The author concludes that most likely “the political-military rapprochement between the GCC states and the United States will continue for the foreseeable future. There are few alternatives for the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. On the other hand, it would be unwise to assume that the relationship will be free of tensions.” (p. 112)

1726. ________, ed. Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States. New York: Palgrave, 2001. A collection of papers from a 2000 conference at UCLA covering all eight states of the Gulf littoral. Iran is covered by Olivier Roy (CNRS, France) who focuses on activities within the Iranian clerical establishment, Shaul Bakhash (George Mason University) discussing Iran’s 2000 parliamentary elections, and Ahmed S. Hashim (Center for Naval Analyses) examines civil-military relations. Joyce N. Wiley (University of South Carolina, Spartanburg) provides background on the Iraqi clergy, Laith Kubba (National Endowment for Democracy) expounds on domestic politics in a post-Saddam Iraq, and Andrew Parasiliti (Harvard University) analyzes the Iraqi military in politics. For Saudi Arabia, Mark N. Katz (George Mason University) assesses the possibility of revolution, Gwen Okruhlik (University of Arkansas) discusses the political economy of tourism, and Robert E. Looney (Naval Postgraduate School) measures the transition from a rentier state. Fatma al-Sayegh (United Arab Emirates University) outlines social and economic policies in the UAE while May Seikaly (Wayne State University) looks at the impact of globalization in Kuwait and Bahrain and Dale F. Eickelman (Dartmouth College) analyzes the role of media in Oman and Qatar. The problem of border disputes is presented by Richard Schofield (School of Oriental and African Studies, London) while Hussein Hassouna (Arab League) concentrates on the Kuwait-Iraq border and Mohammed A. Zabarah (University of Yemen, Sanaa) discusses Yemeni-Saudi relations. Joseph A. Kechichian (Kechichian Associates and UCLA) reviews unity efforts in the Arabian Peninsula and R. Hrair Dekmejian (University of Southern California) assesses institution-building in the GCC states while Muhammed Salih al-Musfir (Qatar Foreign Ministry) discusses their internal dynamics and foreign policies. Gerd Nonneman (University of Lancaster) examines Gulf-
British relations and Rosemarie Said Zahlan (London) takes a historical look at US policy and the Gulf states. Theodore Karasik (RAND Corporation) outlines the Gulf States’ links with Central Asia. Shaykh Sultan bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (Deputy Prime Minister of the UAE) sketches the UAE vision for Gulf security and Shaykh Saif bin Hashil al-Maskery (Oman Consultancy Group) posits future trends in the GCC. Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim (UAE University) analyzes security challenges in the Gulf while Shireen T. Hunter (Center for Strategic and International Studies) assesses the future outlook for Iranian-Gulf relations and J.E. Peterson reflects on what makes the Gulf states endure.

1727. __________. “Political Reforms in Kuwait and the GCC States.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (September-October 1991), pp. 40-43. A RAND Corporation consultant examines attitudes of Kuwaitis and other GCC peoples toward the Arab world after the Kuwait War and asks how far the GCC states will go toward genuine political and social reforms. He suggests that the debate over reforms begun after the war will be difficult to stop and remarks that “Knowingly or not, Saddam Hussein may in fact have forced the end of feudalism on the Arabian Peninsula....” (p. 43)

1728. Kostiner, Joseph, ed. *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. A comprehensive set of contributions on the subject of monarchies in the Middle East, their origins, their construction, and their persistence, edited by an associate professor and research fellow at Tel Aviv University. The first of three parts look at the monarchical tradition, post-Ottoman Arab monarchies, and why some monarchies failed and others survived. The contributions most relevant here consist of case studies, including Joseph Kostiner and Joshua Teitelbaum (Tel Aviv University) on state-formation and the Saudi monarchy, Uzi Rabi (Tel Aviv University) on the Kuwaiti ruling family in the post-liberation period, F. Gregory Gause III (University of Vermont) on the persistence of monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula, and Joseph A. Kechichian (Kechichian and Associates) on Oman. In addition, Onn Winckler (University of Haifa) discusses labor nationalization policies in the Gulf and Gudrun Krämer (Free University in Berlin) looks at the Islamist opposition in Saudi Arabia and other monarchies. As Fred Halliday (London School of Economics) observes in his concluding chapter, “The twentieth century has both created and destroyed monarchies, for reasons that historical and political analyses seek to explain. It is questionable how far the twenty-first century will create any new ones or restore those that have gone.” (p. 302)

1729. Lawson, Fred H. “Postwar Demands for Political Participation in the Arab Gulf States.” *International Journal*, Vol. 49 (Spring 1994), pp. 378-407. A political scientist at Mills College notes that nearly all the Gulf States experienced demands for greater public participation in policy-making and he proceeds to describe the different paths of these demands in each state, as well as discuss the appearance of radical opposition. He concludes that “Only in Bahrain and Kuwait have domestic conditions left open the possibility that radical opposition movements might revive in the foreseeable future” (p. 407) although he suggests that Arab nationalist opposition is equally likely in Bahrain.


1732. Noreng, Øystein. *Oil and Islam: Social and Economic Issues*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 1997. Research Council of Norway, PETRO Research Series in Petroleum Economics and Politics. ●● A professor at the Norwegian School of Management explores the possible links between the Middle East’s oil experience and the surge of politically radical Islamic movements and suggests that the region’s “oil exporters ... evidently are not managing the transition into more diversified economies ... [and] seem to be running into into ever more serious economic difficulties, with steadily more severe social strains and potentially ominous political repercussions.” (p. 1)

1733. O’Reilly, Marc J. “Oil Monarchies Without Oil: Omani and Bahraini Security in a Post-Oil Era.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (February 1999), pp. 78-92. ●● A lecturer at the University of Connecticut looks at the impact that the decline in oil revenues will pose for the political future of these two countries and opines that Oman’s Sultan Qabus has responded to the challenge with positive measures while the style of Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Shaykh Khalifah (the country’s effective ruler) has undermined his credibility.


appoin ted consultative councils in Qatar, the UAE, and Oman, and on the background to consultative councils in Saudi Arabia. The work argues that “The continued suspension of national assemblies and the reluctance to take the step from consultative council to national assembly (or even to create a consultative council) makes taking the step toward true democratic institutions even more difficult.” (p. 121)

1738. ________. “The GCC States After the Iran-Iraq War.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 26 (Fall 1988), pp. 96-106. ●● A view of what might be expected in the Gulf after the war, noting that disarray within OPEC is likely to continue, GCC relations with Iraq will improve at least somewhat, strains with Iran may not prove permanent, there will be more cooperation within the GCC on economic issues if not military, relations with the West will remain strong even if occasionally troubled. In conclusion, “it is clear that the GCC countries have dodged a bullet. Now, they must turn their attention back to dealing with the other major crisis of this decade – the impact of the oil doldrums....” (p. 106)

1739. ________. “The Future of Gulf Security After the Kuwait War.” In Royal United Services Institute and Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1992 (London: Brassey’s UK, 1992), pp. 131-143. ●● A review of the political impact of the Kuwait War on the other Gulf states and an assessment of the viability of a “new Arab order” in response. In conclusion, “It took only a few months after the dénouement of the war for the forces of conservatism to regain control. Once again, emphasis returned to preservation of the status quo, a tried-and-true strategy that has served well the traditionalist monarchs of the Gulf through a multitude of threatening crises....” (pp. 142-143)

1740. Robins, Philip. “Can Gulf Monarchies Survive the Oil Bust?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 13-22. ●● The head of the Middle East program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs chronicles the fall in the Gulf states' oil incomes and suggests that the “move from abundant wealth to scarce resources will affect both the style and substance of politics ... particularly in Saudi Arabia.” (p. 13) He says the kingdom can manage the tensions either through greater consultation or through greater repression, or a mixture of the two” and it appears to be “moving in the first direction without foregoing the second.” (p. 13)

1741. Said Zahlan, Rosemarie. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Rev. ed.; Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998. ●● A London-based historian traces the emergence of the Gulf states, giving particular attention to the development of representative government in Kuwait, the history of political tensions in Bahrain throughout much the 20th century, the role of the ruling families in each of the states, the significance of Saudi Arabia as a much more powerful neighbor, and the Gulf states in the broader international setting. The author notes the continued role of the old political order even as the infrastructure has expanded and social structures have been altered. She concludes that “The disruption of the pre-oil relationship between the ruler and his people has yet to be fully redressed. Until this
occurs, external events will continue to pose a challenge to the well-being of the Gulf
states.” (p. 93)

Institution Press, 1984. A diverse collection of essays, all but one first presented at a
panel of the 1981 Middle East Studies Association conference. Perhaps the most
interesting contribution, by Monte Palmer, Ibrahim Alghofaily and Saud Alnimir, looks at
behavioral patterns in Saudi Arabia and their impact on the country’s attempts to break
away from “rentier” status. The authors conclude that Saudi development efforts face
serious constraints due to the citizenry’s disdain for manual labor, its unwillingness to
relocate geographically to meet the country’s occupational needs, and the premium that
Saudi society places on contentment over achievement and risk-taking in career values.
Calvin H. Allen, Jr., and Robert W. Stookey contribute interesting and well-written surveys
of the US relationship with Oman and the political development of two states in Yemen,
respectively. Nazih N.M. Ayubi’s article on Arab aid, in the context of OPEC-Third World
relations, is comprehensive and thought-provoking, while Robert E. Looney’s examination
of the impact of the petroleum industry on Saudi economic development covers the ground
thoroughly, if rather perfunctorily. The one weak link is Alexander Bligh’s labored attempt
to relate rumors and unsubstantiated accounts of “instability” and coup attempts in Saudi
Arabia to prevailing ideological and political patterns in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia

(1995), pp. 23-34. A lecturer in international relations at the University of Amsterdam
charges that Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a “gradual process of moral and political
decline, disillusionment and dissent, which began in the mid-1970s, after the assassination
of King Faisal. Since then the Kingdom has been on the downgrade.” (p. 23) He then traces
the kingdom’s financial troubles and political “upheaval.”

Routledge, 1993. A professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem uses Saudi
Arabian and other Ph.D. dissertations, secondary sources, and a thorough sifting of
newspapers and magazines to paint a picture of changes in the kingdom’s domestic politics
and economy from the 1950s to the early 1990s. Opening chapters focus on “the
consolidation of the ruling class” (i.e. the ‘ulama’ and the Al Sa’ud) and the effect of
modern education before chronologically tracing power struggles and the process of
modernization through the reigns of Kings Sa’ud, Faysal, Khalid, and Fahd. The final part
discusses the impact of regional crises on changes in Saudi Arabia: the Iran-Iraq War, the
Kuwait War, and the post-war demands for reform. He concludes that “For the time being,
the Saudi regime’s stability seems secure. The new Consultative Assembly will serve as
a steam valve for the new elites’ frustration, and the fundamentalist threat to the Saudis has

1745. ________. *Saudi Arabia in the 1990s: Stability and Foreign Policy*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1 September 1997. Jerusalem Letters, No. 365. Distributed electronically. A professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem looks at the role of the Saudi economy and relations with the US in provoking opposition both inside and outside the kingdom, as well as Heir Apparent ‘Abdullah’s response. In his view, “once Abdallah succeeds Fahd, Riyadh is likely to endeavor to further reduce the profile of the American presence in the kingdom and distance itself from U.S. Mideast policy.” In addition, “Militant fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia is bound to remain a secondary problem ... but is unlikely to win support among the majority of the population despite pervasive anti-U.S. sentiments.”

1746. Ahrari, M. Ehsan. “The Future of Political Stability in Saudi Arabia.” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 100-114. A professor of national security and strategy at the Armed Forces Staff College in Virginia adopts a rather pessimistic view of Saudi Arabia’s future: “The Saudi political system seems to be edging toward internal disorder. It is too early to draw similarities with Iran, but the course of political change that brought about the end of the monarchy in that country does come to mind.” (p. 100) In support of this view, he cites such factors as the shrinking economic pie, continued heavy defense expenditures, rising opposition,” and uncertainty over succession to King Fahd.

1747. Algar, Hamid. *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay*. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002. An Islamic studies specialist at the University of California at Berkeley gives an extremely critical assessment disparaging Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia. Dismissing the Wahhabi preference for description as Muwahhidun (i.e. unitarians), the author claims that Wahhabism was intellectually marginal and had the good luck to emerge in the Arabian Peninsula, the location of Islam’s holiest sites and the source of enormous oil wealth; otherwise it “might well have passed into history as a marginal and short-lived sectarian movement.” (p. 2) He also dismisses the ideas that Wahhabism is part of Sunni Islam and that it shares the same principles as Salafiyah and other Islamic “renewal” movements. While mentioning that Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd, Algar notes Najd’s “topographical barrenness seems always to have been reflected in its intellectual history.” (p. 5) Algar charges that “the Wahhabis have seriously distorted fundamental teachings of Islam; functioned for many decades as the ideological mainstay of a regime that has squandered the wealth of the Arabian Peninsula; vilified Muslims, both Sunni and Shi‘i, as non-Muslim and shed their blood; introduced or exacerbated division and strife wherever they have gone; destroyed a significant part of the cultural patrimony of all Muslims, first in the Hijaz and then in places such as Chechnya, Bosnia,
Defensive and Regional Security in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States

and Kosova; and signally failed to contribute anything to either the intellectual elaboration of Islam or the advancement of its political and civilizational agenda in the present age.” (pp. 69-70)


1750. Baer, Robert. “The Fall of the House of Saud.” *Atlantic Monthly* (May 2003), pp. 53-62. A gossipy diatribe against the Al Sa’ud royal family of Saudi Arabia by a former CIA field agent. The author offers snippets of unfavorable scuttlebutt against various members of the family, especially King Fahd’s youngest son, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who is accused of funding Usamah b. Ladin in an attempt to secure his succession to the Saudi throne. The author charges that signs of impending disaster are everywhere in the kingdom and declares that “sometime soon, one way or another, the House of Saud is coming down.” (p. 62) His charges were subsequently expanded and published as *Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude* (New York: Crown, 2003).

1751. Bahout, Joseph. “Si l’Arabie doit rester séoudite...” *Les Cahiers de l’Orient*, Nos. 25-26 (1992), pp. 71-106. A Lebanese journalist looks at the bases of legitimacy in Saudi Arabia and warns that the country’s rulers must recognize that power, like wealth, is amongst the most difficult things in the world to share.


Saudi Arabia during the era of the late King Faysal. Former ARAMCO researcher George Rentz leads off the collection with a discussion of the evolution of the Al Sa‘ud monarchy, Duke University professor Ralph Braibanti analyzes the impact of Islam and petroleum on Saudi political development, and Saudi Deputy Minister of Information Fouad Abdul-Salam Al-Farsy outlines King Faysal’s conception of the first five-year development plan. Three papers discuss specific factors in the modernization process: the development of the Saudi bureaucracy (Abdulrahman M. Al-Sadhan, Secretary-General of the Civil Service Board in Riyadh), a case study of socioeconomic development in al-Hasa Oasis (Frederico S. Vidal, an anthropologist at the University of Texas at Arlington), and the US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation (John Duke Anthony, then at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies). In addition, George M. Baroody (Executive Vice-President of Texas Eastern Arabian Ltd.), discusses the practice of law in Saudi Arabia, William A. Rugh (a US Foreign Service Officer) looks at Saudi mass media, and Catherine Parssinen (formerly with the Saudi Arabian Bechtel Company) assesses the changing role of women. Four final papers take up different aspects of Saudi foreign policy: David E. Long (a State Department analyst) examines King Faysal’s world view, Abdullah M. Sindi (of King Abdulaziz University in Jidda) presents King Faysal’s emphasis on Pan-Islamism, Abdulaziz H. Al-Sowayyegh (then at the University of Riyadh) looks at oil policy, and Malcolm C. Peck (then Director of Programs at the Middle East Institute) outlines Saudi-American relations. The editor (Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Southern California) provides a brief biographical sketch of King Faysal in his introduction.

1754. Bradley, John R. “Are the Saudis Sunk?” Prospect, No. 90 (September 2003). The managing editor of the Arab News newspaper in Jiddah sketches the kingdom’s ills, which he sees as Najdi domination of al-Hijaz and ‘Asir, conservative opposition to political reforms, social and economic inequality, and the burgeoning Islamist opposition within the country. He concludes that “Significant change is inevitable. The question is whether it will come quickly enough, and whether the economic changes it brings will be sufficient to address the needs of the kingdom’s youth, who may otherwise side with the radical Islamists.”


1756. _________. “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability Within Stability.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999), distributed electronically. A review of social and economic change and their potential to destabilize Saudi Arabia by a research scholar at the Australian National University. He concludes that “Saudi Arabia is indeed entering a period of turbulence which will, nevertheless, see the Saudi dynasty come through intact” but adds that “The dual problems of reform and development in the socioeconomic sphere should not be underestimated.”


1759. Dawisha, Adeed. *Saudi Arabia's Search for Security.* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979-1980. Adelphi Papers, No. 158. There are three purposes to this detailed study: to chart the rapid rise of Saudi Arabia as a regional power; to explain Saudi involvement in Middle Eastern and international politics; and to identify the various paths Saudi policy may follow in the 1980s. Dawisha concludes with a short section on "prospects," which looks at Saudi Arabia's stability in the context of such events as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Iranian revolution, and the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca. See also Dawisha's "Internal Values and External Threats: The Making of Saudi Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 129-143.

1760. Dekmejian, R. Hrair. "Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 204-218. A political scientist at the University of Southern California describes the formation of the Majlis al-Shura and profiles the membership of the second majlis (appointed in 1997) in terms of age, occupation, education, religious conservatives vs. modernist liberals, Shi'ite members, regional representation, and tribal and class background. He sees the majlis as fulfilling honorific, symbolic, representational, and cooptative functions. He concludes that "It is too early to assess the evolving role of the Majlis within the Saudi polity. There can be no doubt, however, that the Saudi political system has undergone considerable change in the last five years, with the Majlis assuming a key role in the evolutionary process." (p. 218)

1761. ________. "The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 400-413. Pointing out that the kingdom has been the target of numerous detractors since 11 September 2001 who have focused their criticism on the country’s Wahhabi identity to the near-exclusion of all other aspects of Saudi society and politics, the author seeks to redress the imbalance by examining the “rebirth” of Saudi liberalism in the last decade or so. He centers his inquiry on the “Strategic Vision” document sent in January 2003 to Heir Apparent ‘Abdullah. He profiles the 104 liberals who signed the document, whom he calls “the Kingdom’s ‘Best and the Brightest,’” in terms of their ideologies, occupations, and regional backgrounds and reasons that “In the dynamics of Saudi politics viewed from the regime’s perspective, the Liberals have had considerable utility as a counter to excessive Islamist pressures, as a highly visible expression of modernity to the outside world, and possibly as a valuable resource to forge a strong and progressive Saudi future.” (p. 413)
1762. Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. “Women and the Stability of Saudi Arabia.” *MERIP Middle East Report*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1991), pp. 34-37. A visiting scholar at Brown University uses the 1990 women’s driving demonstration in Riyadh to examine the relationship between women’s rights and political stability. She observes that “In the absence of open institutions to express political dissent, women will remain a reliable barometer of stability in the kingdom: the first sign that the Saudi rulers are in trouble will continue to be fresh enunciations from the monarchy about the ideal Muslim woman, and a renewal of restrictions on things that women do.” (p. 37)

1763. __________. “Manning the Barricades: Islam According to Saudi Arabia’s School Texts.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 230-247. A visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University thoroughly examines Saudi secondary-school textbooks to determine whether American criticism is justified that the curriculum is anti-Western. She finds that much of the criticism results from selective reading and argues that the principal problem is that the curriculum is too narrow and fails to provide students with an appreciation of the varieties of Islamic interpretation. In addition, the educational system does not encourage critical thinking skills. See also the author’s “Education in Saudi Arabia: Gender, Jobs, and the Price of Religion,” in Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Marsha Pripstein Posusney, eds., *Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy, and Society* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 239-257.

1764. Dunn, Michael Collins. “Is the Sky Falling? Saudi Arabia’s Economic Problems and Political Stability.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1995), pp. 29-39. The editor of *The Estimate* newsletter assesses Saudi Arabia’s “rough year” and “bad press” in 1994 and believes that “while the kingdom faces real economic problems, they are not insurmountable, and that while the kingdom may have long been ‘in denial’ and moved too slowly to respond to those problems, it is now doing so.” (pp. 30-31) While the economic problems are not likely to go away quickly, despite belt-tightening, “The whole history of the House of Saud suggests that if a leader or group of leaders proves unable to cope with a challenge to the family enterprise, the family will find someone else. ... And in the past, the family has shown its skill in reviving old tribal links, co-opting opponents and bringing them inside the tent, and responding to popular discontent.” (p. 38)

1765. Eilts, Hermann Frederick. “Saudi Arabia: Traditionalism versus Modernism – A Royal Dilemma?” In Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds., *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 56-88. A professor of international relations at Boston University and former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia details royal family politics in the kingdom and assesses the kingdom’s capacity for modernization, as well as outlining the stimuli for and constraints against sociopolitical change. He suggests that “The winds of change do not yet gust in Saudi Arabia, but waft they already do. ... The test of Saudi leadership in the years ahead will be furthering constructive sociopolitical reform, including wider public
participation in the affairs of government and enabling women to use their talents more broadly....” (p. 87)


1768. Field, Michael. “Why the Saudi Royal Family Is More Stable Than the Shah.” Euromoney, October 1981, pp. 300, 303, 306, 309, 312. ●● A British journalist observes that “The community structure and politics of Arabian society is what makes Saudi Arabia, and for that matter, the Gulf States more stable than they appear at first glance.” He adds that as long as the bonds between the Al Sa’ud, the tribes, and the Wahhabi ulema hold, the Najdi alliance will continue to dominate the society. ♦


1770. Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Saudi Arabia Over a Barrel.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3 (May-June 2000), pp. 80-94. ●● The options open to Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest petroleum exporter, in the face of rising oil prices are examined by an American political scientist. From a high point of being $100 billion in surplus in 1981, the kingdom faced chronic budget deficits until the oil price rise of 1999-2000. Although one of the few OPEC countries with excess production capability, Saudi Arabia no longer has the desire nor the easy ability to serve as OPEC’s swing producer, raising and lowering production at will in response to shifts in the international oil market. The author argues that American pressure on Riyadh to produce more oil may be misplaced or even counter-productive. Noting that “Neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia wants oil prices to be ‘too low’ or ‘too high,’” (p. 81), Gause concludes that Washington’s best strategy will be “Helping the Saudis detach their oil policies from their immediate revenue needs....” (p. 91), assisting Saudi
Arabia’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and encouraging Riyadh to limit its defense spending.

1771. Geiger, Theodore, and Robert D. Kramer. “Stability and Instability in Saudi Arabia.” New International Realities, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 1979), pp. 9-17. Two officials of the National Planning Association assert that one reason why American policymakers were unprepared for events in Iran was their failure to understand the ramifications of change and modernization in Iranian society. In this article, the authors seek to explain the consequences of these factors for Saudi Arabia. They point out the problems of “transitional societies,” outline the sources of stability in traditional society and warn of new sources of instability, both internal and external. They conclude that “in the years ahead, there is a substantially greater probability than at any time in the past that the production and/or export of petroleum from Saudi Arabia would be drastically reduced or halted by political disruptions or disorders for a long enough period to generate severe shortages in the United States, Western Europe and Japan.”


1773. Goldberg, Jacob. “The Shi‘i Minority in Saudi Arabia.” In Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Shi‘ism and Social Protest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 230-246. A historian at Tel Aviv University provides an overview of the Shi‘ah community of the kingdom’s Eastern Province and its troubled relations with the state during the course of much of the 20th century. He gives special attention to the unrest generated by the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the harsh Saudi response, noting that by 1981 both sides seemed to desire a mending of the fences and that the government’s attention to the Shi‘is’ issues of social and economic concern ended any attempt to confront the régime.


1777. ________. “Saudi Arabia: Radical Islam or Reform?” Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition (June 2003). A recapitulation of the troubles facing the kingdom, with emphasis on the deterioration in American-Saudi relations. In the quoted view of a Saudi
intellectual, “This is a race against the clock.... We are facing acute social, economic and political problems generated by poverty and mounting unemployment. Our young people are confused and disoriented. And we are under enormous pressure from the US. We can respond either by cuddling up to the Americans, making fine speeches, and avoiding the real issues, or by deciding for ourselves to fight corruption and carry through reforms that will ensure more freedom and human rights.”

1778. Gulf Research Center. Reform in Saudi Arabia: Current Challenges and Feasible Solutions. Dubai, July 2003. •• This report takes as its starting point the speech to the Saudi Consultative Council by King Fahd on 17 May 2003, in which he emphasized the need for extensive reform in the kingdom. It goes on to note the challenges to Saudi Arabia of population growth, the status of women, human rights, and the need for various economic and educational reforms, as well as the threat of internal terrorism. The report suggests the creation of a Higher Committee for Coordination to articulate the mechanisms required and develop plans to carry them out. Among the reforms advocated are encouraging economic growth based on the employment of nationals, providing more scope for political participation, delegating more authority to the regions, upgrading the quality of graduates, and modernizing security through the creation of a National Security Ministry.

1779. Hanson, Victor Davis. “Our Enemies, the Saudis.” Commentary, Vol. 114, No. 1 (July-August 2002), pp. 23-28. •• An unremittingly hostile attack on Saudi Arabia by a professor of classics at California State University at Fresno. The author views Saudi Arabia as a “bizarre place” and charges that the kingdom’s “accidental boom” in oil was spent only on the royal family and not on development and that Saudi Arabia would be on the State Department’s list of rogue states if it did not have oil.

1780. Henderson, Simon. After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994. Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 37. •• A British journalist discusses past patterns of succession in the kingdom prior to analyzing prospects of succession among the sons of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and then the grandsons. Many of his recommendations are dated but he notes that “Succession ... could greatly affect the closeness of ties with the United States...” and “U.S. policymakers should take steps to prepare for any number of possible eventualities in a succession process whose outcome is not assured.” (p. xiv)

1781. Hersh, Seymour M. “King’s Ransom.” New Yorker (22 October 2001), pp. 35-39. •• A hostile article by a veteran journalist claiming that Saudi Arabia is “increasingly corrupt, alienated from the country’s religious rank and file, and so weakened and frightened that it has brokered its future by channelling hundreds of millions of dollars in ... protection money to fundamentalist groups that wish to overthrow it.” (p. 35) His evidence for this extreme conclusion is electronic intercepts of conversations between members of the Al Sa’ud, collected by the National Security Agency and leaked to the author by US intelligence officials and unnamed politicians. The intercepts cited are mostly gossipy
rather than revealing, but the author also repeats a number of critical comments from unnamed Americans who call the kingdom “the most immediate threat to American economic and political interests in the Middle East.” (p. 35)


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1783. Lacey, Robert. *The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982. ●● These two massive tomes on Saudi Arabia appeared in print almost simultaneously. Both take as their subject the creation of the modern state by the Al Saud, the beginnings and expansion of the Saudi oil industry, the emergence of the close Saudi-American relationship, the inevitable changes in Saudi society and economy, and the role of the kingdom in foreign affairs. Both books were written with a general audience in mind, are replete with anecdotes, and speculate on the future of the world’s richest kingdom. David Holden, the chief foreign correspondent of *The Sunday Times*, had written about a third of *The House of Saud* when he was mysteriously murdered in Cairo in December 1977. Richard Johns, Middle East editor of the *Financial Times*, subsequently completed the book with the assistance of James Buchan, who contributed a chapter on the 1979 Great Mosque takeover. Robert Lacey, author of *The Kingdom*, is a general non-fiction writer who spent some time in Saudi Arabia in research for his book. ●

1784. Huyette, Summer Scott. *Political Adaptation in Sa’udi Arabia: A Study of the Council of Ministers*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Westview Special Studies on the Middle East. ●● A short study based on a Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation that concentrates on the antecedents to the present council of ministers, the institution’s development during the decades from its establishment in 1953 through the 1970s, an examination of its contemporary role, and studies of the evolution of the civil service and of political elites and culture. She observes that “The growth of the Council of Ministers and the development of the Sa’udi bureaucracy have provided prestigious employment for Sa’udi professionals, establishing a new source of elite status for those with training and ability, but it has not satisfied the needs of professionals outside the government who also seek a voice in political choices.” (p. 136) The appendices include relevant royal decrees and other lists and documents concerning the council.


1786. ________. “Violence and the Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia.” *Middle East Report Online*, 13 November 2003. ●● The author examines recent attempts to push for reform in the kingdom, particularly the petitions by “liberal reformers” and demonstrations organized by the exile group Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), and
concludes that “until the regime rejects its hard-line approach and engages honestly in reform, one thing is certain: state and extremist violence will continue to intensify.”

1787. Jordan, Amos A., Jr. “Saudi Arabia: The Next Iran?” Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 2-8. The author, Executive Director of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, looks at the question of whether the speed of modernization in Saudi Arabia might not produce the same results as in Iran. He analyzes the major reasons behind the Shah’s fall and points out essential differences between the two countries. Jordan notes that Saudi Arabia’s authoritarianism is more muted than that of Iran and its inflation and corruption less. His conclusion is that Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely to follow Iran’s path.


1789. Kechichian, Joseph A. Succession in Saudi Arabia. New York: Palgrave, April 2001. The chief executive officer of Kechichian and Associates and a fellow at UCLA divides the Al Sa’ud, the royal family of Saudi Arabia, into two broad categories: the current generation of leaders and the next generation. He then proceeds to analyze principal figures from both generations and describes the differences between them. He also describes the family’s relationship with the religious establishment, the military, and recent opposition figures. He plays down the chances of a full-blown succession struggle after ‘Abdullah, presently Heir Apparent, but notes that ‘Abdullah’s succession and the elevation of his half-brother Sultan to Heir Apparent will cause tension. In this case, Kechichian believes that “senior Al Saud family members – with the explicit support of several younger princes – would probably move to nominate Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz precisely to avoid a drawn-out dispute that, left to its own course, would threaten internal stability.” (pp. 150-151) There are 17 appendices consisting of chronology, genealogical charts, the cabinet in 1999, recent petitions for reform, and the Basic Law of 1992.

1790. __________. “Saudi Arabia’s Will to Power.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 2000), pp. 47-60. The author, CEO of Kechichian and Associates, points out that the ruling family of Saudi Arabia has developed a “will to power that benefited from the family’s strict adherence to Islamic values and, with oil wealth, transformed the desert into a modern country” (p. 47) and that this “will to power” continues to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances.

1791. __________. “Testing the Saudi ‘Will to Power’: Challenges Confronting Prince Abdallah.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 100-115. A leading Gulf analyst looks at the crises that have hit Saudi Arabia recently, including fallout from the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 12 May 2003 terrorist bombings in Riyadh, and examines some of the responses, including the promise of municipal elections, the creation of an independent human rights committee, and institution of a “National Dialogue” to discuss
reforms. The author remarks that “epoch-making changes” have occurred on the watch of Heir Apparent ‘Abdullah and judges that, like King Faysal before him, "How he responds to accusations that Saudi Arabia supported terrorist activities throughout the Muslim world and how successfully he introduces sorely needed sociopolitical reforms, will surely shape the kingdom’s immediate future.” (p. 100)

1792. Kelidar, A. R. “The Problems of Succession in Saudi Arabia.” *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol. 65 (N.S. 9), Pt. 1 (February 1978), pp. 23-30. ●● The author, lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), notes that politics in Saudi Arabia “remain traditional, autocratic, highly personal and extremely centralized, and rather unaffected by the economic transformation which the country is undergoing.” With this in mind, Kelidar examines the process of succession in a régime where the four kings since 1953 have all been sons of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa’ud, who ruled the country for the first half of this century. Kelidar points out that at least the next several kings are likely to be sons of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz as well, and discusses the implications of an emerging “generation gap” between these men and younger, Western-educated princes.

1793. Koury, Enver M. *The Saudi Decision-Making Body: The House of Al-Saud*. Hyattsville, MD: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1978. ●● An examination of the functioning of and prospects for the Saudi Arabian political system, heavily couched in political science jargon. One of the author’s conclusions reads that “The Saudi government has been able to mitigate mass discontent by correlating the equation of time-volume-content to maximize its political capital through mass support.”

1794. Kuniholm, Bruce R. “What the Saudis Really Want: A Primer for the Reagan Administration.” *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 107-121. ●● The author, assistant professor of policy sciences and history at Duke University, points out that Saudi priorities lie on five descending planes: preservation of the royal family, preservation of the nearly indistinguishable interests of the kingdom, the strong identity with the Arab world, concern with the Islamic world, and shoring up the anticommunist bloc. Kuniholm counsels the Reagan administration, in its formulation of Gulf policy, to be sensitive to Saudi considerations and priorities: “Any attempt to push the Saudis beyond what their instinct for survival tells them is acceptable ... can only result in failure and in damage to our common interests.”

1796. Long, David E. *Saudi Arabia*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976. Washington Papers, No. 39. A State Department official and academic provides a concise overview to modern Saudi Arabia, with concentration on its recent history, political structure, and economy. Long concludes by noting the range of challenges faced by the country and suggests that the Saudi leadership stands a good chance of coping with them. He adds that “Saudi Arabia’s efforts to use its oil wealth to develop a modern society with age-old Islamic values makes it one of the most exciting places to watch in the Middle East.”

1797. *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997. A retired US Foreign Service Officer produces a portrait of Saudi Arabia through its history, political system, oil, economic development and modernization, the administration of the *hajj* (Islamic pilgrimage to Makkah), and foreign policy and national security. Looking into the future, he observes that “the current régime has a greater mutuality of interests [with the West] than any likely successor...” but that the advent of a militant régime is unlikely. “Far more probable than a change of régime, or even a change of basic foreign and domestic policies, is a change of style as a new generation of Al Sauds replaces the older generation.” (p. 131)

1798. McHale, T.R. “A Prospect of Saudi Arabia.” *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 622-647. An American economist with seven years experience in Saudi Arabia reviews the historical development of the country and the impact of oil on its society. McHale identifies a number of areas of stress within Saudi Arabia, including the Sunni Shi’i relationship, tribal divisions, tensions within the royal family, the gap between literates and illiterates, urban-rural conflicts, and divisions between men and women.

1799. Mani, Saleh al-“. Of Security and Threat: Saudi Arabia’s Perception.” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 74-87. An associate professor at King Saud University in Riyadh states that while Saudi Arabia’s geography, Islam, and oil are a source of Saudi strength, they also “create limitations that require specific strategies within its security paradigm to address the country’s long borders, rising Islamic radicalism and needed military and economic alliances with Western (and non-Islamic) nations.” (p. 74) Noting the kingdom’s limited military capabilities, the author discusses both internal and external threats and advocates a reserve system for the Saudi armed forces and full utilization of human resources, both men and women.


1801. Ménoret, Pascal. “Pouvoirs et oppositions en Arabie saoudite: de la contestation armée à l’institutionnalisation de l’islamisme?” *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 177 (Autumn 2003), pp. 21-36. A study that outlines the many manifestations of Islamism in Saudi Arabia, ranging from the armed groups that have carried out recent terrorist attacks to the
participation of Islamist intellectuals in the “national dialogue.” The author suggests that future developments will depend heavily on the ability of the régime to manage and advance political reform.

1802. Nehme, Michel G. “Saudi Arabia 1950-80: Between Nationalism and Religion.” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 931-943. An examination of the political pressures in the kingdom and the response of the royal family to them as background to the establishment of the Majlis al-Shura in 1992 and the continuing differences between “nationalists” and “traditionalists.” To handle the contention between the two groups, the author contends that “the government has been trying to use Saudi nationalism to supplement religion as the unifying force in Saudi Arabia.” (p. 942) In his view, it is either working or at least buying time.

1803. ________. “The Shifting Sands of Political Participation in Saudi Arabia.” *Orient*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1995), pp. 45-60. The author analyzes the impact of the Kuwait War and the establishment of the Majlis al-Shura in Saudi Arabia as a result of promulgation of its Basic Law in 1992, and also discusses the appearance of opposition groups. He asserts that “The Saudi political system, as it stands, cannot satisfy the expectations of the new socio-religious bands, the educated groups, and the Modernizers who strive for a share in the making of policy.” (p. 60)

1804. ________. “Political Development in Saudi Arabia: Empty Reforms from Above.” *International Sociology*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1995), pp. 155-171. An assistant professor at the American University of Beirut describes the impact of rapid economic change on political evolution in Saudi Arabia. He asserts that the Saudi elite are not receptive to progressive demands for a more democratic form of political organization and thus the introduction of the Basic Law in 1992 and other measures are “nothing but empty reforms coming from above.” (p. 155)

1805. Niblock, Tim, ed. *State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia*. London: Croom Helm, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1982. This, the second volume resulting from the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies’ annual symposia, concentrates, as the title indicates, on Saudi Arabia while exploring a wide range of topics within that kingdom’s boundaries. Saudi history is covered by Derek Hopwood (Middle East bibliographer, University of Oxford and St. Anthony’s College), who looks at the Islamic revivalism of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; Peter Sluglett (lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the University of Durham) and Marion Farouk-Sluglett discuss Britain and the creation of the 20th century Saudi state; and Rosemarie Said Zahlan (author of several books on Gulf history) examines King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s relations with the Gulf states in the 1930s. The following contributors examine Saudi Arabia’s politics and foreign policy: Tim Niblock (Deputy Director of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies), who focuses on the interaction between the social structure, economic changes, and political development; James Buchan (a correspondent for the *Financial Times*) on secular and religious opposition; Fred Halliday
(associate director of the Transnational Institute) on US-Saudi relations; and John Duke Anthony (then of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) on contemporary Saudi relations with other Gulf states. British author Shirley Kay also adds a paper on the effects and consequences of social change, while Ugo Fabietti (a social anthropologist from Milan) examines the Saudi policy of sedentarization as a means of detribalization. The enormous degree and rapid pace of economic change receives attention in four papers: J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair (research fellows at the University of Durham) concentrate on the domestic political economy of development; Paul Stevens (lecturer in economics, University of Surrey) on Saudi Arabia’s oil policy in the 1970s; H.G. Hambleton (then professor of economics at the University Laval, Quebec) on the Saudi petrochemical industry; and Rodney Wilson (lecturer in economics, University of Durham) on the evolution of the Saudi banking system and its relationship with Bahrain. The volume also reproduces the remarks of Abdullah Al Saud, Deputy Secretary-General of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu’, at the opening of the symposium.

1806. Obaid, Nawaf E. The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. The author, a Saudi citizen who wrote this study while a visiting research fellow at WINEP, examines the formation and exercise of Saudi oil policy by examining the formal structures and key personalities involved (ruling family members, senior government officials, and oil industry executives). He discusses such fundamental factors in the kingdom’s oil strategy as the need to remain competitive in the global petroleum industry, the volatility of the international market, and the need to reduce dependence on oil income (including the privatization of state corporations). Separate chapters summarize Saudi relations with oil exporters and oil consumers. Obaid concludes that “The crown prince and the senior Saudi leadership have adopted an increasingly professional approach to policymaking and implementation. They are open to a larger role for foreign investment and towards structural economic reform. They are also taking a more assertive stand in regional and international politics. In short, Saudi policy is becoming more professional and more assertive.” (p. xx)

1807. ________. “In Al-Saud We Trust.” Foreign Policy, No. 128 (January-February 2002), pp. 72-74. In a short opinion piece, a former fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy compares the legitimacy of the Al Sa’ud to the late Shah of Iran and concludes that the parallels drawn between the 1979 revolution in Iran and Saudi Arabia’s present difficulties “gloss over a wealth of critical differences.” (p. 72)

“The 1979 attack on the Haram has so far been an isolated incident when seen in the context of the centuries-long Saudi synthesis of religion and politics.”


1810. Paul, Jim. “Insurrection at Mecca.” *MERIP Reports*, No. 91 (October 1980), pp. 3-4. A recap of the incident at the Great Mosque of Mecca in November 1979, when the mosque was seized by the followers of a self-proclaimed *mahdi*. While Saudi Arabia’s religious leaders sanctioned government intervention to regain control of the mosque, expelling the dissidents took several weeks to accomplish. Paul points out that the incident demonstrated how ill-prepared the government was to deal with crises of this sort and suggests that the ruling family has less and less room for maneuvering between disaffected traditional elements and emerging modernist forces.


1812. Peterson, J.E. *Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002. Adelphi Papers, No. 348. Published in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, this study examines Saudi conceptions of national security, internal dimensions of Saudi security, and the impact of 11 September on the kingdom. The study concludes that “In the short to medium term, it is in the interests of both sides to repair and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship, even if it should mean significant loosening of the bonds and at least some Saudi acquiescence in an American policy of containment. Over the long-term, however, Saudi interests may be best served by nurturing a more indigenous conception and practice of Gulf security, one which rests on inclusion and not exclusion.” (p. 83)

1813. ________. “Saudi Arabia at the Threshold.” In David Partington, ed., *The Middle East Annual: Issues and Events, Vol. 4 – 1984* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1985), pp. 53-82. A survey of the domestic determinants of Saudi policy-making and an overview of the nature of the Saudi-American relationship. The article also examines the impact of development and external factors in Saudi foreign-policy perspectives. As for the future of US-Saudi relations, “It seems extremely unlikely that the fundamental nature of the relationship between the two countries will be altered in the near future, although minor differences and even adjustments toward a lesser degree of intimacy may be forthcoming.” (p. 77)

the real possibility that the 60-year American-Saudi alliance (the kingdom’s closest bond outside the Arab world) will be jeopardised.” (p. 112)

1815. Piscatori, James P. “The Roles of Islam in Saudi Arabia’s Political Development.” In John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980), pp. 123-138. The author, a senior fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at the time of writing, explains the role of Islam in molding the institutions of the Saudi state. He also notes that Islam affects policymaking both as a determinant and a constraint. The government has also been able to utilize Islam as a framework for facilitating change and to lend legitimacy to the régime. Piscatori indicates that the Saudi leadership will continue to adhere to a cautious modernization policy and will likely be reluctant to pursue development objectives at the expense of traditional Islamic values. See also Piscatori’s articles, “Ideological Politics in Saudi Arabia,” in Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), pp. 56-72; and “Islamic Values and National Interest: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,” in Aided Dawisha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 33-53.


1817. ________. “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education.” *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 77-89. The author, with the Asian Development Bank, looks at the charges that Saudi Arabia’s educational system propagates anti-Western bias and encourages Islamic extremism. She notes that resistance to reforming the system is likely to be strong but observes that “resistance to curriculum change should not be regarded as necessarily negative. It may provide a starting point for a dialogue among various stakeholders that will be important not only in respect of curriculum development but also for the emergence and involvement of a more active civil society.” (p. 89)

1818. Quandt, William B. *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981. A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former National Security Council staff member looks at significant factors in the formulation of Saudi foreign policy with an emphasis on implications for US policy. Among the external factors he considers are the Arab world and the Palestinians, the Islamic world, and the superpower rivalry. He also describes the Saudi structure of authority, assesses the impact of pressures for change, analyzes recent key foreign policy situations, and explains Saudi oil policy. Quandt ends by suggesting some guidelines for US policy such as the development of a more realistic understanding of the scope of Saudi regional influence and maintaining a modest US military presence in the area. As he points out, “The future of Saudi Arabia depends in large measure on its relationship with the United States.... Few foreign policy matters deserve higher priority in Washington....”
1819. ________. “Riyadh Between the Superpowers.” Foreign Policy, No. 44 (1981), pp. 37-56. ●● A senior fellow at the Brookings Institution surveys the logic of and problems involved in the US-Saudi relationship. He notes that American hesitation over the sale of AWACS aircraft and the lack of progress on the Arab-Israeli front increases the temptation for the Saudis to open a dialogue with the Soviet Union. Riyadh is said to be worried by what it sees as Washington’s inability to transform its military might into political influence, yet for many reasons Riyadh is loathe to sever the security link with the US. Quandt warns that the US should not view Saudi Arabia as Iran’s replacement as a regional power, and suggests that the US military presence there should be kept modest and arms sales policies should be better thought out. ♤

1820. Quilliam, Neil, and Maggie Kamel. “Modernising Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 26-65. ●● According to the authors, the state in Saudi Arabia has suffered from a deficit of legitimacy since the attacks of 11 September 2001. They contend that the state’s strategy of “Islamicization” of society has produced a generation of radicalized Islamists committed to overthrowing the state and when these radicals return to Saudi Arabia, the state will need to deploy new strategies to counter their challenges.

1821. Raphaeli, Nimrod. “Saudi Arabia: A Brief Guide to its Politics and Problems.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003), distributed electronically. ●● A former World Bank employee and present analyst for the Middle Media Research Institute uses published statistical reports and translations of Saudi newspapers to summarize the kingdom’s economic difficulties problems and to outline the role of the royal family in government and commerce. The article includes genealogical charts.

1822. Rasheed, Madawi Al-. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ●● A senior lecturer in social anthropology at King’s College of the University of London discusses the modern history of Saudi Arabia. She begins with chapters on the 18th- and 19th-century periods of Al Sa’ud expansion from the central Najd region to other areas of the Arabian Peninsula, but the greatest part of the book is devoted to the 20th century, tracing the impact of oil income through the reigns of four kings. The penultimate chapter focuses on the Kuwait War and the reform petitions and opposition that the war and its aftermath posed to the Al Sa’ud and the country. A final chapter is concerned with the official historiography of the state and narratives of history. The author concludes that reforms made after the war failed to silence the Islamist opposition. Instead, “Political unrest in the 1990s proved that an organised Islamist opposition was capable of threatening stability. Although today the Islamist opposition seems to be diffused, the conditions that contributed to its rise and intensification remain embedded in Sa’udi society.” (p. 222)

1823. ________. “God, the King and the Nation: Political Rhetoric in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 360-371. ●● A lecturer in social
anthropology at King’s College of the University of London provides an ethnographic reading of the speech by King Fahd in 1992 introducing basic reforms, and notes that “While the reforms are considered major innovations, political rhetoric confirms that they are in line with the established tradition of the country.” (p. 359) She points out that King Fahd not only introduced the reforms but placed them in an ideological context focusing on “how God establishes and governs the political process, how the king enacts his holy mission, and how the nation is required to accept and follow the guidance of God and the king.” (p. 365)

1824. ________. “The Shi’a of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity.” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May 1998), pp. 121-138. ●● The author traces the transformation of Shi’ah resistance to Saudi authority from military confrontation in the 1980s to a search for cultural authenticity in the 1990s. The author observes that “The exiled Shi’a leadership moved from total rejection of the régime during the time when the movement was ‘revolutionary’ (i.e. immediately after the events of the early 1980s) – to a call for dialogue with the state. In the 1990s, the leadership has called for gradual change and reform rather than revolution.” (p. 136) The state’s response has been to engage in dialogue, which has enabled it to turn full attention to the rising Wahhabi opposition.

1825. ________, and Loulouwa al-Rasheed. “The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy Towards Tribal and Religious Opposition.” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 96-119. ●● An examination of how the Saudi state’s strategies toward Shammar tribal opposition in the early part of the 20th century and toward Shi’ah opposition over the last several decades differed. In the first instance, “the state used a combination of overt confrontation and covert economic dependency in encapsulating Shammar opposition” (p. 115) while the state justifies its treatment of the Shi’ah on religious grounds. According to the authors, “In the absence of modern means for political participation and the expression of political opposition, the Saudi state is constrained by its political culture [which] defines the parameters of state actions.” (p. 116)

1826. Rathmell, Andrew, and Mustafa Alani. “Saudi Arabia: The Threat from Within.” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Special Report No. 12 (1996). ●● The deputy director of and a consultant to to the International Centre for Security Analysis at King’s College, University of London, analyze the impact of the Western presence in the kingdom, the need for reform, and the emergence of Islamic opposition. The authors conclude that “The lack of dynamic Royal leadership means that [the reformulation of the political and economic compact underpinning the Saudi system is] unlikely to be addressed in an imaginative and far-sighted manner anytime soon.” (p. 22)

the administrative system consists of five major organizations (the king and the royal bureaus; the council of ministers; the ministries and independent agencies; the judiciary; and local administration) and briefly discusses each. Al-Rawaf concludes by asserting that Saudi Arabia has reached a stage in which new methods of communication and participation are necessary for development and progress but, apart from a brief mention of official decrees in this regard, he does not explain what changes are necessary.

1828. Rouleau, Eric. “Trouble in the Kingdom.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July-August 2002), pp. 75-89. The former French ambassador to Tunisia and Turkey discusses domestic developments in Saudi Arabia and comments on such growing problems as a soaring population growth rate, rising unemployment and falling per capita incomes, as well as a perceived struggle between the royal family and an Islamic opposition, with reformists in disarray. “The fundamental truth ... remains that radical change would spell the end of the Al Saud family’s absolute power and the privileges.... This is the real source of the government’s conservatism....” (p. 89)

1829. Rustow, Dankwart A. “U.S.-Saudi Relations and the Oil Crises of the 1980s.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (April 1977), pp. 494-516. The author, a professor of political science at the City University of New York, examines the economic interests of OPEC countries, with emphasis on Saudi Arabia. He argues that the determinants of Saudi oil policy are price moderation, prevention of a price break within OPEC, and prevention of excessive price rises. He also views Saudi oil policy as a function of regional political conditions and the Saudi leadership’s desire to bring political pressure to bear on the formulation of US foreign policy in Middle East. “In sum, Saudi Arabia’s dominant position in global oil trade and vast financial surpluses have given it unprecedented economic leverage over other OPEC members and in inter-Arab councils-as well as the hope of corresponding political leverage on the United States and Israel.” In conclusion, Rustow argues that US policy should give priority to reducing dependence on Arab oil and developing domestic resources, rather than making massive arms deals and ill-considered military threats.

1830. Safran, Nadav. *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985. A survey of 20th-century Saudi history and security concerns by a professor of Middle Eastern studies at Harvard University. Themes that run through the book are the kingdom’s efforts to improve its defensive capabilities and its security concerns regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Yemens, and the Gulf. The author concludes that “America’s long-term aim should be to disengage its vital interests from the policy and fate of the Kingdom. Its short-term policy should be designed with an eye to achieving that goal while cooperating with the Kingdom in dealing with problems on a case-by-case basis and advancing shared interests on the basis of reciprocity.” (p. 460)

political science at the Université St. Joseph (Beirut) looks at the development of the modern Saudi state, with emphasis on the position of the royal family, the role of the armed forces, and the conduct of foreign affairs. Revised as “Political Power and the Saudi State.” In Berch Berberoglu, Power and Stability in the Middle East (London: Zed Books, 1989), pp. 70-89.


1833. Seznec, Jean-François. “Stirrings in Saudi Arabia.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 33-40. A partner of the Lafayette Group investment company discerns “protodemocratic stirrings” in Saudi Arabia. He discusses the traditional elements of power within the royal family and the limited reforms enacted in the 1990s. Further liberalization, he holds, can only occur with the encouragement or the approval of King Fahd and thus much depends on when and whether Prince ‘Abdullah officially becomes king. Until the royal family is placed on the same footing as the rest of the population and an independent judiciary takes root, “the state will remain imperious. And this will not happen through any pressure from below: Equality under the law can be imposed on the family and the judiciary only by a strong and well-respected king. Paradoxically, an authoritarian ruler of stature will be needed to establish the institutional structures that can push Saudi Arabia further away from ‘closed hegemony.’” (p. 40)


1835. Shaked, Haim. “The Islamic Revolution – Is Saudi Arabia Next?” In George S. Wise and Charles Issawi, eds., Middle East Perspectives: The Next Twenty Years (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 141-146. The director of the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University maintains that the predictions of Saudi Arabia’s collapse at the time of the Iranian revolution seemed highly exaggerated. Then he contends that the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca “exposed the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Saudi Arabian regime....” As a consequence, Shaked concludes that “In
the beginning of the 1980s, Saudi Arabian stability begins to look not merely like a problem, but a highly explosive one.”

1836. Shaw, John A., and David E. Long. *Saudi Arabian Modernization: The Impact of Change on Stability*. New York: Praeger, for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982. The Washington Papers, No. 89. This study by a senior fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (Shaw) and a State Department official with considerable experience in Saudi Arabia (Long) is based on a 1979 CSIS project on Saudi Arabian modernization. The first half deals with the impact of economic change on stability and looks at the oil sector, industrialization efforts, infrastructure development, manpower problems, and business practices. The second half is concerned with the impact of a changing society on Saudi stability, focusing on the royal family, the military, technocrats, merchant families, students, “the Saudi common man,” the religious leadership, women, the Shi‘ah minority, and Saudi dissident activity. The authors’ assessment of Saudi modernization and the issues of stability is summed up in one sentence: “Although there may be cause for concern in the long term, there is little cause for despair in the short.”


1839. Tahtinen, Dale R. *National Security Challenges to Saudi Arabia*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. A tantalizingly short introduction to Saudi Arabia’s security environment, written by the assistant director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute at the time of publication. Tahtinen begins with a brief overview of possible conflicts in and around the Arabian Peninsula, followed by a sketch of Saudi military capabilities. He then assesses the probable performance of the kingdom’s forces against threats from Iraq, Iran, other states in the peninsula and Africa, and Israel. Tahtinen concludes that although “Saudi Arabia faces a number of potential national security challenges, none is of an immediate nature.” He suggests that Riyadh has had ample reason to place emphasis on military modernization over the last decade and approves of the direction these efforts have taken. He also stresses that Saudi Arabia’s importance to the US means that Washington must be closely concerned with Saudi defense requirements.

Law and the Consultative Council Law, followed by an analysis of the laws themselves. The author judges that “A textual analysis of Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law and Consultative Council Law casts doubt on their efficacy in producing a meaningful participatory government [but] a strictly textual analysis ... vastly underestimates the significance of the laws being issued at all.” (p. 274)

1841. Teitelbaum, Joshua. “Dueling for Da’wa: State vs. Society on the Saudi Internet.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 222-239. •• A senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University examines the introduction of the Internet by the Saudi Arabian government, as well as its use by Saudi dissidents in exile. He sees that the kingdom “wants to be part of the ‘new economy,’ but it also wants to keep its unique heritage insulated from what it sees will be the untoward effects of the Internet. The Internet is thus both an opportunity and a challenge.” (p. 237)

1842. Turner, Louis, and James Bedore. “Saudi Arabia: The Power of the Purse Strings.” *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 54, No. 3 (July 1978), pp. 405-420. •• The authors begin by noting that some commentators see a diffusion of power from the superpowers to “threshold” powers, i.e. regional powers which are near the threshold of full development-potentially rich and also potentially powerful. This article sets out to examine the limits on the kind of world role which Saudi Arabia can play, based on its economic advantages. Turner and Bedore, research fellow and research assistant, respectively, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at the time of publication, conclude that in economic terms Saudi Arabia is a world power but that in strategic terms it is still struggling to find an adequate regional role.  

1843. U.S. General Accounting Office. *Critical Factors Affecting Saudi Arabia’s Oil Decisions*; Report by the Comptroller General of the U.S. Washington, DC: GAO, 12 May 1978. •• This study notes that Saudi Arabia’s “capability and willingness to increase [oil] production is dependent on many complex and interrelated technical, political, security and economic factors.” While money and technical assistance should be able to solve the technical problems, difficulties remain in a shortage of skilled manpower and the importation of foreign labor. Both the US and Saudi Arabia share a concern for the internal security of the kingdom and for the containment of communist and radical ideologies in the region; however, they differ over approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The report concludes that, while Saudi Arabia is of utmost importance to the US, the US must reduce its dependency on insecure oil imports. The essence of this study remains relevant today, despite the downward trend in American consumption of foreign oil and the “oil glut” of the 1980s.  

1844. Viorst, Milton. “The Storm and the Citadel.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January-February 1996), pp. 93-107. •• A writer reports on his visit to Saudi Arabia, concentrating on the dissent that arose in the kingdom following the Kuwait War. He declares that “No Saudi I encountered expressed a belief that the dissidents ... had any immediate prospect
of triumphing over the royal family; the Sauds’ [sic] roots are too deep in the society. Some Saudis, however, expressed resentment that the United States had put no pressure on the royal family to be more attentive to human rights.” (p. 107)

1845. Wilson, Peter W., and Douglas F. Graham. *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1994. ●● Two journalists who worked in Saudi Arabia provide a basic overview of Saudi Arabia’s politics, foreign policy, security forces, economy, and social issues. They end with a critical view of the Al Sa’ud and feel that “Today, Saudi Arabia is increasingly resembling the shah’s Iran. The parallels are many: the ruling family is perceived as being corrupt and tied to the United States; foreign policy is pegged to a strong American presence in the Gulf, with indirect ties to Israel; and oil policies are not based on national considerations.” (p. 268) The authors have also written separately on the kingdom: Peter W. Wilson, *A Question of Interest: The Paralysis of Saudi Banking* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), and Douglas Graham, *Saudi Arabia Unveiled* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1991).

1846. Wright, Lawrence. “The Kingdom of Silence.” *New Yorker* (5 January 2004), accessed online. ●● A personal account of life in Saudi Arabia by a journalist hired for three months to train young reporters for the *Saudi Gazette*. The author relates his experiences on the newspaper and his impressions of Saudi life through numerous interviews and conversations.

1847. Yamani, Mai. “Children of Oil.” *World Today*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (March 2000), pp. 22-23. ●● The author, a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, argues that “We cannot know what [globalization] means for the internal and external security of [Saudi Arabia] unless we understand the thinking of those who will be the decision-makers in the 21st century” (p. 22) in this preview of her longer Chatham House study, *Changed Identities*. She then creates three composite profiles of young Saudis’ views on what they expect of their future.

1848. __________. “Middle East Prospects – Saudi Arabia: Awakening.” *World Today*, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December 2000), pp. 21-22. ●● The Palestinian uprising in late 2000 has had great impact in the Gulf where “the youth ... is beginning to share anti-American sentiments, expressed dramatically in the burning of the US flag alongside that of Israel” (p. 21). Spontaneous demonstrations erupted across Saudi Arabia’s expanse and social strata, including one by women in Jiddah. Their underlying message, Dr. Yamani says, is that the government must take account of popular feeling and act accordingly.

that “The government’s ability to control and regulate public opinion has diminished with the advent of new Arab satellite television channels and the Internet.” (p. 14)

1850. ________. “Saudi Arabia: The ‘Arab Street,’ the Media and Popular Agitation Since September 11.” Asian Affairs (London), Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2003), pp. 143-147. ●● A Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs explains the formation of popular attitudes in the kingdom and the role of the media in their formulation. She remarks that “Outside observers have become aware of [the internal Saudi] stresses and potentially dangerous popular disillusionment and dissent, provoking a wave of speculation about Saudi society. Nevertheless, the Saudi state is still struggling to sustain its preferred version of the national story.” (p. 147)

Kuwait


1852. Assiri, Abdul-Reda. “Kuwait’s Political Survival in the 1980s and Beyond: Small-Nation Response to Regional Pressure.” American-Arab Affairs, No. 30 (Fall 1989), pp. 27-35. ●● A professor at Kuwait University looks at Kuwait’s responses to the threats posed to its security by the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. He contends that these events “functioned as catalysts for radical and revolutionary changes in the domestic and foreign policies of Kuwait.” (p. 34) Assiri recommends that “A combination of internal power, regional support, and external help could contribute to Kuwait’s domestic well-being, political stability, and military security.” (p. 35)

1853. Crystal, Jill. Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Westview Profiles/Nations of the Contemporary Middle East. ●● An assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan provides an introduction to Kuwait, beginning with its history, oil economy, and social composition. Other chapters explain political institutions and processes, the country’s foreign policy, and the Iraqi occupation, liberation, and reconstruction. She observes that “The immediate impact of the occupation and war was to sharpen both the democratic and authoritarian impulses in Kuwait. ... The long-term effect will either be the introduction of an authoritarian system unlike any Kuwait has seen before, as the opposition fears, or a real broadening of political power, as the opposition hopes.” (p. 177)

He argues that “Kuwait needs structural reforms that emphasize long-term development, not short-term welfare” (p. 23) and advocates a vigorous privatization strategy.

1855. Ghabra, Shafeeq. “Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1994), pp. 102-119. •• A political scientist at Kuwait University examines the issues in the 1992 elections to Kuwait’s National Assembly (the first since the suspension of the body in 1986 and the war in 1991), the election campaign, and the results. “The new government’s formation and the existence of a strong parliament dominated by the Islamists, shifted the balance of power in Kuwait to the hands of the parliament. For the first time in the history of Kuwait, government ministers can vote in parliament against a government-backed policy should they feel the need to do so.” (p. 115) Still, he remains cautious in judging whether “the Kuwaiti experiment in democratization will be an on-going process or an isolated temporary experience with freedom....” (p. 119)


1857. •••. “10 Years After: Embracing Reform in Kuwait.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (June-July 2001), pp. 23-26. •• The Director of the Kuwait Information Office in Washington discusses the process of an “evolving democratic process” in Kuwait and the country’s National Assembly. He concludes that the Kuwait War “created the conditions for a more dynamic application of democratic principles … and a momentum for reform has developed.” (p. 26)

1858. Ismael, Jacqueline S. *Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982. •• An associate professor of social welfare at the University of Calgary examines the process of social and economic change in Kuwait through the framework of dependency theory. The first part is concerned with pre-oil Kuwait, looking at the tribal origins of the present state, the emerging British predominance over Kuwait, and the underdevelopment of the country in the twentieth century. The elements of post-oil Kuwait examined by the author include the continued dependency of Kuwait within the international system, the internal economic and demographic transformation of the country, and “social change and social control in the welfare state.” • A new edition, *Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), was updated to include a chapter on the war and developments through the Kuwaiti elections of 1992.

political contract; the other threatens political instability and violence. Unfortunately, no one can be certain which path will be chosen.” (p. 55)

1860. Hicks, Neil, and Ghanim al-Najjar. “The Utility of Tradition: Civil Society in Kuwait.” In Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol. I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 186-213. •• The authors observe that “Civil and personal liberties [in Kuwait] have waxed and waned, partly as a function of the government’s perception of its need to garner support from different elements within Kuwaiti society.” (p. 188) They also observe that “The immediate [Kuwait] post-war period saw the emergence of a number of completely autonomous voluntary organizations with their roots in the network of self-help and resistance movements that had emerged under occupation.” (p. 188) But as the government restored its control, this provoked confrontation. “Attempts by the government to stifle the urge for participation in government have not succeeded for sustained periods of time, and have often resulted in conflict.” (p. 213) Still, institutions such as the diwaniyah (semi-public meeting in a private home) have provided Kuwaitis with a remarkably stable government over time.

1861. Human Rights Watch / Middle East. *The Bedoons of Kuwait: “Citizens without Citizenship”*. New York, August 1995. •• A report on the origins, status of citizenship, and treatment before and after the Kuwait War of Kuwait’s stateless bidun population (bidun = without). The report charges that “Kuwait is under a clear obligation to end its arbitrary policies towards the Bedoons. Bedoons must be immediately granted the right to lawful residence and be permitted to travel and seek education and employment without discrimination.” (p. 4)


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1864. Rumaihi, Mohammad Al. “Kuwait: Oasis of Liberalism?” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 31-35. •• Katzman, a US Congressional Research Service analyst discusses the elected National Assembly and Municipal Council in Kuwait and notes US pressure for democratization in the amirate. In the end, however, he judges that “further reform seems inevitable in Kuwait, with or without U.S. pressure. U.S. democratization efforts are probably most needed in Saudi Arabia, where reform is slowest.” (p. 29) Rumaihi, the Kuwaiti editor of al-‘Arabi, continues the discussion of Kuwaiti democracy, with emphasis on the 1992 National Assembly elections, and says that “It’s critical that democracy not fragment Kuwaiti society along tribal, sectarian, and religious lines.” (p. 34)
1865. Najjar, Ghanim al-. “Human Rights in a Crisis Situation.” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 188-209. ●● A professor of political science at Kuwait University examines human rights problems before the invasion (particularly those concerning the *bidun*, stateless residents of Kuwait), during the occupation, and after liberation. He determines that after the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait “many golden opportunities to make structural improvements in human rights practices were missed because of the indifference of both the Kuwaiti and the US governments.” (p. 189)


1867. Pasha, A.K. “Kuwait’s Quest for Security.” *India Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (October-December 1993), pp. 1-16. ●● An assistant professor at Jawarhalal Nehru University sketches Kuwait’s relations with Iraq and changes in its foreign-policy outlook as a result of the invasion. The resultant Kuwaiti alignment with the West, the author claims, “has neutralized the Iraqi threat in the near future, even though it has been sharply attacked as irrational, unwise, suicidal and fraught with dangerous implications for the very existence of Kuwait.” (p. 14)


1869. Sadowski, James Yahya. “Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Kuwait.” *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1997), pp. 57-71. ●● In the transcript of a speech given at MIT, a fellow at the Brookings Institution contrasts the two approaches to democracy in the Middle East – that cultural values and institutions make it impossible and that democratization is inevitable – and concludes that “If there is a potential for democracy in the Middle East ..., it will come about through these sorts of strange deals that are being struck by people the West has never heard of, working with structural reform issues of the type that defeat the U.S. government’s pictures of how reform is supposed to happen. It will come out of small countries like Kuwait or Yemen that aren’t making it onto the U.S. evening news.” (pp. 70-71)

A fellow at the Brookings Institution describes Kuwait’s financial crisis after the Iraqi invasion and costs of paying its liberation, as well as rebuilding its armed forces. He charges that none of the three dominant political blocs in Kuwait (the Al Sabah, the Islamists, and Kuwait’s leftists) “has yet to show any real leadership in dealing with this economic adjustment crisis.” (p. 8)

Sfeir, Antoine. “La contestation au Koweit.” Les Cahiers de l’Orient, Nos. 25-26 (1992), pp. 107-127. An examination of political expression and opposition in Kuwait and the impact of the Iraqi invasion, together with an evaluation of how the pre-war system was put back together after liberation. The author states that “six months after its liberation, no problem in Kuwait is solved; on the contrary, they have been accentuated.” (p. 107) The article discusses political trends, including the role of the diwaniyahs, the media, and associations, as well as both secular and Islamic opposition groups.


Tétreault, Mary Ann. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Most of this work deals with the internal political structure of Kuwait and analysis of the National Assembly elections of 1992, 1996, and 1999. However, one chapter deals with the Iraqi occupation and how various groups of Kuwaitis dealt with it. It is the author’s contention that “liberation did not reveal a ‘new Kuwait.’ The preinvasion struggle between Kuwaitis and their government over whether, how much, and in what direction to revise the social contract governing state-society relations simply resumed, but with an additional vocabulary and a new set of contending myths for each side to bring to bear on the other. (p. 10)

“Kuwait's Democratic Reform Movement.” Middle East Executive Report, Vol. 13, No. 10 (October 1990), pp. 9, 16-19. The author describes the principal issues in Kuwaiti politics and the role of the opposition and use of diwaniyahs to oppose the government. She contends that Saddam Husayn was mistaken in his belief “that some Kuwaitis, particularly the Arab nationalists, would welcome or at least tolerate Iraq’s intervention.” (p. 9) Instead, nationalist feeling has been intensified by the occupation.

“Kuwait: The Morning After.” Current History, Vol. 91, No. 561 (1992), pp. 6-10. A professor of political science at Old Dominion University observes that the expulsion of Iraqi forces left Kuwaitis with the destruction of the best of their old lives – the beauty of the desert, the seafront developments, and the oil industry which fueled the country – while leaving the worst – the insecurity and the autocracy of the régime – intact. She judges that “The future shape of Kuwaiti society will depend on a strong commitment to democratization and human rights....” (p. 10)
1876. ________. “Designer Democracy in Kuwait.” *Current History*, Vol. 96, No. 606 (January 1997), pp. 36-39. ●● The author assesses the impact of the 1992-1996 National Assembly. She gauges that its vilification “as a do-nothing parliament is unfair: it investigated, it legislated – and it fulminated – with vigor. However, its legislative record was certainly mixed, and its behavior aggravated the nation’s rulers and most of the Kuwaiti people more than once during its four-year tenure. It is not clear that the body replacing it will be all that different.” (p. 36)

1877. ________. “Kuwait’s Unhappy Anniversary.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (June 2000), pp. 67-77. ●● A professor of government at Trinity University looks at developments in Kuwait during the decade after Iraq’s invasion, including national security issues, reconstruction, domestic politics, and oil policy. She reports that “Domestically, tensions among social groups and between the government and the opposition interfere with the building of consensus on policies to increase Kuwait’s security. Policy drifts in a kind of limbo while decisions remain unmade.” (p. 77)

1878. ________. “Pleasant Dreams: The WTO as Kuwait’s Holy Grail.” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 75–93. ●● A professor of international relations at Trinity University (San Antonio, Texas) explains privatization in Kuwait as a struggle by pro-democracy proponents to open the régime and neo-liberals to open the economy in the face of opposition from the régime, the Islamists, and the tribalists. The author believes that these two movements have adopted the World Trade Organization as their “holy grail” because “The WTO is seen as the most readily available vehicle for imposing standards of accountability on the state.” (p. 91)


1880. Timmerman, Kenneth R. “The Gulf Monarchies: Kuwait’s Real Elections.” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 53-58. ●● The director of Middle East Data Project, a consulting firm, looks at the 1996 National Assembly elections in Kuwait. He believes that “Both the ruling family and prominent members of the new parliament are eager to work with the United States to understand better the changes taking place in side the region and to craft a joint strategy that contains the threats posed by Iran and Iraq....” (p. 58)

1881. Viorst, Milton. “Out of the Desert.” *New Yorker* (16 May 1988), pp. 65ff. ●● A view of Kuwait after its government called upon the US to escort its oil tankers through the Gulf to protect them from Iranian attacks. The author relates his interviews with a cross-section of Kuwaitis that concentrate on social and political problems emerging during the country’s evolution in the oil era.
1882. Yahya, Mohammed Abdulrahman al-. *Kuwait: Fall and Rebirth.* London: Kegan Paul International, 1993. ●● An examination of the two major shocks to Kuwait’s economy in the past two decades: the collapse of the unofficial Suq al-Manakh stock market in 1982 and the Iraqi invasion and war in 1990-1991, compounded by falling oil prices and the impact of the Iran-Iraq War. In discussing the economic impact and costs of reconstruction, the author notes that rebuilding the country and clearing bad debts might reduce the $100 billion in the country’s foreign assets to less than $40 billion. “Many economists are now arguing that the country is spending an inordinate amount on bad debts, weapons and costly contracts without first establishing a set of priorities, and is giving excessive grants to people, putting an added strain on the country’s exchequer.” (p. 127)

1883. Yetiv, Steve A. “Kuwait: In Iraq’s Shadow.” *Current History*, Vol. 98, No. 625 (February 1999), pp. 69-71. ●● A professor of political science at Old Dominion University takes another look at the situation in Kuwait since 1990 and observes that Kuwaitis “still face the unresolved problem of the ‘gangster’ to the north. No one can predict Saddam Hussein’s future. And until that future is known, the Iraqi dictator will cast a shadow over Kuwait’s search for a new identity.” (p. 71)

1884. ________. “Kuwait’s Democratic Experiment in Its Broader International Context.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 257-271. ●● An associate professor of political science at Old Dominion University contends that Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait “increased the importance of assuring US military support [for Kuwait], engaging in nation-building, and enhancing domestic stability” and “democratic practices were viewed as useful in meeting those three objectives. In this sense, the crisis produced an attitudinal change and an increased commitment toward democratic practices.” (p. 258)

Bahrain


1887. Bahry, Louay. “The Opposition in Bahrain: A Bellwether for the Gulf?” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1997), pp. 42-57. ●● An adjunct professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville places the 1990s political unrest in Bahrain in historical context and the emergence of the Shi’ah opposition movement. He notes that the government response has not stopped the unrest and points to the importance of what happens in Bahrain for its neighbors and the United States. In conclusion, “While the
Bahrain government assures the outside world that it is confronting a group of ‘saboteurs’ and ‘terrorists,’ the facts indicate that it is facing a large-scale popular movement with a high degree of organization.” (p. 56)

1888. __________. “The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain.” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 129-143. An adjunct professor of political science at the University of Tennessee examines the background to the 1994-1999 dissident movement in Bahrain, explaining how the focus of opposition shifted over the years from secular groups to Shi‘ah activism. He looks at Shi‘ah community organization and the grievances that spurred the dissidence. He notes that the tense situation may change with accession of the new ruler. Some of his suggestions on how to improve the situation, such as scrapping the State Security Law and Court and strengthening the move towards democratic institutions, have subsequently taken place.

1889. Dazi-Héni, Fatiha. “Vers un modèle rénové de la monarchie arabe du golfe Persique: Etude de cas à Bahreïn.” Monde Arabe - Maghreb Machrek, No. 173 (July-September 2001), pp. 52-59. The author, of the Institut d’études politiques (Paris), suggests that Bahrain’s new politics may serve as a model for its neighboring monarchies to follow and that the conciliatory attitude of Saudi Arabia towards the changes is a positive sign.

1890. Human Rights Watch / Middle East. Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain. Washington, June 1997. A survey of the 1990s civil unrest in Bahrain with a detailed accounting of human rights violations, as well as policy recommendations for the governments of Bahrain, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The report notes that “The government of Bahrain’s dismissal of the country’s political unrest as Iranian-sponsored ‘terrorism’ has enjoyed the public support of Arab states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia.” (p. 4)


1892. Khuri, Fuad I. Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, No. 14. A study of rapid social change and the bases of political authority in one of the smaller states of the Gulf. The author, professor of social anthropology at the American University of Beirut, focuses on two general themes: “the changing authority system vis-à-vis colonial rule and socioeconomic transformations, and the impact of these forces on the processes of interaction between tribe, peasantry, and urban society.” Khuri first looks at the role of two older institutions, the tribal councils and the religious courts, before analyzing the impact of first the British presence and then oil on bureaucracy and socioeconomic transformation of the country. Two more recent “parapolitical” institutions he examines are the Shi‘i “funeral house” and
the club. The study is rounded out by chapters on organized protests and rebellions and on the short-lived national assembly.

1893. Lawson, Fred H. *Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Westview Profiles/Nations of the Contemporary Middle East. An assistant professor of government at Mills College surveys contemporary Bahrain, focusing on geography and society, the country’s role in the British imperial order, the nationalist movements of the 1950s, politics, economics, and foreign affairs. He sees that because of the Iran-Iraq War “Manama has increasingly been pulled into the orbit of Riyadh when it comes to defense and security matters,” (p. 134) a trend reinforced by the organization of the GCC with Saudi responsibility for military affairs.

1894. ________. “Labor Politics, Economic Change, and the Modernization of Autocracy in Contemporary Bahrain.” In Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds., *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 115-133. An assistant professor of government at Mills College judges that three fundamental dynamics drive Bahraini politics – administrative expansion, the country’s industrial and economic development, and labor movement activity – and proceeds to describe each before analyzing Bahrain’s political economy. The author contends that “Bahrain’s shift from industry- to finance-based development ... was a consequence of several simultaneous conflicts within Bahraini society during the mid-1970s” (p. 132) and that “an adequate explanation for political change in Bahrain will have to concern itself with other forces besides government officials, captains of industry and finance, and industrial workers.” (p. 133)

1895. Louër, Laurence. “Les aléas du compromis des élites au Bahrein.” *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 177 (Autumn 2003), pp. 59-78. A researcher at CERI-Sciences Po in Paris examines political developments in Bahrain since 1999 and ascertains the forging of a compromise between the régime and the “effendis” or leading opposition figures, most of whom were previously in exile, for a process of democratization. Although the largest opposition groups, dominated by the Shi’ah, boycotted the October 2002 parliamentary elections, the “effendis” continue to hold a tight grip over their constituencies despite the restlessness of the youth who were in the forefront of the 1994-1998 “intifadah.”

1896. Mdaires, Falah al-. “Shi’ism and Political Protest in Bahrain.” *DOMES: Digest of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 20-44. The author, of Kuwait University, contends that “Since the beginning of this century [sic], Shi’a suffered from the policy adopted by the ruling family in Bahrain with the help of the British who believed in the ‘divide and rule’ policy. The ruling family inflamed sectarianism among the citizens by putting itself in the position of defending Sunni, while the British put themselves in the position of defending Shi’a.” (p. 37) He notes that revolution in Iran and the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the influence of Marxist and nationalist opposition in Bahrain and strengthened the role of Shi’a religious groups. Although the Shi’a were prominent in the
unrest of the 1990s, “all political forces were behind raising common slogans such as
restoring democracy, abandoning the state security law, improving the social and
economical status, and respecting human rights in Bahrain.” (p. 38)

1897. Nakhleh, Emile A. *Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society*. Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath, 1976. •• A political scientist at Mount St. Mary’s
College examines political development in Bahrain, developing his model of urban
tribalism. Nakhleh focuses on a number of factors bearing on Bahrain’s development,
including education, the role of the clubs and the press, labor, and foreign policy. The final
two chapters detail the origins of the constitutional assembly and the first national election
to this assembly. An epilogue notes that the assembly, suspended less than two years later,
has still not be reconstituted. ✡

1898. Peterson, J.E. “Bahrain’s First Steps Towards Reform Under Amir Hamad.” *Asian Affairs*
of the 1990s unrest in Bahrain by the accession of the new amir in 1999 and his release of
political prisoners, welcoming of the return of exiles, promulgation of a National Charter,
and the promise of elections. “It could be argued that Shaykh Hamad needs time to exert
his full authority over his state. ... The first phase of Shaykh Hamad’s strategy necessarily
has to be defusing the conditions of the unrest and gaining the trust of his people, thus
creating personal legitimacy. Only once this has been secured can he enjoy the requisite
strength to take over the full reins of government.” (p. 225)

(June-July 2001), pp. 35-36, 71. •• A former US ambassador to Bahrain assesses the
“remarkable political turnaround” after the accession of Shaykh Hamad bin ‘Isa Al
Khalifah as Amir in 1999. While noting the possibility of a backfire, Ransom notes that
“something remarkable is happening” in Bahrain and concludes that “In the grim politics
of the region, Bahrain is suddenly a bright spot of hope.” (p. 71)

1900. Sakr, Naomi. “Reflections on the Manama Spring: Research Questions Arising from the
Promise of Political Liberalization in Bahrain.” *British Journal of Middle East Studies*,
Vol. 28, No. 2 (November 2001), pp. 229-231. •• A brief review of recent events that
suggests that past experience, combined with reform experience elsewhere in the region,
will “shed light on the relative levels of stability and instability likely to result from the
push for greater political freedom in Bahrain.” (p. 231)

pp. 33-35. •• The advocacy director at Human Rights Watch / Middle East Watch
provides a brief summary of the course of the 1990s civil unrest in Bahrain. He charges
that “Opposition spokespersons abroad, up to now, have failed to speak out clearly against
attacks on foreign workers” and “The ruling family, with its hold on power and purse still
intact, is all to content with this situation, as it purchases its survival with policies of exclusion and discrimination that are poisoning Bahraini society.” (p. 35)

Qatar

1902. Bahry, Louay. “Elections in Qatar: A Window of Democracy Opens in the Gulf.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (June 1999), pp. 118-127. ●● An adjunct professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville observes that “The emir’s decision to establish a parliament elected by all Qataris, men and women on an equal basis without any restrictions, is probably the single most important event in the history of the country since its independence in 1971.” (p. 119) He pays particular attention to the rights of Qatari women and the amir’s announcement of the abolition of censorship, and compares Qatar’s impact on Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

1903. ________. “The New Arab Media Phenomenon: Qatar’s Al-Jazeera.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 88-99. ●● An adjunct professor at the University of Tennessee discusses the emergence of Qatar’s controversial satellite television channel “Jazeera” (al-Jazirah) as a popular medium for criticism of Arab governments, society, and much else. He briefly summarizes its background, programming, and finances. Bahry notes the impact the station has had on opening Arab politics and freedom of the media, but also cautions that its reach is limited by being a satellite station and that its independence does not extend to criticism of the Qatari government.

1904. Rathmell, Andrew, and Kirsten Schulze. “Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of Qatar.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (October 2000), pp. 47-62. ●● The authors submit that “the emergence of a variety of pseudo-democratic structure sin the [GCC states] suggests that a causal link can be made between socio-economic change and a gradual transition from authoritarian rule towards broader political participation.” (p. 46) But they add that the causal link is much more indirect than assumed and they proceed to use Qatar as a case study “to demonstrate how a policy of political reform may be adopted for reasons that have little to do with economic necessity.” (p. 46) The Qatari reforms are held to have occurred for reasons of foreign policy and ruling family politics and the authors suggest they will have little effect unless combined with reform of state finances.


beginning with its origins and programming. The study’s principal focus, however, is on questions about the station’s objectivity, particularly American complaints that it is biased in its coverage of American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and US policy vis-à-vis Israel and the Palestinians. The author judges that “In postwar Iraq, Al-Jazeera has continued to slant its coverage against the United States, labeling Iraqi attacks against U.S. forces as ‘resistance’ to the ‘occupation.’ Although many of Al-Jazeera’s reports from Iraq are factual accounts of the latest events, reports are often followed by critical statements of local Iraqis without providing the perspective of coalition forces.” (p. 8)


A brief survey of the background to political changes in Qatar, including interviews with the Amir, Shaykh Hamad b. Khalifah, and several prominent women activists, academics, and other Qataris, as well as a trip to television station al-Jazirah.

United Arab Emirates


A graduate student at Georgetown University surveys domestic developments in the federation and the UAE’s foreign policy, especially its border disputes and relations with the United States, as well as its security policy.


A senior researcher at the Center for Research and Documentation in Abu Dhabi assesses the UAE’s experience in federation and observes that “When the UAE was set up, it was essentially a creation of the rulers, and could not have been built without them. Now the national society, by dint of being in a position quite ‘apart from’ the rest of the population, preserves and confirms those very features which make the country continue to adhere to the conditions under which the federation was created and thereby continues to legitimize its rulers’ role within the federation.” (p. 148)

1910. Kechichian, Joseph A., ed. A Century in Thirty Years: Shaykh Zayed and the United Arab Emirates. Washington, DC: Middle East Policy Council, 2000. A collection of papers from a 1999 conference, edited by the head of Kechichian Associates. An introductory chapter by Fahim bin Sultan Al Qasimi (UAE Minister of Economy and Commerce and former Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council), taken from the conference’s keynote address, focuses on Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the UAE. A section on sociopolitical issues features contributions by Hassan M. Al-Naboodah (UAE University) on social change, Fatma Al-Sayegh (UAE University) on political institutions and civil society, and the editor on sociopolitical origins of Emirati
leaders. A second section concentrates on the economy, with papers by Fatima Al-Shamsi (UAE University) on economic growth, Mary Ann Tétreault (Iowa State University) on the economics of national autonomy, and Alan Richards (University of California, Santa Cruz) on the UAE’s banking system. The following section focuses on foreign relations and defense, with papers by Hassan H. Al-Alkim (UAE University) on the UAE and subregional powers, Khalil E. Jahshan (National Association of Arab Americans) on the UAE and Palestine, and F. Gregory Gause III (University of Vermont) on the UAE’s evolving relationship from Britain to the US. William A. Rugh (AMIDEAST and former US ambassador to the UAE) adds a chapter on leadership in the UAE and Sultan bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (Deputy Prime Minister of the UAE) discusses Abu Dhabi’s perception of Gulf security. The last author avers that the US-UAE relationship means “full cooperation based on mutual respect. … The UAE respects its commercial and defense agreements but must assess them within the framework of its overall Arab and regional obligations. Emiratis respect the American people, cooperate with their government, and seek their support to ensure stability in the Arab world in general and the Gulf region in particular.” (pp. 279-280)


1912. Peck, Malcolm C. The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; London: Croom Helm, 1986. Westview Profiles/Nations of the Contemporary Middle East. A programs officer at Meridian House International briefly examines the UAE’s history, society, economy, politics, and foreign policy and security concerns. He notes that the UAE’s careful stance vis-à-vis Iran and membership in the GCC has helped to protect the country against regional dangers but that uncertainties remain, especially the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. “How long and effectively the moderate Arab alignment engendered by the Iran-Iraq war to guard against the Iranian threat will last is also another source of uncertainty whose implications are far from positive.” (p. 155)

1913. Peterson, J.E. “The United Arab Emirates: Economic Vibrancy and US Interests.” Asian Affairs (London), Vol. 34, No. 2 (July 2003), pp. 137-142. The article explains that the UAE’s economy is driven by Abu Dhabi’s massive oil revenues and by Dubai’s emergence and growth as a regional entrepôt before summarizing UAE-US relations. Although relations are good, they are troubled by several gnawing concerns, especially regarding the
Palestinians and after 11 September 2001. “While the prospects are good for a continued fruitful relationship, the future warmth of the partnership is more open to question.” (p. 142)

1914. Rugh, William A. “The United Arab Emirates: What are the Sources of Its Stability?” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 14-24. ●● The president of AMIDEAST and a former US ambassador to the UAE argues that “The UAE political system is ... not as fragile as it might appear.” (p. 15) He notes as advantages, that the country enjoys immense petroleum reserves and that the president, Shaykh Zayid, is universally respected and admired. Furthermore, there are no signs of internal tension and the UAE federal system functions well. “If [the UAE’s] leaders handle their challenges well, it could survive with only modest change for some time to come.” (p. 23)

**Oman**

1915. Allen, Calvin H., and W. Lynn Rigsbee, II. *Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996*. London: Frank Cass, 2000. ●● An examination of Omani development and politics during the reign of Sultan Qabus b. Sa'id, focusing on the historical background, the Dhufar War and military expansion, industrial and human resource development, and foreign policy. In a final chapter assessing the impact of Sultan Qabus, the authors express reservations that the sultanate can continue on the same path, observing that “Omani oil revenues have steadily decreased through the late 1990s and that trend promises to continue into the new millennium. The sultanate simply does not have the resources to go the rentier route.” (p. 226)

1916. Bahgat, Gawdat. “Security in the Gulf: The View From Oman.” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1999), pp. 445-458. ●● A political scientist at the Indiana University of Pennsylvania looks at Oman’s security issues over the twentieth century and describes the sultanate’s relations with Iraq and Iran. He ends with an assessment of the role played by Sultan Qabus in his country’s development and the unanswered question of succession: “Although the Sultanate has already taken significant steps toward the institutionalization of the political process, there remains a long way to go.” (p. 456)


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1920. __________, and M.G. Dennison. “Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-28. ●● A pair of articles by a professor of anthropology and a former head of Omani intelligence discuss the development of the intelligence service in Oman, beginning in the late 1950s, and the process by which British officers were replaced by Omanis.

1921. Eickelman, Dale F. “National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Oman.” *International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1989), pp. 1-20. ●● A professor of anthropology at Dartmouth College discusses the changes in how Omanis practice and discuss religion, noting in particular the shift in the post of mufti from a traditional Ibadi scholar to a more “modernist” figure, the politicization of elements of the Shi’ah community, and the impact of Islamic publications and videotapes on perceptions of religion. He concludes that “religious expression [is] contoured, but not fully controlled, by the state and the opportunities created by the state.” (p. 17)

1922. Haj, Abdullah Juma al-. “The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 559-571. ●● An associate professor of political science at the United Arab Emirates University examines the establishment of Oman’s Majlis al-Shura and how it differs from its predecessor, the State Consultative Council. The author sees that it “has proven to be a stabilizing institution

1923. Klass, Daniel P. “Oman’s Democratization.” *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (June-July 2001), pp. 27-29, 71. ●● The author lauds Sultan Qabus for introducing Oman’s “gentle beginnings toward a more democratic system” and concludes that “there is every reason to believe that” the process will continue throughout the Sultan’s reign. (p. 71)


(Geyer), the social transformation evident in a new generation (Eickelman), and the Omani economy (Page).

1926. Peterson, J.E. *Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State*. London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1978. This study of political change in the Sultanate of Oman over the course of the twentieth century is divided into two parts. The first examines central themes in Omani politics, including the role of the sultans and the ruling family, the development of the administration, tribal politics, and external (primarily British) influences on Omani politics. The second part looks at challenges to the continued survival of the Sultanate, including the revival of the Ibadi imamate of the interior and its denouement during the 1950s rebellion, and the rebellion in Dhufar. The final chapter discusses the coup d'état of 1970 which brought Sultan Qabus to power and marked the new beginning in the socioeconomic transformation of the century.

1927. Pridham, B.R., ed. *Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Developments*. London: Croom Helm, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1987. Papers from a University of Exeter symposium, held in July 1985. Contributions include J.E. Peterson on Oman’s transformation from an imamate to a sultanate, Fredrik Barth (University of Oslo) on geography and tribalism, Dale F. Eickelman (New York University) on Ibadism, Miranda Morris (University of St. Andrews) on the uniqueness of the southern region of Dhufar, Jenny Balfour-Paul (Exeter) on indigo use, R.W. Dutton (Durham University) on agriculture and rural enterprises, H. Bowen-Jones (Durham University) on geography, John Whelan (Middle East Economic Digest) on development strategy, J.S. Birks (University of Exeter) and C.A. Sinclair (World Bank consultant) on education and human resource development, Francis Hughes (formerly with Petroleum Development Oman) on the development of oil, John Duke Anthony (National Council on US-Arab Relations) on Oman’s relations with the Gulf and the United States, Riad N. El-Rayyes (journalist) on Oman’s foreign policy in the region and the GCC, and Anthony H. Cordesman (Analytical Assessment) on regional security options in the Gulf for the West and the GCC.


1929. Skeet, Ian. *Oman: Politics and Development*. London: Macmillan, 1992. A consultant and former Shell International official in Oman divides his account of recent change in Oman into two parts. In the first, he provides snapshots of the country in 1990, a bookend and contrast to his earlier book describing life in Muscat in the 1960s – *Muscat and Oman: The End of an Era* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974). The second part constitutes a detailed survey of developments in the accession of Sultan Qabus, the war in Dhufar, the sultanate’s external affairs especially with the United States and the GCC, its economy and
infrastructure, and society. An examination of the challenges facing the country as it heads toward the 21st century follows. He ends on an optimistic note, observing that “Oman has been lucky in many respects – geography, oil prices, expatriates, external political developments – but all this could have been thrown away if different people had been managing the country and if there had been a managing director in charge other than Sultan Qaboos.” (p. 163)


1931. Townsend, John. Oman: The Making of a Modern State. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977. The former economic advisor to the Sultan of Oman provides a penetrating look at the advances and problems that the Omani government faced half-a-decade after abandoning its almost total isolation. The first part of the book looks at the economic geography of the country, its history, and the reign of Sa’id ibn Taymur, the paternalistic predecessor and father of the current Sultan Qabus. In the main body of the book, Townsend assesses the personality of Sultan Qabus, the creation of modern political institutions, and the threat to the Sultanate from the rebellion in Dhufar and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. Townsend also provides an assessment of the Sultanate’s durability and its international environment. An appendix reprints the only policy statement former Sultan Said made during his nearly forty years in power.

1932. Valeri, Marc. “Réveil laborieux pour l’État-Qabous: Identité nationale et légitimité politique dans l’Oman d’aujourd’hui.” Maghreb-Machrek, No. 177 (Autumn 2003), pp. 37-58. A doctoral student at the Institut d’études politiques in Paris asserts that national unity in Oman has been organized around the person of Sultan Qabus. In the last few years, however, economic strains have brought frustration and a crack in the model, particularly among Omani youth who have become polarized.


The Yemens

1934. Bidwell, Robin. The Two Yemens. London: Longman; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. A political history of the Yemens from the period of the pre-Islamic kingdoms to the beginning of the 1980s. The author is Secretary Librarian of the Middle East Centre at the University of Cambridge and a former Political Officer in the Western Aden Protectorate. Bidwell suggests that the Yemens will not be reunited without a dramatic change in
circumstances, such as a revolt in South Yemen. “Unless there is such a revolt, I feel that the Yemeni problem, like all others in the Middle East will never be solved as long as superpower rivalry endures, for neither Moscow nor Washington could afford to permit a united Yemen to join a hostile bloc.”


1937. ________. “State-Building and Political Construction in the Yemen Arab Republic.” In Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds., *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 210-238. A scholar at New York University reviews the process of state-building in North Yemen during the presidencies of Abdullah al-Sallal, Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, and Ibrahim al-Hamdi. He concludes that “During his short tenure, the dynamic and charismatic al-Hamdi fostered a political environment – an ethos and set of power relationships that sustained and accelerated the prosperity and development activity begun during the al-Iryani era. ... However, like his two predecessors, al-Hamdi left to the future the task of political construction in the YAR.” (pp. 237-238)

1938. ________. “Oil Strike and Leadership Struggle in South Yemen: 1986 and Beyond.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 437-454. A visiting scholar at the University of Washington looks at the impact in 1986 of the discovery of oil in South Yemen and the near-simultaneous internecine power struggle within the régime, as well as the emerging possibility of Yemeni unification. Subsequently he notes, “the two Yemens in May 1988 used the rhetoric of, and modest steps toward, Yemeni unification to camouflage an exercise in crisis management and problem solving.” (p. 453)

1939. ________. “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 483-506. A political scientist at the University of Washington reviews political developments in the YAR (or North Yemen) from the revolution of 1962 until the culmination of long efforts to unify with South Yemen. In his view, “The foundations and some of the framing of a viable, self-standing YAR were finally and surprisingly in place in 19879 when the leaders
in San’a’ even more surprisingly chose to design and construct a larger, differently configured political edifice [and] it is likely that the past work done will help more than it will hinder” the building of the new Republic of Yemen. (p. 503)

1940. ________. “The Republic of Yemen: The Politics of Unification and Civil War, 1989-1995.” In Michael C. Hudson, ed. Middle East Dilemmas: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 187-213. •• A political scientist provides background to the unification of North and South Yemen and discusses the problems in the process (although he does not discuss the civil war). He believes that Yemeni unity will prevail but “the question is how much of the new, fragile, and not yet internalized democracy might they have to sacrifice in order to restore and maintain that unity.” (p. 210)

1941. Carapico, Sheila. Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cambridge Middle East Studies, No. 9. •• An associate professor of political science at the University of Richmond looks at political development, focusing particularly on the development of civil society, in Yemen – north, south, and unified – over the previous half century. She discerns a substantial “animated civic activism” during this period, in terms of both “primordial” and modern activism. States have adopted “civic projects” such as independent development efforts and expressions of intellectual and judicial freedom as part of their legitimizing endeavors while régimes that have suppressed civil society have not fared well. Thus, “Yemeni states, lacking major outside benefactors or domestic wealth, may be unique in the region in their need for civil society.” (p. 17)

1942. ________. “Autonomy and Secondhand Oil Dependency of the Yemen Arab Republic.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1988), pp. 193-213. •• An assistant professor of political science at the University of Richmond applies dependency theory to Yemen, noting that “paradigmatic assumptions about national and state autonomy, whether the mainstream assertion that nation-states are by definition autonomous or the dependency inference that all Third World governments lack autonomy, cannot be made.” (p. 211)

1943. ________. “Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen.” Middle East Report, Vol. 23, No. 6 (November-December 1993), pp. 2-6. •• The author looks at the Yemeni parliamentary elections of April 1993, observing that mass conferences, strikes, demonstrations, political organizations, press commentaries, academic symposia and “salons” all played a part in forcing Yemen’s leaders to follow through with free elections. But she also warns that internal political differences, profound economic crisis, and Saudi hostility puts the achievement at risk.

1944. ________. “From Ballot Box to Battlefield: The War of the Two ‘Alis.” Middle East Report, No. 190 (September-October 1994), pp. 24-27. •• An editor of Middle East Report supplies background to the 1994 Yemeni civil war. She reports that “On a popular level,
the Yemenis saw the ‘war between the two ‘Alis’ ... as recklessly squandering lives, resources, infrastructure and standards of living on crass and seemingly unwinnable power plays. Outsiders, too, saw both sides as taking unequivocal, rash positions.” (p. 26) The two ‘Ali’s refer to Yemen President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih and to Vice-President, and leader of the separatist southerners, ‘Ali Salim al-Bayd. She interprets Saudi backing for the southerners as the result of “Riyadh’s abhorrence of unity – not to speak of democratization – and its readiness to support whomever might break it up.” (p. 27)

1945. Detalle, Renaud. “Les partis politiques au Yémen: paysage après la Bataille.” *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, No. 81-82 (1996), pp. 331-348. ●● A researcher at the Centre français d’Études Yéménites in Sanaa examines the role and background of the two principal parties in unified Yemen – the General People’s Congress (formerly the predominant party of former North Yemen and now the predominant party in the Republic of Yemen) and the Yemeni Socialist Party (formerly the ruling party of South Yemen) – as well as the numerous smaller opposition parties in existence today. He sees the smaller parties as being more the instrument of rivalries between the two prominent government parties than authentic alternatives to the government parties.

1946. Dunbar, Charles. “The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects.” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 456-476. ●● A former US ambassador to Yemen discusses the background to unity, contending that the northern and southern leaders were able finally to unify Yemen because of the demise of the Soviet Union and the growing confidence of northern President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih. His evaluation of future prospects notes the serious economic dislocations caused by Saudi Arabia’s expulsion of Yemeni workers after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the country’s loss of foreign aid but he judges that these problems will be overcome: “it is hard to conceive of any set of circumstances that would produce significant pressure for north and south to separate. Even if the country’s present crisis were to destabilize the régime in Sanaa, pressures for redividing the country would be absent from the ensuing political struggle.” (p. 476)


1948. Hudson, Michael C., ed. *Focus on Yemen; Proceedings of a Conference at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1 October 1998*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1999. ●● A short monograph consisting of three papers presented at a one-day conference and updated for publication. Commentaries on the paper presentations are also included. The first paper by Sheila Carapico (University of Richmond) discusses the state of civil society in Yemen, noting that “the régime has many incentives to yield space and even resources to civil society, and can only benefit from doing so.” (p. 2) Mohammed al-Maitami (Yemeni Center for Research and Studies
and Sanaa University) examines the challenge of structural adjustment and describes Yemen’s situation as a country at war as incomes fall and more Yemenis fall into poverty. “The sharp contradiction between the fast pace of structural adjustment and the slow pace of judicial, administrative and bureaucratic reforms limits the fruits of real reforms.” (p. 13) David G. Newton (a former US ambassador to Yemen) looks at Yemen’s foreign policy and sees three regional priorities: avoiding involvement and regional conflicts and settling its borders; searching for allies as a counterweight to Saudi Arabia; seeking a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.

1949. Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. *The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen: Politics, Economics and Society, The Politics of Socialist Transformation*. London: Frances Pinter; Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986. Marxist Régimes Series. ●● A survey of South Yemen by a pair of professors at the University of Calgary, based on government documents, secondary Arabic sources, and materials produced by international organizations. The authors give attention to the ruling National Front, the organization of the government, political dynamics, the economic system, social policy, and the country’s foreign policy. The authors observe that “While the leadership transitions have been violent, the institutions of the socialist state have none the less survived and been strengthened” but the state remains hostage to “the precarious balance between domestic and foreign policy that results from the potential tensions of revolutionary commitment versus internal development....” (p. 164)

1950. Jenness, Doug. “South Yemen: What Was Behind the Bloodbath?” *Intercontinental Press* (24 February 1986), pp. 96-98. ●● A journalist describes the January 1986 fighting in Aden between factions of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party. While he contends that the outcome will not reverse the social and economic policies of the régime, “the bloodbath will further undermine the confidence of the workers and peasants in the YSP....” (p. 98)


1952. ________. “Civil Conflict in South Yemen.” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 7-13. ●● A research associate at the Smithsonian Institution’s Woodrow Wilson Center describes the background and events of January 1986, with emphasis on the Soviet role. He believes that if “the Soviets really sought the ouster of [President ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad], they probably could have brought about a quick, quiet change of régime at any time ... Instead, it appears that the Soviets were basically satisfied with [‘Ali Nasir] but that they were worried about some of his internal policies.” (p. 12) Thus, they returned his rival ‘Abd al-Fattah Isma’il to Aden as a warning.
1953. Kostiner, Joseph. *South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy, 1970-1985: From Insurgency to Bloc Politics.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1990. ●● A researcher at Tel Aviv University examines the efforts of the National Liberation Front, once in power in independent South Yemen, to export their “revolution” to Oman and the Gulf, and to North Yemen. He notes the similarity of the NLF’s “revolutionary strategy” to other proponents around the world and declares that it was successful in neutralizing immediate dangers to South Yemen from North Yemen and in generating “a regional leftist-revolutionary wave that has survived ever since in the southern Peninsula and the Gulf.” (p. 107) At the same time, South Yemen failed to topple a single régime and its efforts were crippled by economic problems at home. Finally, improving Soviet relations with the Gulf states led Moscow to abandon the use of South Yemen as an insurgent.

1954. Lawson, Fred H. “South Yemen’s Troubles.” *Orient*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1986), pp. 441-449. ●● An assistant professor of government at Mills College attempts to untangle the domestic conflicts in Aden that determined the country’s foreign relations and eventually led to the January 1986 fighting. A principal factor leading to the upheaval was the Soviet Union’s decision to send ideologue ‘Abd al-Fattah Isma’il back to Aden and the author concludes that “this action demonstrated the Soviet Union’s basic fragility of its position in Gulf and peninsular affairs.” (p. 449)


1957. Peterson, J.E. *Yemen: The Search for a Modern State.* London: Croom Helm; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. ●● A study of change and continuity in the politics of North Yemen. The composition and functioning of the pre-1962 imamate are examined first, followed by an analysis of the process of political change through the transformation of attitudes and the experience of civil war. Separate chapters outline the exercise of politics in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) of the 1970s and the struggle to build a viable state and develop the country. The book concludes with observations on the many difficulties the government faces in achieving legitimacy and fostering national cohesion and points out some of the YAR’s responses to these problems.

1958. ________. “The Yemen Arab Republic and the Politics of Balance.” *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol. 68, Pt. 3 (October 1981), pp. 254-266. ●● This article outlines the balancing act that must be followed by any North Yemeni leader. Internally, a fragile balance must be kept
among a wide range of competing political factions. Externally, the Yemen Arab Republic’s leadership must contend with conservative Saudi Arabia to the north and Marxist South Yemen to the south, and beyond these neighbors, the superpowers. It ends with an assessment of the surprisingly long presidency of ‘Ali ‘Abd Allah Salih and the observation is made that “it seems clear that any potential, viable successor will find it necessary to adopt many of Salih’s policies, both domestically and externally.”

1959. Pridham, B.R., ed. *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background.* London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1984. A collection of papers presented at the University of Exeter’s annual symposium in July 1983. These include D. Thomas Gochenour (Fulbright Fellow) on the Islamization of Yemen, Jon Mandaville (Portland State University) on Ottoman officials in Yemen, Leigh Douglas (American University of Beirut) on the Free Yemeni Movement, Helen Lackner (author) on the origins of South Yemen’s National Liberation Front, and Salem Omar Bukair (Aden University) on the early years of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Mohammed A. Zabarah (University of Sanaa) looks at the Yemeni revolution of 1962 and J.E. Peterson examines nation-building and political development in the two Yemenis while Saeed Abdul Khair al-Noban (Aden University) explains political development in the south. Manfred Wenner (Northern Illinois University) provides an overview of South Yemeni politics since independence, Ahmed al-Abiadh (National Institute for Public Administration, Sanaa) looks at North Yemen’s political institutions, and Paul Dresch (St. John’s College, Oxford) analyzes tribal relations in northern North Yemen. Naguib A.R. Shamiry (President of the Supreme Court, Aden) dissects the judicial system in the south, M.S. El Azhary (University of Exeter) covers North Yemen’s relations with Saudi Arabia, and Fred Halliday (London School of Economics) looks at South Yemen’s relations with the Soviet Union. John Duke Anthony (National Council on US-Arab Relations) discusses the Communist Party of South Yemen, Sultan Nagi (Aden University) explains the genesis of the call for Yemeni unity, and Ursula Braun (Scientific and Political Institute, Munich) views the prospects for unity.

A companion volume of other papers presented at the same conference was published as B.R. Pridham, ed., *Economy, Society & Culture in Contemporary Yemen* (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1985).

1960. Schwedler, Jillian. “Yemen’s Aborted Opening.” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 48-55. A review of political developments and elections in Yemen since unification in 1990 by an assistant professor of government at the University of Maryland. The author contends that “we cannot pronounce categorically on whether Islamists would help or hinder democratization in Yemen. Most Islamists within the Islah party are reformers, and many have been outspoken within local and transnational Islamist debates about the compatibility of Islam and democracy.” (p. 53) She notes that Yemen has numerous capable individuals committed to democracy but adds that “The strongest obstacle to political liberalization comes neither from extreme Islamists nor tribal leaders,
but rather from the régime itself, from the bureaucrats who flourish in the existing patronage networks, and from local notables who fear losing control of regional trade and resources.” (p. 54)


1962. ________, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982. ●● A former Foreign Service Officer, and more recently research associate at the University of Texas at Austin, provides a short introduction to perhaps the least-known state in the Middle East. Brief descriptions of the land, people, social structure, and arts and crafts provide the substance of the first chapter, and the long scope of Yemeni history up to 1839 is outlined in the second. Stookey next chronicles the century-and-a-quarter of the British presence there, while succeeding chapters deal with the independent state’s politics, economy, and international affairs, respectively. 😊

1963. Wenner, Manfred W. *The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Westview Profiles/Nations of the Contemporary Middle East. ●● A brief but wide-ranging survey of North Yemen’s people and culture, economy, history, and politics, by a professor of political science at Northern Illinois University. The author observes that the civil war that followed the overthrow of the monarchical Imamate was ended by a compromise in 1970 that “created a secular state that has no explicit or even implicit functions in the realm of religious affairs...” (p. 171) yet two decades later the republic was still searching for legitimacy. The book was written before the two Yemeni states unified in 1990.

1964. ________. “Ideology versus Pragmatism in South Yemen, 1968-1986.” In Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds., *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 259-273. ●● An associate professor of political science at Northern Illinois University observes that politics in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) is a combination of such elements as personal origins, tribal affiliations, ideological orientations, personality politics, opportunism, relations with North Yemen, and the influence of outside actors. In his view, the PDRY is “a country whose political and economic past has clearly influenced its perceptions of the exterior world, but whose political elite has also shown a pragmatic approach to ameliorating the considerable array of problems with which it must cope.” (p. 273)
1965. _______. “National Integration and National Security: The Case of Yemen.” In Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen, eds., *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press; Markham, Ont., Canada: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), pp. 169-184. ●● An examination of the national security perceptions of the two Yemens before unification, noting that the principal security threat to each was the other. He also outlines the threat posed by and to Saudi Arabia. In his opinion, unification will not necessarily improve the Yemeni security situation because unification processes are complex, “the simple addition of more people and land does not necessarily improve the political and economic power of a state” (p. 181), and Yemen’s primary export is labor and the experience of the expulsions from Saudi Arabia in 1990 show its vulnerability.

1966. Zabarah, Mohammed Ahmad. *Yemen: Traditionalism vs. Modernity*. New York: Praeger, 1982. ●● A study of Yemen’s continuing tug-of-war between the forces of traditionalism and those of modernism, written by the chairman of the political science department at Sanaa University. Zabarah divides his subject into four parts. The first examines factors that influenced isolationism in Yemen and those that served to eventually weaken the grip of traditionalism. The second looks at the growing economic, political, and ideological impact of the outside Arab world on a not entirely isolated Yemen. In the third part, Zabarah outlines the impact of the Yemeni civil war on the country and the effect of eventual national reconciliation. A last chapter discusses subsequent socioeconomic and political developments. ●
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1974. Sharif, Walid I. *Oil and Development in the Arab Gulf States: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography*. London: Croom Helm, 1985. A comprehensive bibliography divided into six parts: general works on the Arab Gulf countries and oil; works on individual Gulf countries; oil, development, and cooperation in Gulf states; OAPEC; Arab Gulf oil,
international energy, and the world economy; and the Gulf states in world affairs. Each section includes a listing of works in Arabic and the name and title indices are in both English and Arabic.


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