Foreign Military Presence and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword

In the past two decades, the Gulf has been inundated by foreign military presence (FMP) to a degree never before seen in modern times. Of twenty-one countries in and around the Gulf, only three are without any overt FMP. The United States has a FMP in thirteen of these countries, the UK is in nine, and other external powers have a FMP in nine as well (see Table 7.1). In terms of the number of countries as well as the scope and degree of activities, the FMP is largely, although not exclusively, the domain of the United States. The United States is no longer simply a great power with interests in the Gulf but it has become a Gulf power itself. The FMP of Britain, the last great power to dominate the Gulf, was far less ambitious, far less variegated, and seemingly, far less necessary. Looking farther back in time, the regional footprint of each of the other European powers present in the region between the 16th and 20th centuries was even less. Thus, for obvious reasons, this exposition necessarily focuses mostly on the United States’ role in the Arabian Gulf. Moreover, my remarks are mainly directed at the eight littoral countries of the Arabian Gulf.

Why is the Gulf so central to US security policy and FMP? The obvious answer is the concentration of three-quarters of the world’s oil reserves in the region. However, geo-strategic calculations play a significant role as well. For 500 years, the great powers of each epoch have vied for power and bases, aiming for the control of the Heartland or
Rimland. In many ways, this imperative has never died and has even survived the Cold War. In the post-Soviet and post-9/11 eras, for example, the United States has expanded its basing in Central Asia and added Eastern European facilities.

Table 7.1
Foreign Military Presence in the Greater Gulf Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Country</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>38 other countries represented in ISAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>6 other countries + Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego Garcia</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>France and Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>30 other countries represented in the multinational force (MNF) Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Denmark, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>France, India, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The United States is the predominant source of FMP in the Gulf but it is not the only one. Three tiers of powers exercising FMP can be distinguished. Prior to 1989, the principal players were the two superpowers. Now of course there is only the United States. This creates a new dynamic in that there are no Cold War excuses for establishing and

[184]
maintaining a FMP in the region. NATO and Western European allies, especially the United Kingdom, form a second tier with ties and access based in part on the legacy of European colonialism. Within the Arabian Gulf region, a third tier of extra-Gulf regional powers have had a presence. Pakistan allegedly stationed troops in Saudi Arabia in the past, has provided seconded personnel to a number of Gulf states and possesses what some have termed the “Islamic bomb.” Following the Gulf War of 1990–91, Egypt and Syria briefly enjoyed favor under the “GCC plus two” concept. Although it has no access to the Gulf itself and stations no personnel on its perimeter, Israel in some ways should be considered a Gulf FMP because of its concern, political rivalries, and projection capability. A small degree of FMP exists among the regional states as well. For example, the forces making up the Peninsula Shield force, the Saudi presence in southern Bahrain, and even Iranian interests and activities in Iraq.

It will be obvious that the role and conceptualization of US security policy is central to any discussion of FMP in the Gulf. The genesis of a US global security system lay in the aftermath of World War II, specifically with the decline of Britain as the guarantor of a compatible security system and the emergence of the Soviet Union, and later China, as perceived threats to the Western concept of the world order. Up to that point, however, the United States had few overseas possessions. Since the extent of these possessions increased only marginally (for example, some strategically important Pacific islands and “neo-colonial” outposts in the Philippines, Panama and Guantanamo), the United States was forced to rely on basing rights in the territories of allies and current and/or former colonial possessions, or to lease the use of facilities from host nations. Thus, one author calls the result a “leasehold empire.”³ But in the 1980s the system was regarded by many as overstretched in the same way that previous empires had been: by enormous economic costs and political opposition abroad and at home. The end of the Cold War promised to relieve the pressure on US imperial necessities, but the following years produced more requirements for the projection of US forces overseas.
(Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, anarchy in the Balkans, the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq), even as the nature of those requirements were changing.

The argument for a FMP on the part of a foreign power depends, of course, on its perceptions of security threats in its sphere of influence and the perceived degree of intensity or likelihood of those threats. In addition, a practical consideration must always concern the trade-off between security requirements and political liabilities. For this reason, this paper has been subtitled “a double-edged sword” in recognition that while FMP may bring benefits for either the foreign power or local state or both, it also threatens to create liabilities as well. A discussion of the matrix of benefits and liabilities for both the foreign power and host nations follows an examination of typologies of FMP.

**Typologies of Foreign Military Presence**

“Foreign military presence” can be extremely difficult to define authoritatively. It is possible to elucidate a great variety – and degrees – of FMP in the Gulf. In fact, this paper suggests that there are at least four classifications or typologies for defining or categorizing types and degrees of FMP. In applying these typologies to the Gulf, it can be seen that the activities of the primary sources of FMP – the United States, and secondarily the United Kingdom – fall into a multitude of categories, no matter how one measures it.

The first typology is concerned with levels (or degrees) of FMP (Table 7.2). On a descending scale, these range from full military intervention and occupation to support of some sort for surrogate forces. Most of the 13 categories I have identified are applicable to the Gulf. Intervention and occupation is of course a feature of the US presence in Iraq. It is a legacy from the next category, the presence of an expeditionary force in the region as a function of power projection. Bases and permanent installations are fulsomely scattered around the region, as are non-permanent deployed units. The United States and other external
actors regularly engage in joint or multilateral exercises with host nations and the former has orchestrated a network of pre-positioning and access agreements. A number of powers maintain an offshore naval presence while a few also maintain an “offshore” ready deployment capability from neighboring countries or regions. Arms and equipment transfers are abundant while considerable use is made of “technical” facilities (particularly for intelligence and communications) and aircraft overflights. Two levels of FMP that are not present in the Gulf are mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO is irrelevant and NATO operates only outside the Gulf, in Afghanistan) and support for revolutionary or irredentist movements (although a case has been made by the US government for Iranian covert involvement in Iraq).

### Table 7.2

**Levels of Foreign Military Presence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>✓ intervention and occupation⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓ proximate expeditionary force in region – power projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓ bases and other permanent installations (ranging from full bases, with the FMP enjoying internal sovereignty, to small support functions, such as naval replenishment or technical facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓ non-permanent deployed units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>✓ joint or multilateral exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>✓ pre-positioning and access agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>✓ offshore naval presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>✓ “offshore” ready deployment capability (e.g. from neighboring countries or regions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>× mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO, NATO, SEATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>✓ arms and equipment transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>✓ “technical” facilities (intelligence, space, communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>✓ aircraft overflights (generally unseen and uncontroversial but reverses on occasion of aircraft trouble or in time of conflict or crisis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>× surrogate forces (support for revolutionary or irredentist movements; Cuba in Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[187]
Another useful typology deals with categories of presence or activities (Table 7.3). In the Gulf, FMP includes airfields, naval facilities, ground forces, communications and control, intelligence and command, and logistics. Absent categories are missile sites, facilities concerning space operations, research and testing, and probably environmental monitoring.

**Table 7.3**

**Categories of Presence**

1. **☑** Airfield – or any other site concerned with the operation of aircraft for military purposes; acquired importance only after World War II as the new “coaling stations of contemporary geopolitics.”

2. **☑** Naval – port or any other site concerned with the operation of ships for military purposes, such as repair dockyards, mid-ocean mooring buoys.

3. **☑** Ground forces – any site concerned with the conduct of land warfare, such as army bases, exercise areas, fortifications, fixed artillery; in post-colonial era, applies mostly to NATO and Korea for the United States, although colonial powers continue to have shrinking facilities; there are some Third World bases as well.

4. **☒** Missile – sites concerned primarily with the maintenance and launching of missiles, fixed artillery sites, etc.

5. **☒** Space – sites concerned with the operation or monitoring of military satellites other than communications satellites.

6. **☑** Communications and control – sites concerned with military communications or the control of military systems.

7. **☑** Intelligence and command – sites concerned with intelligence gathering by non-satellite means, and sites exercising command over military systems.

8. **?** Environmental monitoring – sites carrying out monitoring of environmental factors of military importance, such as military meteorological stations.

9. **☒** Research and testing – sites associated with military research and with developmental testing of military systems.

10. **☑** Logistic – sites not obviously assignable to airfield, naval or ground force, and concerned with production, storage and transport of military materiel, administration of military forces, and the housing, medical treatment, etc., of military personnel.


Another way of looking at FMP is by administrative status (Table 7.4). The categories here run from enclaves in sovereign territories (such as ex-colonies) to host nation sites at which foreign powers are provided
access. It should also be noted that basing access has, historically, been acquired in one of three ways:  

- by conquest or colonization;
- by providing security or protection for the host via formal alliances or less formal arrangements that still imply protection; or
- by tangible quid pro quo arrangements: security assistance, arms transfers, subsidies, or what amount to “rents.”

Table 7.4  
Administrative Status

1. ✖ Sites located in colonies, possessions, territories, etc., where the foreign nation has sovereignty.
2. ✖ Sites located in enclaves in which the foreign nation has sovereign rights.
3. ☑ Sites administered by the foreign nation and located within the host nation according to a treaty or similar agreement.
4. ☑ Sites at which the foreign nation has its own facilities within the host nation facilities, and joint foreign/host nation use of host nation facilities.
5. ✖ Sites financed/constructed/operated/used by forces of multilateral alliance.
6. ☑ Sites with facilities operated by the host nation mainly on behalf of the foreign nation, and generally planned/constructed/financed by the foreign nation.
7. ✖ Host nation facilities which contribute significantly to the functioning of a foreign nation military system.
8. ☑ Host nation sites to which the foreign nation has access and of which it makes permanent or repeated use.
9. ☑ Foreign presence at the invitation of, and administered by the host nation, e.g. for the training of host nation forces.


A final typology examines the strategic purpose of the type of FMP (Table 7.5). These range from nuclear deterrence and defense to a scale of conventional conflicts or low-intensity wars to showing the flag and peacekeeping. It should be obvious that requirements for a forward military presence have become increasingly variable or revised. Emphasis is shifting to global threats from WMD (including Third World possession
of nuclear weapons), terrorism, hegemonic rivalry with China, and competition over scarce resources (notably oil but also others, such as iron ore and manganese).  

Table 7.5

**Purposes of Foreign Military Presence**

1. Nuclear deterrence and defense.
2. Conventional conflict.

   a) Generic:
   - Traditional – familiar force-on-force, large-scale engagements, such as the two World Wars, the Korean War, Desert Storm, the Iran–Iraq War, and the 1967 and 1973 Middle Eastern wars.
   - Irregular – what used to be termed “low-intensity warfare,” wherein the dominant frequency of Marxist insurgencies gave way to “Reagan Doctrine” anti-communist insurgencies and then, in the 1990s, to the prevalence of ethnic warfare.
   - Catastrophic – large-scale casualties are caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); can involve interstate warfare or terrorism.
   - Disruptive – more difficult to categorize than the others; presumably they could include such things as electromagnetic-pulse attacks that disrupt communications or “cyber-warfare,” with or without an identifiable perpetrator; they might also involve major political changes in nations via elections or significant shifts in foreign-policy orientation that could heavily impact on US global presence.

   b) Specific:
   - During the Cold War, US planning based on Central Europe and the Arabian Gulf with expected Soviet involvement in both, with horizontal escalation (one would spread to the other); as well as Korea.
   - More recently, disclosure is politically sensitive and higher likelihood of unforeseen conflict both in terms of type and location.

   c) Problems of arms re-supply during conflict – shifting permissions according to conflict.

   d) Coercive diplomacy, air-based intelligence – sometimes still “gunboats” but also forward movement of AWACS, firing of Tomahawk missiles (Sudan and Afghanistan), flying intelligence aircraft off hostile coasts (China), U-2 over-flights.

   e) Showing the flag.

   f) Peacekeeping – “A more recent phenomenon is the use of foreign facilities in order to conduct peacekeeping or interposition operations nearby. Here one might cite US access to facilities in Egypt to support peacekeeping in the Sinai, and in Hungary and Albania for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. West African ports like Dakar, Senegal have been used to support peacekeeping operations in nearby states, such as Liberia.”

[190]
Much has been made of the promise of the current “revolution in military affairs” to reduce the need for an overseas presence, but proponents ignore such still-pertinent factors as continuing requirements for maintaining air superiority, for ground troops to seize and hold territory, and for safe ports to unload sea-lifted equipment.\textsuperscript{10}

Of course, the four typologies outlined above are not mutually exclusive. More accurately, they are complementary. A particular aspect or type of FMP may be located in all four typologies. FMP also exhibits a considerable degree of fluidity. At a more fundamental level, the last several decades have seen changing requirements for FMP, involving a decreasing need for some categories but an increased requirement for others. These fluctuations have been inspired by a number of factors. Perhaps the foremost revolves around changes in the political/security situation. On a global level, the US requirement for many permanent operating bases was obviated by the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, accelerating regional requirements have escalated the US naval presence from a small “show the flag” presence in the Gulf to a key naval headquarters.

Changes in alliances may either remove the need for access or provide new opportunities to create access. Another key factor is technological advances. For example, naval fuel requirements over the past century have moved from a dependence on coaling stations to oil bunkers and finally nuclear-powered vessels. In the air, aircraft have acquired progressively longer ranges, missiles have superseded strategic bombing, and satellites have added an entirely new dimension.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, superiority in science, engineering, and information technology has spurred US dominance on the conventional battlefield—never more evident than in the 2003 attack on Iraq.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, the United States enjoys “command of the commons”—primarily consisting of space and the sea that belongs to no country and provides access to much of the globe.\textsuperscript{13} There is more movement towards basing on US or US-controlled territory (using bomber aircraft based in the United States
and Diego Garcia) and sea basing (use of seaborne platforms for operations ashore, akin to assaults conducted on Japanese-held Pacific islands during World War II).

The pertinence to the Gulf of the purposes and activities outlined earlier in the typologies have changed over the years. The Gulf was important for World War II staging, particularly in the “Persian Corridor” to the Soviet Union. Some airfields formerly held importance for staging and communications: the emergence of the Cold War saw the establishment of facilities such as the Dhahran air base that were later deemed unnecessary. Staging was also regarded as important for local or regional conflict, such as Britain’s marshaling of its forces to protect Kuwait in 1961. Another key concern was – and seems to remain – the use of regional facilities to facilitate regional interdiction, with Iraq being the best example. In keeping with changing requirements – including both military and political factors – the US Department of Defense has shifted its emphasis to devising a spectrum of basing access. In broad form, this spectrum consists of main operating bases, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations.

Obviously, the main thrust here is in the direction of a very limited number of main operating bases, so as to lessen the US overseas footprint, and an increase in forward operating sites and cooperative security locations to accommodate lighter and more mobile forces for a variety of contingencies.

**Balancing the Positives and Negatives in FMP**

The typologies discussed earlier represent the end-result of the process or strategy. Just as important, or even more so, is the decision-making process that defines the strategy regarding FMP on the part of both the foreign power and the local state. On both the strategic and the practical side, FMP involves a process of determining a proper balance between the advantages and disadvantages, benefits and liabilities. This calculation holds true for the host nations as much as it does for the foreign powers.

Separating rational security policy-making from the political and other aspects is not an easy task. Security policy-making in developed
countries is often skewed by domestic political concerns and overarching ideological perspectives. Elite perspectives and assumptions shape the domestic decision-making context, particularly with regard to foreign military intervention. Just as in developing countries, action may be taken on the basis of the reputation and intrinsic interests of decision-makers as much as on a rational and objective calculation of national interests. Security policy-making in developing countries is similarly characterized by a complex mix of contributing factors. These include elite assumptions about the international system and the definition or perception of threats to the regime and/or the state; the assessment of military capabilities and strategies to counter emerging threats; harnessing human and material resources to respond to security imperatives while addressing internal socio-economic demands; and the marshalling of public opinion and political forces to support the regime.

Skewing in developing countries is just as great but perhaps for different reasons. For example, it can easily be seen that security policymaking in Gulf states has little popular input because states are not democracies. The elites consider the security relationship with the United States – and Britain – to have priority over other foreign policy concerns even though perhaps the majority of their populations view the United States with suspicion or hostility for its unquestioning support for Israel, its incursion in Iraq, the conduct of its “war on terror,” and broader concerns about its role in the world.

Calculation of the utility of FMP can be analyzed in terms of a matrix involving military/security benefits to either or both the foreign power and the host state, and the liabilities or disadvantages to both parties. Military/security benefits to the foreign military power include the possibility of coercive diplomacy. It may also involve maintenance or extension of colonial or quasi-colonial presence/influence/control. An obvious benefit – and often the primary purpose of the FMP – would be the enhancement of global security and defense. An analogous benefit would be better response to or control of local/regional security problems.
FMP facilitates coordination between foreign forces and local forces. The foreign power may use its presence to incorporate the local state into larger or global security concerns or networks. Equally, a FMP can freeze competitors out of a country or region. In a major assumption of security planners in major powers, the FMP assists in power projection capabilities. Pertinent examples include the use of Saudi facilities in the 2001 war in Afghanistan, as well as the use of Saudi and Kuwaiti facilities during the Iraq sanctions regime. Arms sales frequently play a fundamental role in creating access.

Military/security benefits to the local host, in the first instance, lie in the creation of a security umbrella for the local state. This may be either overt or over-the-horizon. Joint exercises, such as Bright Star in the Gulf, provide tangible evidence of the security umbrella, demonstrate the commitment of the foreign power to the local state, and provide additional training and experience for local forces. Such a partnership may assist in regime legitimation and the preservation of the local domestic status quo. On a larger plane, reliance on a common FMP may increase cooperation between regional states. Not least, a FMP may have a stimulant effect on the local economy, including facility rents, employment and offsets.

Counterbalancing the benefits are a multitude of at least potential liabilities or disadvantages. For the foreign power, its presence in the host country may increase the vulnerability of its agents and citizens to civil and violent attacks—and may even provide a “red flag” to the local regime’s opposition. Basing agreements with authoritarian regimes may yield short-term benefits but tend to do little for liberalization. Furthermore, basing agreements with such regimes may be volatile and subject to host-nation demands or ousters. Foreign powers may find it difficult to convince erstwhile clients that their security interests are congruent with the foreign power. In the reverse of a point made earlier, access often requires the transfer of arms. This is generally good from the foreign power’s economic point of view but may have political costs or
disadvantages. In a related consideration, maintaining a large FMP in a multitude of countries may constitute serious financial costs for the foreign power.

Finally, while in a strict military/security calculation FMP may make sense for a foreign power, it may prove to be a liability for other reasons. Overwhelming military might in many spheres does not always translate well to regional conflicts where the adversaries enjoy the advantages of greater willingness to suffer, more young males of fighting age, and deeper knowledge of local terrain, weather, and other factors. The FMP may still have the ability to achieve victory, as the United States did in Iraq in 2003, but the costs of waging war may be unacceptable.

Disadvantages and liabilities are just as great, at least potentially, to the local host. Permitting FMP obviously creates an association with the foreign power’s foreign policy, which may create or increase domestic and regional opposition to the local host. Any FMP necessarily involves a loss of sovereignty to at least some degree. It may hamper the formation of or participation in regional cooperation accords, particularly when other local states that are not friendly with the foreign power are involved. The institution of foreign military installations and privileges necessarily involves some degree of surrender of territoriality.

The FMP may constitute a pillar of support for non-democratic regimes against their people, thus reinforcing their resistance to reforms and thereby creating an additional factor in the internal political equation. Reliance on common FMP may strengthen more powerful regional states at the expense of weaker ones. This in turn may lead to foreign-policy initiatives by weaker states aimed at gaining a more significant international profile or enhanced relations with the foreign power at the expense of the stronger state. This has been hypothesized as Qatar’s strategy in welcoming the US Central Command to establish itself in its territory. Qatar also provides an example where hosting the FMP may require a government to provide facilities at little or no cost, or to entertain arms and supply purchases to keep the FMP satisfied. This is not
a problem for Qatar but poorer states will find it a difficult obstacle. Another domestic impact arises when a FMP aggravates or favors one sector of the population above the others, as can be hypothesized for Iranian involvement in Iraq or the Saudi presence in and influence over Bahrain. Even more dangerously, FMP may lead to a skewed threat perception by the local state because of the foreign power’s influence or pressure.

Assessment and Applicability to the Gulf

Any assessment of the impact of FMP on the Gulf must begin with an examination of the changing role of US military strategy, particularly as it relates to the Gulf. Since 2001, US military and security strategy has been geared toward fighting what the government terms the “war on terror.” This emphasis has prompted a transformation of US forces to meet a threat far removed from that posed by the Cold War. As the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006 put it:

The terrorist attacks on September 11 imposed a powerful sense of urgency to transforming the Department .... We have set about making US forces more agile and more expeditionary. Technological advances, including dramatic improvements in information management and precision weaponry, have allowed our military to generate considerably more combat capability with the same or, in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms and with lower levels of manning. We also have been adjusting the US global military force posture, making long overdue adjustments to US basing by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe. 23

Reflecting the perception of terrorism as a major national security threat, the review envisaged that:

Long-duration, complex operations involving the US military, other government agencies and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries around the world, relying on a combination of direct (visible) and indirect (clandestine) approaches.

[196]
Operations have been geared to global mobility, rapid strike, sustained unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities. The emphasis on joint mobility capabilities should be underscored. In particular, these were envisaged as expeditionary forces with minimal dependence on host-nation facilities.24 A shift in emphasis from large Cold War bases in Western Europe, Japan and South Korea to forward operating sites and modest capabilities at host-nation facilities had already been laid out in the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review.25 Among other things, this stimulated additional US interest in developing facilities and security relationships in various Central Asian nations, with which it had previously had little interaction.26 Not unexpectedly, it has been noted that many of the new or potential facilities sought by the United States are in oil-producing countries or on oil routes.27

This new strategy has been criticized on both political and practical grounds. Changing base structure, it is charged, raises questions about Washington’s intentions, reflects a shift in emphasis from maintaining regional security to using forces as an instrument of change, decreases local interests in hosting, requires the renegotiation of complex “status of forces” agreements, and will attenuate US commitments and engagements even though future requirements cannot be known.28

These developments have a direct impact on US military planning and presence in the Gulf, which in fact appears to serve as a major focus of overall US planning. The strategy outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes a move away from “threat-based planning” to “capabilities-based planning.” Given that the Gulf is a principal focus of US security concerns, this undoubtedly means greater emphasis on the US foreign military presence in the Gulf contrary to the review’s overall emphasis—albeit in dissimilar forms. While the shift in emphasis from “static defense and garrison forces to mobile, expeditionary operations” intimates less need for bases or other formal “garrison” installations in the Gulf and around the world, “expeditionary operations” will require a continued, if not intensified, network of support facilities in the Gulf, as well as elsewhere, of the kinds outlined in the typology given in Table 7.3.
With this in mind, several distinctions in the formulation and purpose of Gulf military planning have important effects on Gulf host nations, which necessarily must adjust their planning in response. The first of these is distinguishing between the US requirements for FMP in the Gulf as a function of its global security concerns and posture (especially as obtained during the Cold War) and its desire for FMP derived from regional or local reasons.

A second distinction to be considered is that between short-term strategy and long-term outlook. How much of US security policy is partisan (dictated by the Bush administration’s personal and ideological views) and how much reflects changes in addressing the longue durée (long-term) concerns? How much are the US build-up in the Gulf and its military/security activities there determined by irrefutable national interests and how much is political? How can the motivations between the US presence in Iraq and the saber-rattling vis-à-vis Iran be judged? Is the US experience in Iraq an abnormal blip in the US security posture in the Gulf or is it a template for the future?

Overall and over time, US interest and rationale for FMP in the Gulf have displayed changing motivations. In the past, it was a function of the Cold War and a perceived Soviet threat. At present, it is determined by regional crises—such as threats to regional allies, WMD and terrorism. In the future, it might be determined by the revival of a bipolar rivalry scenario, such as the United States vs. China. It will be obvious that at present, the US perceived need for FMP in the Gulf is high, given the level of conflict and combat-related FMP in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the concurrent requirement for headquarters, rear bases, supply depots, routes, assistance, over-flight rights, and port calls in the GCC and other regional states. In the future, perhaps 5–10 years from now, there is likely to be a lesser need due to heightened political sensitivities in the region and technological advances that allow greater use of bases in the United States and at sea. Future scenarios are naturally dependent on the level of threat (ranging from irregular to catastrophic) and on the nexus of the threat (Iran, hostile regime change in the Gulf states, China, Russia).
Apart from Iraq, US views of regional actors and the need for a FMP in the region have remained markedly steady over the past several decades. In the run up to the Iraq War, of course, the US government had perceived a strong need for action against Iraq. This gradually came to include a perceived requirement for an expeditionary force to topple Saddam. Following the war, the United States has been preoccupied with a need to combat the “insurgency,” broadly defined, and the search for an exit strategy. However, the US presence in Iraq also raises the possibility and desirability of permanent US bases in Iraq. Some have alleged that construction on such bases began shortly after the war ended and much has been made of the fact that the US embassy in Iraq is the largest (and certainly one of the most fortified) embassies in the world.\(^{30}\)

At the moment, Iraq is at the heart of American FMP in the Gulf. The country can be regarded a principal platform of forward power projection. It can be seen as required for expeditionary forces. In terms of the Department of Defense’s three-tiered strategy, as outlined above, Iraq’s potential utility is far more than simply hosting main operating bases. However, myriad security and political problems counteract the military advantages stemming from Iraq. A majority of Iraqis oppose a continued US presence in the country, which so far has served as a lightning rod for guerrilla and suicide attacks and has not been able to provide a secure basis for reconstruction of the country. Politically, the present Iraqi government faces the prospect of being perceived as a US puppet regime, while much of the Iraqi public holds the same negative view of US foreign policy as the rest of the region and much of the world.

Iran, on the other hand, is seen as a threat to the United States and the global order for many of the same reasons that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been accused of, such as WMD allegations and supporting terrorism. Thus Iran by itself presents a requirement for a continued in-theater US military presence, both for intimidation and for strike capability. US intentions towards Tehran may be summarized in ascending order as: (1) containment; (2) intimidation; (3) one or more calculated strikes; (4) a major attack and (5) intervention leading to occupation.
The GCC states fit snugly into the Pentagon’s FMP outlook. They supply essential requirements for forward bases, headquarters and rear facilities, pre-positioning, and transit rights. Their role is as a supporting platform with the FMP consisting of all three Department of Defense (DoD) tiers: main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations.

The specifics of GCC security cooperation with the United States bring up many questions and possibilities. For example, does the negotiated US withdrawal from “bases” in Saudi Arabia represent a model for the future? Or is it simply a one-time solution to a short-term policy difference? In contrast, the American FMP in Qatar has grown as part of a deliberate Qatari policy in recent years to enhance the bilateral relationship. Thus, the Qataris have welcomed the forward headquarters of USCENTCOM, air facilities at Al-’Udayd air base, and increasing use of port facilities. Is the Qatari policy the result of an aggressive strategy for securing a guaranteed security umbrella, a means for expanding Qatari influence within the GCC, a slap at rival Saudi Arabia, part of Qatar’s overall “branding” policy, or a combination of all four motives?

Elsewhere in the GCC, Kuwait has provided a varied range of assistance to US forces and permitted extensive use of Kuwaiti territory and facilities. This seems less likely to be a motive for enhancing its “security umbrella” than fear of Iraq, followed by a sense of shared responsibility for rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq. Thus, Kuwait embraces all three tiers. Bahrain, as is well known, serves as the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Meanwhile, the UAE (which allows port calls and the use of Al-Dhafra air base) and Oman (which permits pre-positioning and use of air bases) prefer to maintain low-profile security cooperation with the United States. The situation in Iraq reinforces the dictum that Gulf security must involve more than just a military dimension. Several calls have been made for a “security architecture” that revolves around a forum for discussion among all eight littoral states.31
Above all, beyond the current emphasis on fighting the “war on terror” in its various permutations, which involve Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the Gulf’s importance to the United States will remain denominated in oil, just as it has been for more than half a century. Since access to Gulf oil continues to be defined as a vital national security concern for the United States, the US capability to project force when necessary to protect that access will be an integral component of US security strategy as long as oil is an essential global commodity.32

What are the implications for Iraq and Iran in these circumstances? Are both countries primarily subject in the US perspective to invasion and control? Does this inevitably mean expanding FMP in Iraq and creating permanent bases and presence? Does it mean US supervision of the expansion of Iraqi oil output while simultaneously hampering Iranian output? Regarding implications for the GCC states, the intensification of US FMP in the Gulf has meant corresponding pressures on these states to “cooperate” by offering extended facilities to US military components, access rights, over-flights and naval visits. This situation will not change in the medium- to long-term. It is dictated by the emergent US stance as a “Gulf power,” not just a superpower with interests in the Gulf.

It is not only the Gulf states that are affected by US Gulf policy and therefore compelled to deal with the ramifications. There are global reactions to US military policy and implications for the Gulf. There are widespread concerns about what is seen as an aggressive unilateralism engendered by 9/11 and the Bush administration. To those who subscribe to this view, the question arises: how long can the US continue to maintain the superiority that confers unipolar status? It can be argued that such aggressive unilateralism is beginning to impel other major powers to engage in balancing behavior already.33 It should also be remembered that unipolar does not mean hegemonic.34 It is often alleged that the United States has relied frequently and overly on a military approach to matters of intervention, consequently experiencing political setbacks and failures which have sometimes required greater military and political intervention.
as a result. Vietnam is a prominent earlier case in which the application of technology and overwhelming military force was seen as the US approach to a regional problem.\textsuperscript{35} The 1991 war and especially the 2003 war against Iraq demonstrated that the approach has not changed. It follows that the United States does not have a good track record in this arena despite, or perhaps because of, its military prowess and superiority. This is demonstrated in the Gulf today where the United States has essentially destroyed the existing Iraq in an attempt to recreate a new country in America’s image. The 2003 war was an unqualified success but the record since then has been largely a dismal failure.

Global reaction, even among US allies, may take any number of forms. There is considerable suspicion that the US motive in becoming involved in Iraq is centered on achieving greater control of Gulf – and thus global – oil supplies.\textsuperscript{36} A possible effect of the reaction to US actions could be the acceptance of euros in payment for oil. This would represent a confluence of European promotion of its currency as a foil to US dominance with a Gulf desire for a more stable currency than the US dollar on which to base its income. Another effect might be more widespread non-cooperation with the United States in the United Nations and the possible drafting of opposing resolutions. Furthermore, the smaller states upon whose cooperation the United States depends for successful execution of power projection may become less reluctant to deny the use of their territory for staging, over-flights and other activities in crisis situations. This not only reduces the power of the United States as a unipolar state, it also raises the costs for military projection.

Before 1971, the Gulf was sometimes referred to as a “British lake.” Insofar as that description was accurate, there were marked differences between the nature of British hegemony and that of US hegemony today. Certainly, the international and regional situation has been transformed considerably. Current norms dictate that Britain would not be able to pursue the same political, military and economic policies that it did before 1971. The same norms would seem to indicate that US policy would be similarly constrained. Yet, fundamentally, it is clear that the relationship

[202]
between external power(s) and local states is, in many ways, as unequal as it was in the past. All the littoral states jealously guard their sovereignty although their ability to determine their own courses of action without outside interference is extremely limited. Militarily, adversarial relationships vis-à-vis the United States have no hope of success, as the two wars against Iraq have demonstrated impressively. Politically, opposing the United States proved suicidal for the Saddam regime and is impossible for Iraq under occupation today. Crossing political swords with the United States is fraught with danger for Iran, and is no longer an option for the GCC states (if it ever was).

The consequence of this gaping inequality is the absence of many constraints on US policy and actions. Is this a healthy state of affairs? On the one hand, the United States can be characterized as a benign power seeking in large part to preserve the status quo in order to defend its own narrowly defined national interests and at the same time to protect and advance its conception (presumably shared by its allies) of a compatible and harmonious global order. On the other hand, the US-led invasion of Iraq seemed to demonstrate the primacy of narrow elite interests in formulating regional policy. Furthermore, the Bush administration's hard-line policy against Iran threatens to embroil the Gulf in yet another war – whether it be a full-scale conventional war, a more restricted conflict that would likely mean assaults on bystander nations and international shipping, or a more cat-and-mouse, covert struggle also with the potential for substantial spillover.37

The GCC states stand in the middle of this. The regimes and elites have staked their survival on a partnership with the United States. As small states, this inevitably means bowing to US pressure on security issues and little more than polite dissension on divergent political issues. It can be postulated that the Gulf’s status as the world’s predominant source of oil produces clout. However, the same situation as in 1973 no longer applies (and it will be noted that the Arab boycott of 1973 did little fundamentally to change US policy with regard to Arab–Israeli matters). As Saudi Arabia has both alluded and openly stated, its own self-interest
demands that it seek stability and moderate prices in the international oil market in order to protect both its own economic well-being over the long run and its "special" relationship with the United States and the West in both the short- and long-term.

Both sides face serious questions and considerations about the future of FMP. What is the balance sheet for foreign powers in the Gulf? It should be firmly recognized in Washington that US security policy in the Gulf – and thus its framework for FMP in the region – must be based on more than just narrowly defined security considerations. In the Middle East and the Arab world in particular, it must be recognized that cultural differences and political disagreements will inevitably shape local attitudes to any American FMP, whether mutually beneficial or not. Proponents of US action in Iraq point to the institution of elections and a government formed as a result of those elections as an example of US intervention fostering democratization in a region notoriously resistant to it, but the attempt to introduce a foreign political concept in an alien manner produces echoes of the Weimar Republic as much as post-war Japan and Germany. The establishment of FMP in Gulf states is not simply a bilateral agreement between the foreign power and the host but also embraces the impact on alliances (as in the GCC and intra-GCC relations) and the impact on the host nation by its vulnerability to antagonism by larger regional powers (for instance, Iran). Above all, the relationship between the United States as the far more powerful source of FMP and the Gulf states as weaker hosts must be based on notions of equality and negotiation, rather than intimidation and unilateral decision-making.38

For their part, the Gulf states must recognize that their dependence on the United States as a security umbrella and economic partner is only a relatively minor role that they play within larger US global security concerns. To have a FMP in the GCC states is an inescapable reality. The question for the GCC states is whether or not a less direct or smaller American FMP is in their interests. Is there any quid pro quo that Gulf states can realistically offer the United States for a less direct FMP throughout the region? At what point – if ever – does a divergence in
attitudes between elites and the general citizenry towards FMP and the United States in particular, create a critical division within society?

There are inescapable parallels between the past British experience in the Gulf and the present American one. They should not be overdrawn but they are relevant nevertheless. The British role gradually deepened over time. As John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, the historians of British imperial history, point out:

The British began to pursue the establishment of a formal, as opposed to informal, empire because of mounting resistance and opposition in the periphery, not because of a change in the objectives being pursued by the British government. British goals remained the same, but indirect influence was no longer sufficient to attain them.³⁹

One wonders whether the US presence in the Gulf is experiencing the same “mission creep.”
Chapter 7


6. Harkavy, op. cit., 27.


12. “U.S. scientific prowess has become the deep foundation of U.S. military hegemony. U.S. weapons systems currently dominate the conventional battlefield because they incorporate powerful technologies available only from scientifically dominant U.S. weapons laboratories … The key to this revolution in military affairs (RMA) has been the application of modern science and engineering – particularly in fields such as physics, chemistry, and information technology (IT) – to weapons design and use. It is the international dominance of the United States in these fields of science and technology that has made possible U.S. military dominance on the conventional battlefield.” Robert L. Paarlberg, “Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance and US Security,” International Security vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 122, 125.

exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance. Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action in Afghanistan. Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.” Posen, op. cit., 8–9.

14. Robert E. Harkavy (2005), op. cit., 25–26. This conceptualization had antecedents in the Secretary of Defense’s annual reports to the President and Congress through the 1990s, which revealed a new emphasis on access agreements and stockpiling in the Middle East where permanent basing was broadly opposed. In 1995, “the Annual Report indicated that pre-positioning was now accepted policy worldwide. ‘Strong deterrence,’ it said, ‘requires us to maintain pre-positioned equipment in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Korea and Europe.’ The new approach was also underlined by the 1998 report which listed permanently stationed forces as only one element amongst eight designed ‘to maintain a robust overseas presence.’ The other seven included temporarily deployed forces, combined exercises, security assistance activities, and pre-positioning of military equipment and supplies.” Sandars, op. cit., 301.


18. “Though it is not really a form of FMP as such, it is important to note that various forms of FMP provide the basis for coercive diplomacy, otherwise referred to – as reflected in the most well-known work on the subject – as ‘politics without force.’ This subject has been comprehensively canvassed in the works of Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, who have produced two volumes – one for the USA and the other for the USSR – in an attempt to conceptualize, measure, and assess this difficult subject. Needless to say, in line with the vivid meaning attached to ‘gunboat diplomacy,’ naval forces have played a large role in coercive diplomacy, even if it is no longer as routine or formalized as in the days when, for instance, the United States had ‘station fleets’ routinely patrolling the Caribbean as a latently coercive force.” Harkavy (1989), 63.


20. Desirous of using the Karshi-Khanabad air base in southern Uzbekistan to support operations in Afghanistan, the United States ignored the lack of democratization and human rights abuses. When Uzbek security forces attacked massive demonstrations in Andijan in May 2004, the United States gingerly criticized the régime, which reacted with restrictions almost immediately. The government in Tashkent ordered the base to be closed within 180 days. The United States faced similar problems in Kyrgyzstan. Cooley (2005), op. cit., accessed online.

21. “Increasingly, indeed, the USA has found it difficult to persuade many of its erstwhile clients that their security interests are convergent with its own. The result in many cases has been a move towards decoupling, resulting variously in full denial of access, the imposition of more restrictive terms of access or, in combination, the imposition of higher costs in the form of rent, increased security assistance and economic aid, political quid pro quo, and so on.” Harkavy (1989), 4.


28. Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2003), accessed online. As Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was seen as the architect of much of this new emphasis. With his departure from office, additional questions were raised as to the conception’s viability.


32. “During the Cold War, however, the critical issue of Persian Gulf oil became inextricably linked to basing access. American bases along oil-
tanker sea-lanes to Asia and North America came to be viewed in the context of a possible Soviet effort (from bases in Angola, Guinea, Somalia, South Yemen, etc.) to interdict them in case of war. In the late 1980s, with the ‘reflagging’ operation on behalf of Kuwait, the United States established new points of access in the Persian Gulf. Today, as is heavily reflected in Defense Department and Congressional Budget Office publications, overseas bases are seen in connection with potential struggles over oil resources, not only in and around the Persian Gulf but in Azerbaijan, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc. Economics, then, in the form of access to oil, has crept back into basing access and global presence.” Harkavy (2005), op. cit., 17.

33. Robert A. Pape, in “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security* vol. 30, no.1 (Summer 2005): 10, discerns that other major powers are beginning to adopt ‘soft-balancing’ measures: “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing, using international institutions, economic statecraft and diplomatic arrangements has already been a prominent feature of the international opposition to the U.S. war against Iraq.”

34. “A unipolar world, however, is a balance of power system, not a hegemonic one. Powerful as it may be, a unipolar leader is still not altogether immune to the possibility of balancing by most or all of the second-ranked powers acting in concert. To escape balancing altogether, the leading state in the system would need to be stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. The term ‘global hegemon’ is appropriate for a state that enjoys this further increase in power, because it could act virtually without constraint by any collection of other states anywhere in the world.” Pape, op.cit, 11.
35. “After 1975, several US military analysts diagnosed the fatal assumptions of what one has called the ‘Army Concept,’ which allowed tactics and operational successes (employing lavish firepower and the unique mobility that helicopters afforded) to dominate and ultimately define grand strategy – an approach ignoring that there was, at best, only a scant relationship between technology and the outcome of ground combat. Military writers have even cogently criticized the hallowed official presumption that political success would follow from military victory. But however valid such censure, the war the United States fought in Vietnam remained essentially a predictable phase in the inexorable escalation in technology and firepower that has repeatedly defined the nature of warfare everywhere since World War I, irresistibly making civilians and their societies increasingly significant military objectives. Vietnam was the most extreme example of this pattern only because the United States had far greater resources to do what many other industrial nations had earlier also attempted.” Gabriel Kolko, *The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 19–20.

36. “Foreign suspicion of US intentions is exacerbated by the politics of oil. Conquering Iraq puts the United States in a strategic position to control virtually all of the Persian Gulf’s vast oil reserves, potentially increasing its power to manipulate supply for political and even military advantage against Europe and Asia. This power could be used broadly by withdrawing Persian Gulf oil from the world market, or selectively by imposing a strategic embargo on a specific major power rival.” Pape, op.cit., 30.

37. Despite the Bush administration’s excesses in this department, it would be a mistake to regard the aggressive attitude against the world as a Bush innovation. As one scholar puts it, “When George W. Bush became president in January 2001 he inherited a vast legacy of contradictions and errors, but he did not create these dilemmas. Anyone who looks at the 1990s closely will recognize all of Bush’s conundrums and his responses. The unilateral direction he took had
already been set by his predecessors, who were far more diplomatic in expressing it but were after the same goals. All of his foreign policy statements, and certainly the doctrine of preemption, were very much a part of the history of US foreign policy dating back to World War II. Still, the administration’s unique, blunt style created an image of wild irresponsibility – which it deserved.” Kolko, op. cit., 95.

38. “1. The United States should treat basing rights and democratization as issues that must be balanced and rationalized. 2. The United States should not seek long-term military facilities in Iraq, unless strongly implored by a wide spectrum of the Iraqi leadership to do so. The United States should conduct future strategic planning on the assumption that U.S. bases in Iraq will be turned over to the Iraqis in the medium-term future. 3. The United States must make a serious effort to heal the rift between itself and the Arab World by privately and publicly treating friendly Arab states as our security partners and not our clients. 4. The United States now has what amounts to a special relationship with Qatar that needs to be continuously nurtured despite differences over Al Jazeera satellite television. 5. The leadership of the United States must make a strong effort to understand how its actions may be placed into the context of Middle Eastern history. 6. To the extent that both parties desire it, the United States needs to strengthen its military and counterterrorism relations with friendly Arab governments. 7. The United States, and especially the U.S. military, needs to reduce and remove bureaucratic obstacles to bringing allied Arab officers to the United States to receive military training and education. 8. The United States must recognize that small Gulf powers have good reasons to seek U.S. bases on their soil, but these states will also be reluctant to antagonize regional powers such as Iran. 9. The United States needs to avoid mistreating its allies needlessly as occurred as a result of the cancellation of the Dubai Ports World agreement with the United Arab Emirates. 10. The United States should continue to work with the Bahraini government to ensure a continued U.S. presence in that country. The United States also should continue to encourage ongoing Bahraini efforts at reform and a government that is inclusive of Shi’ites.” Terrill (2006), op. cit., 78–84.
ARABIAN GULF SECURITY
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

THE EMIRATES CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH
Figures and Tables xi
Abbreviations and Acronyms xiii
Foreword xvii
Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi

INTRODUCTION:

Introduction 3

KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

Security Challenges in the Gulf countries 9
HH Lt. General Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan

Security in the Gulf Region 13
HE Abdulrahman Al Attiyah

Challenges and Dangers Facing the Gulf Region 19
HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud

Arabian Gulf Security: Internal and External Challenges 29
HE Terje Rød-Larsen

An Overall Perspective of Gulf Security 39
HE Lt. General Fahad Ahmad Al-Amir

IRAN, IRAQ AND GULF SECURITY

1 Iran: Weakling or Hegemon? 49
Anthony H. Cordesman

2 Perceptions of Power and Multiplicity of Interests: Iran’s 81
Regional Security Policy
Mahmood Sariolghalam

[vii]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Security Situation in Iraq and its Repercussions on the Gulf Region</td>
<td><em>Abdullah Al-Shaiji</em></td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gulf Security Following the Invasion of Iraq</td>
<td><em>Gareth Stansfield</em></td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The International Dimension of Gulf Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>From the Cold War to the War on Terror: A US Perspective on Arabian Gulf Security</td>
<td><em>David Mack</em></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A European Perspective on Gulf Security</td>
<td><em>Johannes Reissner</em></td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Foreign Military Presence in the Gulf and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword</td>
<td><em>J.E. Peterson</em></td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>GULF ECONOMIC SECURITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Risk: Perspectives from the Private Sector</td>
<td><em>Frederic Sicre</em></td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Economic Diversity and its Significance in Diversifying Income Sources in the GCC States</td>
<td><em>Jassem Hussain Ali</em></td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreements and Economic Security in the GCC Countries</td>
<td><em>Hamad Suleiman Al-Baz‘ie</em></td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Growing Asian Economic Interest in the Arabian Gulf Region</td>
<td><em>S. Narayan</em></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[viii]
TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE GULF REGION

12 Terrorism: Causes of Dissemination and Methods of Combating 283
   Fouad Allam

13 The Impact of Terrorism on our Societies and Methods to Combat it 301
   Ali bin Fayiz Al-Jahni

14 Internal and Cross-Border Organized Crime in the Gulf 317
   Ali bin Abdul Rahman Al-Du‘a‘ij

DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES FACING THE GULF COUNTRIES

15 Migrant Labor Force and the Security Situation in the Gulf Region 355
   Mohammed Ibrahim Dito

16 Migrant Labor Force in the Gulf Region: A New Approach 377
   Shaftiq Al-Ghabra

17 The Imbalance in the Population Structure and its Impact on the States of the Region 389
   Maitha Al Shamsi

Contributors 449
Notes 467
Bibliography 497
Index 513